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LEGITIMACY CRISIS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE 
This work deals with aspects of constitutional development in 
South Africa, in an historical and comparative context. More 
specifically, it examines the political constitution of the 
country from the perspective of consociational democracy. 
~at the South African state system is going through a period 
..",-- ,... 
of crisis is beyond any doubt, although it is by no means the 
only system to be experienci~ this fate. 1 The crisis ten---dencies are observable in the economic, social and political 
spheres of socie~ Recent evidence of the socio-economic 
crisis is found in the increasing industrial strikes, economic 
boycotts, housing shortages and squatter removals, power supply 
cuts, staffing shortages in hospitals, salary discontent from 
teachers and other public servants, school and university boy-
cotts, and high unemployment and inflation. ~Vidence of the 
political systems crisis is found in the emergence of politi-
cal groups in exile, attacks on strategic installations within 
the country and the growing militarisation of the state, loss 
of confidence in government leaders and increased support for 
the Herstigte Nasionale Party in the 1981 general elections, 
low voter turnouts in the community council and the South Afri-
can Indian Council elections, and the seeming inability of the 
system to generate any significant refo~ Again, similar 
phenomena are discernible in many other systems and the South 
African state has responded to them with a not a-typical combi-
nation of coercive and co-optive measures. 3 
But in addition to the above crises there is also a crisis of 
legitimacy in the South African state, and the focus of this 
1. See eg K. Middlemas Politics in Industrial Society (1979) 430-463; J.O. 
Freedman Crisis and Le~itimacy (1978) - in relation to the enduring 
crisis in the L~erican administrative process. In class theory crisis 
is seen as a permanent condition of capitalist societies because of the 
fundamental conflict built into their structure, although socialist sys-
tems are not immune to crises in all spheres of society. 
2. See Raphael de Kadt The South African State System in Crisis (unpublished 
paper, University of Natal, 1981) 1-6; J. Habermas Legitimation Crisis 
(1976) 45-50. 
3. H. Adam and H. Giliomee The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner Power (1979) 
3. 
work is on the government's constitutional response to this de-
velopme~ A legitimacy crisis manifests itself at the 
level of 'symbolic interaction' or 'superstructure' at which 
the authority (as distinct from the power) of a regime is 
maintained. 1 For Lipset,2 
'Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to 
engender and maintain the belief that the existing 
political institutions are the most appropriate ones 
for the society.' 
r;here will be a crisis of legitimacy, for Lipset, during a 
~ransition to a new social structure when all the groups in 
society do not have access to the political system] For 
Friedrich,3 
legitimacy can be achieved only where there 
exists a prevalent belief as to what provides a 
rightful title to rule. If the community is basic-
cally divided on this matter, then no legitimacy is 
possible. ' 
For Habermas,4 legitimacy denotes 'a political order's worthi-
ness to be recognised', and it is a 'contestable validity claim' 
in that there can be a dispute among different groups as to the 
legitimacy of a given political order; at this point a legiti-
mation problem arises. What is common to these three approach-
es to legitimacy is the factor of subjectivity, that is the per-
ceptions of those affected by a political system, and possibly 
of others external ' to it as well. At this level constitutions 
have a focal relevance, regardless of how unrealistic they might 
be in the sense of non-descriptive of who actually exercises 
power. 5 It is not an uncommon contemporary phenomenon for the 
appropriateness of constitutional systems to be challenged, and 
problems of legitimacy, of greatly varying degrees, are discern-
ible in many modern states. 6 
1. De Kadt op cit 1-4. 
2. S.M. Lips~t Political Man (1959) 77ff. 
3. C.J. Friedrich Limited Government - A Comparison (1974) 111. 
4. J. Rabermas 'Legitimation Problems in the Modern State' in Habermas 
Communication and the Evolution of Society (1979) 178. 
5. C.J. Friedrich Constitptional Government and Democracy (4 ed, 1968) 583. 
I 
6. See J.R. Schaar's excellent first essay in Schaar Legitimacy in the 
Modern State (1981) 15-52. 
4. 
In South Africa the contemporary crisis of legitimacy is par-
ticularly acute, and is primarily due to the fact that those 
with political demands continue to be excluded from the poli-
tical system. Evidence of the growing rejection of the state's 
authority is found in many of the factors mentioned above (the 
crisis tendencies are all closely interrelated), as well as 
more symbolic activities such as the anti-Republic festival and 
flag-burning incidents in 1981, and also in the state's increas-
ing tendency to resort to coercive measures such as removals, 
deportations, detentions and censorship. ~o accentuate the 
problem the state is unable to sustain the degree of economic 
performance-based legitimacy it has acquired during times of 
economic prosperity. 
~ 
--Following Weber2 it is usually asserted that legitimacy can be 
.--
derived from traditional authority (a monarch or a chief), or 
charismatic authority (faith in a leader arising from his pres-
tige or charisma) or rational-legal authority (where those sub-
ject to authority accept the appropriateness of the laws under 
which the system operates~ But the Weberian categories of 
legitimacy have been criticised subsequently, as has the notion 
of an historic progression from charismatic to traditional to 
rational-legal authority;4 ~ven rational-legal authority, which 
IS seen as the most progresSive and suitable for modern systems 
of government, is currently being undermined in many countries-. ' ---.. 
Nevertheless the concept of rational-legal authority serves a 
useful analytical purpose as far as South Africa is concerned, 
in view of the almost universal agreement in this country on the 
inappropriateness of the existing laws regulating the political 
system - that is the constitutional order. Wnereas in the first 
two categories of legitimacy authority is vested in specific 
persons, in the third type it is vested in 'impersonal rules and 
the offices created under them,.5 Rational legitimacy is thus 
1. 
2. 
Cf Lipset op cit 77-82. 
M. Weber The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation (by T. Parsons 
(ed) 1947) 130ff. 
3. Eg S.M. Lipset in N.J. Smelser Sociology: An Introductior. (1967) 442-
448. 
4. Habermas op cit 183ff; Schaar op cit 16-17. 
5. S.E. Finer Comparative Government (1970) 31f. 
s. 
closely related to legality,1 and the notion of constitutiona-
lism. 2 But although legitimacy in its modern form presupposes 
legality, the two concepts must be distinguished; while ac-
tions in accordance with the positive law will be legal, they 
will not necessarily be legitimate. Thus the constitution not 
only legitimises modern government, but itself stands in need of 
legitimacy,3 and this requires general acceptance of the 'rules 
of the game', as laid down in the constitution, by those subject 
to them. There is thus a close relationship between rational-
legal legitimacy and the constitution's method of adoption;4 
here the focus turns to the constituent power from which the 
constitution derives its authority and which transcends the con-
stitutional order" and constitutionalists emphasise that the 
legitimacy of a constitution will be assured when it is accepted 
by a referendum or by a constituent assembly comprising popular-
ly elected representatives. 5 On the other hand, as Friedrich 
points out,6 if legitimacy can only be achieved where there 
exists a prevalent communal belief as to rightful rule, there 
,may be conditions under which it is not possible at all. 
The government's contemporary emphasis on constitutional politics 
and the need for a new constitutional dispensation is an express-
ion of its own search for some kind of democratic legitimacy,7 
which, in the absence of an appropriate tradition and charismatic 
1. In fact the term 'legitimacy' derives from classical Latin legitimus, 
meaning in accordance with the law, although now it denotes justification 
in the eyes of the ruled. See P. Rosen 'Legitimacy, Domination and Ego 
Displacement' in A. vidich and M. Glassman (eds) Conflict and Control -
Challenge to Legitimacy of Modern Governments (1979) 75. 
2. On legitimacy and legality 'see A.P. d'Entreves The Notion of the State -
An Introduction to Political Theory (1967) 141-150; and on legitimacy and 
constitutionalism see C.J. Friedrich Limited Government - A Comparison 
(1974) 110-118. Friedrich rejects Weber's classification and distin-
guishes between religious, juristic (philosophical), traditional and pro-
cedural types of legitimacy - op cit 114. 
3. Friedrich op cit 113. 
4. See K.C. Wheare Modern Constitutions (2 ed, 1966) 62-66; B.O. Nwabueze 




Friedrich op cit 112. 
Op ci t 116. 
Cf C.J. Friedrich Constitutional Government and Democracy (4 ed, 1968) 
583. As Weber observed, most forms of power strive for legitimation -
see Rosen ibid. 
6. 
leadership, could only have a rational-legal basis. 1 c-rn its 
response to the crisis of legitimacy the government has em-
barked on an extensive programme of deliberate constitutional 
activity during the last two decades, and particularly the last 
three years. During the former period the Coloured Persons -.......... 
Representative Council was established, only to be subsequently 
discontinued, the South African Indian Council was created and 
later made predominantly elective, the national states have been 
taken through various stages of self-government and four of them 
to constitutional independence, four new 'nationalities' have 
been created in the sub-continent, subordinate local authorities 
have been established for blacks in the 'common area' of South 
Africa, the government has formulated a new constitution and in-
corporated it in a draft constitution bill, and the Senate has 
been aboli~hed and the president's council created. These mat-
ters are all dealt with in the body of the work. Besides these 
activities of high constitutional salience there have been numer-
ous other developments of constitutional relevance. The Con-
stitution Act 2 has been formally amended by forty-two statutes 
between 1961 and 1981, the amendments ranging from the purely 
symbolic (the 'flag-burning' provision3 ) to those making a func-
tional contribution to the political process;4 in addition, pro-
visions of the consti tution have been repealed by implication,S and 
other enactments have affected important aspects of the broad 
constitutional system. 6 The last few years have also seen the 
appointment of numerous commissions of enquiry bearing on the 
constitution and related matters: those appointed by the govern-
1. The consociational model's dependence on leadership elites suggests the 
possibility of a degree of charismatic authority as occurred in the 'new 
nations', but it would have to be buttressed by a greater degree of 
rational-legal authority than exists at present. 
2. Act No 32 of 1961. 
3. S SA of the Constitution Act introduced by Act No 101 of 1981 which cr1m-
inalises the destruction or discrediting of the national flag. 
4. Eg the amended ss 20(3), 20A and 40(1)(b) and (c) which further the cen-
tralisation of power in South Africa and contribute to the managerial 
style of government which characterises the Botha administration. 
5. Most notably by the Status Acts Nos 100 of 1976, 89 of 1977, 100 of 1979 
and 110 of 1981, which impliedly repealed s 114(a) of the Constitution 
for the purposes of those acts. On juridical aspects of this matter 
see below, 448-449. 
6. Eg the Prohibition of Political Interference Act No 51 of 1968 (which 
proscribed racially-mixed political parties) and the Electoral Act No 45 
o~ 1979 (which provided for the registration of parties for the first 
t1me and affected other aspects of the electoral system). 
7 . 
ment, such as the Theron, Schlebusch and Niewoudt commissions, 
and those appointed by other bodies such as the Quail "CCiskei), 
Lombard and Buthelezi commissions. 
1 
Various other commissions 
have investigated matters such as industrial relations, group 
areas, regional development, security legislation, the media, 
black urban rights, education, and the courts, all of which have 
broad implications for constitutional development. And finally 
the government has also rece~tly shown formal deference to the 
importance of the process of constitutional change and the sig-
nificance of this factor for legitimacy,2 . although it has yet 
to give significant effect to this acknowledgement. 
These frenetic constitutional activities have clearly been inad-
------equate thus far in that they have not resolved the legitimation 
crisis and are perceived even by the government as only the pre-
cursors of more substantial constitutional chang~ in addition 
some developments have been of only temporary duration and others 
have been mutually inconsistent with one another. To the extent 
that they are inadequate and inconsisten~ and have created ad-
ditional, but as yet unfulfilled, political expectations, it 
might even be said that some of these developments have contri-
buted to the legitimation crisis. 3 A further problem is that 
the juridical ease with which the government can, and does, ef-
fect constitutional changes,4 highlights the situational nature 
of constitutional rules and structures 5 and gives a quality of 
impermanence and vulnerability to institutional innovations. 
~ 
But despite th~se factors of fluctuation and uncertaint~ it is 
v' 
1. The reports of these commissions are dealt with in the text, where appro-
priate, and cumulatively in chapter 5, below. 
2. Eg in its acceptance of the Schlebusch report's recommendation that in 
the process of constitutional change there should be 'the widest possible 
consultation and deliberation ... ' (Interim Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry on the Constitution (R.P 68}1980) § 8(b)), and in the creation of 
the president's council as a vehicle of constitutional change, despite 
that institution's many shortcomings - see below, 326-333. 
3. Not only among non-whites but also among whites, for whom the changes in 
existing conservative institutions are perceived as a threat. Cf S.M. 
Lipset Political Ma~ (1959) 78. 
4. S 118 of the Constitution Act. In recent years the select committee 
procedure has tended to be avoided even for important constitutional inno-
vations, eg the enlargement of the House of Assembly to accommodate nomi-
nated and indirectly members in a way not even recommended by the Schle-
busch commission. See below, 321-326. 
5. In terms of the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy the government 
was able to amend s 114 of the constitution in 1981 with retrospective 
effect to 1961. See s 7 of Act No 101 of 1981. 
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possible to identify two consistent lines of constitutional de-
velopment during the past few years: the creation of separate 
political institutions in the national states into which all 
black political activity is intended to be channelled, and the 
creation of separate and joint institutions in the 'common area' 
through which coloureds and Indians will be gradually incorpor-
ated into the 'white' political system. The government has 
sought to legitimise the former process in terms of the princi-
ple of self-determination; for this purpose use is made of ·the 
concepts of international law and the process is depicted as one 
of 'internal decolonisation'. The latter process has also been 
legitimised in terms of self-determination, but more recently 
the government has come to use consociationalism as a legitimis-
ing ideology, albeit often imPlicitlY ] ~f 
~nsociational theory was devised as an alternative to the two 
traditional theories of western constitutionalism, those of par-
liamentary and presidential government respective l y: In es-
--.,J 
sence consociationalism differs from traditional liberal-consti-
tutionalism in that'it replaces its majoritarian and adversarial 
aspects with a syst;;- of proportionality and power-sharin~ 
---.::.-.J 
it also posits a crucial role for leadership elites in the poli-
tical process, at the cost of extensive popular participation in 
government. Consociational democracy is both an empirical and 
a normative model - it provides a description of the political 
system in certain divided plural societies, and a prescriptive 
arrangement for other divided plural societies. It is intimately 
associated with theories of pluralism and the plural society and 
must therefore be evaluated in the light of these theories, and 
their relevance. But consociationalism does not provide an 
analytical constitutional-juridical model for plural societies, 
and its principles can be applied in a variety of constitutional 
frameworks - in fact the main contributors in the consociational 
1. Save for that exercised through the community councils. See below, 179-182. 
2. See the references in T. Ranf, H. Weiland and G. Vierdag South Africa: 
The Prospects of Peaceful Change (1981) 412-413; see also House of Assembly 
Debates vol 16 cols 8115-8119 (4 June 1980); vo16 col 3438 (10 September 
1981) . 
3. On these systems see chapter 1, below. 
4. The characteristics of consociationalism are described in chapter 3, 
below. 
5. On whether consociationalism constitu~es a 'model' in social science terms 
see A.J. Venter n Kritiese Ontleding van die Konsosiasiemodel van Arend 
Lijphart. unpublished M.A . t-n~C!;c n .... .; ...... (1 ()Of'\\ 41"\4 AI">" 
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school are political sociologists who approach the subject from 
a behavioural-attitudinal and not a legal-institutional pers-
pective. Nevertheless it is possible to identify the princi-
ples of consociationalism with well-known constitutional fea-
tures and mechanisms and to indicate which constitutional frame-
works would be most conducive to the ewergence of a consociation-
al system of government. 
In this work consociational democracy is not applied prescrip-
tively to South Africa for reason of the absence here of many -
of the crucial preconditions for its successful operation. 
South Africa's political culture has never shown much affinity 
wiili the coalescent nature of consociational government, and its 
constitutional tradition shows little convergence with the opti-
mal institutional arrangement for a consociational system. The 
analysis 1 shows, on the contrary, the South African constitution's 
historical adherence to the Westminster system of government, as 
far as the composition and functions of the main institutions and ,..--. 
the conventions of the constitution are concerned. The major 
\ 
constitutional deviations from the Westminster model are found 
in the restricted franchise and the more limited operation of the 
rule of law in South Afri~. In response to demands that these 
deficiencies be rectified, most pertinently through the extension 
of the franchise, the government has on the one hand created sep-
arate Westminster-modelled systems in the national states,2 but 
on the other purported to move away from the Westminster system 
in the common area. The seeming paradox is, however, readily 
~ 
explicable: b . rejecting the Westminster system as a normative 
model for South Africa, the government is also able to avoid its 
features of a universal franchise and majority rule, which would 
inevitably threaten its own position; in fact,particularly since 
1976 3 the government has emphasised the need to move away from 
the Westminster paradigm in the development of a new constitution-
al order for South Africa. Clearly a movement away from a sys-
tem which has never properly existed is somewhat illusory, but 
the 'Westminster system' continues to be used as a point of de-
parture in the quest for an alternative constitution. Othet 
1. See chapter 4, below. 
2. This statement must be somewhat qualified, since not all the national 
states have copied Transkei in accepting the Westminster paradigm. See 
chapter 5, below. 
3. The year of the Theron Commission report. 
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parties have joined in the investigation of new constitutional 
models 1 and have tended to combine with the government in 
adopting the terminology of consociationalism, but like the 
latter in an eclectic and often inaccurate wa. But the more 
recent constitutional developments in pursuance of the 50-
called movement away from Westminster do show some affinity 
with the principles of consociationalism - this applies parti-
cularly to the government's 1977 constitution,2 and to a lesser 
extent some aspects of the homelands policy, including the pro-
posed 'constellation' arrangement. In essence what have emerg-
ed are formal and informal structures in which appointed and 
nominated leaders of racially and ethnically defined groups hold 
consultations, based on a political agenda prepared by the gov-
ernment. As yet this process is not accompanied by popular 
political participation in joint institutions and it falls de-
monstrably short of a system of consociational democracy; it 
has, nevertheless, been referred to as a form of 'sham consocia-
tionalism,.3 In social science terms, the government continues 
to regulate conflict unilaterally,4 whereas genuine consociation-
alism assumes a system of democratic conflict regulation through 
multilateral negotiations. But despite the use which is now 
made of consociational concepts, the ruling ideology remains 
opposed ; o( power-sharing,S which is a central tenet of consocia-
tionalism. 
--....., 
As far as future constitutional developments are concerned this 
work is restricted mainly to what is loosely referred to as 'a 
period of government-controlled change'. There is clearly no 
sense in which the government could be regarded as an autonomous 
actor during such a period, since constitutional changes would 
invariably be made in response to economic and political tensions, 
and other internal and external pressures. But from a legal-
institutional point of view there is a sense in which it can be 
1. Chapter 5, below 
2. This is analysed in chapter 6, below. 
3. See Ranf, Weiland and Vierdag op cit 4~0-415. But the very notion of 
'sham consociationalism' is a matter of dispute; see the discussion in 
F. van 2yl Slabbert and J. Opland (eds) South Africa: Dilemmas of Evo-
lutionary Change (1980) at 32-33. 
4. Ranf, Weiland and Vierdag op cit 18. 
5. Ibid 379. 
1 1 . 
said th~t the government will, for a certain period, be able 
to initiate and implement constitutional changes without 
losing formal control of the process of change. If one were 
to pinpoint the termination of the corresponding period in the 
Zimbabwe constitutional transition it would probably be the 
internal agreement of March 1978, which made provision for a 
transitional government; 1 at this point the white government 
lost the formal initiative over constitutional change, despite 
the fact that the white parliament remained in existence as the 
sole legislative authority. There is no indication of any com-
parable transition in South Africa wiihin the intermediate term, 
although some attention is given to the relevance of consocia-
tionalism if a 'no-win' situation is reached in South Africa.
2 
But no attempt is made to construct an ideal constitutional blue-
print for the country, whether consociationally-influenced or 
otherwise. 
It has been said that, 
'political change in South Africa is most likely to 
take a "consociational form" in the initial stages 
. 3 
of power-sharing.' 
While the ruling ideology is at present opposed to power-sharing, 
this observation highlights the process of consociational engin-
eering which can be anticipated in the future. 4 Past constitu-
tional developments, the existing momentum of institutional 
change, and the expressed government intentions! indicate what 
the state's priorities will be during a period of government-
controlled constitutional change, and it clearly has the legal 
and logistic means to give effect to its intentions in a sub-
stantially unilateral way. What can be anticipated is the fur-
therance of the 'internal decolonisation' process until all, or 
1. The transitional government remained in office until the Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia constitution came into effect on 1 June 1979; see below, 239-240. 
2. See chapter 10, below. 
3. See L. Schlemmer South African Society in the 1980's: An Exercise in 
Hazardous but Concerned Speculation (CASS, University of Natal, 1979) 3. 
4. See chapter 7, below. 
5. There have been numerous such expressions, some of them conflicting; 
one of the more important is the 'twelve-point plan' which, although 
vague and subject to various interpretations, indicates a future con-
tinuity of past constitutional trends. The plan was f i rst expounded 
at the Natal congress of the National party in 1979; see 1980 Annual 
Survey of Race Relations 10. See also the references in chapter 7, 
below. 
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most, of the national states are constitutionally independent 
and their members have been denationalised, and the gradual 
incorporation of whites, coloureds and Indians into a common 
political system. In both these processes aspects of conso-
ciationalism will be apparent: any resurrection of the govern-
ment's 1977 constitution will probably retain the general prin-
ciples of the original, including its quasi-consociational fea-
tures, and both the pre-independence and post-independence re-
lationships between the national states and the republic are 
likely to have some affinity with the normative consociational 
model. But again this would fall well short of a system of 
consociational democracy which would require, inter alia, con-
stitutional changes of a fundamental nature,1 and these by defi-
nition would not be accepted during a period of government-
controlled change. What is predicted is a complex form of 
quasi-consociationalism with its foundations embedded in the con-
stitutional past, but a transition from this situation to gen-
uine consociationalism is unlikely to be achieved through a 
process of piecemeal constitutional adjustments. 
Whether these constitutional developments could resolve the 
economic and political crises of the future falls outside the 
scope of this work, but what can be anticipated is that they 
will not resolve the legitimation problem if the constitutional 
system continues to be based on concepts of colour and ethnicity 
and the changes are unilaterally implemented by the government 
through its control of the political agenda and virtual monopoly 
of bargaining power.2 There remains to be investigated the rele-
vance of consociationalism should these crises not be resolved, 
and what several commentators refer to as a 'no-win' situation 
is reached in South Africa. 3 From the government's point of 
view this would occur when it perceived the costs of maintaining 
the system to be greater than those of entering open-ended nego-
tiations for its replacement. The corresponding moment for the 
internal Zi~babwe gov~rnment would be when it accepted the prin-
ciple of the Lancaster House constitutional conference. If 
1. See chapter 8, below. 
2. It will be shown that, while the government adopts the terminology and 
some of the structures of consociationalism, the procedure whereby it 
effects constitutional changes is far from being fully consociational. 
3. See F. van Zyl Slabbert and D. Welsh South Africa's Options - Strategies 
for Sharing Power (1979) 121. 
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this point were reached in South Africa, previous patterns of 
constitutional development and prevailing perceptions of power 
and privilege are likely to result in the main issue for nego-
tiation beina seen as the constitutional accommodation of blacks o 
and whites (or alternatively blacks and non-blacks) in a common 
political system. And if a negotiated constitution were to 
emerge from such deliberations it would be likely to incorporate 
features such as proportional electoral systems, legislative 
veto-rights, joint executive authorities, justiciable fundamen-
tal rights, a decentralisation of authority, and an inflexible 
amending procedure - in short the constitutional devices for 
protecting minorities and promoting power-sharing which are 
associated with consociationalism. At this stage the emphasis 
on institutional and symbolic matters is likely to result in a 
form of rational-legal authority and largely resolve the legiti-
mation crisis, regardless of the system's real potential for re-
solving socio-economic problems. 1 If a democratic system 
emerges through a process of intermittent constitutional evolu-
tion, culminating in a negotiated constitutional settlement, it 
is likely to be a form of constitutional democracy (as opposed 
for example to participatory democracy), which shows at least 
some features of a consociational system. As Lijphart has said 
of South Africa, 
'the outlook for democracy of any kind is poor, but if 
there is to be democracy at all it will almost cer-
2 tainly have to be of the consociational type.' 
The subject-matter of this work is approached primarily from a 
constitutional-juridical perspective. It is concerned predom-
inantly with the constitutional allocation and limitation of 
authority and judicial interpretations thereof, and not with the 
far more complex feature of social systems, namely power. It 
therefore suffers from the same limitations as other institution-
al analyses. At the same time sight is not lost of the fact 
that,for the most part,our constitutional theory was devised for 
a simple version of the plural society and that in many respects 
1. Chapter 10, below. 
2. A. Lijphart Democracy In Plural Societies (1977) 236. 
14. 
it needs updating in the light of modern socio-economic and 
political realities. 1 The emergence of the bureaucratic-
administrative state, the rise of corporatism, the long-stand-
ing centralisation of power, the recent moves towards a mana-
gerial form of government, and the use of some of the structures 
of consociationalism, have all contributed to a growing diver-
gence between theory and reality in South Africa. Against this 
background a re-evaluation is made of some constitutional doc-
trines closely affected by current and anticipated constitution-
al developments. 2 
Finally reference should be made to the comparative scope of 
this work. Although consociationalism was conceived as an al-
ternative to the parliamentary and presidential systems, it never-
theless remains within the ambit of western liberal-constitution-
alism. Most of the comparative material relates to countries 
falling within this tradition, and in particular the original 
presidential and parliamentary systems in the United States and 
Britain respectively, and also to the main empirical consociation-
al systems; more eclectic references are made to other countries 
with Westminster-derived constitutions, and semi-presidential and 
quasi-consociational systems. No comparative references are 
made to the constitutional systems in the socialist countries, 
and only a few to those in third world countries. African con-
stitutionalism does not provide much comparative scope because 
constitutional democracy has not generally been a success in 
Africa and there has been a trend towards authoritarianism and 
military regimes in the post-colonial era;3 howeve~ the African 
one-party systems and various principles of traditional African 
public law show an affinity with some aspects of consociational-
ism. Of the more recent instances of constitutional transform-
ation in the African sub-continent, Zimbabwe and its constitution-
al experience have obvious relevance for South Africa, and ref-
erence is also made to pre-independence constitutional develop-
ments in Namibia; but for the reasons already mentioned the 
Mocambiquean and Angolan constitutions are not referred to. 
1. See L. Baxter's valuable paper 'Constitutionalism, Bureaucracy and Cor-
poratism' in L.J. Boulle and L.G. Baxter (eds) Natal and KwaZulu: Con-
stitutional and Political Options (1981) 75-108. 
2. Chapter 9, below. 










The story of modern constitutionalism has been depicted 1 as a 
great debate between British and American constitutional prin-
ciples which, it has traditionally been asserted, were respons-
ible for the two historic versions of stable democracy, the 
British parliamentary and the American presidential systems. 
\But despite the historical and institutional differences between 
~se two systems they are both based on the principle that the 
essence of democracy is majority ru~ Lijphart has suggested2 
that within a typology of democratic political systems the 
British and American versions can, on the basis of this common 
feature, be contrasted with the system of nsociational democ-
raci7which '~ha enges the notion that democracy should be equated 
with majority rul~ The political competition ' which takes place 
in an adversarial context and according to predominantly majori-
tarian rules in the traditional liberal democracies, is replaced 
in consociational theory by elite co-operation and consensual 
decision-making accordi~g to what may loosely be called the 
'power-sharing' principle. The distinction between majoritarian 
rule in an adversarial context and power-sharing in a co-oper~tive 
context is a central theme of this work. 
Although the identification of democracy with majority rule is a 
wide-spread contemporary phenomenon within the liberal democracies 
there was an earlier principle in many societies according to 
which decisions had to be reached unanimously.3 The majority 
principle came to be recognised gradually throughout Europe but 
1. C.J. Friedrich The Impact of American Constitutionalism Abroad (1966) 12; 
cf G. Almond and G. Po~ell Comparative Politics (1966) S. 
2. Arend Lijphart 'Consociational Democracy' 21 (1968-9) World Politics 267, 
'Majority Rule Versus Democracy in Deeply Divided Societies' 4 (1977) 
Politikon 113. 
3. See D.V. Cowen The Foundations of Freedom (1961) 104ff. 
1 7 • 
was, and continues to be, justified in widely differing terms. 
Thus it has been sai~ in different times and contexts, to be 
based on the superior force of the majority,1 on various theories 
of natural law,2 on the theory of the social contract,3 on a 
variety of legal fictions,4 on its utilitarian function,S and on 
its 'certain naturalness,.6 B ut i /s contemporary justification 
tends to have a more pragmatic basis - if it is not possible to 
achieve a unanimity of opinion, the optimal situation, then con-
venience and practical necessity require that the will of the 
majority should prevail, if only as a last resort. The norma-
tive principle that modern government rests on the consent of all 
the governed,must be balanced against the need in practice for 
effective government - and in certain cases this means quick and 
decisive decision-making,provided it carries the minimum support 
of a bare majori The only alternative to majority rule, it 
is felt, is 'minority rule', for which there can be no theoretical 
or practical justification. 7 
But liberal-constitutionalists h~ve always experienced a tension 
between the principles of majoritarian democracy, based on the 
rights of popular majori~ies, and constitutionalism, founded on 
1. Cf Sir James Stephen's well known comment, 'We count heads instead of 
breaking them' (quoted in Cowen op cit 105). 
2. Grotius De Jure Belli ac Pacis 2.5.17; see Huber Heedendaagse Rechts-
geleertheyt 4.3.1-20 and cf Puffendorf Droit de la Nature et des Gens 
7.2.15. 
3. John Locke Two Treaties of Government Bk 11 ch 8 (Everyman's Library 
ed, 1977, 165-6); J.J. Rousseau The Social Contract Bk IV ch 2 (Every-
man's Library ed, 1913, 88). 
4. D.V. Cowen op cit 106. 
5. A. de Tocqueville Democracy in America (1835) ch 14 (World's Classics 
ed, 1946, 183). For De Tocqueville 'the very essence of democratic 
government consists in the absolute sovereignty of the ma j ority' . 
6. John Rawls A Theory of Justice (1972) 356. 
7. The term 'minority-rule' is clearly misleading since a minority can have 
no more than a negative power to restrain the majority; this does not 
allow it to rule, but could give it some share in the exercise of power. 
Nevertheless the term 'minority rule' serves to emphasise a minority's 
abilitY,under certain constitutional circumstance~ to preserve the 
status quo. 
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the fear of an abuse of power. If majority rule was the essence 
of democracy did this entail unlimited power for a bare majority? 
Conversely, if constitutionalism involved limitations on the 
exercise of power could it also limit the popular will? The 
constitutionalists, by definition, tended to answer the latter 
question in the affirmative and were able to draw on a long, if 
somewhat erratic, intellectual tradition in support of the view 
that popular majorities should be constitutionally restrained-' 
..-
Lockets belief in government by consent and rule by the majority 
accommodated a concern for minority rights, and he regarded 
rulers as liable to be replaced if they acted tyranically.1 
Rousseau, who espoused a more radical majoritarian viewpoint, dif-
ferentiated between the majorities necessary for 'grave and im-
portant' matters (near unanimity) and -matters requiring 'an in-
stant decision' Ca majority of one vote). 2 Madison had a consti-
3 r- 4 
tutional rather than a populist notion of democracy, Burke re-
garded majority rule as 'a most violent fiction of law', and 
both De Tocqueville 5 and Mil1 6 regarded the 'tyranny of the 
majority' as an evil against which society should be on its guard.1 
7 8 -----. 
And in the twentieth century, writers from Hayek to Finer to 
9 Rawls J have perceived the need to restrict majority rule through 
1. John Locke op cit 224ff. 
2. J.J. Rousseau The Social Contract (1762) Bk 4 ch 2 (Everyman's Library 
ed, 1 973 , 2 5 1 ) . 
3. J. Madison The Federalist Papers (1788) No. 10 (Mentor Books ed, 1961, 
77-83). 
4. E. Burke An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs in B.W. Hi11 (ed) 
Burke on Government, Politics and Society (Fontana e~ 1975) 373. 
5. A. de Tocqueville Democracy in America (1835) ch 14 (The World's Classics 
ed, 1946, 182-198). 
6. J.S. Mill On Liberty (1859) ch I (Dent & Sons ed 1972 68f). , , 
7. F.A. Hayek The Constitution of Liberty (1960) 103-117. 
8. S.E. Finer Comparative Government (1970) 62-66. 
9. Rawls op cit 129. 
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various constitutional devices in order, respectively, to limit 
the scope of governments' activities, to allow minorities the 
means to become a majority, and to acquire a more just body of 
legislation. Dahl sought to resolve the contradiction between 
populist and constitutionalist democracy by developing the 
hybrid notion of polyarchal democracy. 1 
Friedrich's views on constitutionalism and democracy can be re-
? 
garded as representative of modern liberal constitutionalists.-
By constitutionalism Friedrich understands a system of govern-
ment in which authority is constitutionally divided among various 
bodies and its exercise is subject to legal restraints and con-
3 troIs. He points out that constitutionalism was at the outset 
not democratic, but rather aristocratic;4 democracy only spread 
gradually through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with 
the extension of the franchise and the elimination of public dis-
crimination, until popular majorities came to . be recognised as the 
only basis oi legitimate government. 5 But it is unrealistic and 
contrary to fact to assert that a 'bare majority' has unlimited 
power in a democracy - there is a need for '~lexibility in deter-
mining what should constitute a majority for different purposes. 
A good constitution should demark clearly what are grave and more 
important decisions, and require qualified majorities in these in-
stances; provided the constitutional limits are accepted by the 
majority of the people there need be no conflict between democracy 
1. R.A. Dahl A Preface to Democratic Theory (1956) ch 3; see also Dahl's 
Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (1971). 
2. C.J. Friedrich Limited Government: A Comparison (1974) 34-49. 
3. And, by implication, the political responsibility of the government to 
be governed. Cf C.H. Mclllwain Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern 
(rev. ed, 1947) 146. 
4. Cf WaIter Bagehot's aversion to the ultra-democratic theory The English 
Constitution (2 ed, 1872) (World's Classics ed, 1974, 129ff). Dicey's 
notion of parliamentary sovereignty assumes an unrestricted franchise 
although he did not canvass this issue; he did, however, accept the 
majority rule viewpoint: A.V. Dicey An Introduction to the Study of the 
Law of the Constitution (10 ed, 1959) 83. See also C.B. Macpherson 
The Real World of Democracy (1965) 1-11. 
5. Cf S.E. Finer op cit 35. 
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and constitutionalism. And should the limitations on popular 
majorities entrench the position of minorities then, according 
to Friedrich following Locke, the majority of the community 
retains a residuary power to alter the constitution by revolu-
tionary means. Thus for Friedrich majority rule remains the 
quintessence of democrary provided it is not taken to mean 
'majority-of-one' . Among the traditional devices used by con-
stitutionalism to res rain majorities have been bicameralism,. 
the separation of powers, the federal division of powers, pro-
portional electoral . systems, the use of qualified majorities in 
deliberative bodies, checks and balances, constitutional rigidity, 
bills of rights and judicial review; these devices are designed 
to limit the scope of majority rule, the kinds of matters on 
which majorities have final authority, and the speed with which 
the aims of majorities can be put into effec~ 
The main weakness of these theories of constitutionalism con-
cerns their limited view of where power actually lies in a poli-
tical system; they are concerned only with the formal distri-
bution of constitutional authority and the legal restraints 
thereon, and with the question of whose views should prevail in 
a democratic system rather than with whose views actually do 
prevail. But as this work is concerned predominantly with the 
constitutional allocation of competence in political systems it 
is unnecessary to develop this type of critique of liberal-
constitutionalism. What is relevant for present purposes are 
the factors in a constitutional system which determine whether 
the will of the majority can prevail on matters requiring 
authoritative decisions, or whether it is formally restrained 
by the constitution. These include: 
(i) The electoral system - whether this operates on the 
plurality principle in single-member constituencies 
to the advantage of the major parties, or on a pro-
portional basis in multi-member constituencies to 
the advantage of minority parties; 
1. See J. Rawls op cit 224. For Rawls there ~s an inverse relationship 
between the degree to which a constitution is majoritarian and the 
extent of 'equal political liberty'. See also S.A. de Smith The New 
Commonwealth and its Consti.tutions (1964) 107-109. 
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(ii) The legislative process - whether this allows bare 
majorities to enact their policies, or whether legisla-
tion requires qualified majorities or approval by a re-
view chamber or the electorate; 
(iii) The executive - whether it is composed exclusively of 
members of the majority parliamentary party and is 
thereby enabled to dominate the legislature, or whether 
it comprises members of all legislative parties or has a 
separate popular mandate; 
(iv) The allocation of competence - whether competence is 
allocated exclusively to a few authorities, or is widely 
dispersed among many on a functional and territorial 
basis; 
Cv) The constitutional amending procedure - whether this is 
rigid. or flexible; 
(vi) The sites of political competition - whether there is 
only one decisive site, as in a unitary parliamentary 
system, or numerous sites established by a separation and 
division of powers; 
(vii) A bill of rights - whether or not this is constitution-
ally entrenched and legally enforceable; 
(viii) Referenda - on what issues a referendum is constitution-
ally prescribed and whether there is a right of popular 
initiative. 
~ 
The above factors will determine the extent to which a consti-
tutional system is formally responsive to politically organised 
majorities although the extent to which actual effect can be 
given to their wishes depends on a range of additional extra-
constitutional factors. Conversely, they determine the extent 
to which the rights of political minorities are constitutionally 
safeguarded and they are enabled to work towards creating a new 
majority, although the actuality of these aspects likewise de-
pends on extra-constitutional factors. In the following two 
sections specific attention is given to these factors in an in-
vestigation of the relationship between majoritarianism and con-
stitutionalism in Britain and the United States. It is possible 
22. 
at this stage, however, to state that the liberal democracies 
are 'qualified democracies' in that they display some or most 
of the above features which restrain major~ties. 1 The notion 
of 'qualified democracies J also indicates that the term majority 
can become a multifaceted concept in the context of a constitu-
tional system. While definitionally 'IT.ajority' denotes the 
? 
greater number in or part of a certain group,- the term can be 
understood in a number of different ways, as can be illustrated 
in relation to the electoral system. Thus by 'overall majority' 
is understood at least fifty per cent plus one of those who 
have voted in an election, a total which need not be attained 
where there are more than two candidates; 'absolute majority' 
has the same meaning,save that the percentage is usually calcu-
lated in terms of those who were entitled to vote, as opposed to 
those who actually voted. These two terms can be distinguished 
from 'relative majority· which denotes a plurality of votes -
where there are more than two candidates a relative majority 
could constitute an overall minority. A further distinction 
can be drawn between a 'simple majority', namely fifty per cent 
plus one, and a f qualified maj ori tyJ, which is larger than the 
former, for example a two-thirds or three-quarters majority, and 
which could involve concurrent majorities within specified sub-
groups, or even unanimity. Thus while majority rule is usually 
understood in terms of simple or overall majoritie~ many of the 
constitutional devices used by the liberal democracies involve 
one or more forms of qualified majoritarianism, and the electoral 
system usually operates according to the relative majority prin-
ciple. 
Consociationalism shares with liberal democracy a deep sense of 
constitutionalism but differs from it in that it seeks to re-
place the majority principle with the principle of proportion-
ality; while the terms majoritarian and proportional are usually 
1. S.E. Finer Comparative Government (1970) 74; C.J. Friedrich Constitu-
tional Government and Democracy (4 ed, 1968) 18; G. Carter and J. Herz 
Government and Politics in the Twentieth Century (3 ed, 1973) 269. 
2. Vol VI Oxford English Dictionary 59. · 
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used in connection with electoral la~ consociationalism applies 
the proportionality principle to the decision-making process as 
a whole. 1 This is based on the assumption that in divided 
plural societies there are likely to be permanent electoral 
majorities and permanent minorities,with the latter being un-
able to convert to majority status and therefore be i ng excluded 
indefinitely from power.2 The effect of this arrangement, runs 
the consociational argument, is to violate the primary rule af 
democracy which is that those affected by political decisions 
should have a chance to participate, either directly or through 
representatives, in their making. But when there is a zero-
sum approach to politics,and minorities are excluded from par-
ticipation in decision-making (eg in Westminster-type cabinets) , 
then effect is only given to the secondary rule of democracy, 
namely that the will of the majority should prevail. 3 The pro-
portionality of the normative consociational model leads to a 
system of power-sharin~ in which all groups are represented in 
decision-making processes and are enabled to influence decisions 
according to their proportional strength. The constitutional 
basis for power-sharing includes most of the institutional de-
vices for restraining majorities associated with liberal democ-
racy, but consociationalism requires additional institutional 
and extra-constitutional factors to be successful. 4 
1. J. Steiner 'The Principles of Majority and Proportionality' 1971 
British Journal of Political Science 63. 
2. See chapter 2, below. 
3. W.A. Lewis Politics in West Africa (1965) 64ff; A. Lijphart 'Majority 
Rule Versus Democracy in Deeply Divided Societies' 4 (1977) Politikon 
113 at 115. 
4. See chapter 3, below. 
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2. The British Parliamentary System 
Ca) General constitutional principles 
Descriptions of the British constitution usually emphasise 
that it is a product of a gradual evolutionary development 
originating in medieval times, and that even in its modern form 
it remains largely uncodified and regulated more by the rules 
of political conduct known as constitutional conventions than 
1 
by legal rules. Its main institutions are said to be a con-
stitutional monarchy, a bicameral parliament, a parliamentary 
executive, an independent judiciary and an impartial public 
service; while there do exist sub-national institutions, the con-
stitution is unequivocally unitary and the system of government 
highly centralised. The most important rule of the constitu-
tional system is the supremacy of parliament which finds its 
justification in terms of that institution's representative com-
position; the House of Commons is elected on the basis of a 
universal franchise through an electoral process which gives 
rise to a predominantly two-party system and an adversarial 
style of politics. Although there are no constitutional guar-
antees of human rights or judicial safeguards against an abuse 
of power, the Rule of Law is said to qualify the supremacy of 
par 1 iamen t and to provide some protec tion for the individual. 
Constitutional lawyers usually refer to these as the main fea-
tures of the British constitutional model, or as it is sometimes 
2 known, the 'Westminster system' of government. 
But the term 'Westminster system' is also used in a narrower 
sense to refer to only certain features of the British consti-
tution; in this sense it means, 
'A constitutional system in which the head of state 
is not the effective head of government; in which 
1. See e.g. S.A. de Smith Constitutional and Administrative Law (2 ed, 
1973) 35ff; E.C.S. Wade and G. Phillips Constitutional and Administra-
tive Law (9 ed by A.W. Bradley, 1979) 32f£; O. Hood Phillips and P. 
Jackson Constitutional and Administrative Law (6 ed, 1978) 19ff. 
2. The term 'Westminster system' has no p=ecise constitutional or political 
meaning and has been particularly misused in the South African context. 
(See chapter 4, below). See S.A. de Smith The New Commonwealth and 
its Constitutions (1964) 77; L.J. Boulle 'The Second Republic: It's 
Cons~itutio~ Lineage' 1980CILSA lff; D.H. van Wyk 'Westminsterstelsel -
requ~escat ~n pace? of: kan n luiperd sy kolle verander?' 198i THR-HR 
105ff. 
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the effective head of government is a Prime Minister 
presiding over a Cabinet composed of Ministers over 
whose appointment and removal he has at least a sub-
stantial measure of control; in which the effective 
branch of government is parliamentary inasmuch as 
ministers must be members of the legislature; and 
in which ministers are collectively and individually 
responsible to a freely elected and representative 
1 e g is 1 a tu re. ' 1 
In this definition attention is focussed on the executive branch 
of government and its formal relationship with the legislature 
which gives rise to the particularly British form of parliamen-
tary government, although there are other species of parliamen-
tarianism. The main feature of this system evolved out of two 
distinct historical processes: 2 the differentiation of the 
functions of government which led to the limitation of the 
monarch's powers, and the subsequent practice of the monarch of 
selecting as ministers persons who had the confidence and sup-
port of the majority in the Commons. The close institutional 
relationship between the legislature and executive is tradition-
ally regarded as the essence of the Westminster system and its 
most distinctive feature. Bagehot 3 attributed the 'efficient 
secret 14 of the constitution to this feature, which, as he under-
stood it, involved 'the close union, the nearly complete fusion, 
1. S.A. de Smith The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions 77-78. This 
definition is usually used in relation to the Westminster export 
models and in a comparative context. 
2. See G. Carter and J. Herz Government and Politics in the Twentieth 
Century (3 ed, 1973) 35-36; the second process overtook the first 
and made it superfluous. 
3. w. Bagehot The English Constitution 9. J.A.G. Griffith aptly describes 
Bagehot's oft-cited work as 'unhappily misleading'. ('The Political 
Constitution' 42 (1979) Modern Law Review 1 at 2). 
4. By the 'efficient' part of the constitution Bagehot understood those 
parts by which in fact it worked, and he contrasted these with the 
'dignified' parts which brought it into force and attracted its motive 
power. 
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of the executive and legislative powers'. Bagehot!s purpose 
was to expose the 'fallacies! of Montesquieu and Blackstone who 
ascribed the stability of the English system to the separation 
of powers doctrine; but subsequent critics have pointed out 
that the close relationship between the executive and legisla-
ture does not exclude the importance of the constitutional dis-
tinction between the two: English constitutionalism has always 
recognised the need for a partial separation of government func-
tions and a partial separation of personnel. 2 Bagehot's con-
cept of fusion also obscured the notion of balance between cabi-
net and parliament which was central to the theory of British 
parliamentary government and was effected through the mechanisms 
of dissolution and ministerial responsibility.3 However, the 
notion of balance has in turn been outdated in terms of the con-
temporary dominance of parliament by the cabinet,4 and dissolu-
tion and ministerial responsibility no longer play the role 
attributed to them during the classical period of parliamentary 
government. 5 But although the relationship between the cabinet 
and parliament distinguishes the Westminster system from the 
1. Cf C.F. Strong Modern Political Constitutions (8 ed by M.G. Clarke, 
1972) 211f - this is one of the many works which eulogises Bagehot's 
contributions. 
2. See Wade and Phillips op cit 48; M.C. Vile Constitutionalism and the 
Separation of Powers (1967) 226f; C.J. Friedrich Limited Government l8f. 
in recent English decisions the separation of powers doctrine has been 
invoked to prevent ~he iudiciary from intruding in the legislatiye field 
(Hind v The Queen /1977/ AC 195, Duport Steels Ltd. v Sirs /1980/ 1 WLR 
142) although ther~ is-evidence of the doctrine's continued-vit~lity in 
other fields: C. Munro 'The Separation of Powers: Not Such a Myth? 
1981 Public Law 19-24. 
3. Vile Cop cit 226ff) convincingly exposes Bagehot's limited insight into 
English constitutional histor~ during which the two theories of mixed 
government and separation of powers had been combined into the single 
theory of the balanced constitution which was based not on the fusion 
of all power in one set of hands but a partial separation of powers. 
Bagehot did no more than 'expose' the long since discredite~ extreme 
theory of separation of powers which he assumed to underly the English 
constitution; he overlooked the more subtle division of power between, 
and interdependence of, the executive and legislature. 
4. Cf H. Laski Parliamentary Government in England (1938) 171ff. 
5. Vile op cit 228. 
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non-parliamentary executive of the presidential system as well 
as other systems of parliamentary government; constitutional 
theorists still differ on the exact nature of this relationship 
and the implications of the 'weak separation of powers' which it 
involves. 
As De Smith's definition 2 indicates, cabinet members in the West-
minster system must be members of parliament on appointment, or 
become so within a stipulated period of grace. 3 Executive 
authority vests predominantly in the cabinet and its members are 
collectively and individually responsible to parliament for the 
exercise of this authority. The theoretical diffusion of exe-
cutive authority results in residual powers remaining with the 
head of state, but these tend to be of a ceremonial or nominal 
nature and are exercised on the advice of the cabinet. The most 
important function of the head of state is the appointment of the 
prime minister who, by convention, must be the leader of the 
majority party in the House of Commons; the prime minister ef-
fectively appoints and dismisses other members of the cabinet, 
although ministers remain nominally servants of the Crown. Al-
though the cabinet is dependent for its continuance in office on 
1. The parliamentary systems of Western Europe are also characterised by 
the inter-locking of the executive and legislature but differ from the 
Westminster system in various ways, each of which places the executive 
in a weaker position than its British counterpart: in some cases the 
executive has no power of dissolution, in others the President is ,vested 
with real executive powers, and in others the multi-party systems lead 
to frequent votes of no-confidence and cabinet resignations. As par-
liamentary government generally depends for its stability on the two-
party system these governments tend to be unstable. Strong op cit 
220ff; Carter and Herz op cit 40. 
2. Sae above, 24-25. 
3. This arrangement is followed faithfully in all Westminster's export 
models. The older Commonwealth countries (New Zealand, Australia 
Canada, South Africa) all developed from representative to responsible 
government, at which stage the responsibility of the executive to the 
locally elected legislature was ensured by law or convention; the re-
lationship between the executive and legislature in these countries 
still conforms to the Westminster model, with local variations in style 
and practice. In many of the newly independent Commonwealth countries 
the executive branch of government was also parliamentary, either 
through force of statute or through the incorporation by reference of 
the relevant British conventions. S.A. de Smith The New Commonwealth 
and its Constitutions 82ff; Carter and Herz 37ff. 
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the support of parliament,the two-party system tends to ensure 
its stability for the full term of a parliament's life.
1 
Ultimate political control remains in the hands of the elec-
torate and is exercised in periodic elections. 
This, in brief and somewhat eclectic overvie~ is the traditional 
constitutional theory underlying the Westminster system of govern-
ment,although it provides at best a very limited insight into-
the actual operation of the British or other Westminster-based 
political systems. However it does provide a general back-
ground against which the majoritarian aspects of the Westminster 
system can be examined. 
Cb) Majoritarian Features 
As far as its institutional arrangements and constitutional allo-
cation of competence are concerne~ the Westminster system can be 
described as thoroughly majoritarian in the following respects: 2 
(i) The electoral system operates through single-member 
constituencies and according to the plurality principle.3 
This entails the election in each constituency of the 
candidate with a relative majority of votes, which in con-
tests between more than two candidates could constitute 
an overall minority of the votes cast. The system 
favours major parties because votes cast for losing 
candidates have no post-electoral effect and smaller par-
ties are unable to translate their electoral support into 
1. See S.E. Finer Comparative Government (1970) 158f. 
2. See A. Lijphart 'Majority rule versus democracy in deeply divided 
societies' 4 (1977) Politikon 113 at 115; M. Wiechers 'Possible Struc-
turar Divisions of Power in South Africa' in J. Benyon (ed) Constitu-
tional Change in South Africa (1978) 107 at 111. 
3. On the British electoral system see Hand, Georgel and Sasse (eds) 
European Electoral Systems Handbook (1979) 217-233; Halsbury's Laws of 
England (1977) vol 15, 205ff. 
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parliamentary seats unless it is strategically concen-
trated in certain constituencies. This can result in 
inadequate representation for minorities, to the point 
of their being effectively disenfranchised. The system 
tends to throw up two major parties with broad national 
support and of almost equal strength, but since there is 
no direct arithmetical relationship between the number 
of seats won by a party and its overall electoral sup-
port the party with minority popular support may achieve 
a legislative majority. Hence Wade's remark that it is 
a tcrude majority ' system'. 1 Further distortions can 
arise through the unequal delimitation of constituencies; 
although the principle of equality in the voter strengths 
of constituencies has been accepted for some time 2 it is 
still not applied in practice~ and is further aggravated 
be the fact that Scotland and Wales are more generously 
represented in parliament than England. 4 
The British electoral system is traditionally said to 
have the advantages of presenting a clear choice to the 
electorate and of fulfilling clearly the competing rolls 
of government and opposition; it produces both a legis-
lature and a government, and the government-opposition 
dichotomy in the Commons establishes clear lines of res-
ponsibility. By virtue of its parliamentary majority 
1. H.W.R. Wade Constitutional Fundamentals (1980) 9. 
2. Wade and Phillips Constitutional and Administrative Law (9 ed, 1977) 146. 
3. After the last redistribution the average size of the English constit-uencies was 64,134 electors, but this ranged from 25,023 to 96,830, an extraordinary maldistribution (see A.H. Birch The British System of Government (4 ed, 1980) 69-71). The standard constitutional law texts mention, but tend to gloss over, this phenomenon. 
4. For a tabulation of these distortions, which includes the 1979 general election, see H.M. Drucker (ed) Multi-Party Britain (1979) 13; see also E. Lakeman How Democracies Vote (1970) 39ff. 
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and the convention of joint responsibility1 the govern-
ment is able to provide strong and effective leader-
ship and to give effect to its policies. But almost 
without exception contemporary commentators on the elec-
toral system call for its drastic reform. While the 
suggestions for reform are wide-ranging, and include such 
matters as the constitutional regulation of political 
parties, they generally call for a fairer apportionment 
of seats and fairer electoral outcomes 2 - in short, a 
movement away from majoritarian elections to a more pro-
portional system. 
Cii) Parliament in its legislative capacity functions on a 
majoritarian basis which empowers the government, acting 
through the dominant partYJ to enact legislation even 
against the objections of a large minority. Because 
enactments require only a simple parliamentary majority 
and because that majority may reflect only a narrow 
electoral majority, or even minority, a statute may rest 
in a very narrow basis of popular consent. The same 
legislative procedure is followed, in the Westminster 
system, for all legislation,and even constitutional 
amendments are subject to no formal suspensory or abso-
lute veto exerciseable by a sizeable minority. Nor 
does the system of standing legislative committees modi-
fy this process in any significant way,as is the case in 
other countries. 3 The majority party dominance extends 
to parliament's other traditional elective, control and 
financial functions. 
1. Carter and Herz op cit 106. 
2. H.W.R. Wade Constitutional Fundamentals (1980) 20. See also S.E. Finer 
(ed) Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform (1975); N. Johnsc~ In 
Search of the Constitution (1977) 217-219; Lord Hailsham The Dilemma 
of Democracy (1978) 183-189. 
3. See S.A. Walkland 'Committees in the British House of Commons' in J. 
Lees and M. Shaw Committees in Legislatures - A Comparative Analysis 
(1979) 242 at 249; but select committees 'compensate in limited fields 
for the deficiencies of the party confrontation in the Commons' (262). 
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(iii) The cabinet is composed solely of members of the majority 
party which results in the exclusion of all legislative 
or electoral minorities from power. As the executive 
is the main instrument of modern systems of government, 
majoritarianism at this level, though intrinsic to the 
Westminster system,1 has far-reaching consequences. The 
homogeneously composed cabinet can utilise its parliamen-
tary majority to ensure its continuance in office 2 and to 
secure the enactment of its legislative proposals. 3 
(iv) The majority party not only forms a single-party cabinet 
but it captures the 'spoils t of government on a winner-
takes-all basis. As far as the allocation of resources, 
the provision of public services, the extraction of means 
from various sources and the making of public and quasi-
public appointments are concerned, the cabinet is in a 
pre-eminent position and is subject to no constitutional 
restraints. Through its control of the bureaucracy the 
majority leaders have a virtual monopoly on access to in-
formation, which can be further used to benefit supporters 
of the majority. At the apex of the system is the prime 
minister with extensive personal powers of patronage in 
relation to members of his cabinet, parliamentary caucus 
and party, and this has led to the suggestion that cabinet 
government has been replaced recently with a system of prime 
1. Dissolution is the means whereby a deadlock deriving from a legislative majority hostile to the executive can be broken. A fresh appeal is made to the electorate so that the legislative majority and the executive will once again be of the same mind - this is the only basis on which parliamentary government can operate. See S.E. Finer (ed) Five Constitutions (1979) 5Sf~ 
2. The system requires relatively centralised and disciplined political parties to ensure the majority parliamentary support on which the cabinet continuously depends. 
3. As numerous commentators have 
more than an extension of the 
the true sense of the word. 
cabinet's power is difficult 
Cabinet (3 ed, 1977) Sff. 
pointed out the Commons has become no 
executive and is not a 'legislature' in 
Nevertheless the true extent of the 
to define. See J.P. Mackintosh The British 
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1 ministerial government. 
(v) The principle of legislative supremacy entails that there 
are no geographical or functional areas from which par-
liamentary authority is barred and therefore within which 
the parliamentary majority is precluded from intervening. 
As contemporary constitutional reformers 2 point out,fun-
damental human rights, the status of minorities, the long 
standing principles of the constitutional system, all are 
theoretically at the mercy of the supreme parliament in 
the context of a flexible constitution. While sub-
national law-making authorities do exist these have no 
constitutional tenure and could be abolished at the dis-
cretion of parliament. The corollary of legislative 
supremacy is the fact that the courts have no testing right 
over legislation, duly enacted, and no supervisory consti-
tutional role. 
(vi) The centralisation of authority in the Westminster system 
is a majoritarian feature which emanates from two other 
constitutional features, but deserves separate mention. 
The first feature is the supremacy of parliament which 
renders the constitution unitary and allows no legislative 
rivals to this central institution; the second is the 
doctrine of ministerial responsibility which, regardless 
of its political efficacy, has resulted in more and more 
powers being granted to the ministers as the only persons 
who could be identified as responsible within the parlia-
mentary structure of government. 3 In a highly centralised 
1. R. Crossman (ed) WaIter Bagehot: The English Constitution (Fontana, 1963) 54; but cf J.P. Mackintosh op cit 428-458 and 628-631; S.E. Finer Comparative Government (1970) 169-174; R. Blake The Office of Prime Minister (1975) 45-68. 
2. Those points are made mainly in relation to the introduction of a British bill of rights,some aspects of which are dealt with at 436 to 445, below. 
3. See the perceptive analysis of N. Johnson In Search of the Constitution (1977) 81ff. 
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system of government there will be relatively few 
important sites of political competition and there-
fore relatively few opportunities for the ma j ority 
party's dominance to be contested. The thrust of 
the Westminster constitutional system is to concen-
trate political powe~ and not to divide it between 
different institutions and levels of government. 
As far as its instrtutional arrangements and constitutional allo-
cation of competence are concerned,the Westminster system is 
consistently majoritarian and involves a winner-takes-all com-
petition at one decisive site, namely the constituency elections.' 
The development of competitive two-party politics makes success 
in this decisive (and highly centralised) site of political com-
petition of crucial importance. The party that gains a simple 
overall majority in the election controls parliament, and the 
party that controls parliament controls the Bxecutive. The prin-
ciple of parliamentary supremacy limits the independent status 
of the judiciary; when a conflict of interests arises its sub-
ordinacy becomes apparent. 2 This has led to descriptions of 
the system of government as an 'elective djctatorship,3 and con-
cern has been expressed over the trend towards a system of 'prime 
ministerial' government. 4 But while there is a growing clamour 
for the modification of many of these constitutional principles, 
so as to impose more effective curbs on the power of government, 
the majoritarianism in the British constitutional system has in 
reality always been mitigated by a number of factors. 
1. Cf A. du Toit Federalism and Political Chan~e in South Africa (1974) 21. 
2. Ibid; and see N. Johnson op cit 85. 
3. By Lord Hailsham. See The Dilemma of Democracy (1978) 125-132. 
4. See fn at 32 , above. 
34. 
Cc) Limits on Majoritarianism 
Despite the existence of many nominally majoritarian features 
in the Westminster constitutional model, the British system of 
government is not highly majoritarian in practice. The same 
may not be true as far as the Westminster export models are 
concerned because most of the factors mitigating majoritarian-
ism in Britain derive from its peculiar constitutional history 
and political culture, factors which are clearly not for export. 
But constitutional lawyers have always asserted that the British 
system is characterised by a strong sense of constitutionalism, 
or limited government - that British democracy is 'qualified 
democracy! because of the formal and informal restraints on the 
majority's power.1 Among the features usually referred to as 
qualifying the apparently unlimited majoritarianism are the 
following: 
Ci) The first restraint on the majority is the certainty of 
a general election every five years, and often more fre-
quently. This tends to result in a regular alternation 
in office between the two major parties - as Laski re-
marked, the success of the system lies in the opposition's 
'proximity to office,.2 The alternation in office de-
rives from the dual balance of power between two relative-
ly even-sized parties,which requires only small fluc-
tuations in voter allegiance to turn the opposition into 
the majority party, and vice versa. 3 Lijphart 4 goes so 
far as to say that this alternation in government is the 
1. Eg S.A. de Smith Constitutional and Administrative Law (2 ed, 1973) 37; C.J. Friedrich Limited Government (1974) 46; Wade and Phillips Consti-tutional and Administrative Law (9 ed, 1977) 30; o. Hood Phillips and P. Jackson Constitutional and Administrative Law (6 ed, 1978) 27. 
2. H. Laski Parliamentary Government in England (1938) 176; Bagehot's ob-servation was, 'Two can play at that fun'. The English Constitution (Worldts Classics ed) 206. 
3. See the classic account of the two-party system in Britain in I. Jcnnings The British Constitution (4 ed, 1952) 63f (r ••• opposing the Cabinet will be another party accepting the principle of majority rule, but expecting sooner or later to replace the party in office and form a Cabinet in turn ... f). 
4. A. Lijphart 'Majority Rule Versus Democracy ~n Divided Societies' 4 (1977) Politikon 113 at 115~ 
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'vital condition' of democracy, for without it the primary 
rule of democracy (that citizens are entitled to partici-
pate in decision-making), is violated by the secondary 
rule (that the will of the majority should prevail), in 
that the minority is effectively excluded from power for 
an extended period.' Alternation in power prevents 
majority rule from becoming exclusive rule, in the sense 
of indefinite rule by one group. It also prevents majDr-
ity rule from becoming unqualified rule in so far as the 
real possibility that the government will shortly be in 
opposition acts as a powerful restraint on the exercise 
of its theoretically extensive powers. The winners do 
not in fact take all and the losers do not lose all; the 
losers will accept their minority status because of its 
limited duration and, more importantly, will accept the 
general rules of the game. 2 The alternation in office, 
while it persists, prevents real hardships for the minor-
itY,even in the absence of legal restraints on government 
and justiciable fundamental rights. 
(ii) The Rule of Law has an important influence on the opera-
tion of the Westminster system in that the constitution 
has gradually grown up out of a recognition of it. 3 In 
the first place the Rule of Law qualifies the principle 
f .. 4 o legislative supremacy In practlce, in so far as the 
legal values inherent in the Rule act as a restraint on 
the otherwise unlimited scope of parliament's powers, 
thereby fulfilling a similar function to that of a justic-
iable bill of rights. S The restraint which the doctrine 
, . See above, 23. 
2. In a sense this begs the question since an underlying consensus is a sine qua non for the functioning of this system. 
3. Cf C.F. Strong Modern Political Constitutions (8 ed, 1972) 251. 
4. See J. Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978) 37ff. 
5. O. Hood Phillips and P. Jackson (Constitutional and Administrative Law (6 ed, 1976) 39) describe the concept as involving 'the existence in the English Constitution of certain principles almost amounting to fundamen-tal laws.' 
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exercises on parliament is both political and mora1 1 and 
it provides a partial substitute for legal safeguards. 
This clearly implies an understanding of the Rule in 
terms of the preservation of basic procedural and sub-
stantive liberties and not simply as the principle of 
legality, in which form it is more easily reconcileable 
with, and does not effectively qualify, parliamentary 
supremacy. 2 The Rule of Law also affects the exercise 
of executive power in two ways:3 firstly it requir~~ that 
the executive's powers are authorised by statute and the 
common law and they can therefore be partially controlled 
by the judiciary, and secondly it implies that the execu-
tive's power should not be so extensive as to permit in-
roads on basic rights except in cases of emergency. The 
judicial control over legislation can be directly or in-
directly curtailed by statute, and extensive discretionary 
powers can be granted in wide enabling legislation, but 
the Rule of Law does provide some check on leg 'islative 
and executive power, thereby mitigating the majoritarianism 
in the Westminster system. 
(iii) While checks and balances are not a prominent feature of 
the Westminster constitutional system, they deserve some 
attention in relation to the restraints on political major-
ities. The weak separation of powers gives rise to two 
main reciprocal controls between parliament and cabinet, 
1. J. Dugard op cit 39; Dicey, the 'father' of the Rule of Law recognised the implications of the concept for his notion of parliamentary sover-eignty. (An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10 ed, 1959) 406-414); and see D.H. van Wyk 'Westminsterstelsel -requiescat in pace? of: kan n luiperd sy kol1e verander?' 1981 THR-HR 105 at 111. 
2. For the wide meaning of the term see A.S. Mathews Law, Order and Liberty in South Africa (1971) 31-33. 
3. Mathews op cit 26; cf I. Jennings The Law and the Constitution (5 ed, 1959) 46ff. 
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namely dissolution and ministerial responsibility, but 
these no longer perform their traditional functions.
1 
Legislative power is distributed among the component 
parts of parliament: each of which must function in 
order to give rise to a valid enactment. The House of 
Lords retains a suspensory veto which has in the past, 
albeit very seldomly, been used to restrain the legis-
lative activities of the Commons; the royal veto power 
remains a more remote restraint, but further ensures that 
the principle of legislative supremacy cannot be exploited 
by a single institution. 3 Simila;ly the diffusion of 
executive power between the Crown and cabinet leaves 
the former with residual prerogative powers which could 
be used in exceptional circumstances. 4 The judiciary 
in turn has some control over the executive in relation 
to the latter's powers and the way it exercises them, 
but generally the checks and balances in the Westminster 
system provide only a limited qualification on majori-
tarian rule. 
(iv) While single-party cabinets based on clear parliamentary 
majorities are regarded as the normal pattern of West-
minster government,the reality is somewhat different: 
as Butler points out coalitions or quasi-coalitions have 
been in power in Britain for about one third of the twen-
tieth century.S This phenomenon is attributed to the 
1. See above, 25-27. 
2. Or more pedantically the 'Queen-in-Parliament'} in whom legislative competence vests. 
3. Cf M. Vile Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 305. 
4. It should be remembered that in English constitutional law the CrcT~'s prerogatives can never be completely replaced by conventions. 
5. D. Butler (ed) Coalitions in British Politics (1978). The clear and explicit coalition governments were the two war-time coalitions (1915-1945) and the national government of 1931, but there have been six other periods of 'minority rule~ where the government has depended on the votes or abstention of at least one opposition party. 
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weakenina of the forces which have traditionally given o 
the country single-party governments 1 - there has been 
a breakdown in the national homogeneity and voter dis-
cipline which fitted the nation into the stable two-
party mould; and the majoritarian electoral system is 
now producing indeterminate results which make coalitions 
? necessary and a more permanent feature of political life.-
In the British context this process is seen to have the' 
disadvantageous effect of blurring lines of responsibility 
and obscuring the clear-cut choices which a two-party 
system provides,3but it hasthe advantage, in the context 
of this analysis of majoritarianism, of reducing the costs 
of adversary politics; a genuine coalition is a form of 
power-sharing by specified groups. 
Cv) During the last decade the possibility of devolution in 
Britain has become stronger,and an effective devolutionary 
process would involve significant limitations on majori-
tarianism. Although the concept of devolution 4 refers 
to a delegation of central government powers without the 
relinquishment of parliamentary supremacy? it does involve 
1. Butler op cit 113. 
2. Cf H.M. Drucker (ed) Multi-party Britain (1979): 'Britain no longer has a simple two-party political system. The old concept must be replaced' (at 1). Since Drucker's book the Social Democratic Party has been formed from among former members of both major parties; in an elec-toral alliance with the Liberals it scored two by-election successes in 1981 and seemed capable of breaking the Labour/Conservative domina-tion of parliament. Some constitutional commentators (eg Wade and Phillips Constitutional and Administrative Law (9 ed, 1977) 31) have suggested that the constitutional structure of Britain does not nece-ssarily rest on the two-party system,but it seems clear that any permanent departure from this system would bring significant changes to the politi-cal process. See also N. Johnson In Search of the Constitution (1977) 63ff. 
3. Butler op cit 118; and see also Johnson op cit 68. Other traditional arguments against coalitions are that they do not render the electorate sovereign, they make for unresponsive government, and they involve weak government. 
4. On devolution in Britain see V. Bogdanor Devolution (1979), and for a more comparative view H. Calvert (ed) Devolution (1975). 
5. This was the definition provided in the Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution (Kilbrandon) Cmnd 5460 (1973) para 543. The report dis-tinguished further between administrative, executive, and legislative devolution. See Wade and Phillips op cit 372-378. 
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the exercise of powers by political authorities who are 
not directly answerable to the central government
1 
and 
can thus be seen as a limitation on majoritarianism. 
The phenomenon of devolution is not new in the United 
Kinadom in that Northern Ireland had a devolved parlia-o 
ment and executive from 1922 to 1972, although it has 
since been governed directly from Westminster; it can 
also be seen as a continuation of the administrative de-
centralisation to Wales through the Welsh Office, and, on 
a more substantial basis, to Scotland through the Scottish 
Office. 2 But whereas decentralisation refers to the 
regional exercise of central government powers by offi-
cials of the central government~ the two devolution bills 
considered in 1978 made provision for locally elected 
assemblies for each of Scotland and Wales. 4 The Scottish 
Assembly was to have legislative and executive powers on 
devolved matters, while the Welsh Assembly was empowered 
to administer certain laws of Westminster in so far as 
they pertained to Wales. Neither Assembly would have in-
dependent sources of finance but would be dependent on 
block grants allocated by the Westminster parliament. It 
is thus clear that control and residual constitutional 
authority remained with the central government, but that 
as long as the scheme of devolution continued there would 
be a territorial division of power. Both bills received 
the royal assent but failed to receive sufficient support 
in separate Scottish and Welsh referendums to be brought 
into operation. The prospects of devolution are 
at present uncertain, but it is clear that if federalism is 
understood as process,S the process of federalising a 
1. O. Hood Phillips and P. Jackson Constitutional and Administrative Law (6 ed, 1978) 714. 
2. The decentralisation of certain government functions also extends to the regions of England. Hood Phillips and Jackson op cit 714-715. 
3. Ibid. 
4. The Scotland Bill and the Wales Bill. 
5. See C.J. Friedrich Constitutional Government and Democracy (4 ed, 1968) 193f. 
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political community and transforming a unitary state 
into a federally organised whole, then devolution can be 
seen as an important part of the federal process which 
would have a significant effect on the majoritarianism 
of the British constitutional system.
1 
h 2 F'" h 3 F . 4 (vi) Finally commentators from Bage ot to rlearlC to lner 
have emphasised that parties in Britain do not push th~ir 
principles to their logical conclusion and that the 
British political traditions ensure that the majority 
does not impose its will continually on the minority. 
This is not only a consequence of the alternation-of-power 
phenomenon,but also of the nature of the political culture. 
Thus the recognition of the opposition is a long-standing 
political and parliamentary practice,and on important 
issues the leader of the opposition tends to be consulted 
by the government. The government's sensitivity to pub-
lic reaction is also sometimes apparent, as on the conten-
tious issue of Britain joining the European Economic Com-
munity where the government resorted to a form of 'direct 
democracy' by holding a referendum; it clearly felt that 
such a major policy decision required more than the ap-
proval of the bare majority in both houses of parliament 
and sought wider support. Britain is a prime example, it 
is said, of a liberal-democracy and in a liberal democracy 
government is, by definition, qualified; the government is 
sensitive to minorities, and majority rule is in practice 
qualified majority rule. 
If the evaluation in the previous paragraph is accurat~ it would 
indicate that in Britain constitutional democracy tends to pre-
vail over populist democracy and that the 'thorough majoritarian-
ism' of the Westminster model is mitigated in practice, at least 
1. The federal process would clearly require other institutional changes, such as the reform of the House of Lords and a federal role for the judiciary. See V. Bogdanor 'Devolution and the Constitution' 
1978 Parliamentary Affairs 252. 
2. W. Bagehot The English Constitution 130. 
3. C.J. Friedrich Limited Government (1974) 46. 
4. S.E. Finer CornDarat1vP (:("nTP.,-"rno..--t- (1nif"\\ 10,)~~ 
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in its original setting. And the two contemporary phenomena 
of modern industrial societies, bureaucratic power and cor-
poratism, have served further to distort the principles of con-
stitutionalism. Sedgemore has said of the former phenomenon, 
'One cannot understand how power is ex~rcised in Britain 
unless one can appreciate the interaction of Prime 
Ministerial power and civil service power'. 1 
And corporatism has been said to threaten parliamentary democracy 
directly by by-passing ministers, by-passing parliament and by-
passing the people. 2 These factors have severely qualified the 
majoritarian and competitive aspects of the Westminster consti-
tutional system. 
3. The American Presidential System 
Ca) General constitutional principles 
Presidentialism may be institutionally distinguished from the 
Westminster system chiefly on the basis that the head of execu-
tive government is popularly elected, serves for a fixed term 
and is not dependent on legislative support for his continuance 
in office, and is not constitutionally accountable to the legis-
lature in the exercise of his executive powers. Whereas the 
essence of the Westminster system is parliamentary government, 
1. B. Sedgemore The Secret Constitution (1980) 33. 
2. Sedgemore op cit 36. Commentators have been reluctant to define cor-
poratism and to stipulate the extent to which Britain has moved from 
pluralism to corporatism. Schmitter has characterised it as 'a system of 
interest representation in which the constituent units are organized 
into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hier-
archically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recog-
nized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate 
representational monopoly within their respective categories in ex-
change for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and 
articulation of demands and supports'. P. Schmitter Corporatism and 
Public Policy in Authoritarian Portugal (1975) 9. See also Sedgemore 
op cit 34; J.K. Galbraith The New Industrial State (2 ed, 1972) 297f£; 
K. Middlemas Politics in Industrial Society (1979) 371-388; J. Richard-
son and A. Jordan Governing Under Pressure (1979) 161-163; J. Harrison 
Pluralism and Corporatism (1980). On corporatism and consociationalism 
see at ~14, below. 
42. 
the essence of presidentialism is the separation of powers. 
The principle of the non-parliamentary executive has found its 
clearest application in the constitutional system of the United 
States, and American presidentialism has in turn served as a 
model for other presidential regimes. 
As with the Westminster system, so with American presidentialism 
does the constitutional allocation of public power provide a 
limited, and at times deceptive,picture of the American system 
of government despite the more tangible presence of the United 
States constitution; if anything there has been a far greater 
legalism associated with the United States constitution because 
of its codified nature and the authoritative function of the 
Supreme Court, and there has been a tendency to study'constitu-
tional law' and not the constitution. However, as this work is 
concerned primarily with the constitutional framework of govern-
ment attention will be given mainly to the formal institutions 
in the United States, and particularly to those at the national 
level of government. In this context it can be said that there 
are three outstanding features of the United States constitution-
al system, namely the separation of powers, the checks and 
balances, and the federal division of power. 
The separation of powers has traditionally been regarded as the 
fundamental principle of the United States constitution; 1 in so 
far as there is an almost complete separation of the personnel 
of the legislative and executive branches of government it dif-
fers from the weak or partial separation of powers of the British 
parliamentary system. The prominence of this principle was 
clearly apparent in the format of the 1787 constitution. Pro-
vision was made first, and by implication foremost, for the 
legislative power, which was vested in Congress 2 consisting of 
the popularly elected House of Representatives and a Senate which 
was formally designed to reflect state interests. Executive 
power was vested in the President~ to be elected for a four year 
period by an electoral college, thus gIVIng him a different con-
stituency to the legislature; it is to the old theory of the 
1. See ~g G. Caney 'The Separation of Powers' in G. Graham and S. Graham 
Founding Principles of American Government (1977) 98. 
2. Art I. 
3. Art 11. 
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separation of powers that the democratic value of the non-
parliamentary executive is traceable - a president popularly 
elected to perform executive functions should not be subject 
to limitation in his executive capacity by a body elected for 
another purpose. 1 The members of his cabinet would be appoint-
ed by the President and remain accountable to him and not to 
the legislature,in whose proceedings neither cabinet members nor 
the President might participate; he also had the power to 
appoint and remove public office-holders, thus making him the 
effective administrative head of government as well. 2 Finally 
the judicial power was vested in the Supreme Court and other in-
ferior courts which Congress might establish. 3 Members of the 
Supreme Court would be appointed by the President 4 and it would 
have both original and appellate jurisdiction. This basic 
structure has remained fundamentally unaltered since its incep-
tion~ although from the earliest operation of the constitution 
all three organs of government came to exercise powers beyond 
those allocated to them,in contravention of any strict notion of 
separation of powers. 
In reality the separation of powers was qualified by the second 
prominent feature of the United States constitution, the well-
known checks and balances,which were designed to subject each 
branch of government to some influence and control from the other 
branches. 6 The most important of the internal checks and 
balances is the bicameral structure of the federal legislature; 
the Senate and House of Representatives have virtually identical 
1~ C.F. Strong Modern Political Constitutions (8 ed, 1972) 232. 
2. B. Schwartz Constitutional Law (1972) 143. 
3. Art Ill. 
4. Art I s 2.2. 
5. The main formal changes to this structure have been the XII and XXIII 
amendments (dealing with the election of the President and Vice-
President - see below, 50-51) and the XVIV amendment (providing for the 
popular election of senators). 
6. As M. Vile Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 18 
observes,the amalgam of the doctrine of separation of powers with the 
theory of checks and balances formed the basis of the United States 
constitution; this single, essentially American, doctrine replaced 
the pure doctrine of separation of powers which had been espoused in 
revolutionary America. 
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powers in respect of legislation and finance and neither can 
override the other. 1 Of more significance to the separation 
of powers doctrine are the checks and balances which operate 
externally to each branch of government, so that none can act 
without the approval and support of another branch, notwith-
standing that the legislature and executive each have a direct 
popular mandate. 2 Thus acting as restraints on Congress's 
legislative power are the President's ability both to initiate 
3 legislation and to veto acts passed by Congress; the veto, 
4 
however, can be overridden by a two-thirds majority in Congress 
and does not exist in relation to constitutional amendments. 
Another substantial check on the legislative function of Con-
gress is the courts' power, not expressly provided for but first 
asserted early in the history of the constitution,S to review 
the constitutionality of federal laws. As far as the President 
and other members of the executive are concerned, they are sub-
ject to removal by Congress through the process of impeachment, 
and their actions can be invalidated by the court in the latter's 
capacity as arbiter between government and nation, and between 
the branches of government. The President also requires 
senatorial approval for appointments to the Supreme Court and 
other key positions, and ratification by the Senate of treaties 
negotiated by him;6 and although he can appoint federal officials, 
1. See S.E. Finer Comparative Government (1970) 224. The 'filibuster' 
practice ~n the Senate can be regarded as another internal check. 
2. Cf J. Lees The Political System of the United States (1969) 36. 
3. A far more remote check is the Vice-President's role as president of the 
Senate, in which he has a casting vote in the event of an equality ~n 
deliberative votes. 
4. The so-called 'pocket veto' prevents Congress from overriding a presi-
dential veto of measures passed at the end of a Congressional session. 
5. Marbury v Madison (1803) 1 Cranch 137. Some support for the courts' 
review powers is to be found in Arts III and IV of the constitution, but 
it is also an inevitable consequence of constitutionalism. ef Lees op 
cit 43; E.L. Barrett Constitutional Law (5 ed, 1977) 17-39. 
6. The appointments require the Senate's 'advice and consent' and by con-
vention this check has been considerably expanded; treaties require 
approval by a two-thirds majority in the Senate but the President can 
bypass this requirement through the device of 'executive agreements'. 
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the power to create public offices vests in Congress.
1 
The 
Supreme Court in turn has its members appointed by the Presi-
dent (with senatorial approval) and they remain liable to 
impeachment by Congress; the Courts' structure and jurisdic-
tion is subject to the authority of Congress, and they are also 
dependent on the administration to give effect to their deci-
sions. 2 
While the separation of powers in the United States constitution 
ensured that the main exercise of each power would be entrusted 
to one person or institution, the checks and balances introduced 
a minor participation for other persons and institutions. 3 
Thus Congress acquires a quasi-judicial function in relation to 
impeachments 4 and the Senate an executive function in relation 
to the treaty-making and appointment processes. The President 
has an important legislative role in relation to initiation, and 
the veto power (which may be exercised for any reason) allows 
him to particpate directly in the law making process. 5 The 
Court, through its review powers, can act as a 'council of re-
vision' or 'superlegislature' and final policy-maker for the 
nation. While the extent of these modifications to the separa-
tion of powers was not always precisely envisaged by the found-
ing fathers, they are integral features of the contemporary poli-
tical process in the United States. 
The third outstanding feature of the United States constitution 
is the federal division of power between the national and state 
authorities,with each set of institutions having its own sphere 
of competence and having a direct impact on citizens within its 
1. B. Schwartz Constitutional Law (1972) 140. 
2. Cf J. Lees op cit 253 . 
3. C.J. Friedrich Constitutional Government and Democracy (4 ed, 1968) 184. 
4. That is the House of Representatives acts as 'prosecutor' and the 
Senate as a 'court'. Cf C.R. Pritchett The Ameriean Constitution (2 ed, 
1968) 203-5. 
5. B. Schwartz op cit 137. The President has been referred to as the 
'chief legislator' - R.G. Tugwell The Emerging Constitution (1974) 398. 
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jurisdiction. 1 It was sought to safeguard the distribution of 
competence and the status of each level of government through 
the rigid constitutional amending procedure and the supremacy 
of the constitution, and the authority of the judiciary came to 
be exercised to enforce the constitution's supremacy and to re-
solve conflicts between the levels of government. Partly be-
cause of the rigid amending procedure most changes relating to 
the federal aspects of the constitution were made through judi-
cial interpretation,and this was to modify the original federal 
principles significantly. The general trend has been for the 
federal jurisdiction to be enlarged at the expense of the 
states t jurisdictio~ and the division of power has not prevented 
the national authorities from exercising power on any substan-
tive area of government; 'co-ordinate' federalism has given 
way to tco-operative' and 'organic' federalism in turn; and 
resulted in a system which is decidedly less federal. But the 
federal principle is still said to be a reality in the United 
States,particularly in relation to political parties and the 
electoral system; and there is evidence of a greater concern 
from the Burger court for the rights of states in the federal 
system. 4 
Cb) The United States constitution and majoritarianism 
The American system of government has always been regarded as 
a constitutional democracy, based on a distrust in government 
and faith in the division, diffusion, limitation and sharing 
of authority.S Each of the constitution's three main features, 
1. Cf G. Sawer Modern Federalism (2ed, 1976) If. 
2. G. Sawer op cit 98-108. 
3. J. Lees op cit 66; S.E. Finer Comparative Government (1970) 215ff; 
R.G. Tugwell op cit 536-541. 
4. See eg L.R. Tribe 'Unravelling National League of Cities: The New 
Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services' 
90 (1977) Harvard Law Review 1065-1104; R.Y. Funston Constitutional 
Counter-Revolution? The Warren Court and the Burger Court (1977) 345f£; 
and the collection of articles on this theme in 86 (1977) Yale Law Jour-
nal 1018-1296. 
5. See C.J. Friedrich Limited Government (197 4) 34-49. 
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the separation of powers, the checks and balances, and the fed-
eral arrangement,can be regarded as qualifications of the 
political systemfs basic premise of majority rule. The three 
basic elements of federalism, the territorial distribution of 
competence, the supremacy of the constitution,and the authority 
of the federal judiciary, have an anti-majoritarian effect at 
the national level; furthermore the territorial distribution 
of competence allocates to the individual states, each of 
which is a minority in the national context, authority on 
matters of state (or minority) interest.' The division of 
competence, together with the functional separation of powers, 
combines to prevent a concentration of power in a single insti-
tution,thus avoiding the possibility of any 'sovereign' auth-
ority.2 The checks and balances involve a further qualifica-
tion of majoritarianism by establishing an elaborate interde-
pendence between the various authorities,which requires the co-
operation of more than one authority to exercise a given power. 
Bicameralism serves as a restraint on the popular majority in 
the House of Representatives, and the Senate has a liberum veto 
in respect of presidential appointments;3 the president in 
turn, through his legislative veto power, can require laws to 
achieve a two-thirds rather than a simple majority in Congress. 4 
The courts have a fcounter-majoritarian' effect in relation to 
their two main constitutional functions - upholding the suprem-
acy of the constitution and enforcing the 'Bill of Rights. 5 
Finally, drastically qualified majorities are required to effect 
1. This assumes a form of 'dual federalism' which no longer exists, but 
the point still has a qualified relevance. 
2. Although the constitution divides sovereignty one could say in a legal-
istic sense that the United States has a sovereign power equivalent to 
the Queen-in-Parliament, namely two-thirds of both houses of Congress 
together with three-quarters of all the states, but the difficulty in 
mobilising the constituent parts makes the comparison unrealistic. 
See M. Vile Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 205. 
3. C.J. Friedrich Limited Government (1974) 57. 
4. ef R.E. Tugwell op cit 139. 
5. The rights listed in the American constitution are basically liberal 
in nature and designed to protect the individual against invasion by 
public authorities. 
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formal amendments of the constitution, a factor not unconnected 
with the relatively few such amendments since its inception. 
Thus it cannot be said of the American presidential system, as 
is true of the Westminster system, that authority is constitu-
tionally allocated on the basis of a 'winner-takes-all' compe-
tition at a single decisive site; there is ·in fact a multi-
plicity of sites, both functional and territorial, of political 
competitio~ and from a comparative point of view one would ex-
pect the system to operate more slowly than its British counter-
part in giving effect to majority views. 1 
Further insight into the question of majoritarianism in the 
United States constitutional system can be gained by looking 
at specific aspects of the three main institutions. It then 
becomes apparent that the principle of majority rule underlies 
both Congress and the presidency, whereas the Supreme Court's 
powers are premised partly on the need for minority protection. 
As far as Congress is concerned,both the electoral system and 
legislative process are formally majoritarian. Elections for 
the House of Representatives are based on single-member con-
stituencies and the plurality principle, with the same electoral 
consequences as in the Westminster model. This system is 
again accommodative of two broadly aggregative parties which 
dominate the House,and there is no assured representation for 
minority parties. The discrepancies between votes polled by 
the major parties and the seats won by them are not, however, 
as great as in Britain. This may be attributed to two prin-
cipal factors - the reapportionment decisions of the 1960's, 
which introduced what has been referred to as 'the doctrine of 
quantitative majoritarianism,2 in terms of which electoral con-
stituencies came to be equally delimited to ensure that all 
1. Cf G. Carter and J. Rerz Government and Politics ln the Twentieth Cen-
tury (3 ed, 1973) 53. 
2. M. Uhlmann 'The Supreme Court and Political Representation' in L. 
Tbeberge (ed) The Judiciary in a Democratic Society (1979) 91 at 92; 
and see L.R. Tribe American Constitutional Law (1977) 737ff. 
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votes would be of equal we ight, 1 and the existence of solid 
blocks of constituencies which, at least until recently, did 
h . . 2 S t I not change t eIr party representatIon. ena ors are a so 
elected on a majoritarian basis in district or state-wide 
elections,with the same political consequences for minority 
parties; however, in the case of the Senate all states have 
equal representation,which entails over-representation for the 
smaller states and has an anti-majoritarian influence on the 
final composition of the Senate. The legislative process is 
also majoritarian in that enactments require simply majority 
votes in the Senate and House of Representatives, with the 
exception of decisions relating to constitutional amendments 
or the reversal of the presidential veto, which both require 
qualified majorities; conversely it can be said that a con-
gressional minority3 (and in the case of constitutional amend-
ments a minority of states in addition 4) can prevent the major-
ity in Congress from functioning. Another significant devia-
tion from the Westminster pattern of legislating is the more 
fully developed committee system in the United States Congress; 
in many of these committees, which take most of the important 
legislative decisions, there are norms of bargaining and com-
promise which deviate from the adversarial pattern of decision-
1. This occurred through judicial interpretation of the 'equal protec-
tion' clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as requiring equality of 
access for citizens to the political process through equal represen-
tations in legislative bodies, but can also be seen as a logical out-
come of the majoritarian principle. In Baker v Carr (1962) 369 US 
186 the rule that apportionment laws were beyond judicial cognisance 
(Colegrove v Green (1946) 328 us 549) was rejected, and the court in 
Reynolds v Sim(1964) 377 US 533 gave constitutional effect to the 
principle that all votes should be of equal weight. However, the re-
apportionment decisions of the Warren Court have been greatly criti-
cised; see eg R. Berger Government by Judiciary(1977) 69-98; 
M. Uhlmann op cit 91-109. 
2. See E. Lakeman How Democracies Vote (3 ed, 1970) 34. 
3. That is one third of the members of either house. 
4. That is one quarter of the states. 
so. 
k · 1 ma lng. However, it can be said that maj ori tarianism 'is the 
general constitutional rule concerning the composition and 
functioning of Congress, and the qualifications to the rule 
tend to be exceptional. 
The second area in which majoritarian elements are evident in 
the United States constitutional system is the executive; this 
can be seen in relation to the election of the President and 
the modern phenomenon of a concentration of power in the execu-
tive. The presidential electoral system is predominantly 
majoritarian and weighs strongly in favour of the two major 
parties and heavily against minor parties. Within the elec-
toral college the winner must acquire an absolute, and not a 
relative, majority of votes. But it is difficult for the non-
major parties to be represented and have any influence in the 
electoral college because of the 'uni t rule', in terms of which 
all the electoral college votes of a particular state are ear-
marked for the candidate with the relative majority of popular 
votes in that state; votes cast for losing candidates in each 
state have no impact on the electoral result. 2 All that re-
mains of the electoral college is a mode of electing the Presi-
dent by majorities in the states, rather than a majority of the 
electorate as a whole. 3 Numerous proposals have been made for 
1. See J. Lees 'Committees in the United States Congress' in J. Lees and M. 
Shaw (eds) Committees in Legislatures (1979) 11-60. Because of the 
federal nature of the political process and the absence of a parlia-
mentary executive the national parties in the United States are rela-
tively weak and have less internal discipline than in Britain. 
Thus even in Congress there is no consistent adversarial contest. 
2. C.R. Pritchett The American Constitution (2 ed, 1968) 313. In 1966 
the state of Delaware unsuccessfully challenged the rule on this basis, 
and because it favoured the large states, and created the possibility 
of minority presidents. Delaware v New York 385 US 895 (1966). 
3. C.J. Friedrich Constitutional Government and Democracy (4 ed, 1968) 
399. This arrangement also means that a candidate could be elected 
with only minority overall support, but this has happened on only one 
occasion. 
5 1 . 
the reform of this system 1 but, apart from the fact that there 
has been no consensus on an alternative, it is difficult to 
avoid a majoritarian election where only one person is to be 
elected for a single term of office. The presidential elec-
toral system, therefore, constitutes a zero-sum competition at 
an important site in the political system. 
The other salient feature of the executive is its steady accu-
mulation of power in modern times. Authority is vested ini-
tially in the President, the head of the executive, and he is 
able to appoint his own cabinet, which is not a collective body 
and has less influence over him than a parliamentary cabinet 
has over a prime minister. He also has extensive patronage 
in the form of the 'spoils' of government: a new President is 
entitled to make substantial changes of administrative per-
sonnel outside the competitive civil service. 2 Apart from 
assuming the role of 'chief legislator,3 the President has 
accumulated extensive powers, particularly in relation to 
foreign and military affairs; he has been assisted in this 
process by his powers of patronage and his ability to appeal to 
the electorate for popular support, and has not been signifi-
cantly impeded by the constitutional checks and balances. The 
failure of the checks and balances is exemplified by the past 
inability of Congress to scrutinise and control the executive,4 
in particular the President and his White House staff, a de-
velopment which has led to the phenomenon of the 'imperial 
presidency,.5 The crisis of Watergate has been described as 
1. See eg C.R. Pritchett op cit 315-321. 
2. By contrast no civil service positions change hands if there ~s a change of government in Britain. 
3. See above, 45 fn 5. 
4. P.B. Kurland Watergate and the Constitution (1978) 28. 
5. See A. Schlesinger's work The Imperial Presidency (1974). Schlesinger suggests that Nixon concluded that the separation of powers had so frustrated government on behalf of the majority that the constitutional system had become intolerable (252); one of his attempted solutions was to transform the presidency of the constitution into a plebiscitory presidency (377). 
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the result of a long build-up in the concentration of presiden-
tial power, and the failure to adhere to the limitations on 
authority explicitly and implicitly contained in the constitu-
tion. 1 While the scope and extent of presidential power has 
2 h . . probably diminished since the Watergate era, t e InterventIon 
of the bureaucracy in all fields of government continues to 
undermine the premises of the separation of powers doctrine and 
the notion of checks and balances. 3 Majoritarianism and the. 
concentration of power are therefore important features of the 
executive, with implications for the constitutional system as a 
whole. 
Finally, reference should be made to the Supreme Court's 'counter-
majoritarian' function within the United States constitutional 
system. Hamilton4 wa; of the view that the court would be the 
'least dangerous' branch of government because it would have 
'neither force nor will, but merely judgment'. When the Court 
first asserted its power of judicial review it purported to re-
strict itself to legal issues so that it could not be accused 
of usurping the majoritarian powers of Congress and the President. 
It has been suggested that this led to the development of a con-
stitutional myth to reconcile the conflicting demands for major-
itarianism and the preservation of minority rights: according 
to the myth Congress and the President were to decide 'politi-
cal' issues by majority rule, while the Supreme Court would pro-
tect the 'legal rights of minorities as set out in the constitu-






Kurland op cit 4. Kurland (at 172) attributes the executive's domi-nance to judicial constructions of the constitution which allowed it to exercise the national power over foreign affairs, to occupy the en-tire field of government and regulation, and to acquire extensive powers through delegation. The separation of powers doctrine became ineffective in restraining the exercise of these powers and was further blurred by party allegiance. 
See, eg T.E. Cronin 'A Resurgent Congress and the Imperial Presidency' 95 (1980) Political Science Quarterly 209-237. 
P. Kurland op cit 35ff; cf M. Vile Constitutionalism and the Separa-tion of Powers (1967) 321-2. 
A. Hamilton The Federalist No 78 (Mentor Books ed, 1961, 465); ef A. Bickel's well-known work The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (1963). 
See C. Abernathy 'America's Supreme Court and the Balance of Justice' (Byliner series, Oct 1979). 
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of judgments during the era of the Warren Court 1 in which the 
Court gave decisions on clearl y political issues; it became 
a more active political organ of government and moved from a 
constructionist position to one where it began balancing com-
peting societal interests. This led to accusations of judi-
cial usurpations; and terms such as 'super-Iegislator,3 and 
'imperial judiciary,4 came to be used in relation to the Sup-
reme Court. And from the earlier notion that the Supreme 
Court was 'counter-majoritarian', developed the notions of 
'minority rule by nine old men'S and 'the tyrrany of the 
minority,.6 An important element in these accusations were 
the facts that the justices of the Supreme Court are not elect-
ed, constitute a relatively isolated elite, and, apart from the 
remote threat of impeachment, enjoy tenure for life. There 
have, however, been numerous rejoinders to these attacks and 
it has been suggested that the notion of 'government by judi-
ciary' is a gross overstatement of the case. 7 It is pointed 
out that the judiciary is no less representative than other 
institutions such as the presidency and bureaucracy,8 that the 
judicial majority usually reflects the majority in the larger 
political system,9 that the court can be overriden as a last 
1. 1954-1969. The court's most notable decisions were in the fields of 
legislative reapportionment, race relations and criminal accuseds' 
rights. 
2. Eg A. Bickel The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress (1978) 3. 
3. R. Berger Government by Judiciary (1977) 2-3. 
4. P. Kurland in L. Theberge (ed) The Judiciary in a Democratic Society 
(1979) 21-22. 
5. See C.J. Friedrich Limited Government (1974) 46. 
6. ·P. Kurland in L. Theberge op cit 23. 
7. R. Funston Constitutional Counter-Revolution? The Warren Court and 
the Burger Court (1977) 12. 
8. D. Horowitz The Courts and Social Policy (1977) 18. 
9. G. Schubert Judicial Policy Making (rev ed, 1976) 209. Other writers, 
however, suggest that to speak of 'counter-majoritarianism' is to miscon-
strue the true basis of majority rule. For further views on this 
matter see below, chapter 9. 
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resort through constitutional amendment. 1 While there has 
been some change in the extent of judicial activism in the 
transformation from the Warren to the Burger ~ourt~ the whole 
question of the proper role for the judiciary within the Ameri-
can constitutional system remains a controversial one. 3 
Thus only a complex overall picture can be provided of majori-
tarianism in the United States constitutional system. This 
can be attributed partly to the long-standing dualism in Ameri-
can political thought: a desire for limited government on the 
one hand, and for democratically responsible government on the 
other. 4 The separation of powers, checks and balances, federal 
division of power and judicial review are linked with the for-
mer, and the populist and majoritarian aspects with the latter. 
The result is fan imperfectly antidemocratic judicial process 
and an imperfectly democratic political process,.5 It is, 
however, possible to agree with the assertion that whereas the 
parliamentary system is designed to translate majority wishes 
swiftly into legislation,the presidential system is designed to 
restrain popular pressures, and protects vested groups and in-
terests. 6 
4. Conclusion 
In the preceding overview of liberal-democratic constitutionalism 
emphasis has been given to the majoritarian features of the two 
historic versions of liberal-democracy, British parliamentarianism 
1. On four occasions the amendment procedure has been used to overrule Supreme Court decisions: the tenth, fourteenth, sixteenth and twenty-sixth amendments. See L.H. Tribe American Constitutional Law (1977) 50-51; A.P. Grimes Democracy and the Amendments to the Constitution (1978). 
2. R. Funston op cit 327-373. 
3. See L.R. Tribe op cit 47-52. 
4. ef See R. Funston op cit 11-12. 
5. L. Tribe op cit 51. 
6. G. Carter and J. Herz (3 ed, 1973) Government and Politics in the Twen-tieth Century (1973) 53, and see 145; as M. Vile (Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 335) observes, the emphasis in the former system is on coordination and in the latter on control. 
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and American presidentialism. It has been shown that both 
systems are premised on the principle of majority rule with its 
concomitant adversarial pattern of politics, but that in prac-
tice various constitutional and political factors combine to 
prevent majority rule involving unlimited rule by a bare major-
ity. The British system tends to place greater reliance on 
political factors 'and the American system on constitutional fac-
tors in this process, but both systems display the basic prin~ 
ciples of constitutionalism, and are regarded as constitutional 
democracies, in the traditional sense of that term. 
South Africa's constitutional system has never conformed to 
either of the historic versions of democratic constitutionalism, 
and has at the most constituted an attenuated version of West-
minster parliamentarianism. 1 The liberal tradition in South 
Africa has generally drawn comparatively on the empirical con-
stitutional models of Britain and the United States in advocat-
ing a programme of constitutional reform for the country.2 
Thus it has been suggested that South Africa's version of the 
Westminster constitution should be adapted to conform more 
closely to the original model, in a series of gradual reforms 
involving, inter alia, the extension of the franchise (often on 
the basis of educational or property qualifications), the re-
storation on the Rule of Law, the removal of references to race 
and ethnicity in the constitution (and the statute book gene-
rally), and the reformation of the Senate. Alternative suggest-
ions have been made with reference to American constitutionalism, 
and have involved a separation of legislative, executive and 
judicial powers, a territorial-federal devolution of power, a 
justici~ble bill of rights,and other checks and balances de-
signed to fragment power and preserve liberty. These proposals 
1. See below, chapter 4. 
2. See for example D. Molteno The Molteno Report for the Progressive Party (1960), K. Heard Political Systems in Multi-Racial Societies (1961), D.V. Cowen Constitution-Makin for a Democracy (1960) and The Foun-dations of Freedom 1961. For a critique of liberal-constitutionalism with specific reference to South Africa see the Sprocas report South Africa's Political Alternatives (1973) 128-143. 
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have not been uncritical of the majoritarian aspects of liberal-
democratic constitutionalism 1 and have suggested that they need 
to be constitutionally qualified to accommodate the 'multi-
racial' conditions of South African society, but their consti-
tutional recommendations have generally been based on the prin-
ciple of maj ori ty rule in an adversarial poli tical context. 2 
Consociationalism, on the other hand, challenges the notion that 
democracy should be equated with majority rule,and seeks to 
avoid this principle at every level of government. Although 
consociationalism does not provide an analytical constitutional 
model3 its principles have a close affinity with those constitu-
tional features of the liberal-democracies which are designed 
to qualify majoritarianism and safeguard minority intere~ts.4 
It is further possible to indicate an optimal constitutional 
framework for the operation of a consociational system,S although 
its successful working will inevitably depend as well on a 
range of extra-constitutional factors. But consociationalism's 
particular relevance is in relation to the plural society, in 
respect of which it is said to provide a normative model, and 
whereas the classical liberal tradition tended to be based on an 
individualistic model of politics and society,6consociationalism 
is more closely associated with the pluralist tradition. It is 
therefore necessary to give attention to the theories of plura-
lism and the plural society. 
1. Cf K. Heard op cit 3ff; D. Cowen op cit 104-11. 
2. There has also been a tendency in this tradition to emphasise constitu-tional measures without attending to the social and political precon-ditions for their operation; clearly constitutional engineering alone cannot create the conditions for a stable democracy. (See the Sprocas report op cit 127ff). Some attention is given to these matters in chapter 8, below. 
3. See below, 96~108. 
4. See eg the nine 'safeguards against the abuse of majority power' referred to by S.A. de Smith The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions (1964) 107-10. 
5. See below, 400-405. 
6. See the Sprocas report op cit 127; C.B. Macpherson The Real World of Democracy (1966) 1-11. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PLURALISM AND THE PLU~~L SOCIETY 
1. Introduction 
Consociationalism challenges not only the identification of 
democracy with majority rule; but also the notion that democ-
racy is not a viable form of government for divided plural 
societies. 2. In the refutation of this second notion,consocia-
tionalism is presented as an explanatory theory for the via-
bility and stability of certain empirical democracies with 
plural societies, but its proponents also advance it as a norm-
ative model for other plural societies. 3 Consociationalism 
is therefore closely related to theories of pluralism and 
should be analysed in that context. 
Concepts of pluralism have been used extensively in the study of 
comparative politics and nearly all countries in the world have 
at times been described as pluralistic. The South African soc-
iety is far from unique in that it consists of two or more cul-
turally different and socially distinct segments, nor in the 
fact that it is politically dominated by one such segment. In 
the current constitutional debate much emphasis is given to 
these features of cultural and social difference, frequently 
through the loose and ill-defined use of the concepts of 'plura-
lism' or 'plural society,.4 Both supporters and opponents of 
the South African government describe situations of ethnic dom-
inance as intrinsic problems of ·'plural societies',5 and various 
1. See above, 56. 
2. A. Lijphart 'Majority Rule Versus Democracy in Deeply Divided Societies' 4 (1977) Politikon 113; see also Lijphart's chapter on Pluralism and Democracy in The Politics of Accommodation (2 ed, 1975) 1 - 15. 
3. A. Lijphart Democracy in Plural Societies (1977) 1 - 3. 
4. Perhaps the highpoint in terminological abuse was the designation 'Department of Plural Relations' for the former Department of Co-Operation and Development. 
5. H. Adam and H. Giliomee The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner Power (1979) 42 - 43; and see L. Schlemmer 'Theories of the Plural Society and Change in South Africa' 3 (1977) Social Dynamics 3 - 16, and W.B. Vosloo fPluralisme as teoretiese perspektief vir veelvolkige naasbestaan in Suid-Afrika' 1 (1977) Politikon 4 - 14. 
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constitutional models have been justified in terms of South 
Africa's 'plural population,.l It is therefore necessary to 
give attention to the different theories of pluralism, their 
association with consociationalism, and their significance for 
South Africa. 
Three principal uses of the term pluralism as used by social 
and political theorists may be distinguished. 2 The most im-
portant,as far as the present work is concerned, is in relation 
to the ftheory of the plural society', which has been developed 
by anthropologists and sociologists but has implications for 
the study of comparative politics. The other two uses derive 
from the work of the English political pluralists and their 
American counterparts. In spite of the widely different senses 
in which the concept of pluralism is understood by these three 
groups~ each is concerned with the same basic issue, namely the 
relationship between unity and diversity in society. It is 
convenient to deal with these three traditions in their rough 
chronological sequence. 
2. Political Pluralism 
Whereas the theories of the sociological pluralists are concerned 
with the relationship between social conditions and political be-
haviour and stability, political pluralist theory focusses on the 
distribution of political power in society.4 The sense in which 
the term pluralism is used in political thought has only a tenuous 
1. ef W. Thomas Plural Democracy (1977). 
2. D. Nicholls Three Varieties of Pluralism (1974) 38ff. 
3. L. Kuper ('Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems' in L. Kuperand 
M. Smith (eds) Pluralism in Africa (1971) 7) refers to the 'quite anti-
thetical' traditions which may be discerned in regard to the nature of 
societies characterised by pluralism. He is referring to the 'equi-
librium model' of pluralism of the American school of political plura-
lists which associates democracy with pluralism, and the 'conflict 
model' of pluralism of the 'plural society' theories. 
4. See A. Lijphart The Politics of Accommodation (2 ed, 1975) 2. 
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connection with its meaning in the theory of the plural society, 
although, as has already been mentioned, the relationship be-
tween unity and diversity is a theme common to both traditions. 
There are two distinct traditions of political pluralism, the 
first emanating from the English political theorists and the 
second from their American counterparts; while each tradition 
has its distinct features there are also large areas of converg-
ence. 
Ca) English political pluralism 
English political pluralism emerged in the early decades of the 
present century and was promoted by writers such as J.N. Figgis,1 
Harold Laski,2 and G.D. Cole. 3 The theory rested on three 
/ basic principles:~ 
Ci) The first was that liberty is the most important politi-
cal value and is best preserved by the dispersal of power 
in society. The fear of concentrated power was a per-
vasive feature of pluralist thought and placed pluralists 
in the tradition of such writers as De Tocqueville and 
Proudhon. 5 
Cii) The second principle was that groups should not be de-
picted merely as collections of individuals but as having 
1. J.N. Figgis Churches ~n the Modern State (1913). 
2. H.J. Laski Authority in the Modern State (1919). 
3. G.D. Cole Guild Socialism Re-stated (1920). 
4. See D. Nicholls Three Varieties of Pluralism (1974) 5 - 12. 
5. R. Presthus ('The Pluralist Framework' in H.S. KarielCed) Frontiers of Democratic Theory (1970) 274 at 282-5) suggests that the or~g~ns of the pluralist rationale probably lie far back in history-the ancient fear of impersonal and arbitrary government and the realisation that 'power corrupts in geometric proportion as it grows'. But whereas this rationale for pluralism existed in England,with its sovereign parlia-ment, it was not so necessary in America where the constitution had al-ways been seen as limiting the power of government. See also K.D. McRae 'The Plural Society and the Western Political Thought' 12 (1979) Canadian Journal of Political Science 675ff. 
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a real personality. The English pluralists argued 
that groups could not adequately be understood simply 
in terms of the lives of their individual members, and 
that both political and legal theory should take more 
seriously their substantive personality and consequent 
rights. 1 Frederic Maitland was one of the first plura-
list writers to assert that groups were real entities in 
society, and he drew in turn on the work of Otto van 
Gierke who, although writing on German nationalism and 
not himself a pluralist thinker, emphasised the signifi-
cance of groups and their claim to have rights and 
privileges recognised by law. 2 
Ciii) The third principle involved a denial of the theory that 
in every state there must be a sovereign. As far as 
legal sovereignty was concerned, pluralism took issue 
with the view that law is simply the will of the sover-
eign, irrespective of its content or character. This in-
volved a rejection of both Bentham's sovereign legislator 
and Austin's positive law, as well as the model of the 
state as a legal order in which a determinate authority 
acts as the ultimate source of power.3 In its political 
form sovereignty may be understood as the view that in 
every society there is a power that can resolve disputes 
by saying a last word that will be obeyed, and this atti-
tude was criticised by pluralism as being of doubtful fac-
tual correctness, and as having dangerous moral conse-
quences. 4 Consistently with the above two standpoints 
1. This approach had important implications in the field of l aw and challeng-
ed legal practice to replace the fiction theory of group personality, 
as advanced by Von Savigny and having extensive application in regard to 
corporate persons, with the recognition that behind legal personality 
was a real social entity which could develop and change its original pur-
pose. See Nicholls op cit 8-9. 
2. H.S. Kariel 'Pluralism' in International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences 
164-168. 
3. H. Laski A Grammar of Politics (1925) SOf. 
4. Ibid 44. According to Laski the monistic notion of the state as a 'hier-
archical structure in which power is, for ultimate purposes, collected at 
a single centre' was both 'administratively incomplete and ethically in-
adequate'. The remedy lay, inter alia, in decentralisation and cor-
porate representation. Laski -'The Pluralistic State' in The Foundations 
of Sovereignty (1921) 24 and 66. 
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the notion of moral sovereignty was also rejected by the 
English pluralists. 1 
In developing their doctrine 2 the English pluralists were re-
acting against nineteenth century liberalism and utilitarianism, 
which had placed the individual in a social vacuum and focussed 
exclusively on the relationship between the individual citizen 
and the sovereign state; by drawing on the empirical political 
evidence of man's interest in, and loyalty to, a plurality of 
groups, they came to emphasise the group nature of politics. The 
view that the individual's relationship with the state was 
mediated by groups and associations exhibited a basic aversion 
to the classical liberal tradition,which was based on an indivi-
dualistic or atomistic model of politics and society, and viewed 
politics in terms of a basic opposition between the individual 
and the state. 3 In the pluralist view the groups and associa-
tions in society were characterised by voluntary (and hence at 
times overlapping) memberships, were equal in status with one 
another,and possessed autonomy in so far as they themselves 
decided on their rules of behaviour. 
The function of the state,4 according to this tradition of plura-
lism, was to provide and maintain the framework within which 
1. As H.S. Kariel (op cit 167) expresses it, 'They /the pluralist thinkers7 
found sovereignty divisible and allegiance to th~ state contingent and-
qualified. They argued what American statesmanship - insisting on bills 
of rights, on a separation of powers, and on the institution of federal-
ism - had concluded more than a century before'. 
2. Reliance is placed in this section on J. Degenaar's valuable chapter 
'Pluralism and the Plural Society' in A. de Crespigny and R. Schrire (eds) 
The Government and Politics of South Africa (1978) 223-244, and his essay 
in Model van Pluralisme' in Degenaar Moraliteit en Politiek (1976) 92-110. 
3. See the Sprocas report South Africa's Political Alternatives (1973) 127-
130, and references cited there. The report goes on to observe that 
despite its departure from the methodological individualism of the lib-
eral tradition,political pluralism may itself be derived from that tra-
dition, or more particularly its constitutional features. American 
pluralism, on the other hand, tends to be justified more in terms of a 
social-psychological insight into the group basis of personality and 
society. 
4. For Laski the state was just one of many groups in society, but Figgis 
regarded it rather as a group composed of groups: Nicholls op cit 12-14. 
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groups interacted and pursued their substantive purposes, and 
to guarantee the continued existence of the groups. The power 
of the state was limited by other powers in society, exercised 
by different non-state organisations, with whose autonomy 
the state should not interfere. Political action was perceived 
. not as the exercise of sovereign powe~ but as the interplay of a 
variety of plural associations resulting at times in a conflict 
of wills arising from the complex network of group relationships. 
Freedom was formulated not negatively, in terms of the limita-
tions on governmental powers, but positively, as the equal oppor-
tunity for self-realisation by the individual in his groups or 
social structures. By spreading power according to the diver-
sity of functions it had to perform,the state could maximise the 
opportunities for freedom and development. In this view of 
politics the participatory role of the citizen became crucia1 1 -
he had firstly a duty to become involved not only in the state, 
but in the society as a whole, in which, as has been shown, he 
participated through his membership in a plurality of groups. 
Secondly, as the state created areas of freedom in which groups 
could operate, the groups themselves, and hence their members, 
shared a co-responsibility for the conditions in the society -
pluralism of responsibility became a feature of the pluralist 
model. 2 Finally, insofar as the citizen was faced with a choice 
between conflicting loyalties, to the state and organisations in 
competition to the state, he might on a specific issue be com-
pelled to give his loyalty to a group other than the state, and 
thus resort to civil disobedience. 
The English pluralist view necessitated a search for more complex 
institutional arrangements than the direct democracy desired by 
Rousseau,or the simple representative mechanisms described by 
Locke. 3 Nitholls4 makes reference to various institutional 
1. It will be shown in the following chapter that a critical part~c~pato=y 
role for citizens is not a feature of the normative consociational model. 
2. Degenaar 'Pluralism and the Plural Society' 232. -
3. See R.P. Wolff 'Tolerance' in The Poverty of Liberalism (1968) 122 at 
125; this essay first appeared as 'Beyond Tolerance' in A Critique of 
Pure Tolerance by Wol£f and Marcuse (1965). All references are to 
the later work. 
4. Nicholls op cit 54-56. 
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embodiments of pluralism,such as the guilds envisaged by the 
auild socialists, as well as to various forms of corporativism 
o 1 
and functionalism (in the sense of functional representation) 
advocated by the pluralists. The pluralist model could even 
be described as essentially 'federal' in so far as it implied a 
- 2 3 
functional division of power among corporate groups. Laski 
went so far as to observe that for a proper understanding of 
any society it should be regarded as essentially 'federal,4 in 
its nature. By this he meant that general activities which 
interested all members of society belonged to the state, while 
activities which were primarily specific in their incidence 
should be administered by those most directly affected by them -
these latter activities interested the state only in so far as 
they affected the rest of the community, in which event the state 
might exercise its ultimate reserve power. The criterion for 
the functional devolution of power was social utility. 
English political pluralism began to grow irrelevant even before 
the emergence of its American counterpart. It had tended to be 
more normative than empirical, and among the most frequent criti-
cisms levelled at it were that it ignored the complex reality of 
group life and the possibility of the groups becoming oligar-
chical and unscrupulous, that it presupposed on the part of the 
individual an interest and rationality in politics, and that it 
tended to overlook the dangers of deadlock and stalemate in the 
political system. 5 Even proponents 6 of pluralism began to see 
1. Both W. Churchill (Parliamentary Government and the Economic Problem 
(1930)) and L. Amery (Thoughts on the Constitution (1947)) advocated a 
functionally based chamber, as do some contemporary proponents of a re-
constituted House of Lords. 
2. It can be said that this model necessitated a framework of le~al insti-
tutions to resolve inter-group conflicts which would include such consti-
tutional features as judicial review and bills of rights. 
3. Laski op cit 59. 
4. The italics are the writers. Throughout this work the term federal 
is used to denote a system of territorial, and not functional, decen-
tralisation. 
5. See Kariel 'Pluralism' 166-167, and Degenaar 'Pluralism and the Plural 
Society' 240-1. 
6. While Laski was initially a forceful advocate of pluralis~ he later 
adopted a basically Marxian standpoint. 
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the need for something beyond a vigorous group life, such as 
national leadership and a more purposeful role for the state. 
The tradition's opposition to state absolutism, and its empha-
sis on the dispersal of power and the group nature of politics, 
constituted its main contributions to political theory. 
Cb) American political pluralism 
Pluralism has been the dominant tradition within American poli-
tical sociology for several decades. During this time American 
political pluralism has purported to be an explanation of,and 
justification for, the United States' political system, although 
at times this system has been viewed, as critics have frequent-
ly suggested, in a rather romantic light. The tradition 1 may 
be traced back to De Tocqueville, with his reflections on self-
governing fintermediate bodies' capable of countervailing both 
an atomistic society and a totalitarian state,2 and Arthur 
Bentley, who portrayed the political arena as being composed of 
a large number of groups each attempting to forward some parti-
cular interest. 3 The themes of Bentley were developed by sub-
sequent American theorists who came to associate democracy with 
pluralism; far from viewing differences in social and politi-
cal positions as being incompatible with democratic ideals for 
a plural society, the theory saw in their balanced adjustment the 
1. See D. Nicholls Three Varieties of Pluralism (1974) 28ff. 
2. A. de Tocqueville Democracy in America (OUP ed, 1946) 126-133; R. 
Presthus ('The Pluralist Framework' in H.S. Kariel (ed) Frontiers of 
Democratic Theory (1970) 274 at 283)traces the origins of the pluralist 
rationale further back in history to the Greek city-states and 
Aristotle, and the ancient fear of government and impersonal arbitrary 
rule. 
3. A.F. Bentley The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures 
(1908). Bentley has been described as the ffather' of American plura-
lism, De Tocqueville as the 'spiritual father'. 
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essential conditions for democracy. Thus in pluralist theory 
policy outcomes were perceived as the result of group processes, 
and not individual rational choices as envisaged by classical 
democratic theory. 
In the nineteen-fifties American pluralist theory began to take 
on the role of an 'ideology' and to be applied in a descriptive 
and prescriptive manner. 1 A free society was said to be charac-
terised by the existence of semi-autonomous groups whose lead-
ers compete for political power, while the state enforces the 
rules of the game. The multiplicity of groups are characterised 
by cross-cutting cleavages, and the multiple affiliations
2 
of 
individual members prevent the emergence of exclusive loyalties 
which would exacerbate conflict. 3 The presence of multiple 
affiliations, together with a commitment to common values and a 
competitive balance of power, leads to the integration and sta-
bility of such a society.4 The political structure of this 
type of society is itself plural, in that equal political rights 
are exercised by its citizens in a constitutional systemS char-
acterised by a separation of legislative, executive and judicial 
powers, a justiciable bill of rights, and a federal or quasi-
federal division of power.6 Not only is political power frag-
mented among the branches of government, but it is shared between 
1. D. Nicholls op cit 25. Among its better-known proponents was D. 
Truman The Governmental Process (1951). 
2 On the importance of multiple affiliations see W. Kornhauser The Politics 
of Mass Society (1960) 81f; cf S.M. Lipset Political Man (1959) 87-90. 
3. As Kuper (Kuper and Smith op cit 9) points out, this extends the concept 
of pluralism to the level of individual pluralism. 
4. E.A. Shiels The Torment of Secrecy (1956) 155f; Kornhauser (op cit 104) 
does not postulate the inevitability of common values in the equilibrium 
model of pluralis~and refers to its fluidity and diversity of value-
standards. 
5. On the 'constitutional basis' of political pluralism see H.S. Kariel 
The Decline of American Pluralism (1961) 7-13. 
6. Acceptance of the legitimacy of existing constitutional and political 
structures is a further feature of this model. ef P. van den Berghe 
South Africa - A Study in Conflict (1965) 270-271. 
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the state and a number of private groups and individuals. 
1 
The relationship between the groups and government is~ however, 
subject to some dispute,and Wolff 2 distinguishes between two 
pluralist theories according to their treatment of this rela-
tionship: the tvector-sum' theory, in which the different groups 
are seen to exert pressures on government agencies which form-
ulate a compromise~ and the 'referee' version, in which the state 
is perceived as a passive co-ordinating authority which upholds 
the rules for competition and conflict resolution. 3 In the 
latter theory groups achieve their goals directlY,and in the for-
mer indirectly through organisation as influential pressure 
groups. Both theories nevertheless emphasise the value of a 
plurality of interest groups in society and the resultant de-
centralisation of public power. 4 
In opposition to the pluralist writers of the fifties other 
theorists began to assert the 'elitist nature of the American 
polity~ and while this opposition was to stimulate a vigorous 
defence of the orthodox pluralist position it led ultimately to 
a redefinition of the concept - whereas historically pluralism 
had demanded active citizen participation in group and public 
affairs (and a reasonable equality of bargaining power among 
interested groups), it began to mean competition among elites and 
organised groups~ irrespective of whether decision-making within 
the groups was dominated by the few. 6 American pluralism1s 
1. Cf R. Presthus 'The Pluralist Framework' 280-281. 
2. R. Wolff The Poverty of Liberalism (1968) 129. 
3. See also D. Nicholls op cit 23. 
4. On the decentralisation of the United States system see the contribution 
of R. Dahl A Preface to Democratic Theory (1956). This feature high-
lights the antithesis of pluralism to monis~by which is understood the 
acceptance of the state as the highest sovereign power to which all 
other associations are legally subordinate. See R. Presthus op cit 
280. See also Madisonfs anticipation of the pluralist standpoint in 
The Federalist Papers, No. 10. 
5. D. Nicholls op cit 26f. This approach 1S exemplified by C. Wright Mills 
The Power Elite (1959). 
6. R. Presthus op cit 301; and cf R. Dahl Who Governs? Democracy and 
Power in an American City (1961). The first formulation of this model 
has been attributed to Joseph Schumpter Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy (1942). 
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emphasis on group behaviour led, ironically, to the decline 
of individualism 1 and to elitist theories of democracy.2 
It is beyond the scope of this work to provide a detailed crit-
icism of the pluralist political model. One of the most per-
sistent criticisms is that,while purporting to be empirical it 
ignores the realities of the American political process,which 
has been blatantly undemocratic vis-a-vis groups which have 
shown the greatest degree of cultural or social pluralism. 
Wolff 3 provides a threefold criticism of pluralist theory: the 
first is that existing groups are in practice always favoured 
over groups in the process of formation, thereby inhibiting 
social change;4 the second is that in the case of inter-group 
conflicts the system systematically favours the stronger over 
the weaker party, and legitimate interests which are unorganised 
will find their disadvantaged position perpetuated. S These two 
criticisms are based on the empirical evidence of the American 
system. 6 The third is based on an alternative philosophy of 
society,which rejects the pluralist notion that there is no such 
thing as the public interest or the common good in the modern 
state; while the pluralist emphasis on public-competition among 
1. H.S. Kariel The Decline of American Pluralism 180ff. 
2. See C.B. MacPherson The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (1977) 77-
91 and references cited there. MacPherson suggests use of the term 
'pluralist elitist equilibrium model'. 
3. Op cit 150. 
4. This criticism relates to the vector-sum theory of pluralism which re-
quires state recognition of emergent groups, while the following criti-
cism relates to the 'referee version' in which the state is held to 
play a more passive role. 
5. A criticism first articulated by H.S. Kariel The Decline of American 
Pluralism 140. On the question of the bias of pluralism see S. Lukes 
Power - A Radical View (1974). Lukes suggests that pluralism provides 
a 'one dimensional view' of power. 
6. R. Wolff (op cit 126ff) points to three specifically American factors 
which contributed to the theory of pluralism - its federal structure, 
the American penchant for dealing with problems by means of voluntary 
associations, and the presence of 'ethnic politics' in America. 
Presthus Cop cit 285) accurately observes that the rationale for plura-
lism in England, where the supreme state was an actuality, did not 
exist in America. See also Kariel op cit 146ff. 
68. 
groups may be appropriate for solving problems of distributive 
justice,it is inadequate for solving problems relating to the 
common good,or for reorganising society on a large scale. 
This requires the broader vision of 'community', which Wolff 
attempts to formulate as an alternative to the pluralist model. 1 
From a different perspective Szymanski 2 advances two primary 
criticisms of pluralism. The first concerns its assumption 
that American society is composed of a diversity of equally 
powerful groups reflecting the interests of most people,when in 
fact only half the population belon~to voluntary associations, 
most of which have only a peripheral interest in politics. The 
second concerns the function of the state in the pluralist model, 
which is regarded as reconciling the various group influences 
and converting them into state policies; it does not recognise 
the limited number of policies which the state can follow with-
out causing socio-economic disruption of the society, nor that 
the state's main purpose might be to defend the predominance of 
a particular class. 3 But despite these criticisms the plura-
list view of society as outlined in this section continues to 
predominate in the United States, and in western countries gen-
erally. 
3. Theories of the Plural Society 
The most recent tradition of pluralism finds expression in the 
theory of the plural society. Whereas 'pluralism' for the 
American political pluralists is a condition of democracy, for 
the plural society theorists it is a threat to the democratic via-
bility of societies. In this context a 'plural society' is understood 
as one which contains two or more communities which are distinct 
in a number of ways - culture, race, caste, class, language and 
1. In his essay 'Community· in Wolff op cit 162-195. Nicholls (op cit 31) 
describes the suggestions of Wolff as a statement of the 'new Rousseauism' • 
2. A. Szymanski The Capitalist State and the Politics of Class (1978) 4-6. 
3. Cf R. Milliband The State in Capitalist Society (1969) 4f. The most 
important alternative to the pluralist view is that of Marxism. The most 
notable attempt to integrate Marxist ideas into a pluralist framework 
was by S.M. Lipset Political Man (1959); see Szymanski op cit 16-18 and 
the references cited there. 
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religion; these lines of differentiation, or 'cleavages', 
tend to be deep and mutually reinforcing, and there is a rela-
tive absence of cross-cutting cleavages and multiple group 
affiliations. 1 Furthermore,political divisions also follow 
closely the lines of social cleavage, leading to sharp con-
flicts between the politically organised groups, or 'seg-
ments' - hence the notion of 'conflict pluralism! as opposed 
to the earlier 'equilibrium pluralism' ~ While the rela tion-
ships between the different segments are invariably character-
ised by inequality, there is some difference of opinion as to 
whether the concept of the plural society should be restricted 
to systems which are dominated by one such segment. 3 Never-
theless it is generally agreed that pluralism has multiple 
dimensions, the most important of which are cultural and 
social, and that there is a prevalence of political dissensus 
and conflict in plural societies which frequently results in 
the non-democratic regulation of the society and minority poli-
tical domination. 
This model of the plural society was first developed by Furnivall, 
and was based on his study of tropical colonies in which he was 
concerned with the impact of western capitalism on Asian pre-
capitalist societies. 4 He defined a plural society as one 'com-
prising two or more elements or social orders which live side by 
1. This is to paraphrase Eckstein's definition of pluralism (H.Eckstein Di-
vision and Cohesion in Democracy (1966) 34) which was adopted by the--
leading consociational theorist, A. Lijphart Democracy in Plural Societies 
(1977) 3-4. 
2. See L. Kuper 'Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems' in L. Kuper and 
M.Smith~d~Pluralism in Africa (1971) 7; Kuper and Smith's work remains 
the most authoritative statement on the theory of the plural society. 
See also M. Fortes The Plural Society in Africa (SAIRR, 1970). 
3. See P. van den Berghe 'Integration and Conflict in Multi-National States' 
1 (1975) Social Dynamics 3. 
4. J.S. Furnivall Netherlands India - A Study of Plural Economy (1944) and 
Colonial Policy and Practice - A Comparative Study of Burma and Nether-
lands India (1948). J.H. Boeke Economics and Economic Policies of Dual 
Societies (1953) also contributed to the early formulation of the theory. 
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by side, yet without mingling, in one political unit'. 1 Each 
section of the community lived separately and held by its own 
language, religion and culture, meeting only with members of 
other groups in the market-place in buying and selling. The 
plural society was created largely by economic forces,and was 
the distinctive character of modern tropical economy with its 
division of labour along racial lines and differential incor-
poration of ethnic groups,which created distinct 'economic 
castes} ~2 This type of society was characterised by the ab-
sence of a 'social will',which made democracy impossible;3 the 
society was held together by the colonial power and a common 
economic system, and its basic political problem was one of 
in te gra t ion. Furni vall advoca ted federal ism as a possible method 
of reintegrating such societies, and in fact likened the plural society 
in its political aspect to a confederation of states which united 
for certain common ends but otherwise remained separate;4 the 
plural society,however, lacked the traditional confederal features 
of a voluntary union, territorially segregated sections, and the 
possibility of secession. It should be emphasised that in 
Furnivall's theory the conflict in a plural society did not 
arise from racial or cultural divisons per se, but because econo-
mic exploitation and boundaries co-incided with racial or cul-
tural differences. 5 
1. Furnivall Netherlands India 446. 'Society' is thus understood in politi-
cal and administrative, and not sociological, terms. While Furnivall ini-
tially included South Africa, Canada and the United States as plural socie-
ties, he later limited his definition and described these as societies with 
plural features, and distinguished them from the tropical plural societies. 
As his distinguishing feature was 'a common tradition of western culture' 
he would seem to have been referring only to 'white' South Africa. 
2. Furnivall gave close attention to the question of how far the principles 
of orthodox economics were applicable to a plural society. 
3. In this sense it provided a diametrically opposed perspective to con-
sensus functionalism. 
4. This approach draws attention to the concept of corporate federalism 
which is analysed in chapter 3, below. 
5. See eg M. Cross 'On Conflict, Race Relations and the Theory of the 
Plural Society' 1 2 (1971) Race 479. 
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Since Furnivall the conflict theory of pluralism has been fur-
ther developed by writers such as Kuper, Smith, van den Berghe 
and Schlemmer, and it has been extended beyond the tropical 
scene to all heterogeneous, that is culturally and socially 
stratified, societies. But Smith, its main proponent, reacts 
against this extended usage. 1 He distinguishes between heter-
ogeneous societies,which may exhibit varying degrees of plura-
lism, and plural societies proper;2 the former are characterised 
by a common system of basic institutions shared by the majority 
of their members,who are differentiated at the secondary level 
of institutional and organisational specialisation, while the 
latter are characterised by incompatible institutions (the sole 
institutional framework that incorporates the aggregate is gov-
ernment); and dominated by one of the cultural groups, usually 
a minority. For Smith, then, political domination by a cul-
tural minority is part of the definition of the plural society. 
Smith's other major contribution concerns the mode of incorpora-
tion of the various groups into the public domai~ which deter-
mines their access to political power. In the plural society 
the groups are differentially incorporated, which results in un-
equal access to government,and minority domination, whereas if 
incorporation occurs on a consociational basis there is equal 
access to government: federation can be seen as a constitution-
al equivalent of the latter mode of incorporation. 4 The main-
tenance of the plural society, for Smit~ is a function of its 
common economic system,and the non-democratic regulation and 
coercion of- the dominant minority which subordinates the politi-
cal institutions of other groups. The heterogeneous societ~ on 
1. M.G. Smith began employing the concept in his studies of the Caribbean. 
M.G. Smith The Plural Society in the British West Indies (1965); see 
also 'Social and Cultural Pluralism' 83 (1960) Annals of the New York 
_Academy of Sciences 763-785; 'Institutional and Political Conditions 
of Pluralism' in Kuper and Smith op cit 27-61. 
2. Smith builds on Despres' distinction between homogeneous, heterogeneous 
and plural societies; the latter's refinement of the plural model de-
pends on a distinction between local and national institutions. L. 
Despres Cultural Pluralism and National Politics in British Guiana (1967) 
21f£; and see D. Nicholls Three Varieties of Pluralism (1974) 42f. 
3. Smith in Kuper and Smith op cit 36. 
4. Cf S. Bekker 'The Pluralist Approach of Pierre van den Berghe' 1 (1975) 
Social Dynamics 12. 
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the other hand, has social cohesion as the basis of its sta-
bility and does not develop a rigid and hierarchical ordering 
of relations between the different sections. Smith's model 
thus extends Furnivall's perceptions within a ge~eral theoret-
ical framework. 1 
Van den Berghe 2 broadens the scope of the pluralist approach 
considerably, in his attempt to explain the development of the 
majority of multi-national societies in terms other than those 
of consensus functionalism or Marxism. Unlike Furnivall or 
Smith,he conceives pluralism as a variable, Tather than an all-
OT-none phenomenon; plural societies are not regarded as sui 
generis. 3 A society is pluralistic~ for Van den Berghe, to 
the extent that it is structurally segmented and culturally 
diverse, and exhibits a relative lack of value consensus, rela-
tive rigidity and clarity of group definition, and the relative 
presence of conflict and lack of integration; pluralism is a 
matter of degree,and societies may range from the relatively 
homogeneous to the extremely pluralistic. A basic distinction 
is made between cultural and social pluralism in society: the 
former refers to the existence of ethnic groups themselves, and 
hence cultural diversity, while the latter refers to distinct 
social sections, each with analogous, and hence duplicated, 
sets of institutions. 4 While cultural pluralism in a society 
inevitably involves a degree of social pluralism, the converse 
is not necessarily true, and groups which share the same culture 
may nevertheless be relegated to inferior positions on the basis 
of race, class or caste membership. Van den Berghe refers to 
this feature as secondary pluralism~ a useful reference in dis-
cuss~g the nature of South Africa's pluralism. 5 
1. See L. Kuper 'Plural Societies! Perspectives and Problems' in Kuper and 
Smith op cit 14; also D. Nicholls op cit 41-47. 
2. See P. van den Berghe Race and Racism (1967); South Africa-A Study ~n 
Conflict (1965); 'Pluralism and the Polity: A Theoretical Exploration' ~n 
Kuper and Smith op cit 67-90; Race and Ethnicity (1970); 'Integration and 
Conflict in Multi-National States' 1 (1975) Social Dynamics 3-10. 
3. s. Bekker op cit 13. 
4. See S. Bekker op cit 13ff, D. Nicholls op cit 48f. 
5. See below, 83-89. 
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Van den Berghe is expressly concerned with the question of 
stability in society~ and how it may be maintained in multi-
national societies in such a way that structural inequalities 
based on ethnicity are minimised. 1 These societies are all 
held together by relations of power and relations of production, 
but the crucial variable in multi-national states is what he 
calls the 'degree of symmetry,2 in the relationship between 
ethnic groups, that is the extent to which the groups are in .a 
hierarchy,and there is political domination and economic ex-
ploitation. Most multi-national societies begin with a domi-
nant group,whose policy towards subordinate groups can range 
from genocide, to enslavement, to indirect rule through the co-
option of subordinate group elites,3 to democratic pluralism 
which involves well-defined constitutional arrangements, pro-
portional ethnic representation, entrenchment of minority rights, 
and local autonomy. This last type of multi-national £tate is 
the most infrequent,4 and its constitutional arrangements are 
clearly consociational in nature. The persistence of this 
type of state as an entity is said to depend on neither coercion 
nor consensus,but on the realisation that economic and political 
interests are best advanced by staying together in a sensibly 
arranged political union. For Van den Berghe minority govern-
ment is not directly relevant to the question of social and 
cultural pluralism, although it is associated with the first 
three types of multi-national state. 
In his study of patterns of conflict in divided societies 
Dahrendorf S makes the distinction between group affiliations 
which are dissociated and those which are super-imposed. He 
places the nature of group affiliations on a continuum,with 
complete dissociation, giving rise to cross-cutting affiliations, 
1. See S. Bekker op cit 14. 
2. Van den Berghe 'Integration and Conflict in Multi-National States' 6. 
3. This policy has been extensively pursued in South Africa's version of 
the plural society. See generally chapters 6 and 7, below. 
4. Switzerland, one of the empirical consociations, provides the most 
clear-cut case. 
5. R. Dahrendorf Class and Class Conflict in IndustrialSoci~ty (1959) 173; 
and see Nicholls op cit 49. 
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on the one end, and complete superimposition, or reinforcement 
of affiliations, on the other. For Dahrendorf it is the 
structural phenomenon of superimposition of affiliations, caus-
ing a convergence of lines of group conflict,which has adverse 
political consequences. But Dahrendorf uses the term plura-
lism in relation to countries with dissociated affiliations, 
which is the opposite sense to that in which it is used by the 
plural society theorists,and more akin to that of the American 
political theorists referred to in the previous section. 
Finally, in his contribution to the theory of the plural society 
Schlemmer 1 attempts to explain the variation in the degree of 
conflict among different plural societies. Schlemmer builds 
on the earlier pluralist theorists in identifying the constit-
uent dimensions of pluralism - inter ali~ cultural distinctive-
ness, power disparities, socio-economic differentials, 'con-
sciousness' of class, group or culture, and perceptions of rela-
tive deprivation. For Schlemmer the essential basis of con-
flict in plural societies is not cultural incompatibility, but 
the nature of the Isocial formationJ. The distribution of 
power and privilege in a plural society is regulated within 
social institutions which are associated with corporate group 
organisations. These corporate groups are formed through the 
elite mobilisation of people, which is inherent in the nature 
of a plural society, but in turn corporate groups involve a 
degree of popular involvement in the system - that is popular 
insistence on the satisfaction of needs and interests articu-
lated through the group. For Schlemmer it is the degree of 
mass popular participation in the interaction between corporate 
groups which is the essential feature of plural societies,be-
cause this creates various forces and needs in the political 
economy - the defence of popular material interests, the defence 
of status interests, the fervour of mass ideologies (eg 
'nationalism'), the maintenance of group integrity. Schlemmer 
refers to this basic dynamic of plural societies as Jpopular 
social communalism', a process in which class, identity and 
power are combined and articulated to serve the interests of 
the . corporate groups, and which determines the degree of conflict. 
1. L. Schlemmer 'Theories of the Plural Society and Change in South 
Africa' 3 (1977) Social Dynamics 3-16. 
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It is apparent from this overview that there is a wide diver-
gence of views among the conflict pluralists as to the defin-
ing characteristics of a plural society, and the essential 
sources of conflict. What is clear is that while all societies 
exhibit pluralism, in the sense of a divergence of groups which 
sustain social relationships with one another,1 only societies 
with certain kinds of pluralism qualify as 'plural societies'. 
'The extreme case of a plural society is a society of 
total identities, of self-contained cultural systems 
2 or exclusive racial groups'; . 
but such a society will be infrequently identified in practice, 
and would fit Mitchell's description of 'a contradiction in 
terms,.3 "The identification of less extreme examples will de-
pend upon which of the above theories of the plural society is 
applied. 
For the purposes of this work Bekker's definition of a plural 
society is the most appropriate, namely, 
fa political unit which manifests cultural differences, 
structural units with boundaries coinciding with the 
differences, and a mode of differential incorporation,.4 
These defining characteristics are clearly distinguishable from 
the assumed characteristics of the equilibrium pluralist socie-
ty,and the aspect of 'differential incorporation' implies 
political domination by one group. Consociationalism is 
claimed to avoid such political domination in a divided plural 
society by ensuring a mode of uniform incorporation for all 
groups. 
1. L. Kuper 'Ethnic and Racial Plura l ism: Some Aspects of Polarization and 
Depluralization' in Kuper and Smith op cit 459-487 at 465 . 
2. A.A. Mazrui 'Pluralism and National Integration' in Kuper and Smith op 
cit 333-349 at 347. 
3. J.C. Mitchell Tribalism and the Plural Society (1960) 25f : 'The term 
"plural society" it"s"elf fs a contradiction since the idea of "society" 
in terms of usual sociological definition implies "unity" - the anti-
thesis of plurality. The problem of plural societies, then, lies in 
this contradiction - in what way can these societies be both "plural" 
and "societies" ... ' This problem is avoided in the present work by 
using the term society to refer to a political unit. 
4. S. Bekker op cit 12. 
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As a sociological theory conflict pluralism has been criticised 
from both the consensus functionalist and Marxian perspectives, 
and particularly from the latter. 1 Thus it is said that it 
denies the fundamental importance of the economic base and the 
class structure of social conflict,2 that it reifies cultural 
differences as if they were immutable, 3 tha t . it disregards ~he 
existence of 'third column f institutions which are generated 
by the interaction between groups,4 that some of its proponents 
emphasise political domination to the exclusion of economic 
interdependence,S and that it fails to explain the origins, de-
velopment and directions of change in plural societies. 6 Other 
critics of the 'plural society' concept assert that there must 
be something other than . force and economic interest which holds 
plural societies together - something in the way of a common 
set of values. 7 But whether or not pluralist theory actually 
provides a better account of what takes place in society than 
class theory or structural functionalism, it is perceived as a 
meaningful theory in the South African context,and is used by ' 
the government as a type of legitimating ideology for its poli-
cies. 8 It also partially accounts for the official movement 
towards consociational strategies,in that consociationalism is 
intimately linked with notions of pluralism. South Africa's 
constitutional development can be better understood, therefore, 
against the background of pluralist theory. 
1. Cf D. McK Irvine 'Plural Societies and Constitution-making' in J.A. 
Benyon (ed) Constitutional Change in South Africa (1978) 94. 
2. Ibid; cf H. Adam in Adam & Giliomee The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner 
Power (1979) 45. 
3. Ibid. 
4. J. Rex Race Relations in Sociological Theory (1970) 11. 
5. Cf H. Lever South African Society (1978) 99. 
6. S. Bekker op cit 11; as S. Greenberg (Race and State in Capitalist 
Development (1980) 18) observes, the theory does not explain why a 
cultural minority whose position has been built on 'differential in-
corporation' begins 'incorporating' other groups. 
7. D. Nicholls Three Varieties of Pluralism (1974) 45; see also M.G. Smith 
'Some Developments in the Analytic Framework of Pluralism ' in Kuper and 
~mit~ op cit 415 at 42 1, for a suomary of the four most general ob-
Ject~ons to the theory. 
8. 'H. Adam op ci t 45. 
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4. Synthesis 
While the three pluralist traditions which have been referred 
to are all concerned with the relationship between unity and 
diversity in society, each provides a d~fferent emphasis:' the 
British tradition of political pluralism emp.hasises the import-
ance of individual liberty and group life and the need to limit 
the activity of the state, American political pluralism empha-
sises the value of a plurality of groups with cross-cutting 
memberships in society,and the sharing of power between these 
groups and government agencies, and the plural society tradition 
focusses on the cultural diversity in society and its negative 
implications for the political process and the stability of the 
system. Because of the basic antithesis between the two 
latter models, it is appropriate to give some definitional 
clari ty to the term 'plural t, to dis t inguish between two differ-
ent situations. Thus it is convenient, if not necessarily 
scientific, to draw the following distinction: 2 
(i) The term 'plural society' refers to highly segmented and 
conflict-prone societies; 
(ii) The term 'pluralistic society' refers to societies in 
which there are many politically significant groups with 
cross-cutting memberships and interests. 
The political form of the plural society is sectional domination, 
and of the pluralistic society liberal democracy.3 
It would be difficult to incorporate the various trends in the 
pluralist perspectives into a single system, in particular the 
'equilibrium' model of American political pluralism and the 
'conflict' model of the plural society,which imply two basic 
types of society. Kuper also suggests that because of the dif-
ference in their social structure the transition from a divided 
1. Cf J. D:genaar 'Pluralism and the Plural Society' in A. de Crespigny and 
R. Schr~re Ceds) The Government and Politics of South Africa (1978) 223. 
2. Cf L. Kuper 'Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems' in Kuper and 
Smith op cit 7 at 22. 
3. Ibid 14. 
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plural society to an open pluralistic society is liable to 
be extemely difficult. 1 Nevertheless Degenaar attempts to 
frame a pluralist model in which insights from all three tra-
ditions are incorporated. 2 This model displays the following 
characteristics, inter ali~, of the state and society: 
1. The state loses its assumed character of sovereignty and 
can therefore not claim any absolute nature; 
2. The state is viewed as only one of the groups through 
which a society operates; 
3. Society is seen as the co-existence and interrelated-
ness of individuals and groups within a geographic unit 
acting according to systems of rules; 
4. Each group is seen as a group of individuals acting with-
in the same system of rules and cultivating common values 
through continual contact with one another; 
5. The relation between citizen and state is not only direct 
and immediate, but also indirect and mediated; the citi-
zen belongs to a variety of groups which the state must 
take into account in its dealings with individuals; 
6. By means of spreading power over the whole of society, in 
such a way that a continual structuring and restructuring 
of power takes place, the concentration of power in the 
state can be effectively opposed; 
7. It is possible for a plurality of loyalties to co-exist 
in society, and the state must compete with this plurality 
of claims to the loyalty of the citizen; 
8. The autonomy of groups, residing in the fact that groups 
decide themselves on the rules that govern their behaviour, 
should not be viewed in an encapsulating way, but rather as 
a voluntary basis for being open to one another as regards 
contact, tension, criticism, influence and co-responsibility. 
1. L. Kuper op cit 16-22; Kuper concedes, however, that a theoretical syn-
thesis of the two models might be possible. See also the Sprocas re-
port South Africa's Political Alternatives (1973) 84. 
2. J. Degenaar op cit 230-233. For the purposes of this enterprise Degenaar 
defines pluralism as 'a political philosophy in which man is described as 
acting in society not as an isolated and sovereign individual but within 
a plurality of groups'. See also J. Degenaar Moraliteit en Politiek 
(1976) 92-93. . 
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The emphasis in this model is on organisational pluralism and, 
as Degenaar shows, a number of its characteristics are not evi-
dent in the South African system. But Degenaar goes on to in-
troduce the dimension of cultural diversity, which allows him to 
frame three further analytical models which are of direct rele-
vance to the subject of this work. 1 The first is the con-
flict pluralist model, which emphasises the fact that cultural 
and ethnic diversity inevitably leads to the undemocratic domi-
nation by one group over others; this clearly leads back to 
Smith's version of the plural society outlined above. 2 The 
second is the consensus or open pluralist model, in which the 
effects of cultural diversity are mitigated by cross-cutting 
group affiliations, which tend to diminish the probability of 
conflict by building up mutual trust and an integrated society; 
this leads back to the American tradition of democratic plura-
lism. 3 The third is the consociational pluralist mode~ which 
recognises cultural diversity as a decisive factor but main-
tains stability and avoids conflict through negotiation and co-
operation at the elite level,despite the absence of voluntary 
associations and cross-cutting affiliations. Relating these 
models to South Africa Degenaar suggests that) 
'the present situation can be described in terms of 
conflict pluralism with a possible development in 
the direction of consociational pluralism which could 
be the stage of transition towards a fully-fledged 
1 1 " ,4 consensus p ura Ism ... 
Degenaar further suggests that consociational democracy should 
take priority over majoritarian democracy as being better suited 
to the nature of South Africa ' s divided plural society, and this 
view is shared by others who apply the theory of the plural 
society to this country. Thus although consociationalism is 
not applied prescriptively in this work, it is necessary to refer 
briefly to the reasons why majoritarian democracy is said to be 
unsuited for divided plural societies such as South Africa. 
1. J. Degenaar op cit 238-239; also Moraliteit en Politiek 109; Degenaar 
~as more recently restated these views - see Sunday Times 18 October 1981. 
2. At 71-71. 
3. See above, 64-68. 
4. Degenaar loc cit. 
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5. Pluralism and Liberal-Democratic Constitutionalism 
It has been shown 1 that majority rule is a basic principle of 
liberal-democratic constitutionalism, although this principle 
is mitigated in practice by constitutional and political fac-
tors. One of these factors is said to be the homogeneous 
political culture encountered in the British and American sys-
tems, itself a product of their pluralistic societies which con-
sist of numerous interest-groups with cross-cutting memberships.2 
The supposed homogeneous political culture 3 of the Anglo-Saxon 
democracies can be contrasted with the fragmented political 
culture of the continental European systems; this is a pro-
duct of their divided plural societies,which embody predomi-
nantly reinforcing, and not cross-cutting,politically relevant 
cleavages. The fragmented political culture in these socie-
ties, runs the argument, gives rise to political conflicts be-
tween clearly defined segments,which makes viable and stable 
democratic government difficult. Thus it has been a general 
belief in comparative politics 4 that a movement away from a 
fragmented political culture towards a homogeneous political 
culture would reduce the likelihood of instability and con-
flict, and improve the prospects of strong and stable democracy. 
Without such a transition, it is felt, the prospects for 
stable democracy are not good, even in the established first 
world countries. 
The theory of the plural society adds to the 'democratic 
pessimism' as far as the third world countries are concerned. 
As has been shown these countries also lack the cross-cutting, 
politically relevant, affiliations which give rise to a homo-
geneous political culture, and for at least some pluralist 
writers the undemocratic regulation of conflict is a defining 






See above, 16. 
See the up-to-date discussion of this topic in T. Hanf, H. Weiland and 
G. Vierdag South Africa: The Prospects of Peaceful Change (1981) 3-10, 
and the references cited there. 
The qualification relates to the fact that it is generally agreed that 
the homogeneity of western societies has been greatly overstressed, 
particularly in relation to the economic base of the political system. 
See D. Nicholls Three Varieties of Pluralism (1974) 5"6; A. Lij phart 
The Politics of Accommodation (2 ed, 1975) 3. 
M.G. Smith 'Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism' in Kuper 
cniSmith nn ('; t- ?7-f"t; 
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1 In addition numerous commentators have drawn attention to 
the accentuation of ethnic and linguistic conflict in recent 
times,arising from a reassertion of communal attachments in 
plural societies; this phenomenon has challenged the assump-
tions of the 'political modernisation' theorists that the 
political significance of cultural, ethnic and religious ties 
would diminish with economic development, and that the process 
of national integration would lead to the eradication of com-
munal attachments and their replacement with a national 
2 loyalty. As Smock and Smock observe, 
'The politicisation of plural subgroups and the sig-
nificance of its political implications have caught 
many social scientists unprepared communal 
attachments do not quietly wither away with exposure 
to modernizing influences. Quite the contrary, 
modernization often creates the very conditions 
necessary for the incubation of strong communal 
identities and sets the stage for communal competi-
t ion. ' 
In the light of this evidence the Jdemocratic pessimists,3 have 
concluded that it is not possible to depluralise such societies 
through a process of modernisation and nation-building, nor is 
it possible to manage and regulate their conflicting forces 
democratically.4 
Consociationalism provides a challenge to the 'democratic pessi-
mists', by indicating for divided plural societies alternative 
1. See on this theme S.P. Huntington in the foreword to E. Nordlinger 
Conflict Re ulaticn in Divided Societies (1972); N. Glazer 'The Univer-
salisat~on of Ethnicity' 44 1975 Encounter 8ff; A. Rabushka and K. 
Shepsle Politics in Plural Societies (1972); D. and A. Smock The Poli-
tics of Pluralism (1975); N. Kasfir The Shrinking Political Arena (1976); 
M. Essman 'The Management of Communal Conflict' 21 (1973) Public Policy 
49; Crawford Young The Politics of Cultural Pluralism (1976); A. 
Lijphart 'Religious vs Linguistic vs Class Voting: The "Crucial Experi-
ment" of Comparing Belgium, Canada, South Africa and Switzerland' 73 
(1979) The American Political Science Review 442-458. 
2. Op cit 3-4 and references cited there; for these writers communalism 
involves 'the overriding attachment to groups sharing inherited bonds 
based on religion, ethnic descent, language, race or regional origin'. 
3. The term is Lijphart's: Democracy in Plural Societies (1977) 2-3; cf 
also T. Ranf et al op cit 4-6. 
4. See in particular Rabushka and Shepsle op cit 212ff; but cf Crawford 
Young op cit 125. 
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political processes to those adopted in the stable liberal-
democracies. It is pointed out that the majoritarian features 
of the British and American constitutional systems,and the re-
sulting government-versus-opposition dichotomy,are particularly 
unsuited to plural societies because they assume flexible 
voting patterns and changes in voter allegiance,which by defi-
nition are absent in these systems. Because political pref-
erences consistently coincide with lines of cleavage,the major-
itarian principle is likely to result in practice in permanent 
political majorities and permanent minorities. As Smock and 
1 Smock observe, 
'The winner-takes-all ethos that characterizes the 
Westminster model does not suit many plural societies 
because it almost assuredly means that some communal 
groups will be in power at the expense of others.' 
The logic ,of the situation precludes rotation in office and an 
alternating monopoly of power; upon which both the Westminster 
and presidential systems depend for their democratic function-
ing. And if there is no alternation in office the exclusion 
implicit in the government-versus-opposition d~chotomy can 
have drastic consequences for those excluded indefinitely from 
office,who would furthermore have no incentive to abide by the 
rules of the game. This pattern involves a violation of what 
Lewis calls the primary rule of democracy, namely that all 
citizens should have the opportunity to participate in decision-
making, if only through elected representatives. 3 Rabushka 
and Shepsle suggest that 'majoritarianism is the cause of the 
dominant community': and their paradigm of politics in plural 
societies involves the sectional domination of decision pro-
cesses, a decline in democratic competition, electoral machina-
tions and political violence, resulting in the destabilising of 
the whole polity. 
1. Op cit 331. 
2. See H. Adam 'The Failure of Political Liberalism' in Adam and Giliomee 
op cit 258 at 273. 
3. W.A. Lewis Politics in West Africa (1965) 64-66. And see above, 23. 
4. Op cit 90; 'white' politics in South Africa shows some affinity to 
their paradigm. See also E. Nordlinger Conflict Regulation in Divided 
Societies (1972) 36 for the view that majoritarianism contributes to 
the conflict's exacerbation. 
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While consociationalism is not over-sanguine as to the pros-
pects of democracy in divided plural societies, its proponents 
can be regarded as the 'democratic optimists' in relation to 
such societies. 1 Operating on the assumption that it is not 
possible to depluralise a plural society through assimilation 
or partition, the consociationalists assert that conflict in 
such societies can be democratically regulated, provided it is 
not done on the basis of the majoritarian principle. The 
basic principles of ,consociationalism point to alternative con-
stitutional features to the majoritarian features of the tra-
ditional liberal-democratic constitutional systems. 
6. South Africa and Pluralism 
Ca) The plural society 
The theory of the plural society has been applied to South Africa 
by numerous writers, and South Africa has been described as a 
prime example of a plural society.2 This may be partially 
attributable to the difficulty of explaining the existence and 
maintenance of South African society in terms of consensus func-
tionalism. The definition provided by Bekker 3 is one which 
could be applied to South Africa in all its essential elements, 
but generally the writers do not elevate pluralism to a general 
theory of society, but regard it instead as a useful variant 
theory.4 The government, on the other hand, tends to use notions 
1. Cf Ranf, Weiland and Vierdag op cit 7-8. 
2. See eg J. Rex 'The Plural Society: The South African Case' 12 (1971) 
Race 401-413; L. Kuper Race, Class and Power (1974); P. van den Berghe 
SOUth Africa - A Study in Conflict (1965); L. Schlemmer 'Tneories of the 
Plural Society and Change in South Africa' 3 (1977) Social Dynamics 3-16. 
See also the surveys of the literature in R. Adam and R. Giliomee The Rise 
and Crisis of Afrikaner Power (1979) 42-50; V.V. Razis Swords or Plough-
shares? (1980) 91-129; Ranf, Weiland and Vierdag op cit 10-15. 
3. See above, 75. 
4. Eg L. Schlemmer op cit 5. 
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of the plural society in the absence of a legitimising ideol-
ogy of mino r ity domination. 1 The perception of government 
policy as a cynical manipulation of race and ethnicity to fur-
ther a divide and rule strategy has led, in turn, to an exten-
sive discrediting of notions of pluralism. The most persistent 
criticism of pluralist theory in relation to South Africa comes 
from the class perspective,which holds that racial and cultural 
pluralism are not in themselves relevant, or have only peri-
pheral relevance, to the fundamentally class conflict in soc-
iety. This has given rise to an extensive debate on the true 
nature of the conflict in South Africa, and the relevance of race 
and ethnicity to future constitutional developments . 
The pluralist approach emphasises the extensive cultural heter-
ogeneity of South Africa,which derives from the cultures of 
three continents. 2 Western European culture was introduced in 
two main variants, English and Dutch, and through the process 
of acculturation is at present the dominant culture, being 
shared by all whites, most coloureds, and increasing numbers of 
blacks and Indians. The other imported culture is that of the 
Indians, and there is the indigenous culture of the Bantu-
speaking people, both of which have survived the process of 
acculturation in varying degrees. The lines of cultural cleav-
age in South Africa do not, however, coincide completely with 
'racial' divisions (as the term 'race' is used in the South 
African context 3 ), since the whites and coloureds are regarded 
as different 'races' without there being sep~rate cultures; 
coloured persons share two identifying characteristics, lan-
guage and religion,with the Afrikaans sub-culture. This fea-
ture is described by Van den Berghe as secondary pluralism. 4 
The criterion of 'race' further complicates the pattern of 
1. See Adam and Giliomee op cit 45. 
2. See P. van den Berghe South Africa - A Study in Conflict (1965) 38-72; 
H. Lever South African Society (1978) 1-36. 
3. As Lever Cop cit 5) points out,racial differentiation in South Africa 
has a social rather than a scientific basis; one might more accurate-
ly suggest a social-legal basis. 
4. See above, 72. While coloureds share the dominant culture they 
are relegated to an inferior .position because of their 'racial' mem-
bership. 
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social stratification and segmentation in South Africa since 
it results in imposed, and not voluntarily assumed, group iden-
tities. 1 Membership of the statutorily-defined 'race' groups 
is ascribed at birth,and mobility between the groups is dif-
ficult;2 the single criterion of 'race' entails important 
political, social and economic consequences for an individual 
in terms of the existing social and legal dispensation. In-
ternally each 'racial' group is further sub-divided accordinR 
to different criteria and with differing degrees of rigidity: 
the white group is stratified on the basis of language, reli-
gion and class, the coloured group on the basis of class and 
physical traits, Indians on the basis of religion, language, 
class and caste, and blacks on the basis of ethnicity and 
tribal loyalty, class and degree of urbanisation. Thus the 
stratifications in South Africa are characterised as being 
based on race, language, religion, culture, class, colour, 
tribalism and urbanisation, and as being maintained partly by 
custom and partly by law. The fundamental cleavages in South 
African society are not generally muted by cross-cutting mem-
bershi~in associations, which for legal and traditional rea-
sons have tended to be 'homogeneous'in composition; the main 
exceptions are found in respect of religious denomination, the 
process of accul turation, and the continuing industrialisation 
3 
of the country, but these do not shift the society significantly 
towards the dissociation end of the spectrum.4 If pluralism is 
a matter of degree,then South Africa is seen as highly pluralist 
with a large convergence in its lines of cleavage; in addition 
it features the sectional domination associated with plural 
societies, in that the white group is at the apex of a hierarch-
ical system controlling political and economic power and enjoying 
1. The most important statute dealing with 'race' classification is the 
Population Registration Act No 30 of 1950, but some other acts contain 
their own par-ticular defl.nitions. It is clear from the first-mentioned 
act that coloured persons constitute a residual category (s 1). 
2. On race classification generally see M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 
151ff. Edogamy is enforced by the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 
No 55 of 1949. 
3. L. Kuper 'Political Change in White Settler Societies' in Kuper and Smith 
op cit 180; Sprocas South Africa's Political Alternatives (1973) 84-85. 
4. See above., 73-74 .. 
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the attendant privileges,1 and beneath them are coloureds, 
Indians, and finally blacks. In this context the theory of 
the plural society would seem to have some relevance. 
Van den Berghe 2 has described South Africa as an example par 
excellence of a plural society, in the sense in which he uses 
the term. He perceives a proliferation of separate societies 
with different institutions and facilities, different goals and 
opportunities, and differing values and points of view. In 
the absence of value consensus, coercive measures are required 
to ensure stability and enforce laws, and the inherent conflict 
could lead to the breakdown of the system. But together with 
others who apply the plural society concept to South Africa; 
Van den Berghe does not emphasise cultural factors to the ex-
clusion of economic factors. ~n their study Slabbert and Wel~h4 
define the nature of the conflict in South Africa as 'struc-
tural inequality of wealth, status and power'. Because the 
inequalities are institutionalised on the basis of statutorily-
defined concepts of 'race' and J ethnic i ty', these concepts ac-
quire an important political salience and the conflict tends to 
be articulated in racial/ethnic terms. While they do not deny 
the importance of the class conflict (and the authors concede 
the large degree of overlap between colour and class), they 
point out that in the political arena the conflict is seldom 
articulated in economic terms, or in terms of the interests of 
a particular economic class; and they suggest that where class 
and ethnic solidarities compete, ethnicity will invariably pre-
vail. Even by those operating within the broad pluralist tra-
dition, therefore, the theory of the plural society is seen to 
have a limited explanatory value in South Africa; what is 
sought is a recognition, but not an absolutising, of ethnic and 
cultural diversity. 
1. See H. Lever op cit 7. 
2. P. van den Berghe Race and Racism (1967) 64. 
3. Eg L. Schlewmer 'Theories of the Plural Society and Change in South 
Africa' 3 (1977) Social Dynamics 3-16. 
4. F. van Zyl Slabbert and D. Welsh South Africa's Options: Strategies for 
Sharing Power (1978) 23. 
5. Ibid 14. 
87. 
The main criticism of the pluralist approach from the class 
perspective is that it overlooks the real dimensions of the 
class struggle in South Africa. 1 In reality, conflict is attribu-
table to the cleavages between classes having opposed economic 
interests, and the concepts of ethnicity, language and religion 
used by the pluralists serve only to conceal the real nature of 
this conflict. The 'racial' conflict in South Africa is 
attributed to the fact that 'race' can be equated with class" 
and the phenomenon of ethnic mobilisation is attributed to 
'false consciousness' on behalf of the working class. It is 
also said that the political and economic systems in South 
Africa are not operating in opposition to each other, and that 
racial domination flows from the needs of the capitalist mode 
of production; from this follows the view that economic develop-
ment will not necessarily lead to political liberalisation, and 
that there is no possibility of fundamental political change 
under the present capitalist mode of production. 2 The Marxist 
and neo-Marxist analyses of conflict in South Africa have been 
criticised in turn for their tendency to overlook subjective 
reality and their pre-occupation with economic factors; it is 
said that racial discrimination in South Africa cannot be ex-
plained solely as a product of the system of production. This 
has led to attempts to combine some aspects of pluralist theory 
with Marxist theory. In his article on black labour in South 
Africa John Rex 3 concludes that the analysis justifies neither 
wholly pluralist nor wholly Marxist conclusions: 
' ... What is eviden~ is certainly not the pluralism 
of cultural segments which either Furnivall's analysis 
... or Smith's ... suggests. If there is division, 
the divisions can be seen to be functionally inter-
related within an overall pattern of political con-
flict generated by the capitalist development ... a 
1. See L. Kuper Race, Class and Power (1974); F.A. Johnstone Class, Race 
and Gold: a Study of Class Relations and Racial Discrimination in South 
Africa (1976); M. Legassik 'South Africa: Capital Accumulation and 
Violence' 3 (1974) Economy and Society 253-291; see further the refer-
ences in Adam and Giliomee op cit 46-50, V.V. Razis op cit 91-111 Hanf, 
Weiland and Vierdag op cit 10-11. ' 
2. This is too perfunctory a treatment of class theory to be of great value, 
but a constitutional study must, by definition, attend to 'superstructure' 
and not the economic base. 
3. 'The Plural Society: The South African Case' 12 (1971) Race 401-413. 
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specific kind of class struggle there undoubtedly 
is, namely one in which the classes are groups of 
varying histories and ethnic origins who enter the 
modern society with varying rights and degrees of 
rightlessness ... all the groups and segments in 
this society are held locked together, albeit in a 
bitter conflict, not solely by the institution of 
government, but by a rapidly expanding economy I 1 
The race/class debate remains, however, fundamentally unresolved. 
In a recent major study of conflict and its regulation in South 
Africa Hanf, Weiland and Vierdag 2 distinguish between three 
principal dimensi6ns of conflict, namely economic, socio-cul-
tural and political, and suggest that it is implausible to stip-
ulate in principle that one dimension will be primary. The 
relative importance of the dimensions of conflict, and the re-
lationship between them, should be treated not as matters of def-
inition,but as empirical questions which should be answered in 
the light not only of potential sources of conflict resulting 
from objective differences between groups,but also perceptions 
of conflict, which they regard as a central factor in conflict 
regulation. 3 Whereas all three types of conflict are unilater-
ally regulated at present by the dominant white group, they 
suggest, in the light of their surveys, that the economic con-
flicts could in principle be resolved by negotiated regulation 
in the future; on the other hand the conflicts over socio-
cultural identity and power raise considerable difficulties, 
inter alia, because of the subjective perceptions of the com-
batants. The study concludes, on this aspect, that some form 
of consociational solution need not be completely excluded 
for the future. 4 
1. Op cit 412. 
2. South Africa The Prospects of Peaceful Change (1981). 
3. Ibid 12. 
4. Ibid 381. 
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While the three forms of conflict identified in the Hanf 
study are closely related to one another, it is the conflict 
over political power with which the present work is primarily 
concerned. While political formation , on the basis of per-
ceived differences between cultural groups is a feature of 
most plural societies; in South Africa the formation of poli-
tical groups, and therefore the expression of the political 
conflict, takes place in a context of statutory group defini-
tions. At present the political conflict is a product of the 
differential incorporation of these groups into the political 
system,and the fundamental political issue relates to full 
political rights for those presently excluded from voting and 
standing for public office. 2 And regardless of the complex-
ity of the overall patterns of conflict, the political relations 
between blacks and whites is the priority issue in South Africa 
at present. This is also the conflict with which constitu-
tionalism is most closely related,and the need is usually ex-
pressed by political reformists in South Africa to create con-
stitutional structures which will terminate white political 
domination and allow for universal political participation, 
without at the same time allowing for any other sectional dom-
ination. It is thus inevitable that in the constitutional de-
bate existing concepts of 'race' and 'ethnicity' should be used, 
regardless of the extent to which the statutory groups coincide 
with objective or perceived group interests. 
Cb) Political pluralism 
It is clear from the preceding analysis that South Africa does 
not have the 'open pluralistic society' and homogeneous politi-
cal culture associated with the British and American liberal-
democracies. Insofar as the traditions of political pluralism 
emphasise the need for limitations on the power of the state, 
and the need for institutional arrangements to distribute and 
share power, it can also be said that South Africa lacks the 
other ingredients of political pluralism. 3 
1. Ibid 15. 
2. Cf. L. Schlemmer 'Conflict and Conflict Regulation in South Africa' ln 
De Crespigny and Schrire op ' cit 160~161 . . 
3. Cf Degenaar's integrated pluralist model at 78 . ahovp. 
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The pluralist aversion to a concentration of power is not 
apparent in the South African system of government which has 
shown a general tendency to concentrate power in the central 
authorities, more particularly the cabinet and bureaucracy. 
This tendency may be partially attributed to specific consti-
tutional features, such as the unitary nature of the constitu-
tion which has facilitated the growth of the central legisla-
ture's powers at the expense of provincial and local authori~ 
ties. 1 The flexibility of the constitution and the doctrine 
of sovereignty, in both its legal and political forms, have 
also been conducive to a concentration of power, and, in com-
bination with the system of parliamentary government, have enabled 
the white executive to dominate all other branches of govern-
ment and control the whole political system. The absence of 
a judicial testing-right or justiciable bill of rights has given 
further strength to the arm of the central government. While 
separate development can·be said to have given rise to a 'plural' . 
devolution of power along territorial and functional lines, this 
has not threatened the sovereignty of ~he central legislature, 
nor has it proved to be a substantial check on the process of 
centralisation. It is rather true to say that there is a 
position of state sovereigntY,without any plural division of power 
'based on a division of functions according to social utility,.2 
As far as group formation and activity are concerned, there is 
also considerable deviation in South Africa from pluralist theory. 
The most severe deviations have been caused by state intervention, 
in the form of direct and indirect statutory restrictions on the 
composition and membership of groups and associations; even 
political parties are restricted in their composition; which has 
led to a disjunction between 'official' and 'actual' groups in 
South Africa. 4 The absence of voluntary group identities and 
cross-cutting group memberships has affected the groups' other 
1. These matters are analysed in more detail in chapter 4, below. 
2. J. Degenaar 'Pluralism and the Plural Society' in De Crespigny and 
Schrire op cit 223 at 228. 
3. Mainly by the Prohibition of Political Interference Act No 51 of 1968. 
4. F. van 2yl Slabbert and D. Welsh South Africa's Options (1979) 11. 
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functions in society: they tend not to be open to one another, 
and their sporadic contacts are inclined to be inhibited and 
unsuccessful. 1 
Besides playing an important role in defining group boundaries, 
and in creating divisions within such groups, the state in South 
Africa also polices intergroup boundaries and unilaterally 
confers legitimacy on,or withdraws it from, existing or emerging 
groups. The government also tends to restrict the activities 
of non-state groups such as universities, schools, churches and 
trade unions; Degenaar cites specific instances of the govern-
ment acting in a non-pluralist manner, such as when it warns 
these organisations not to interfere in politics. 2 While the 
state's role in pluralist theory is to ensure the co-existence 
of groups so that the greatest freedom is granted to individuals 
and groups,the tendency in South Africa is for the state to deny 
political participation on a pluralist basis to groups other 
than itself. When the state assumes its character of sovereign-
ty,groups tend to become subordinated and absorbed by it. 3 
Thus while the 'white' political system may be described in 
terms of competing interest groups~ the pattern does not spread 
through society as a whole. The inequalities in power and re-
sources of non-white groups precludes any notion of an overall 
competitive balance of power. As has been indicated~ one has 
to do here with a system of conflict pluralism and not consensus 
pluralism, and this work investigates the extent to which it 
might develop in the direction of consociational pluralism. 
1. See M. Savage's analysis of group and personal interaction ~n 'Major 
Patterns of Group Interaction in South African Society' in L. Thompson 
and J.Butler (eds) Change in Contemporary South Africa (1975) 280-302; 
see also Peter Harris 'Interest Groups in the South African Political 
Process' in D. Worrall (ed) South Africa: Government and Politics 
(2 ed, 1975) 25~-284. 
2. J. Degenaar 'Pluralism and the Plural Society' 233; see also J. van 
der Vyver 'The Function of Legislation as an Instrument for Social 
Reform' 93 (1976) SALJ 56-67. 
3. Ibid. See also M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 189. 
4. See H. Adam 'Interests Behind Afrikaner Power' in Adam and Giliomee 00 
cit 177-195; Adam singles out two groups as having pronounced pOliti-
cal power and influence in decision-making: English and Afrikaner big 
business, and sections of the state bureaucracy. Corporatist ten-
dencies are clearly evident here. 
5. See 79 , above. 
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7 . Conclus i on 
This excursus on pluralism and the plural society is designed 
to serve three purposes. The first is to provide some under-
standing of, and definltional clarity to, concepts which are ex-
tensively and often inappropriately used in the current con-
stitutional debate. The second is to situate consociationalism 
within the different traditions in political science and poli-
tical sociology; here its close association with theories of 
pluralism has been established. The third is to highlight 
the forms of conflict which the pluralist traditions regard as 
important, and their essential nature. At the political level 
the main perceived conflict is between whites with political 
rights and non-whites without, and it is to a constitutional 
resolution of this conflict that the principles of consociation-
alism might be called in aid, as an alternative to partition and 
other forms of political separation on the one hand, and uni- . 
tarianism and majoritarianism on the other. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CONSOCIATIONAL ALTERNATIVE 
1. Introduction 
Consociationalism 1 challenges the pluralist proposition that 
viable and stable democracy is not possible in divided plural 
societies because they lack the 'essential' characteristics 
of cross-cutting cleavages and multiple group affiliations. 2 
It also challenges the tendency to equate democracy with 
majority rule, and provides an alternative pattern of decision-
making to that associated with the Westminster and president-
ial systems of government to suit the circumstances of plural 
societies. It thus indicates the necessity for modifications 
to both pluralist theory, and to accepted notions of democratic 
government. 
1. The word 'consociate' dervies from the Latin consociare (to asso-
ciate together, join in fellowship) and 'consociation' has been 
used in respect of a union in fellowship, a close association, and 
a political alliance or confederation. The principle of confed-
erating churches has been referred to as consociationism (S.C.D. 
vol I 376) lef Hasnet (1603), 'When a Lyon a Fox and an Asse were 
met together in Pilgrimage it was much wondered at •.. what the Con-
sociation meant. '7 The term was used by Johannes Althusius (1563-
1638) in his work Politica Methodice Digesta (1603). The first 
modern writer to use the term was David Apter (The Political Kingdom 
in Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism (1961) who (at 24f) 
defined consociation as a 'Joining together of constituent units 
which do not lose their identity when merging in some form of union'. 
He described it further as essentially a system of compromise and 
accommodation but subject to immobilism because of the need to find 
agreement on common action. The first writer to use and apply the 
term systematically was Arend Lijphart beginning with his articles 
'Typologies of Democratic Systems' 21 (1968) Comparative Political 
Studies 3-44, and 'Consociational Democracy' 21 (1969) World 
Politics 207-225. G. Lehmbruch (Proporzdemokratie: Politische 
System und politische Kultur in der Schweiz und in Oesterreich (1967) 
developed the concept independently of Lijphart. Other terms used 
for the same concept are accommodation, contractarianism, amicable 
agreement and konkordanzdemokratie. In this work use is made of 
both 'consociationalism' and 'consociation', as with 'federalism' 
and 'federation'. 
2. See A. Lijphart The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and 
Democracy in the Netherlands (2 ed, 1975) 1ff. 
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The literature suggests that consociationalism can be approach-
ed from three different, though related, standpoints. 
1 
These 
are: firstly, as a pattern of social structure which emphasises 
the degree of religious, ideological, cultural or linguistic 
segmentation in a society;2 secondly, as a pattern of elite 
behaviour, emphasising the process of decision-making and con-
flict regulation;3 and thirdly, and more elusively, as an 
underlying characteristic of the political culture arising from 
historical circumstances. 4 In this chapter consociationalism 
is depicted in terms of the second approach, though its close 
relationship with the third will become apparent. 
As espoused in the second approach,consociationalism refers in 
essence to a political system in which there is close co-
operation between the leadership elites of all significant 
groups in a divided society who make a conscious effort to 
transcend the cultural and social fragmentation at the mass 
level. 5 In consociational theory overarching elite co-opera-
tion is a substitute for cross-cutting cleavages and multiple 
group affiliations, and the immobilising and destabilising 
effects of cultural fragmentation are counteracted by the de-
liberate political efforts of pragmatically oriented elites. 
The corollary of elite accommodation in a consociational system 
is relative self-containment and mutual isolation for the dif-
ferent subcultural segments; consociationalism not only ex-
1. K. McRae (ed) Consociational Democracy: Political Accomodation ln 
Segmented Societies (1974) 5-13. 
2. As exemplified by V. Lorwin 'Segmented Pluralism - Ideological 
Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies' 
3 (1971) Comparative Politics 141-175, and included in McRae op cit 
33-69. 
3. As exemplified, inter alia, by Lijphart in his works referred to below. 
4. The approach emphasised by H. Daalder; the Daalder-Lijphart debate 
is referred to at 121-123, below. 
5. The idea that negotiation should continue until a solution acceptable 
to all participants is found corresponds in some way to the method 
of palaver traditionally used by some African tribes. See J. 
Steiner Amicable A reement Versus Majority Rule - Conflict Resolution 
in Switzerland 1974 5. Cf B.O. Nwabueze Constitutionalism in the 
Emergent States (1973) 168f; W.D. Hammond-Tooke Command or Consensus 
(1975) 4-75. 
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pressly recognises these segments, but makes provision for their 
cultural and political autonomy. For empirical models of con-
sociationalism its proponents have pointed to relevant periods 
in the history of the European democracies of Austria, Switzer-
land, Belgium and Netherlands, and to less striking examples 
outside Europe, but they suggest that it can also serve as a 
prescriptive model for other divided plural societies. Where-
as traditional typologies of political systems had not account-
ed successfully for the smaller European democracies, which 
tended to be stable despite lacking a homogeneous political 
culture, the consociational writers argue that these systems 
fit into pluralist theory as amended by the consociational 
phenomenon of elite accommodation. 
Consociational democracy differs in essence from the Anglo-
American constitutional tradition in that it avoids majoritar-
ianism at all stages of the decision-making and distributive 
processes of government, without resorting to minority rule or 
other non-democratic devices. It should be emphasised, how-
ever, that consociationalism does not provide an analytical 
constitutional model, and its principles may be encountered in 
a wide variety of institutional arrangements; as some consti-
tutional features are more favourable than others for the ap-
plication of the consociational principles, it has become 
natural to associate these with consociationalism, and even to 
refer to them as consociational institutions or devices - for 
example a proportional electoral system. It is thus useful 
to draw a distinction between the consociational system, in 
which all the relevant principles are applied, and consocia-
tional devices, which can be encountered in non-consociational 
systems as well - in fact many political systems have a com-
bination of co-operative consociational features and competi-
tive majoritarian features. And while the emphasis in the 
second approach to consociationalism is on behavioural -
a tti tudinal factors, it will be shown that the system I s success 
is enhanced by those constitutional features and devices which 
encourage a co-operative style of government by departing from 
the.majoritarian and adversarial aspects of the Westminster 
and presidential systems. The effect of these institutions is 
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to replace majoritarian government with joint consensual rule; 
the government-versus-opposition dichotomy and the alternation 
in power phenomenon are replaced by a system in which power-
sharing among all significant groups becomes a prominent feature 
of the political system, if not an institutional requirement. 
The writers in the consociational school differ among them-
selves as to the essential characteristics of a consociational 
system, the efficacy of the various consociational techniques, 
the favourable conditions for successful consociationalism, 
and the classification of various systems as consociational or 
semi-consociational. In what follows an analysis will be 
given of the principles which are generally accepted as being 
characteristic of the consociational model, the conceptual 
links between consociationalism and federalism will be des-
cribed, a brief survey will be given of the main empirical ex-
amples of consociationalism, an indication will be given of 
the factors conducive to the system's success or failure, and 
reference will be made to some of the drawbacks in consocia-
tional theory and in a consociational system of government. 
Finally, attention will be given to consociationalism in the 
South African context. 
2. General Characteristics of Consociationalism 
The most significant contribution to consociational theory has 
been made by Arend Lijphart,who defines consociationalism in 
terms of four fundamental characteristics which will be taken 
1. Among the main sources which have been used in this work are A. 
Lijphart The Politics of Aceornmodation (above) and Democracy in Plural 
Societies - A Comparative Exploration (1977); K. McRae (ed) Conso-
ciational Democracy (above) which includes contributions by many of 
the major writers in this school; and E. Nordlinger Conflict Regula-
tion in Divided Societies (1972). Other proponents and critics of 
the consociational theme are refer.red to below. Among the most im-
portant reviews of the literature are those by H. Daalder 26 (1974) 
World Politics 604-621, B. Barry 5 (1975) British Journal of Political 
Science 477-505, G. Powell 73 (1979) American Journal of political Science 
296, and J. Steiner 1981 Comparative Politics 339-354. 
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as the basis of the analysis that follows. Each of these 
characteristics can be compared and contrasted with a corres-
ponding majoritarian feature of the Westminster and presiden-
tial constitutional systems, and cumulatively they give rise 
to a system which shares, diffuses, separates, divides, de-
centralises and limits power.1 The consociational model 
stands in particularly sharp contrast to the Westminster model, 
with its tendency to concentrate political power in the hands 
of the electoral majority, and it is with this model that it 
can be most appropriately compared in the South African context. 
The two basic elements of consociationalism are power-sharing 
at the national level of government, and group autonomy at the 
sub-national level, but in fact all four of the consociational 
characteristics can be identified at the sub-national level in 
certain systems. 2 
Ca) Grand coalition3 
The most important feature of a consociational system is the 
grand coalition in whith the leaders of all significant groups 
in the society are represented. 4 It is at this level that 
leadership elites are able to transcend the subcultural cleav-
ages at the mass level and lend stability to the political 
system; the grand coalition is also the forum where bargains 
are struck by group leaders without requiring direct popular 
ratification. It is a cartel of pragmatically oriented elites. 
The composition and functioning of the grand coalition shows a 
clear deviation from the assumptions of majority rule and the 
1. A. Lijphart 'Consociation: The Model and its Applications in Divided 
Societies' 3, paper presented at the Study Conference on Models of 
Political Co-operation', Queen's University, Belfast, 25-28 March 1981. 
2. See, for example E.A. Aunger's work In Search of Political Stability: 
A Comparative Study of New Brunswick and Northern Ireland (1981) in 
which he identifies the consociational characteristics in the Canadian 
province of New Brunswick. 
3. On this characteristic see A. Lijphart Democracy in Plural Societies 
25-36; E. Nordlinger op cit 21f. 
4. ~ut cf B. Barry 'The Consociational Model and its Dangers' 3 (1975) 
European Journal of Political Research 393 at 405f,who argues that the 
grand coalition is only an epiphenomenon and that the political 
willingness to maintain stability is the more important factor. 
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government-versus-opposition pattern' in which an elected 
majority enjoys extensive constitutional power for the 
duration of its majority status. The competitive majoritar-
ian model embodies a principle of exclusion in relation to 
both the composition of the cabinet and its decision-making 
patterns,which denies minorities access to power for the 
duration of their minority status;2 the principle becomes 
less exclusive if the minority can achieve majority status and 
there is an alternation in office, but becomes highly exclusive 
where minority status is of indefinite duration, as is the ten-
dency in divided plural societies. The basis of the grand 
coalition's composition, by contrast, is the principle of in-
clusion, which ensures participation for all minorities in the 
coalition on a proportional basis, regardless of whether their 
status is permanent or not,3 and this reduces the need for an 
'alternation in office'. Their presence and participation in 
the grand coalition are made meaningful by the other consocia-
tional devices,which allow minorities to induce a consensual 
type of decision-making that is not institutionally supported 
by the homogeneous composition of conventional Westminster or 
presidential cabinets. 4 Consensus and a coalescent style of 
leadership in the grand coalition become the characteristics of 
a consociational political system. 
1. This is something of an idealised concept since R. Dahl (Political 
Oppositions in Western Democracies (1965) 332) has shown that 'govern-
ment-versus-opposition' systems are the deviant cases in Western 
democracies, which show no single prevailing pattern of opposition. 
2. But cf E. Aunger (op cit) to the effect that the Westminster system's 
one-party majority cabinets are not incompatible with a grand coa-
lition, provided the segments are represented in both major parties. 
3. The grand coalition principle contradicts the theory that in zero-sum 
conditions coalitions tend toward the minimal winning size. See W. 
Riker The Theory of Political Coalitions (1962) 28-32. 
4. A. Lewis Politics in West Africa (1965) 68 and referred to at 23, 
above, advocated coalition government by all major parties ~n pref-
erence to the one party systems which emerged in the early years of 
African independence; 1n addition he favoured proportional represen-
tation in all branches of government, and federalism or a provincial 
devolution of power. 
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Grand coalitions can be found in many institutional forms but the 
prototype is the grand coalition cabinet, as exemplified by the 
Swiss national executive, the federal council. This body consists 
of seven members, each of whom is chosen by the main political par-
ties in proportion to their electoral strength, and the presidency 
rotates among the members of the council on an annual basis.
1 
Many of the Swiss cantons also have power-sharing executives 
which are composed and function along similar lines. During 
Austria's consociational experience the coalition principle 
was applied within the national cabinet in which the two major 
political parties were equally represented, and in an extra-
constitutional coalition committee in which there was also 
equal representation. Another variety of grand coalition is 
found in the case of economic or cultural councils,which might 
have only informal and advisory powers but nevertheless play 
a decisive role in the political process. 2 There are also 
cases where cabinets are formed not on the grand coalition 
basis but with a broader political base than is required by a 
majoritarian system; this tendency is even discernible in 
Britain,with its thoroughly majoritarian parliamentary system, 
when exceptional circumstances have required the promotion of 
national policies. 3 A distinction should be made, however, 
between coalitions formed prior to elections with the avowed 
aim of conflict regulation, and common government coalitions 
which may merely represent post-electoral marriages of politi-
cal convenience. 4 In the latter case, if one or more major con-
flict organisation is not included in the coalition the arrange-
ment will not have a consociational outcome, and could even 
1. This so-called 'magic formula' results in two socialists, two Catho-
lics, two liberal-radicals, and one peasants' party representative 
being elected, by convention, to the federal executive. These numbers 
have fluctuated according to the respective strengths of the parties 
and the present quota is of comparatively recent origin. In addition 
the linguistic segments are also catered for within this formula. See 
c. Hughes The Federal Constitution of Switzerland (1954) 108f, and 
The Parliament of Switzerland (1962) 69-83. 
2. A. Lijphart refers to empirical examples in Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Austria and Czechoslavakia, but they are also encountered Ln non-
consociational systems such as France. 
3. See D. Butler (ed) Coalitions in British Politics (1978) 113, and 
above, 37-38. 
4. E. Nordlinger op cit 21-22. 
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lead to the divisive 'outbidding' phenomenon from those 
omitted from the coalition. 1 
As far as constitutional arrangements are concerned, it is 
clear that the majoritarian Westminster system with its one-
party executive, two competitive parties, and concentration 
of the opposition, is not favourable for the application of 
the coalition principle;2 however a parliamentary system does 
have the advantage of allowing all parties in parliament to be 
represented on the executive, provided it is not homogeneously 
composed. The presidential system also does not provIde a 
favourable institutional basis because it vests executive 
authority predominantly in a single individual with a separate 
popular mandate; nevertheless a type of coalition could exist 
between the president and other top office-holders,3 and the 
separation of powers principle inherent in presidentialism can 
be conducive to co-operation and compromise in an executive 
which is not directly responsible to the legislature. 4 The 
most favourable constitutional setting is provided by the semi-
parliamentary Swiss system in which the federal executive is 
elected on a proportional basis by the national legislature, 
is relatively independent of the legislature during its term 
of office, and is a collegial body in that all its members are 
of equal formal status and importance. S The efficacy of the 
grand coalition, however, is also intrinsically dependent on 
the other consociational characteristics. 
1. See A. Rabushka and K. Shepsle Politics in Plural Socieites (1972) 83: 
, ... ambitious politicians not included in the multi-ethnic coali-
tion have incentives to generate demand for communal rather than 
national issues ... Lthey7 seek to increase the salience of communal 
issues and then to outbid the ambiguous multiethnic coalition'. 
2. ef R. Dahl op cit 349-352. 
3.. A. Lijphart cites the example of Lebanon for such an arrangement. 
4. A. Lijphart Democracy in Plural Societies 34. The same can be said 
of the semi-separation of powers in the Netherlands. 
5. A more detailed analysis of the optimal constitutional framework for 
consociationalism is provided in chapter 8, below. 
1 Cb ) Mutual veto 
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~~ile the grand coalition enables all groups to participate 
in the decision-making process, the availability of the mutual 
veto at this level ensures that all participating groups, in-
cluding minorities, will be able to influence that process 
materially. The veto can be viewed from two closely-related 
perspectives - as a device to ensure that there is unanimity 
among those present on all decisions, or as a device to enable 
minorities to prevent the taking of decisions which might ad-
versely affect their essential interests. It is natural for 
the focus to fall on the second aspect since a minority veto, 
with its connotation of negative minority rule, is perceived 
as a contentious deviation from the majoritarian principle 
whith gives miriorities disproportionate power and leverage. 2 
In the consociational model, however, it is seen as necessary 
to afford minorities both voices and vetoes, primarily within 
the grand coalition, but also in theory in other branches of 
government such as the legislature and judiciary. The concept 
is remiriiscent of Calhoun's doctrine of the 'concurrent major-
ity'J whith required that each interest or combination of in-
terests in society should consent to the making and execution 
of laws in order to safeguard minorities against the will of 
'democratic majorities,.3 Calhoun found manifestations of 
his doctrine iri the separation of powers, checks and balances, 
and amending process of the United States constitution, and 
most codified constitutions embody the principle in relation 
to a rigid amending procedure. 
1. A. Lijphart Democracy in Plural Societies 36-38; E. Nordlinger op 
cit 24-26; R. Dahl op cit 358. 
2. See D. Rae 'The Limits of Consensual Decision-Making' 69 (1975) 
American Political Science Review 1270-1294. Rae argues forcefully 
that consensus should not even be a normative criterion, despite its 
deep roots in liberal thought (cf the reference to John Locke at 17, 
above) . 
3. J. Calhoun A Disquisition on Government (The American Heritage Series 
edited by C. Gordon Post (1953) 20-31). Calhoun contrasted the 
numerical or absol~te majority with a concurrent or constitutional 
majority. Writing before the American Civil War he had some support 
from J. Madison The Federalist Papers No. 10. See further D.M. 
Potter The South and the Concurrent Majority (1972) for ways in which 
the South was able to maintain a position of power in the national 
government through this device, and to prevent, inter alia, the ad-
vancement of civil rights. 
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Numerous variations are possible in relation to the availa-
bility and effect of the veto right. Thus it could be 
available in respect of all decisions, or only those relating 
to constitutional amendments, or only those which affect cer-
tain vital interests,1 and variations could also exist in re-
lation to the minimum size Cif any) of the group which might 
exercise the veto. It could operate at the national or sub-
national levels of government, in different branches of gov-
ernment, and its effect could be absolute or merely suspensive. 
Different combinations of these variations are found in prac-
tice. 2 Practical variations are also found in relation to 
the veto's constitutional status - that is whether it is in-
corporated into the constitution itself, is formally agreed 
upon by the respective parties but lacks constitutional force, 
or is informally practised and dependent on usage and conven-
tion. In the Netherlands and Switzerland the veto principle 
has been applied informally, in Austria it was the product of 
a formal agreement, in Belgium the former informal understand-
ing was incorporated into the constitution in 1970 and now 
requires a concurrent majority on cultural and linguistic 
matters, and in Lebanon the Christians and Muslims have for 
some time had a legislative veto as a constitutional right. 
There are clear attractions in the formal availability of the 
mutual veto in a system which has no strong tradition of poli-
tical compromise and consensus, whereas a legacy of elite co-
operation renders this less necessary. 
In the light of the earlier discussion on majoritarianism3 it 
is clear that the mutual veto involves a radical departure 
from majority rule, and even from the less extreme forms of 
qualified majoritarianism. Its purpose is to effect a form 
of joint consensual rule, or power-sharing, by preventing 
decisions being taken unless they are acceptable to all relevant 
1. ef the reference to J.S. Mill at 18, above. 
2. For further discussion of these possible variations, see below, 421-425. 
3. At 16 to 23, above. 
103. 
parties. The manifest danger of the veto is the immobilisa-
tion of government, or at least a radical deceleration of the 
governing process; 1 and if political choices do not have 
outcomes then the resultant inaction or delay inevitably 
. 2 
favours the status quo and vested interests. '\~atever the 
normative appeal of consensual decision-making there appears 
3 
a need for a non-consensual path for at least some outcomes. 
The consociational writers, however, attempt to put these dis-
advantages in perspective by emphasising the mutuality (or 
double edge) of the veto, the security it gives to minorities 
who might otherwise favour a violent alternative, and the in-
stitutional necessity it creates for compromise where govern-
mental activity is essential. Over a long term, they argue, 
and with the growth of mutual trust and the benefit of exper-
ience, it can be a feasible principle of government. Of all 
the consociational characteristics, however, it is the most 
potentially di~ruptive and requires the greatest sense of res-
ponsibility from leadership elites. 
Cc) Proportionality4 
The term 'proportionality' is usually used in relation to elec-
toral systems whith do not operate on a majoritarian or plural-
ity basis,S but in the consociational model it is used in re-
lation to the decision-making process as a whole. 6 Here the 
function of proportionality is to ensure that all groups in-
fluence decisions and actions in proportion to their numerical 
1. The failure of the Cypriot consociational constitution has been attri-
buted in part to the over use of the veto, which was available as a 
constitutional right. 
2. As D. Rae Cop cit 1280) points out,a majoritarian decision minimises 
the maximum number of voters who can be dissatisfied with such an outcome. 
3. Ibid. 
4. See A. Lij phart Democracy in P1 :lral Societies 38-41; E. Nordlinger op 
cit 22-24;J.Steiner lThe Principles of Majority and Proportionality' 1 
(1971) British Journal of Political Science 63-70 (and reprinted in 
McRae op cit 98-106); R. Dahl op cit 358. The arguments of G. Lehm-
bruch in Proporzdemokratie (1967) are summarised and developed in fA 
Non-Competitive Pattern of Conflict Management in Liberal Democracies: 
The Case of Switzerland, Austria and Lebanon' in McRae op cit 90-97. 
5. See above, 22. 
6. J. Steiner op cit 63. 
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strength, in contrast to the winner~takes-all outcomes in 
majoritarian systems. The principle again applies primarily 
in respect of the grand coalition which is composed in pro-
portion to the electoral strengths of the various parties; 
here it constitutes an essential complement to the coalition 
and veto principles. But proportionality also operates at 
numerous other levels in the normative consociational model. 
The principle is first encountered at the electoral level, 
where it ensures representation for all groups in joint author-
ities in proportion to their electoral support; 1 proportional 
representation involves proportional influence in decision-
making if the mutual veto is also available in these authori-
ties. Likewise indirect elections, such as those for a coal-
ition cabinet, are conducted on a proportional basis. The 
second area of application is at the appointment level, where 
the principle ensures that all non-elective government posi-
tions are proportionately allocated among the various groups; 
this would apply particularly to the bureaucracy, but the prin-
ciple could be extended to public corporations, advisory boards 
and administrative tribunals. The third area of application 
is at the allocation level, where the principle ensures that 
there is an equitable distribution of public funds and the 
other 'spoils' of government. At all levels the principle is 
designed to minimise conflict by reducing the degree of compe-
tition for governmental power, administrative positions, and 
scarce resources. 2 Two variations of proportionality are the 
deliberate overrepresentation of minorities, and parity of rep-
resentation for all groups;3 each of these arrangements results 
in exaggerated influence for minorities, as opposed to the 
majorities who are favoured in majoritarian systems. 
l. Greater attention is given to comparative electoral regimes 1n chapter 
8, below. 
2. E. Nordlinger op cit 23. This is facilitated by the fact that the 
proportional model postpones decisions to the highest level of govern-
ment where it is easier to effect compromises, though this obviously 
incurs costs in respect of the concentration of power and administra-
~ive secrecy. 
3. Eg there is parity of representation in the Belgian cabinet for members 
of the French- and Dutch-speaking groups, although the latter consti-
tute an overall majority of the population. 
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The principle of proportionality is hardly alien to modern 
constitutionalism and is encountered in various forms in 
numerous constitutional systems. It is consistently applied 
in federal constitutions in such matters as the equal state 
representation in the federal chamber 1 and proportionality 
as a basis of representation or a method of making public 
appointments or allocating resources is to be found in the 
constitutional provisions and practices of numerous other non-
consociational systems. But in many of these cases it tends 
to be applied eclectively and at times inconsistently, and has 
a limited impact on the 'majoritarian bias' of the constitu-
tional system as a whole . In the normative consociational 
model, on the other hand, proportionality has more extensive 
and consistent application and it effectively negates the pos-
sibility of majoritarian rule; it 'abolishes the sharp dis-
tinction between winners and losers: both majorities and 
minorities can be "winners" ... ,.2 Although the propor-
tionality principle is seldom encountered in its pure form,3 
it has been widely practised in the empirical consociations 
4 of the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium and Lebanon, 
where it has had an important accommodationist role. 
While the problems relating to the mutual veto are partly norm-
ative, those relating to the proportionality principle are pre-
dominantly ·pract ical. Pol icy dec is ions are diff icul t to take 
along proportional lines,S as are decisions of a basically 
dichotomous nature; an example of the former category would 
be the conduct of foreign affairs, and of the latter a clear-
cut decision on defence matters, such as the declaration of war. 
The consociationalists point out that these problems can be 
1. For example the United States and Australian Senates. 
2. A. Lijphart 'Consociation: The Model and its Applications ~n Divided 
Societies' (1981) 4. 
3. J. Steiner op cit 64. 
4. There are numerous examples of proportionality in practice at different 
levels of government, some of which are referred to subsequently in 
this wo=k. To cite a single example: in Belgium political decisions 
on matters such as industrial development, education and public works 
projects are taken on a 'proportional' basis. See E. Nordlinger op 
cit 24. 
5. J. Steiner op cit 63. 
106. 
partially resolved through the practice of reciprocal con-
cessions and package deals over time, so that a group disadvan-
1 
taged on one occasion will be preferred on another. Diffi-
culties also pertain to the filling of a single important 
vacancy,where the only possibility is to provide for the fre-
quent rotation of office (that is proportionality in the tem-
poral dimension 2 ), as occurs with the Swiss presidency. But 
even where there is more than one position to be filled the 
proportionality principle tends to emphasise the quantitative, 
rather than the qualitative, dimensio~ and fails to take 
account of the fact that some offices may be considerably more 
important than others; the latter consideration should there-
fore be seen as an integral feature of effective proportional 
patronage in public office. Finally, as a basis for making 
public appointments proportionality tends to prefer the equal 
treatment of groups to the respective merits of individual 
appointees,whith can involve costs in terms of ability and 
efficiency; here it displays some of the problems encountered 
in 'affirmative action' programmes, with which it shares a 
common function. 3 These problems, however, are an inevitable 
consequence of the consociational approach and, so it is 
argued, should be compared with the manifest problems of a 
majoritarian approach in a divided plural society. They have, 
however, led to various attempts to refine consociational 
theory. For example, Steiner4 suggests a form of decision-
making by 'interpretation!, which involves taking account not 
only of the numerical strength of various groups, but also 
their political status; while this approach raises problems 
of its own, it does allow intensities of preference to be con-
sidered in the process of interpreting the sense of a meeting 
or hearing, and it might benefit from further development. 
1.. Ibid; A. Lijphart Democracy ~n Plural Societies 39. 
2. J. Steiner op cit 63. 
3. 'Affirmative action' as a consociational device is discussed briefly 
at 418-419, below. 
4. See J. Steiner 'The ConsociQ~ional Theory and Beyond' 13 (1981) 
Comparative Politics 339-354; see Lijphart's response to these sug-
gestions in the same volume at 355-360. 
1 (d) Segmental autonomy 
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The function of the first three features of consociationalism 
is to establish a system of joint decision-making by leader-
ship ~lites on matters of national concer~ and thereby effect 
at the highest level of government a power-sharing arrange-
ment among the various segments in a plural society. The 
fourth feature completes the overall pattern by requiring the 
delegation of as much authority as possible to the respective 
segments, with the intention of allowing autonomous Tule-
making and rule-application by each segment,without interfer-
ence from the other segments or the joint authorities. 2 The 
application of the principle of segmental autonomy has lead, 
in practice, to the creation of exclusive segmental organisa-
tions which have a form of 'personal jurisdiction l over the 
members of an individual segment on matters such as education, 
the media and industrial relations. Segmental autonomy not 
only involves a recognition of segmental cleavages in society, 
but also a reinforcement of them through this type of organi-
sational pluralism. It also involves a significant deviation 
from majoritarianism in that areas of decision-making are re-
moved from the potential influence of national majorities, and 
each (minority) segment is enabled to take decisions on matters 
of exclusive concern to it. 
One of the earliest forms of group autonomy on the basis of 
the personality principle was devised by Karl Renner for the 
Austro-Hungarian empire. 3 Contemporary examples are found in 
the Netherlands, Belgium and Lebanon in relation to religious 
1. A. Lijphart Democracy in Plural Societies 41-44; R. Dahl op cit 358. 
E. Nordlinger does not refer to segmental autonomy as a conflict-
regulating device, and specifically excludes federalis~with which 
it is closely related (op cit 31-33). 
2. This characteristic has been interpreted as 'a kind of dissolution 
of the modern territorial state into a quasi-feudal system'. See G. 
Lehmbruch 'Consociational Democracy in the International System' 3 
~197S) European Journal of Political Research 377 at 379. 
3. See the references to Renner's work in T. Hanf, H. Weiland and G. 
Vierdag South Africa: The Prospects of Peaceful Change (1981) 385. 
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and linguistic communities. But segmental autonomy also has 
a measure of de facto application in countries such as Switzer-
land where the segments are territorially concentrated. In 
these circumstances it is possible to avoid applying the prln-
ciple on the problematic basis of the personality principle, 
because segmental autonomy can be effectively institutionalised 
through a geographic federation, itself a consociational method.
1 
As segmental and territorial autonomy are closely related 
matters, special attention needs to be given to the conceptual 
and empirical liriks between consociation and federation. 
3. Consociation and Federation 2 
It has been pointed out in the previous section that in coun-
tries such as Switzerland the principle of segmental autonomy is 
applied through a conventional federal arrangement. Switzer-
land is thus both an empirical federation and an empirical con-
sociation, although the correlation need not always be so great, 
as the following analysis indicates. 
As federation is a greatly over-defined term, no attempt will be 
made to provide even a working definition thereof;3 the modern 
1. The territorial concentration of segments could be conducive to par-
tition or secession which are theoretical solutions to divided socie-
ties but are, by their nature, alternatives to consociationalism. 
2. See on this section two valuable papers given by Arend Lijphart: 
'Federal, Confederal and Consociational Alternatives for the South 
African Plural Society: Theoretical and Comparative Aspects' at the 
Conference of the World Peace Foundation and S.A. Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, Rustenburg, 26-29 July 1978, and 'Consociation and 
Federation: Conceptual and Empirical Links' at the IPSO Conference on 
Intergroup Co-operation in Southern Africa, New York, 23-25 October 
1978. These papers have been included in amended form in, respective-
ly, R. Rotberg and J. Barrett (eds) Conflict and Compromise . in South 
Africa (1980) 51-75, and 12 (1979) Canadian Journal of Political Science 
499-515. All reference to Lijphart in this section are to these two 
papers, the second being an elaboration of the first. Some of 
Lijphart's views have been developed and applied to South Africa in 
L.J. Boulle 'Federation and Consociation - Conceptual Links and Current 
Constitutional Models' 1981 THR-HR 236-254. 
3. See on this aspect Boulle op cit 241. 
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tendency is to describe federalism as a process, or in terms 
of the various reactions to a federal situation, and as a 
function not of constitutions but of societies. 1 Neverthe-
less, from a constitutional-juridical point of view, a feder-
al system's most salient feature can be concisely stated
2 
-
political authority is territorially divided between two for-
mally autonomous sets of institutions, one national and the 
other regional, and the various institutions have some guaran-
tee of continued existence as institutions and as holders of 
power. The secondary characteristics of federalism all bear 
some relation to the first: the constitution is necessarily 
codified, the legislature is bicameral,3 and all constituent 
regions are entitled to be involved in the process of consti-
tutional amendment - these are the invariable features of the 
empirical federations. The other secondary characteristics 
are more varied in nature, namely the overrepresentation of 
small states in the federal chamber, and the degree of de-
centralised government resulting from the first federal princi-
ple. 4 Finally, it is a federal characteristic that the judiciary 
resolves conflicts between governmental authorities and gener-
ally upholds the supremacy of the constitution, which in some 
cases includes a bill of rights. 
In the context of this work it is appropriate to refer briefly 
to some aspects of federalism which pertain particularly to 
heterogeneous or plural societies. There exists a basic dis-
agreement here on the optimal relationship between the boun-
daries of the federal units and the boundaries dividing the 
different segments in such societies. Lipset,5 on the one hand, 
1. See egU.Hicks Federalism: Failure and Success - A Comparative Study 
(1978) 3-19. 
2. See I. Duchacek Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of 
Politics (1970) 192; G. Sawer Modern Federalism (1976) 1. 
3. The few exceptions to bicameralism (eg in Pakistan) go to prove the rule. 
4. D. Elazar ('Federalism' in Greenstein and Polsky Handbook of Political 
Science vol 5, 101) finds it more appropriate to describe this feature 
as one of 'non-centralisation'; in practice, however, federalism and 
decentralisation tend to go together. 
5. S.M. Lipset Political Man (1959) 61. Lipset's argument is that feder-
alism increases the opportunity for mUltiple sources of cleavage by 
adding regional interests to the others which crosscut the social 
s;ructure; this additional source of crosscutting cleavages is lost 
when federalism divides a country along the lines of its basic cleavages. 
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suggests that the optimal arrangement is for the two types of 
boundaries to be cross-cutting, so that national differences 
are reproduced at the unit level Ca symmetrical federation), 
whereas Lijphart, on the other, argues that the optimal arrange-
ment is for the boundaries to coincide, so as to translate the 
national heterogeneity into unit homogeneity Can asymmetrical 
federation) . The empirical evidence points to Switzerland as 
the most successful asymmetrical federation, and to the United 
States and Austria as successful examples of symmetrical feder-
ations, though these descriptions are somewhat relative. The 
disagreement, however, extends to the very utility of federa-
tion in resolving problems associated with ethnic or racial 
diversity.1 It can correctly be said that federation constitutes 
an attempt at solving territorial, and not racial or ethnic, con-
flicts of interest,2 but does it follow that where communal di-
versities are not territorially based the federal formula has no 
useful purpose to serve? Lijphart suggests that where the fed-
eration is asymmetrical it can indeed contribute to solving a 
plural society's problems; he is in fact viewing this aspect of 
federalism consistently from the consociational perspective, which 
holds that conflict can be reduced where there are clear dividing 
lines between antagonistic groups, and these are reinforced by 
state boundaries. 3 The more traditional attitude is that where 
federal boundaries coincide with these lines of antagonism, a 
di~ruptive and conflict prone situation4 will arise, and that 
1. Cf Carnell 'Political Implications of Federalism in New States' in U. 
Hicks (ed) Federalism and Economic Growth (1961) 23f. 
2. Cf V. Lorwin 'Segmented Pluralism' 1971 Comparative Politics 141 at 151. 
3. E. McWhinney(Federal Constitution-Making for a Multi-National World 
(1966) 41) argues that the successful examples of multi-racial societies 
are those where the different ethnic-cultural communities are conven-
iently located in territorially distinct units of the country Cie 
'horizontal federalism'). He adds that where these groups are not dis-
persed in this way, the constitutional draftsmen must look beyond the 
'classic' federal ideal-types. 
4. E. Nordlinger Cop cit 31) does not include federalism in his list of 
conflict-regulating devices, but for a different reason, viz that he 
regards it as a substantive outcome of the other conflict-regulating 
practices. See also D. Horowitz 'Quebec and the Canadian Political 
Crisis' 433 (1977) American Academy of Political & Social Science Annals 
'9. 
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there may in fact be advantages in a federal arrangement which 
reproduces national differences at the unit level where it 
would be easier, on a smaller scale and with local variations, 
to solve intergroup problems. Federalism also serves the use-
ful purpose of avoiding a centralisation of power through its 
dispersement of authority - the basis of constitutionalism -
which mitigates against a single ethnic or racial group domi-
nating a whole political system through its control of the 
centre, and this applies as well to a symmetrical federal arrange-
ment. Thus both groups see a useful purpose _for federalism in 
the context of a plural society, but from fundamentally different 
perspectives. 
Because of its affinity to consociationalism,brief reference 
should also be made to the concept of 'corporate federalism'. 
Conventionally federalism is viewed in terms of a territorial 
division of power, but some writers, such as Friedrich,1 extend 
the concept to include a non-territorial arrangement where 
autonomy is extended to corporate groups, instead of geograph-
ically defined regions. Friedrich applies the term 'corporate 
federalism' to the short-lived Cyprus constitution of 1960, 
but in this work the extended definition will not be used. The 
immediate relevance of the extended definition, however, is 
that it leads on to the consociational model, because the feder-
al 'corporate units' correspond to the consociational segments 
to which autonomy is correspondingly extended in the latter 
model. 
It is clear that the consociational and federal systems coincide 
in many respects, and most evidently in that they both involve 
the sharing out of governmental power among a number of authori-
ties in the country. Some institutions have jurisdiction over 
the whole country, and in the decision-making process at this 
level all component units are entitled to participate, while 
others have more limited jurisdiction, either territorial or 
1. C.J. Friedrich Trends of Federation in Theory and Practice (1962) 124. 
For Friedrich the main advantage of 'corporate federalism' is that it 
does away with the problem of 'territorial districting' - 'The Politics 
of L~n~uage and ~o:porate Federalism' in J.G. Savard and R. Vigneault (eds) 
Mult~l~ngual Pol~t~cal Systems, Problems and Solutions (1976) 233. 
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personal, and provide the basis for the decentralisation of 
authority. Both systems are formally anti-majoritarian, 
though in differing ways and degrees, and both require a for-
mula for resolving disputes between the various authorities, 
and for amending what is usually a rigid and supreme constitu-
tion. In other respects the two models overlap, but do not 
converge: the federal upper chamber usually displays some 
characteristics of a grand coalition, and the coalition prin-
ciple tends also to be applied in the formation of the federal 
executive, though not to the same degree as in the consociation-
al model. Proportionality also tends to be applied to a more 
limited extent in the federal model, namely in the composition 
of the federal chamber, while it is, by definition, a pervasive 
feature of the consociational model. Similarly, the principle 
of consensuality has less application in the federal model, 
though constitutional rigidity usually provides a legislative 
veto in respect of constitutional amendments.' The number of 
component units in either model could be as low as two, but the 
federal model can accommodate a great many more units than the 
consociational model,which becomes susceptible to immobility or 
deadlock with a large number of units; the jurisdictional com-
plications inherent in non-territorial units would also act as 
a practical limitation on their number. Finally, it can be 
said that the two models show clear divergences in so far as 
the segments in the consociational model are defined in terms 
of common personal characteristics or interests, while the regions 
in the federal model are territorially defined; jurisdiction is 
thus based on the personality and territorial principles respec-
tively. A second divergence lies in the fact that the federal 
1. Sawer (op cit 15-16) observes that after the creation of the US con-
stitution there was a 70 year dispute as to whether the system was 
predominantly national or confederal. Those emphasising the latter 
spoke of the 'concurrent majority' required in congress, which would 
have given each region or group of regions a veto power, and the 
theory of nullification envisaged a reserve power for each region to 
disregard major decisions affecting their interests. Since 1865 
primacy has been given to the national assumptions of the system. 
The doctrine of the concurrent majority is most often associated with 
J. Calhoun A Disquisition on Government (ed Post, 1953) who is re-
ferred to by several of the consociational writers. 
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model need not be democratic as is the case, by definition, 
with consociational democracy. 1 
To summarise, then, a consociation will be a federation when 
the segments are geographically concentrated and the boun-
daries between the federal units follow segmental boundaries 
as far as possible, and where the other federal principles, 
such as bicameralism, are applied. Conversely, a federation 
will also be a consociation where the first three consociation-
al principles are applied, where the federation is asymmetrical 
(as previously defined) and consists of an appropriate number 
of small component units, and where it establishes a decen-
tralised system of government. In fact, federal theory em-
bodies all theconsociational principles in rudimentary form; 
and the concept of 'corporate federalism' highlights the affi-
nity between the two. There can also exist a large number of 
federal and consociationa1 combinations, as illustrated by the 
example of Belgium. 3 Here the religious and socio-economic 
cleavages were resolved along consociational lines through bar-
gaining and compromise and with each segment having its own 
organisational infra-structures, but a federal decentralisation 
was required to accommodate the French-Dutch ethno-cu1tura1 
cleavage,which became increasingly salient in in the 1960's. 
As Heis1er observes,4 
for some purposes Belgium could be thought of 
as a federal entity consisting of three units, 
1. Consociationalism, on the other hand, can also operate undemocratically, 
as where non-elected leaders are drawn into the process of government 
on a limited scale. On the democratic quality of consociationalism 
see below, 127-128. 
2. This is not restricted to theory. Eg S. Noel 'Consociational Democ-
racy and Canadian Federalism' 1971 Canadian Journal of Political Science 
14-16 shows that in Canada elite accommodation along consociational lines 
takes place in the institutions which are central to the maintenance 
of the federal system: the federal cabinet, federal boards and coun-
cils, and inter provincial conferences. 
3. See M. Heisler 'Managing Ethnic Conflict in Belgium' 1977 American 
Academy of Political and Social Science Annals 33 at 38. 
4. Op cit 42. 
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while for other purposes it is comprised of only 
two. f 
wnile the consociational techniques were insufficient to manage 
ethnic differences, their experience facilitated the transition 
to a federal regime. 
It is possible to introduce a third element into the discussion 
on federalism and consociationalism by showing the affinities 
between these two systems and the contemporary phenomenon of 
corporatism. Reference has already been made to the modern 
trend away from pluralism to corporatism and neo-corporatism\ 
as evidenced, inter alia, by the collaboration between business 
and organised labour in certain areas of economic policy-making. 
In an il"luminating article 2 McRae extends Lijphart's "earlier 
analyses by identifying five basic similarities between cor-
poratism, consociationalism and federalism in democratic set-
tings. The most important of these is the fact that, 
'the total load of government is shared, either for-
mally or informally, between a central government 
and at least one other level, or arena, of interest 
intermediation and decision-making. f 
While the three systems have this important similarity,they 
differ as to the kind of problem that is removed from the cen-
tral political arena, and offer alternative modes of response 
to the problem of governmental overload. But again corpora-
tist, consociational and federal systems all have in common, 
'a certain minimum disposition among elites towards 
collaborative or co-operative, rather than authori-
tative or majoritarian, modes of decision-making in 
order for the system to function ... ' 
In this sense they may all be contrasted to the constitutional 
assumptions of the majoritarian Westminster system of govern-
ment. Combinations of the three systems are also possible in 
1. See 41, above and the references cited there. 
2. K.D. McRae 'Comment: Federation, Consociation, Corporatism - An 
Addendum to Arend Lijphart' 12 (1979) Canadian Journal of Political 
?cience 517-522. 
1 15. 
a single polity, and McRae suggests that of the four 'classic' 
consociational democracies only Belgium is not simultaneously 
considered neo-corporatist. In the context of this work it 
is the relationship between corporatism and consociationalism 
which is of some significance, and it is given further atten-
tion subsequently. 1 
4. Consociationalism in Practice 
Consociational democracy has thus far been presented mainly as 
a theoretical model, with only passing references to empirical 
examples where stable and democratic government has been 
achieved in highly divided societies. McRae 2 has identified 
four 'classic' cases of consociationalism, all among developed 
Western democracies, namely the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium 
and Switzerland; temporal qualifications must be added, however, 
to indicate the key period of consociational accommodation in 
each case 3 - in Austria during the period of Catholic-Socialist 
grand coalitions from 1945 to 1966, in Belgium since the first 
world war, in the Netherlands from 1917 to 1967, and in Switzer-
land from 1943 to the present. 4 Examples of consociational 
systems outside Europe have been Lebanon from 1943 to 1975, 
Malaysia from 1955 to 1969, Cyprus during the brief period from 
1960 to 1963, Surinam from 1958 to 1973, the Netherlands Antilles 
since 1950, and Colombia from 1958. 5 Lijphart 6 describes two 
other countries as 'semi-consociational' democracies, 
1. See the analysis in chapter 8, below. 
2. K. McRae Consociational Democracy (1974) 13. 
3. See A. Lijphart 'Majority rule versus democracy ~n deeply divided 
societies' 4 (1977) Politikon 113 at 119. 
4. A less notable European example is that of Luxembourg. 
5. On Colombia see R.H. Dix 'Consociational Democracy - The Case of 
Colombia' 1980 Comparative Politics 303-326. 
6. Op cit 119. 
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namely Israel since 1948 and contemporary Canada,' each of 
which has several consociational features without being fully 
consociational. Nigeria, which was referred to as the main 
example of consociationalism by the first modern writer in the 
school,2 could at best be labelled semi-consociational during 
the period 1957-1966. 3 The latest example of a semi-consocia-
tional system is Zimbabwe, whose independence constitution em-
bodies several consociational institutions and devices.
4 
In 
the light of the earlier comparison of federalism and conso-
ciationalism it may be noted that of the ~bove examples all 
save Lebanon, Cyprus, Israel, Surinam and Zimbabwe are also 
federations or semi-federations, indicating that the conceptual 
links between the two systems are reflected in practice. 
But consociationalism remains a disputed concept, even in res-
pect of Switzerland which is often held out as the 'prime ex-
ample' of consociational democracy. As far as the nature of 
Swiss society is concerned, Bohn5 argues that on the evidence it 
is not fragmented into isolated and competitive segments and that, 
particularly from the ethnic perspective, the social struture is 
best accounted for by the open pluralist model. Other writers 
also refer to the presence of cross-cutting cleavages in Switzer-
land and suggest that stability is a result of the 'remarkable 
consensus' in Swiss society, and not its consociational regulation 
1. R. Presthus (Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics (1973» finds that 
Canada meets most of the functional requisites of consociational poli-
tics and that consociationalism is a useful theory in explaining the 
Canadian political system; in his analysis he demonstrates how accommo-
dation occurs not only within the formal political structure but also 
between government and private political elites; see also Noel op cit. 
On the Israel case see A. Lijphart Democracy in Plural Societies (1977) 
129-134. 
2. David Apter The Political Kingdom in Uganda (1961). See the reference 
at 93, above. 
3. A. Lijphart Democracy in Plural Societies 161-164. 
4. On the Zimbabwe constitution, see 244 to 247, below. 
5. D.E. Bohn 'Consociational Democracy and the Case of Switzerland' 42 
(1980) The Journal of Politics 165-179. 
6. See, eg, B. Barry's review article of J. Steiner's Amicable Agreement 
versus Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in Switzerland (1974) in 5 
(1975) British Journal of Political Science 477-505. 
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of conflict. As far as its institutional features are con-
cerned,it is pointed out that Switzerland has one of the most 
extensive systems of direct democracy at both national and 
subnational levels in existence, and that the referendum and 
popular initiative through which it is effected are decidedly 
non-consociational in character. 1 Because of the possibility 
of direct majority rule created by these institutions, it is 
argued that Switzerland provides no support for the theory of 
consociational democrac~ despite the existence and important 
function of such consociational devices as proportionality and 
the grand coalition. 2 
In practice most political systems contain a mixture of co-
operative and competitive strategies of conflict regulation. 
While the consociational systems have a preponderance of the 
former over the latter,3 there are numerous non-consociational 
systems which contain some consociational devices. Nordlinger4 
points out that wherever conflict is successfully regulated in 
divided societies one or more of these devices is invariably 
employed, although not always the whole range. These factors 
have led Steiner5 to suggest that, instead of classifying speci-
fic countries as consociational, it might be more appropriate . 
to take, as the units of classification, decision-making for 
individual conflicts within those countries. This approach 
would lead to a more accurate and useful system of classifica-
tion because distinctions could be drawn between issues resolved 
along co-operative and competitive lines within each country, 
and comparisons could be made not only between, but also within, 
1. For descriptions of direct democracy in Switzerland see J. Steiner op 
cit 18ff and M. Mowlam 'Popular Access to the Decision-making Process 
in Switzerland' 14 (1979) Government and Opposition 180-197. 
2. But cf M. Mowlam (ibid) who concludes that although many groups have 
access to the agenda-setting phase of decision-making, elites have the 
power and resources to turn outcomes against them if they (the elites) 
so wish. 
3. See G. Lehmbruch 'Consociational Democracy in the International System' 
3 (1975) European Journal of Political Research 377 at 378. 
4. E. Nordlinger Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (1972) 117. 
5. J. Steiner 'The Consociational Theory and Beyond' 1981 Comparative 
Politics 339 at 345ff. 
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countries. It should be pointed out, however, that where 
consociational devices are eclectively applied they might not 
have consociational outcomes, and could even increase the in-
fluence of majorities and diminish the likelihood of co-
operation; 1 this necessitates an investigation beyond consti-
tutional arrangements to concrete decision-making situations. 
In this work, however, the focus is on institutional arrange-
ments,and the classification of countries and constitutional 
systems is made on that basis. 
Apart from disputes relating to the classification of countries 
as consociational or semi-consociational,'it is evident from the 
above survey that many cases of consociational democracy have 
been of short or limited duration, and that others have ended 
in failure. Are these factors attributable to the weakness of 
the consociational techniques and the inappropriateness of the 
basic pr~nciples of consociationalism? This is a complex 
question with no easy answer, owing partly to the fact that the 
total sample of empirical consociations is relatively small. 
Lijphart 2 has argued in respect of the Netherlands and Austria 
that consociationalism made itself superfluous by its very suc-
cess, and that these countries were easily able to shed it in 
favour of stable and democratic majoritarian systems; in these 
cases, he urges, the termination of consociationalism should not 
be equated with its failure. 3 The interruption of consocia-
tionalism by the Lebanese civil war is attributed partly to the 
international nature of the Lebanese conflict and the interven-
tion of external forces; the consociational experience before 
this interruption is regarded as having been moderately success-
ful, despite the fact that some of the consociational devices 
were over-rigidly applied. 4 The consociational principles 
1. On this aspect of the government's 1977 constitutional proposals see 
chapter 6, below. 
2. In the second edition of The Politics of Accommodation (1975) he added 
a further chapter (196-219) in which he adduced reasons for the re-
treat from consociationalism in the Netherlands and atte~~ted to ex-
plain why Dutch politics became less stable when social cleavages began 
~osing their sharpness and political salience. 
3. For his most recent rebuttal of the arguments based on the 'failed con-
sociations' see A. Lijphart 'Consociation: The Model and its Applica-
tions in Divided Societies' (1981) 6-8. 
4. Eg the system of proportionality was not made flexible so as to accommo-
date demographic changes. 
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embodied in the 1960 Cyprus constitution were unable to prevent 
civil war and the eventual partition of the country, and this 
consociational experiment can be classified as a failure; on 
the other hand it could be argued that the external interven-
tion by Greece and Turkey jeopardised the precarious political 
stability and that the easy availability of the mutual veto 
power contributed to the political breakdown. 1 A further prob-
lem in Cyprus was that consociationalism was only reluctantly 
agreed to by the Greek majority, which far outnumbered the 
Turkish minority.2 The consociational school argues, moreover, 
that despite its empirical failures consociationalism remains 
the only feasible alternative to a majoritarian system for a 
divided plural society - other than political partition, or the 
permanent suppression of minorities. Assuming, ex hypothesi, 
the correctness of this proposition, it becomes necessary to 
examine more closely the favourable conditions for the operation 
of a consociational system. 
5. Favourable and Unfavourable Conditions for Consociationalism 
From the successes and failures of consociationalism commentators 
have identified those conditions whith are favourable and un-
favourable for its operation, although the views on this aspect 
tend to be widely diverging, and at times conflicting. 3 Not-
withstanding the agreement which does exist, it is also invaria-
bly pointed out that the favourable conditions are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for successful consociationalism, and 
the converse applies to the unfavourable conditions. In re-
ferring to these conditions a distinction should be dra~~ between 
1'. E. McWhinney (op cit 76-80) is complimentary of the 'professorial' 
Cyprus constitution and suggests that its influence ir. the exacerbation 
of communal strife was at the most peripheral. 
2. As is pointed out later (at 120, below) a dual balance of power is in 
any case not conducive to successful consociationalism 
3. See A. Lijphart Democracy in Plural Societies (1977) 53-103; E. 
Nordlinger Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (1972) 42-116; K. McRae 
(ed) Consociational Democracy (1974) 8-10; V. Lorwin JSegmented 
Pluralism' 1971 Comparative Politics 141-175; G. Lehmbruch 'Conso-
ciational Democracy in the International System' 3 (1975) European Jour-
nal of Political Research 377-391; J. Steiner Amicable Agreement Versus 
Majority Rule (1974) 269-273. 
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factors which are attitudinal, such as those relating to elite 
behaviour, and those which are objective, such as the social 
structure and physical features of a country; it is clear 
that the former can be changed more easily over time than the 
latter. 
Ca) Favourable conditions 
As consociationalism has been described mainly from the perspec-
tive of elite behaviour 1 it is not surprising that its success-
ful operation makes significant demands on leadership elites, 
and that, while all political systems require elite leadership, 
consociational theory posits a critically decisive role for this 
factor. Leaders should accept at least some basic national 
symbols and be committed to the maintenance of the system, they 
should be able to transcend the sub-cultural cleavages in soc-
iety through over-arching co-opera tion and compromise, and above 
all they should be strong enough to take their followers with 
them, whith requires at least the appearance that they are 
accommodating popular demands. Moreover, the leadership should 
be relatively stable, in that a high circulation of leaders is 
not conducive to the strong and effective leadership needed with-
in the segments, and the trust and co-operation needed in respect 
of inter-segmental relationships. The corollary of structured 
elite predominance is a citizenry which accepts the position and 
role of elites, and which is itself relatively apolitical and 
acquiescent. Besides these factors relating to non-elites, 
there should also be at the mass level some loyalty to the sys-
tem as such,2 and at least a minimal consensus on the rules of 
the game. 
Among the more objective favourable conditions frequently cited 
are a multiple balance of power among the segments in a plural 
society~3a multi-party system through which each segment is 
1 . See 94, above. 
2. Nationalism has not, however, been a strong feature of the four 
Europe~n consociations. 
3. This entails at least three segments and approximate equilibrium among 
them, so that no compact majority group exists and each individual seg-
ment is in an overall minority; in this situation working majorities 
can only be acquired through compromises. See J. Steiner Amicable 
Agreement Versus Majority Rule 253f. 
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represented by its own political party, and distinct lines 
of cleavage between the subcultures 1 and internal political 
cohesion within them. The country should be of a relatively 
small size in area and population since co-operation, and the 
governing process generally, becomes more complicated on a 
large scale,2 and the existence of external threats against a 
small country can be conducive to internal cohesion and co-
. 3 operatIon. 
The most contentious of the favourable conditions for success-
ful consociationalism is that of a prior tradition of elite 
accommodation which has given rise to a protracted debate be-
tween Daalder and Lijphart;4 this has led to two diverging 
approaches to consociationalism~ each of which has different 
consequences for the system as a normative model. The issue 
in question is whether consociationalism is the product of 
earlier political traditions, or whether it can be created 
through the deliberate efforts of leadership elites. Accord-
ing to the former view, as espoused by Daalder, the historical 
tradition of compromise and co-operation is crucial for a suc-
cessful consociational arrangement in the modern period; in 
1. On whether the continued existence of fundamental cleavages is an ab-
solute condition for the persistence of the system see G. Lehmbruch 
op cit 94f. See also the last chapter of A. Lijphart The Politics 
of Accommodation. 
2. But cf H. Daalder tOn Building Consociational Nations: the Cases of 
Netherlands and Switzerland! 23 (1971) International Social Science 
Journal 355. 
3. This presupposes that the threats are similarly perceived by all 
groups. Small group research shows solidarity increases within a 
group under external pressure, and the same applies to states. During 
the external pressure of World War 11 Britain deviated from the majority 
model in setting up an all-party government. 
4. See H. Daalder 'On Building Consociational Nations· (op cit), 'The Con-
sociational Democracy Theme' 26 (1974) World Politics 604-621 and 'The 
Netherlands: Opposition in a Segmented Society' in R. Dahl Political 
Oppositions in Western Democracies (1965) 188-236, and A. Lijphart 
'Cultural Diversity and Political Integration' 4 (1971) Canadian Jour-
nal of Political Science 1 and 'Majority Rule versus Democracy in 
Deeply Divided Societies' 4 (1977) Politikon 113 at 124. 
5. That is the second and third approaches,referred to at 94 , above. 
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this view consociationalism is seen not as a response to the 
dangers of subcultural divisions, but as the reason why these 
never became disruptive. Lijphart by contrast, and parti-
cularly in his early writings, stresses the voluntaristic, 
rational and purposive aspects of elite behaviour, in estab-
lishing a consociational system: at a particular moment in 
history elites consciously decide to counteract the threats of 
political and cultural divisions through an arrangement of 
mutual accommodation based on power- sharing and compromise -
the 'self-denying hypothesis', which stands in contradiction 
to the theory of the plural society.1 The difference between 
the two relates to both timing and causal relationships.2 
While the debate has not been satisfactorily resolved, the 
viewpoints need not be regarded as irreconcilably ~ opposed: 
Lijphart concedes that even in Austria, where Daalder's theory 
seems least applicable in view of the fact that a civil war 
preceded the consociational accommodation, the grand coalition 
was not a purely intellectual conception since the principle 
had been applied at the Lander level during the first Republic; 
nevertheless he argues that one should not shift from a volun-
tarist position to one of complete determinism. 3 Daalder, in 
turn, concedes that the consociational model may be relevant for 
developing nations without a history of elite accommodation, pro-
vided they have at least some earlier pluralist traditions. 4 
1. The divergence is aptly revealed by the different approaches to the 
Dutch Pacificatie in 1917; Lijphart describes it as the response to 
the perils of subcultural divisions, while Daalder emphasises the prior 
accommodation arrangements and describes Pacificatie as the prelude 
(not response) to the development of subcultural interest organisations. 
2. K. McRae op cit 12. 
3. Lehmbruch Cop cit 380-1) in fact suggests that if past violence is 
perceived as traumatic by all subcultures, it may be an inducement to 
more peaceful means of conflict regulation in the future. 
4. Lehmbruch Cop cit 379ff) distinguishes between 'genetic' and 'sustain-
ing' conditions of consociational democracy, and suggests that having 
chosen a consociational strategy under specific genetic conditions, 
elites may internalise these strategies as norms (in terms of learning 
theory) thus establishing a routine pattern of conflict regulation 
which outlives the genetic conditions. Clearly the bargaining results 
will have to be perceived as satisfactory by all groups for this de-
velopment to occur. 
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This debate has a particular relevance for South Africa in 
relation to the position of consociational democracy as a 
prescriptive model. If consociationalism presupposes the 
existence of a tradi tion of poli tical accorrnnodation and a 
special elite culture, then its implementation in societies 
without these features is likely to be very difficult; this 
would be the case in South Africa, with its stark historical 
absence of accommodationist politics. On the other hand if 
consociationalism depends rather on the intelligent choice 
by particular elites at a critical juncture in a divided 
nation's history, then it can still serve as a normative 
model for societies, such as South Africa, without a tradition 
of political accommodation. Any attempt to apply consocia-
tionalism prescriptively to South Africa must inevitably 
assume the latter view, rather than the one based on histori-
cal determinism. 
Cb) Unfavourable conditions 
By necessary implication the absence of the above conditions 
will be unfavourable for a successful consociational arrang.e-
ment. In addition a high degree of socio-economic inequali-
ties within a country, and the presence of external threats 
which are not perceived in the same way by the different seg-
ments,will not be conducive to its operation. Although it 
has been emphasised that consociationalism can be applied in 
a variety of institutional frameworks, some constitutional 
features are less conducive to its success than others; thus 
unitarianism, presidentialism, and majoritarian electoral sys-
tems are less suitable than federalism, a parliamentary exe-
cutive and proportional representation; 1 more generally it can 
be said that those constitutional features which place a rela-
tively high total load on central institutions and centralise 
the sites of political competition will be less favourable than 
1. More detailed attention is given to the optimal constitutional frame-
work for consociationalism in chapter 8, below. 
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those which divide and devolve power and increase the sites 
of competition.' There is more ambivalence over the ques-
tion of whether the structure of the cleavages, their quality, 
and the degree of politicisation they give rise to, can be 
unfavourable for a consociational system in a divided society.2 
~~ile consociational theory has generally not regarded the 
absence of cross-cutting cleavages as an unfavourable condi-
tion, the fact that there are cross-cutting cleavages in many 
of the working consociations, such as Switzerland, has led to 
the view that the success of consociationalism might be a 
function of this factor, together with the nature of the cleav-
ages;3 it has been suggested, for example, that the existence 
of cleavages based on ethnic identity is not auspicious for a 
consociational arrangement. Even Lijphart concedes that the 
chances for consociational democracy decrease as the degree 
of pluralism of plural societies increases. 4 This i s, how-
ever, a matter to which insufficient attention has yet been 
given. 
This survey of favourable and unfavourable conditions for con-
sociationalism gives only a limited indication of its feasi-
bility in a practical situation. Just as the absence of the 
political will to participate in a co-operative arrangement 
1. There may seem a contradiction between the emphasis on (conspiratorial) 
elite accommodatmn in the consociational model, and the desirability 
of a division and devolution of power. The aim of the latter features, 
however, is primarily to ensure that no single elite group attains a 
hegemonial position which could result in a zero-sum political process, 
and not necessarily to encourage non-elite political participation 
which might remain low even in a devolved political structure. Cf 
J. Steiner Amicable Agreement Versus Majority Rule (1974) 259ff. 
2. See H. Daalder op cit 616ff; B. Barry 'Political Accommodation and 
Consociational Democracy' 5 (1975) British Journal of Political Science 
478 at 488. 
3. See for example E. Aunger1s recent work In Search of Political Stabili-
ty: A Comparative Study of New Brunswick and Northern Ireland (1981). 
4. A. Lijphart 'Majority R~le Versus Democracy in Deeply-Divided 
Societies' 4 (1977) Politikon 114 at 120. 
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would be fatal to any consociational system, regardless of 
the presence of conditions favourable for its success, so 
would the existence of such will compensate in some measure 
for the presence of unfavourable factors. Lijphart goes so 
far as to suggest that consociational engineering can be 
attempted 'even where the conditions for it do not appear 
1 promising at all'. "It is nevertheless expedient to examine, 
in due course,2 the existence or otherwise of the various con-
ditions in the South African context. 
6. The Shortcomings of Consociationalism3 
While consociational theory has been authoritatively described 
as 'among the most influential contributions to comparative 
politics in the last decade': it remains relatively undeveloped, 
and its descriptive adequacy and explanatory capacity have been 
seriously questioned. In the first place, therefore, conso-
ciationalism can be criticised as a theoretical model. But as 
a system of government consociationalism also has manifest draw-
backs, particularly in relation to its democratic qualities and 
its efficiency. 
Early critics were concerned about the type of conflict which 
might be regulated along consociational lines, and in his criti-
cal analysis Barry5 concludes that it is doubtful as to whether 
1. Ibid 124. 
2. See below, 130-133. 
3. See generally A. Lijphart Democracy in Plural Societies (1977) 47-52; 
D. Rae op cit; B. Barry 'The Consociational Model and its Dangers' 3 
(1975) European Journal of Political Research 393-412; and the reviews 
referred to at 96, above. 
4. G.B. Powell 'Review of Arend Lijphart: Democracy in Plural Societies' 
73 (1979) American Political Science Review 295. 
5. B. Barry 'Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy' 5 (1975) 
British Journal of Political Science 471-505. 
1 26. 
consociationalism could be used to accommodate divisions based 
on ethnic (as opposed to linguistic or religious) identity; 
this limitation would considerably narrow the range of conso-
ciationalism as a prescriptive model. A more fundamental 
criticism has been made from a Marxist perspective, with speci-
1 
fic reference to consociationalism in the Netherlands. It 
is pointed out that the religious cleavages in the Netherlands 
were never so deep and intense as to require consociational 
arrangements to avert civil war, but they did serve to divide 
the working-class movement and contribute to the maintenance 
of the existing relations of production which was more import-
ant, as far as the interests of the bourgeoisie were concerned, 
than the formal consociational arrangements. Moreover the 
accorrnnodationist arrangements in the Netherlands, 
'were themselves determined by shifts in the balance 
of class forces between the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat. For that very reason it is not wholly 
surprising that these arrangements should start 
breaking down with the intensification of class con-
flict, that is, precisely during those periods of 
social and political unrest when they are supposed 
to be most effective.,2 
This line of argument could clearly be developed into a more 
generali~ed critique of consociational theory from a class per-
spective. A formal analytical assessment of Lijphart's ideas 
has been made by Boynton and Kwon,3 and they suggest that his 
argument is incomplete because accommodation does not necessarily 
follow from the structure called consociational democracy. 
They conclude that more is required to guarantee political ac-
commodation and democratic stability in plural societies than is 
advocated by consociational theory. Some attempts have been 
made to refine consociational theory4 in the light of its short-
comings,but these come only a small way towards meeting the cri-
ticisms levelled at it as a theoretical model. 
1. R.A. Kieve rPillars of Sand: A Marxist Critique of Consociational 
Democracy in the Netherlands' 1981 Comparative Politics 313-337. 
2. Ibid 332. 
3. G.R. Boynton and W. Kwon 'An Analysis of Consociational Democracy' 3 
(1978) Legislative Studies Quarterly' 11-25. 
4. Eg J. Steiner 'The Consociational Theory and Beyond' 1981 Compara-
tive Politics 339-354. 
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As a system of government the drawbacks of consociationalism 
arise from the reliance it places on leadership elites and 
the premium it puts on co-operation and compromise. Its 
unashamedly elitist character 1 has obvious implications for 
its democratic qualities, although the interaction between con-
sociationalism and democracy tends to have been inadequately 
analysed by the consociational writers. 2 If the democratic 
quality of a system depends upon the strength of the structured 
oPPosition,3 the periodical alternation in office, or the com-
petitiveness of the electoral system, then consociationalism 
is democratically defic-ient in that there is no opposition in 
the traditional sense,4 no alternation in power between govern-
ment and opposition, and electoral outcomes are not crucial. 5 
These criticisms, however, display a majoritarian bias, whereas 
the consociational pattern of decision-making discards the very 
assumptions of majority rule. But what does have implications 
for the democratic qualities of consociationalism is the fea-
ture of structured elite predominance, which results both from 
the system's emphasis and reliance on elite co-operation, and 
such manipulative constitutional features as electoral party 
1. Cf Macpherson's description of the 'pluralist elitist equilibrium 
model' of democracy in C.B. Macpherson The Life and Times of Liberal 
Democracy (1977) 77-82. 
2. Cf H. Daalder 'The Consociational Democracy Theme' 1974 World Politics 
604 at 617. 
3. But cf R. Dahl's epilogue on the desirability of structured opposition 
in a democratic sys~em: Political Oppositions in Western Democracies 
(1965) 387-401. 
4. Cf o. Kirchheimer's early approach to this matter in 'The Waning of 
Opposition in Parliamentary Regimes' 24 (1957) Social Research 127-
156. It should be emphasised, however, that there can still be a 
majority government confronted by an opposition in a consociational 
system, but each group would be a coalition and would not be formed 
along the lines of the major cleavage. E. Aunger shows that in res-
pect of New Brunswick the grand coalition principle is compatible with 
one-party majority (that is Westminster) cabinets: In Search of 
Political Stability: A Comparative Study of New Brunswick and Northern 
Ireland ( 1981) . 
5. The system in fact places a premium on the non-circulation of leaders. 
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important role of elites in the co-operatlve process requlres 
popular deference to leaders, acquiescent attitudes to author-
ity, and patron-client relationships between leaders and 
followers; the danger that leaders will be regarded as apos-
tates because of their willingness to compromise might even 
necessitate the suppression of popular dissent. 3 The system 
of 'bargaining behind closed doors' by an elite cartel involves 
restrictions on popular participation in government and on 
access to information, and the possible co-optation of all 
experts who might oppose elite decisions; moreover elites are 
in a more than usually favourable position to keep certain 
issues off the political agenda, so as to maintain the status 
quo. 4 These features have serious consequences for the demo-
cratic qualities of consociationalism as far as non-elites are 
concerned, and the notion of democracy as self-government be-
comes heavily qualified in the consociational context. 
The obvious disadvantage of the anti-majoritarian features of 
the consociational model is that they produce slow and in-
effective government. The coalition and veto principles, in 
particular,might lead to complete immobilism in government 
which would inevitably frustrate attempts to introduce social 
and economic reforms and tend to favour the status quo. There 
is an impl~ed assumption in the system that changes of policy 
are more costly than the continuation of policy, an assumption 
which could lead to the destabilisation of the political system 
and the rise of private power. 5 Further loss in efficiency can 
be anticipated from the extensive application of the proportion-
ality principle, particularly if important appointments are made 
1. There are other less centralised forms of proportional representation 
available. Electoral matters are dealt with in detail in chapter 8, 
below. 
2. ef E. Nordlinger's (op cit 74-78) argument for elite predominance. 
3. See C. Young The Politics of Cultural Pluralism (1976) 83; T. Lustik 
'Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus 
Control' 1979 World Politics 325 at 334. 
4. ef P. Bachrach and M. Baratz 'Power and its Two Faces Revisited' 69 
~1975) American Political Science Review 901; and S. Lukes Power: 
A Radical View (1974) 16-20. 
5. See D. Rae 'The Limits of Consensual Decision-Making' 69 (1975) Ameri-
can Political Science Review 1270 at 1280; also M. Heisler 'Managing 
Ethnic Conflict in B l' '1977 Am . .. . . . e g~um er~can Academy of Polltlcal and Soclal 
SClence Annals 33 at 38. 
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on this basis rather than on merit. Financial inefficiency 
can also be expected through the above factors, and the mul-
tiplication of institutions involved in the implementation 
of the segmental autonomy principle. 
The proponents of consociationalism are ready to concede the 
existence of the above drawbacks, but point out that they 
should not be exaggerated. The short term effectiveness of 
majoritarian systems, they argue, is likely to be counter-
productive if it leads to instability in the long-run; con-
versely, the consociational model may be slow and frustrating 
in the short term, but more effective in the long. As far as 
the democratic drawbacks are concerned, they suggest that 
these are not so drastic when compared with the democratic 
prospects of a majoritarian system in a divided society, or 
even, with the real (as opposed to theoretical) democratic 
qualities of the traditional Western systems. 1 They also 
point to Austria and the Netherlands as evidence of the rela-
tive ease wi th whic"h consociationalism can be discarded in 
favour of a majoritarian system. 
One additional drawback of the consociational model which re-
quires mention is its tendency to make a plural society more 
plural. 2 This derives from the institutionalisation of seg-
mental differences and the organisation of politics along seg-
mental lines,which has the tendency to increase segmental 
isolation and potential hostility, despite the 'good fences and 
good neighbours' hypothesis of consociational theory. Further-
more the assumption that the cleavages in society are static can 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Barry3 has argued that 
for these reasons the model should not be used outside its ori-
ginal areas since it might lead to increased polarisation and 
1. Lijphart gives specific attention to the quality of Dutch democracy 
during the period of accommodation in The Politics of Accommodation 
(2 ed, 1975) 177-180; cf C.B. Macpherson The Life and Times of Liberal 
Democracy (1977) 82-92. 
2. Cf V. Lorwin 'Segmented Pluralism' 1971 Comparative Politics 141 at 158. 
3. B. Barry 'The Consociational Model and its Dangers' 3 (1975) European 
Journal of Political Research 393. 
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instability; he suggests that in the particular situations 
of Canada and Northern Ireland consociational practices 
might make matters considerably worse. In short consocia-
tionalism should be treated cautiously as a prescriptive 
model. 
7. South Africa and Consociationalism 
The remainder of this work is devoted to aspects of consocia-
tional government in the South African context. The notion 
of a consociational option in South Africa was first mooted 
in 1973 in the Sprocas commission report on political alterna-
tives. 1 Since then numerous political 'scenarios' have,either 
expressly or implicitly, included forms of consociationalism, 
and consociationalism has been presented as a prescriptive 
model for the reconciliation of what are perceived as the two 
polarised political demands in South Africa - from whites, 
political separation and continued white domination in the 
'common area', and from blacks, an extension of political rights 
to all citizens in a unitary system of government. The govern-
ment itself has made use of some of the consociational cant in 
an attempt to construct a new legitimising ideology for its 
political programme. But recent political developments have, 
at the most, given rise to a form of 'sham consociation', or 
'consociational authoritarianism', in which the crucial conso-
ciational principle of 'power-sharing! is manifestly absent. 2 
However,most of the commentators who have analysed the practi-
cal feasibility of the consociational option in South Africa 
have concluded negatively, because many of the important con-
ditions for its successful operation do not exist in this 
1. Sprocas Report No. 10 South Africa's Political Alternatives (1973) 163-166. 
2. See in particular the analysis in chapter 6, below. 
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country - or at least there are serious obstacles to its im-
plementation here.' Thus it is pointed out that there is 
no voluntary group membership in South Africa, there is no 
multiple balance of power among existing groups nor would 
there necessarily be one among future groups, there are few 
overlapping memberships among groups, there is no strong tra-
dition of political moderation and co-operation in South 
Africa, the country is fairly large in size, it has a high 
international profile, and the external threats against it are 
not uniformly perceived by all inhabitants, and finally there 
is a very high degree of socio-economic inequalities within 
the country. But perhaps the most serious drawbacks to con-
sociationalism in South Africa relate to leadership elites 
and the restrictions imposed on them;2 this has led to the 
existence of leadership vacuums, non-representative leaders, 
and externally-based elites, none of which factors has existed 
to the same degree in the empirical consociations. And even 
in respect of the leadership elites who are participating in 
the political process,-there does not exist a common commitment 
to maintaining the integrity of the system and to observing 
the rules of the consoc'iational game - in short consociationa-
lism is not accepted as a fundamental norm. 
The most authoritative work on this matter~ however, concludes 
slightly less negatively, albeit somewhat ambiguously, on ~he 
prospects of consociationalism for South Africa. The study 
of Hanf, Weiland and Vierdag examines the objective and per-
ceived factors of conflict in South Africa, in the light of which 
1. See L. Schlemmer 'The Devolution of Power in South Africa: Problems 
and Prospects', paper presented at the conference on Intergroup Accommo-
dation in Plural Societies, Cape Town,1977, and 'Social Implications of 
Constitutional Alternatives in South Africa' in J.A. Benyon (ed) Consti-
tutional Change in South Africa (1978) 266; H. Adam and H. Giliomee 
The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner Power (1979) 288ff; Royal Institute of 
International Affairs A Survey of Proposals for the Constitutional 
Development of South Africa (1980). 
2. For a more detailed analysis of these matters see chapter 8, b~low. 
3. T. Hanf, H. Weiland and G. Vierdag South Africa: The Prospects of Peace-
ful Change (1981) - this is th~ English translation of Sudafrika, 
friedlicher Wandel? 
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they conclude that there is no possibility of peacefully 
creating a unitary state in which there is a full democratic 
franchise. But as an alternative to unitarianism, on the 
one hand, and partition, on the other, they find that 'some 
form of consociational democracy need not be completely ex-
cluded,1 for the resolution of the conflicts in South Africa. 
As far as the conditions for successful consociationalism are 
concerned, this study is also more optimistic, though at times, 
in the present writerts view, unduly so.2 Thus on the basic 
structural conditions of consociationalism they conclude,3 
we may say that the basic conditions of the 
group structure in South Africa and the country's 
international profile a~e not unfavourable to the 
emergency of a consociational democracy. While 
the existing political culture clearly militates 
against it, the possibility exists that change may 
occur because serious conflict is recognised to be 
imminent. ' 
Of the conditions pertaining to political leadership, they find 
that the most important are fulfilled, namely the existence of 
strong and representative leaders, but they refer to the pre-
vailing attitude of the white power-elite as the destructive 
factor at this level. 4 And as far as the conditions pertaining 
to the population as a whole are concerned, they conclude that 
these are in part favourable and in part unfavourable, but that 
the latter could be overcome through incisive changes in economic 
relations. S In short, it is primarily a change in attitude by 
white leaders \\Ti thin the short or medium term which would be 
1 . At 381. 
2. Eg at 389 the authors suggest that 'if South Africa were to adopt an 
acceptable form of conflict regulation it would achieve a low profile 
in international politics.' It is not clear, however, that consocia-
tionalism would be regarded internationally as an acceptable arrange-
ment, and it would probably not be if it excluded external black 
leaders; in other words the work seems to underestimate the degree 
to which political issues in South Africa have become internationalised. 
3. At 391. 
4. At 393. 
5. At 394. 
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needed to ensure the emergence of a system of consociational 
democracy. But because of the absence of a real threat to 
white political power during this period,the authors are of 
the view that the present system of 'unilateral conflict 
regulation' is as possible, for the foreseeable future, as 
peaceful change: 
'Our conjecture about the immediate future is there-
fore that the white power-elite will not opt for 
consociation, but for a sham consociation; that is, 
for a perpetuation of unilateral conflict regula-
tion in forms which only resemble those of a conso-
ciational democracy. ,1 
They also suggest that a transition from sham consociation to 
genuine consociation is possible, but not likely under pre-
vailing circumstances. For these reasons, inter alia, the 
system of consociational democracy is not applied prescript-
ively in this work; consociationalism is rather used as a basis 
of analysis for an examination of South Africa's political consti-
tution. 
8. Conclusion 
In this chapter consoci~tionalism has been referred to mainly 
as a system of government in which leadership elites play a 
decisive role. In the chapters which follow the focus will be 
turned to constitutional arrangements in South Afric~ and the 
extent to which these sustain or inhibit a consociational form 
of government. Thus the institutional basis of the present 
system of sham consociation will be analysed,and there will be 
a description of the constitutional adaptations required to 
constitute the minimal institutional conditions for consocia-
tional democracy. But,as the tenor of this chapter has shown, 
consociationalism cannot be completely reduced to constitution-
al factors, and the analysis should be seen in this perspective. 







SOUTH AFRICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter a brief historical overview is given of the 
main constitutional developments whith have taken place in 
South Africa during the seven decades since Union.' The 
survey does not refer, other than in passing, to those con-
stitutional developments which form part of the 'government's 
new constitution' whith was first publicised in 1977 and 
which has been implemented since then in certain respects; 
these latter developments are dealt with subsequently.2 
The purpose of the survey is rather to describe, in an his-
torical perspective, the constitution as it existed immediate-
ly prior to these changes, and thus to provide the background 
against whith the current constitutional debate is taking 
place. 
Two broad themes can be identified within the period of con-
stitutional development referred to above: the first is the 
evolution in South Africa's status from a position of colonial 
and dominion subordinacy to one of republican independence, -a 
transition whith is of only oblique relevance to this work. 3 
The second theme relates to the 'internal' changes in consti-
tutional structures and processes; within this area there are, 
despite some fluctuations and conflicting trends, various 
clearly discernible constitutional consistencies~ and in many 
respects the government's constitutional proposals constitute 
their continuation and, in a purely institutional sense, their 
culmination. 
1. This chapter updates and develops the analysis in L.J. Boulle 'The 
Second Republic: its Constitutional Lineage' 1980 CILSA 1-34. 
2. See chapter 6, below. 
3. See on this theme H. May The South African Constitution (3 ed, 1955) 
30-43; H. Rahlo and E. Kahn South Africa: The Development of its 
Laws and Constitution (1960) 128-175; and M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed, 
1981) 192-217. 
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This latter aspect of South Africats constitutional develop-
ment has been comprehensively documented and is generally 
well-known. 1 To serve the purposes of this work it is pro-
posed to describe these developments in terms of their affi-
nity or otherwise with the Westminster constitutional system. 
In the first place this makes it possible to show the extent 
of the normative influence of the majoritarian principle, 
which is closely associated with the Westminster model, in 
South Africa's constitutional system; to the extent that this 
system has incorporated majoritarian Westminster institutions 
it is at variance with the principles of consociationalism, 
although it does not necessarily follow that the non-Westminster 
institutions in South Africa are consociational in nature. In 
the second place this approach gives a sense of perspective to 
at least one aspect of the current constitutional debate. ~t 
has become fashionable in the last few years to depict recent 
constitutional changes in terms of a movement away from the 
Westminster system towards a constitutional 
suited to South Africa's plural society.2 
be traced back to the Theron report; which 
supposed 'Westminster nature' of the South 
arrangement better 
This tendency may 
first focussed on the 
African constitution 
1. The definitive text on the South African constitution, and South 
African constitutional law, is Marinus Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) -
a perceptive and up to date authority. Of more historical importance 
are R. May The South African Constitution (2 ed, 1949 and 3 ed, 1955), 
Rahlo and Kahn op cit, Verloren van Themaat Staatsreg (2 ed, 1967). 
More recent, but synoptic, contributions are found in Hosten, Edwards, 
Nathan, Bosman An Introduction to South African Law and Legal Theory 
(1977) 588-634, and R. Goldblatt 'Constitutional Law' in vol 5 The Law 
of South Africa 3-48. On the constitutional politics of South Africa 
see D. Worrall (ed) South Africa: Government and Politics (2 ed, 1975), 
A. de Crespigny and R. Schrire (eds) The Government and Politics of South 
Africa (1978), C. Niewoudt, G. Olivier, M. Hough (eds) Die Politieke Stelsel 
van Suid-Afrika (1979). " 
2. See Boulle op cit 2; D. van Wyk 'Westminster-stelsel - Requiescat in 
Pace? of: kan n luiperd sy kolle verander?' 44 (1981) THR-HR 105-119." 
3. Report of the Commission "of Inquiry into Matters Relating to the 
Coloured Population Group (RP 38)1976) 178. See below, 263-265. 
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and suggested that the existing 'Westminster-founded constitu-
tion' might have to be amended to accommodate South Africa's 
particular conditions~ Those who have taken up this argument 
have invariably used concepts of consociationalism in promoting 
a particular constitutional alternative to South Africa's 'West-
minster system~ ~Bu the analysis which follows shows that 
the point of departure in these arguments is somewhat tenuous, 
r-
in that the South African import version of the Westminster 
./ 
constitutional model deviates in several fundamental respects 
from the origin~ Furthermore,what is so far known about the 
supposed movement away from Westminster would in fact perpetuate 
many of the Westminster and the -non-Westminster constitutional 
features of the past, including the non-consociational majori-
tarian aspects. An examination of South Africa's past and 
present constitutional system also reveals very little in the 
way of consociational institutions and · practices. Thus from a 
constitutional point of view~y transition to an authentic con--sociational arrangement would involve fundamental changes with 
the pas t] 
2. Westminster Features of the South African Constitution 
The main constitutional features of the Westminster system of 
government have already been described,1 together with their 
affinity or otherwise with the principle of majority rule. 
r-
The three most important Westminster features which have been 
incorporated into the South African constitutional system are 
the supremacy of parliament, the parliamentary executive and 
the plurality electoral system;2 of less significance are the 
bicameral legislature and the constitutional conventions 
1 . See above, 24- 2 8 • 
2. See Boulle op cit 2-8; Van Wyk op cit 106-112; A. Cilliers 'Die 
Westminster-sisteem en Suid-Afrika se Konsepgrondwet' 1979 Obiter 86-
92; D. du Toit 'Geskiedkundige oorsig van Suid-Afrikaanse konstitu-
~ionele modelle met besondere verwysing na die Westminster-staatsmodel' 
in S. Jacobs (ed) n Nuwe Grondwetlike Bedeling vir Suid-Afrika - Enkele 
Regsaspekte (1981) 8-24. 
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Ca ) Parliamentary supremacy 
While the drafters of the Union constitution had several con-
e---
stitutional traditions upon which to draw, they b ted for the 
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy of which the Cape, Natal 
and the Transvaal had had experience, and thereby discarded 
the Orange Free State precedent of a rigid constitution with 
guaranteed rights and judicial review. 1 This was to be the 
most important principle of the South African constitution and 
it had far-reaching political consequences~ 
~ntil the passing of the Statute of Westminster in 193 3
T
the 
legislative capacity of the Union parliament was qualified by 
the subordinate constitutional status of the country. Thus 
\!he British parliament retained legislative supremacy over the 
Union, including the right to amend its constitution uni-
laterally, the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865 4 was still 
in force and precluded the Union legislature from legislating 
repugnantly to an act of the British parliament extending to 
the country, and there was also a territorial limitation on the 
Union parliament's powe~ , though its extent was not clear. 5 
The Union's position of subordinacy also involved other dero-
gations of sovereignty - the Governor-General, a British gov-
ernment nominee, could reserve bills for the King's considera-
tion, and the King retained the power of disallowance. 6 
The Union's constitutional subordinacy was not, however, re-
r----








In Brown v ds (1897) 4 Off Rep 17 Kotze CJ held that the Grondwet 
of the Free State republic constituted fundamental law with which the 
Volksraad had to conform; in asserting a judicial testing right he 
referred to the celebrated ·Marbury v Madison 1 Cranch 137 (1803) as 
authority. 
See John Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978) 
25ff. 
22 Geo V, c 4. 
28 and 29 Vict, c 47. 
May (3 ed) 24. 
Ss 66 and 65 of the South Africa Act (9 Edw 7, c 9), respectively. 
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regulating British-dominion relationships led to a gradual 
increase in the independence of the dominions. It was never-
theless considered \necessary to remove the three legal limi---tations on the dominions' legislative powers, and this was 
effected by the Statute of Westminste J whose main significance 
was that ~tjgave juridical force to prevailing practice. The 
statute (i) ~rovided that no British law should apply to a 
dominion unless requested ~ by the latter; 1 (ii) repealed the 
Colonial Laws Validity Ac provided that no future legislation 
of a dominion would be void for its repugnance to the law of 
England or any existing or future British act, and empowered 
the dominions to repeal or amend British statutes;2 and 
~i) empowered the domi!}.ions thenceforth to legislate with 
extra-territorial effect~ To avoid constitutional problems 
which might be created by the possible, though unlikely, repeal 
of this British statute, the Union parliament incorporated its 
relevant provisions into South African municipal law in the 
Status of the Union Act,4 which enactment described the Union 
parliament for the fiist time as 
power in and over the Union,.5 
legislati~e limitati6ns implicit 
ance. 6 
having 'sovereign legislative 
This statute also ended the 
in reservation and disallow-
The only remaining limitati6n on the Union parliament's legis-
lative competence was the proce"dural one contained in the en-
trenched secti6ns,7 although the majority opinion bef.ore the 
constitutional crisis of the 1950's was that the entrenching 
1. S 4. The British courts did not, however, regard this as a curtail-
ment of the Westminster parliament's powers. See further on this 
matter pages 436 to 445, below. 
2. S 2. The doctrine of repugnancy was thus unequivocally terminated, 
but it was also necessary to make the position clearer than had been 
the case before 1865 . 
3. S 3. 
4. Act No 69 of 1934. 
5. S 2. 
6. ~xcept ~n respect of the matters referred to in s 10 of the Status Act. 
7. Ss 35, 137 and 152 of the South Africa Act. The writers who denied 
that entrenchment rendered the Union parliament non-sovereign are 
referred to in Hahlo and Kahn op cit 101-164. 
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procedure was ineffective. 1 The crisis itself was to have 
an ironic outcome: it confirmed the juridical efficacy of 
the entrenched procedure: but showed how easily it could be 
circumvented by the principle of parliamentary supremacy, and 
that principle was further emphasised in the wake of the 
crisis through the introduction of the fore-runner to s 59(2) 
of the Republic Constitution Act: 
'No court of law shall be competent to enquire into 
or pronounce upon the validity of any law passed 
by Parliament other than a law which alters or re-
peals or purports to alter or repeal the provisions 
of s 137 or s 152 of the South Africa Act, 1909. ,3 
In so far as pa~liamentary supremacy denotes the absence of 
legislative rivals to parliament and a judicial testing-right 
.,-,i-
over legislation, it is clear that the Union parliament en-
-r 
joyed such supremacy subsequent to the Statute of Westminster 
and the constitutional crisis. 4 From a juridical point of 
view it could be said, however, thatllegal sovereignty was 
divided between parliament as constituted under s 63 and under 
the proviso to s 152 of the South Africa Act;5 thus in terms 
of the 'new view' of parliamentary supremacy the legislature 
had, in order to render its enactments effective, to comply 
with the provisions of the constitution which for the time be-
ing regulated its own composition. 6 
r;~en the Union became a Republic with the enactment of the 
Republic of South .Africa Constitution Act 7 ' ... a legislature 
1. See Stratford J in Ndlwana v Hofmeyer NO 1937 AD 229, 'Parliament ... 
can adopt any procedure it thinks fit; the procedure express or im-
plied in the South Africa Act is ... at the mercy of Parliament like 
anything else ... '; see May (2 ed, 1949) 33 (where he refers to the 
two-thirds majority rule as being 'legally as dead as the proverbial 
dodo'); and Rahlo and Kahn op cit 154, and Dugard op cit 29. 
2. The second Rarris decision (Minister of the Interior v Rarris 1952 (4) 
SA 769 (AD)) remains the authoritative curial pronouncement on the 
entrenchments. 
3. S 2 of the South Africa Amendment Act, No 9 of 1956. 
4. It seems that at common law the courts did have a legislative testing 
right. See M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 334-339. 
5. Centlivres CJ in Rarris v Minister of the Interior 1952 (2) SA 428 (AD). 
6. A detailed and critical analysis of the 'new view' of sovereignty 
appears at 441 to 444, below. 
7. Act No 32 of 1961. 
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sovereign in the traditional sense in all respects save 
that it was bound by entrenchment, made an irrevocable trans-
fer of its powers to a new legislature, differently composed 
• 1 ~e new legi~lature was.the republ~can pa~liam~nt 
which was again descrlbed as havlng 'soverelgn leglslatlve 
authority' in and over the republic,2 and the provision first 
adopted in 1956 was retained3 to emphasise that the courts 
could only review legislation relating to the entrenched 
clauses~ It remains necessary for the constituent parts of 
parliament to function as constitutionally prescribed to ren-
- 5 
der enactments effective. 
'rhe pr.inciple of parliamentary supremacy entails in South 
lirica,_ as it does in the Westminster system, \that there are 
---' 
no geographical or functional areas from which parliamentary 
authority is barred and, because parliament operates on a 
majoritarian bas~, within which the parliamentary majority 
is precluded from intervening. As applied in South Africa the 
principle has three important constitutional corollaries. The 
first is the legal dependence of the judiciary on the legisla-
ture, and the absence of any significant legislative testing 
rights for the courts. 6 The second is the unitary, as opposed 
1 . E. Kahn 'The New Constitution r 78 (1961) SALJ 244 at 272. 
2. Constitution Act, s 59(1). 
3. Constitution Act, s 59(2). 
4. Ss 108 and 118 of the Constitution, s 118 as amended by s 1 of Act No 
74 of 1980. Despite changes to the various quorums of the appellate 
division effected by Act No 46 of 1980, the quorum of 11 judges has 
been retained for appeals in which the validity of an act of parliament 
is in question (s 12(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Act, No 59 of 1959). 
See S v Tuhadeleni 1969 (1) SA 153 (AD). 
5. That is according to s 24, or s 118 (and before the abolition of the 
Senate s 63) of the Constitution Act; see Boshoff AJP in S v Hotel 
and Liquor Traders' Association of the Transvaal and others 1978 (1) 
SA 1006 (W). Whether s 114 regulates the composition of parliament 
is more problematic - this matter is dealt with in greater detail at 
448 to 449, below. 
6. S v Tuhad~leni 1969 (1) SA 153 (AD). In Cowburn v Nasopie (Edms) Bpk 
en andere 1980 (2) SA 547 (Ne) Van der Heever J suggested (obiter) 
that s 59(2) imposed only a limited limitation on the courts review 
powers. This was said in relation to the possible invalidity of the 
Status of Bophuthatswana Act, No 89 of 1977, for non-compliance with 
the provisions of s 114 of the constitution. See further pages 447 
to 450, below. 
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to federal, nature of the constitutional syste~ desPite the 
'federal characteristics' which commentators have been wont 
to identify in the Union and Republican constitutions; 1 the 
'federal' division of competence inherent in the provincial 
system2 was in fact always constitutionally susceptible to 
unilateral transformation by the central parliament and never 
f 
.. 3 
a federal system 0 government ln practlce. 
constitution is highly flexible, save for the re-
maining entrenched clauses. 4 These three features also testi-
fy to the relative absence of inst i tutional restraints in the 
South African constitutional system on the power of political 
majorities 
~rom a constitutional point of view the principle of parlia-
mentary supremacy has, together with the system of parliamen-
tary government, enabled the party controlling the legislature 
to enact wide-ranging changes, without affecting this predomi-
nant principle of the constitutio -S There have thus been 
far-reaching changes affecting the franchise, the composition 
of the House of Assembly and the Senate, the status and powers 
of the provincial governments, and the control and operation 
1. Eg the equal representation of the provinces in the former Senate, 
and s 114 of the Constitution (and its predecessor s 149 of the 
South Africa Act) - see C. Schmidt 'Section 114 of the Constitution 
and the Sovereignty of Parliament' 79 (1962) SALJ 315. A 'federal' 
interpretation of s 114 was given (obiter) in-COWburn v Nasopie 
(above) but the fate of s 114 was soon to be sealed (see at 449, 
below) . 
2. See H. May (3 ed~ 1955) 359 on the federal/union 'compromise'. 
3. The courts have acquired a type of federal testing right in respect 
of legislation of the non-independent national states in terms of 
s 19(1) of the National States Constitution Act No 21 of 1971. See 
S v Zitudeza 1970 (2) SA 773 (EC) , S v -Heavyside 1976 (1)SA 584 (AD), 
and J.C. Bekker 'Rewriting the Textbooks: A Re-evaluation of Some 
Traditional South African Constitutional Law Assumptions' 1979 CILSA 
272 at 277. 
4. Ss 108 and 118 of the Constitution Act, the latter as amended by 
Act No 74 of 1980. 
5. Parliamentary procedure in South Africa is also fundamentally majori-
tarian, and the Westminster precedent has been followed in respect 
of both parliamentary standing orders and the privileges of parliament. 
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of political partles. There have also been major institu-
tional innovations in the form of separate, subordinate 
authorities for coloureds and Indians, and a system of terri-
torial decentralisation leading to the self-government and 
partition of the black states. In recent times parliament 
has been subject to no legal restraints when it has prolonged 
its own life, abolished one of its component parts, amended 
the entrenching proc~dure, limited its geographical jurisdic-
tion, and enacted a constitutiOnal amendment having retrospec-
tive effect for a twenty year period. Finally, it has been 
possible to enact such pervasive features of the living con-
stitution as the Population Registration Act 2 and the Group 
Areas Act; which would remain indispensible features of the 
governmentts new constitution. These constitutional changes 
have had a profound effect on the political system and have 
resulted in a significant concentration of political power in 
South Afrita, but have not affected the broad constitutional 
framework constituted by the twin Westminster principles of 
parliamentary supremacy and parliamentary government. 
Cb) Parliamentary government 
Reference has been made 4 to the close institutional relation-
ship bet"ween the legislature and executive whic"h is regarded 
as the distirictive feature of the Westminster system and which 
distinguis"hes it frompresident"ial government. Historically 
the cabinet came to be seen as a committee of parliament, 
accountable to that body and not to the Cro~~, and dependent 
on parliament's confidence for its continuance in office. 
Parliament's control over the cabinet was effected through the 
1. All the developments referred to in this paragraph are dealt with 
in the body of this work, below. 
2. Act No 30 of 1950. 
3. Act No 36 of 1966. 
4. At 25, above. 
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fact that ministers had to be, or become, members of the 
legislature, and were jointly and ind iv idually responsible 
to that body for the performance of their duties. In time 
the conventions of responsibility gave way to the control 
and domination of parliament by the cabinet,leaving little 
notion of balance between the two. It is, however, the close 
institutional relationship between legislature and executive 
which remains the defining characteristic of parliamentary 
government. 
It was not surprising that the drafters of the Union constitu-
tion, having preferred the Westminster notion of parliamentary 
supremacy to that of a legislature limited by the constitution, 
should make provision for a parliamentary executive as well. 
The principle of the parliamentary executive had first been 
transmitted to the Cape in 187 2 . 1 This meant in essence the 
application of the cabinet system in the Cape, and other colo-
nies, where the ex~cutive function had formerly been in the 
hands of the imperial government;2 effective executive power 
passed into the hands of the executive council which remained 
in office while it enjoyed the support of the locally elected 
lower house. The South Africa Act, however, provided only a 
'fragmentary statutory basis for responsible government' ,3 
namely the requirement that no minister could hold office for 
longer than three months unless he was or became a member of 
either house of parliament. 4 The implications of responsible 
government were not spelled out in the constitutio~but had to 
be sought in the English common law which was the main source 
1. In this context the term 'responsible government' was used to em-
phasise the responsibility of the colonial government to the colo-
nists, and not the metropolitan power. Natal received responsible 
government through the Constitution Act of 1893. 
2. Cf Strong Modern Political Constitutions (8 ed, 1972) 217. 
3. Rahlo and Kahn op cit 129. 
4. South Africa Act s 14(1). This was the usual arrangement in the 
dominions; s 1~(1) follows almost exactly the wording of art 64 of 
the LAustraliag/ Commonwealth Act of 1900. The 'period of grace' 
derives from the British convention -S.A. De Smith The New Common-
wealth and its Constitutions (1964) 101. 
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of South African constitutional law. Some of the English 
conventions were specifically enacted 1 and others came to be 
2 incorporated by reference, while a third group were never 
specifically referred to by the Union constitution. The 
Governor-General's duty to act on the advice of the execu-
tive council, an essential feature of parliamentary govern-
ment, was statutorily regulated; to prevent difficulties 
which could emanate from the Westminster-derived diffusion of 
executive power between the head of state and head of govern-
ment. The conventions of joint and individual ministerial 
responsibility came to be observed 'within elastic limits,4 
to give further support to the system. 
The Republic Constitution Act also provided only a fragmentary 
basi~ for responsible government by requiring ministers to be, 
or become, members of the Senate or House of Assembly within 
three months of assuming office;5 in 1980 the period of grace 
was extended to twelve months~ and with the abolition of the 
Senate at the end of that year ministers were compelled to be 
elected or nominated members of the House of Assembly only.7 
The State President's duty to act on the advice of the execu-
tive council was statutorily prescribed,8 as were some other 
conventions, while the remainder were given statutory recogni-
tion without being enacted. 9 The most important among the 
1. Eg ss 22 and 56 of the South Africa Act. 
2. Eg s 4(3) of the Status Act No 69 of 1934. 
3. South Africa Act, s 13. Certain powers were reserved for the 
Governor's personal discretion. 
4. Rahlo and Kahn op cit 131. 
5. RSA Constitution Act s 20(3). 
6. S 1 of Act No 70 of 1980. Only one such period is permitted. 
The act also amended s 54 of the Constitution to prevent (for the 
first time) such a minister from voting in parliament. 
7. These matters are dealt with in detail in chapter 6, as part of the 
government's constitutional proposals. 
8. Unless otherwise expressly stated or necessarily implied; Consti-
tution Act s 16(2). 
9. Constitution Act s 7(5). 
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last group is ~he State President's duty to appoint the leader 
of the majority party in the House as prime minister, and the 
other ministers on the prime minister's advice ; The prin---... 
ciples of joint and individual ministerial responsibility re-
main dependent for their enforcement on the conventions of the 
constitution. ~ccording to the theory of parliamentary gov-
.../' 
ernment the executive is responsible to the people through the 
mediation of the legislature and the efficacy of the system 
depends materially on the representative nature of the legis-
lature. As the analysis of the South African electoral system 
and franchise show~, 1 ~e legislature in South Africa is large-
ly unrepresentative and the convention of ministerial respons-
ibility has undergone substantial modification in scope and 
significance in the light of political events of the late nine-
teen seventies. 2 These conventions have also been notionally 
weakened through the increased period of grace for cabinet 
ministers, and the innovation in 1981 of nominated members of 
parliament. 3 In the light of these institutional differences, 
the political responsibility of the government is significantly 
less in South Africa than in the Westminster system itself, and 
~e system of parliamentary government has amounted in prac-
tice to complete domination of the legislature by the cabinet~ 
1. See below, 147-150. 
2. Chiefly the 'information affair!. For the Erasmus Commission's ob-
servations on individual responsibility see the Report of the Com-
mission of Inquiry into Alleged Irregularities in the Former Depart-
ment of Information (RP 1131)3 197.8) § 11.345 - B 11.349. For a 
ministerial dictum on the 'uberrima fides relationship' between minis-
ters see House of Assembly Debates vol 1 cols 321-322 (8 February 1979). 
3. See below, 321 to 326. 
4. W.H.B. Dean (The Riots and the Constitution in 1976 (1976) 15) 
suggests that the sole contemporary function of parliament is to 
provide the executive with the legislation the latter requires to 
effect . its policy and that the idea of the legislature controlling 
the government is obsolete. 
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The system of parliamentary government in South Africa, and 
the co-ordination of legislature and executive activities 
which it involves, has given rise to an efficient and deci-
sive governing process. 1 But it has also c:ontribut to a 
massive concentration of power in the cabinet which has part-
ly contributed to the le itimacy crisis which the state sys-
t em fa c e s in the 19 8 0 I ; :2 As far as the c on s t i tu t i on a 1 all 0-
cation of competence is concerned there is a winner-takes-all 
competition at one decisi~e site: the party which gains a 
majority of seats in the elections or the House of Assembly 
controls both parliament and the cabinet, and control of the 
latter leads to indirect control and influence in vast ayeas 
( 
of the administrative sta~ The twin principles of parlia-
mentary supremacy and a parliamentary executive, together with 
the electoral system to be described below, have made the South 
African constitutional system thoroughly 'majoritarian': with-
out the compensation, even within the limits of 'white politics', 
of the al ternation of majorities which characterises the West-
minster model. r;he rise of bureaucratic power and the emer-
gence of corporatism4 in South Africa has led to further dis-
tortions of the constitutional th~ory underlying the Westmins-
.---, 
ter syst m. In South Africa the limited form of Westminster 
government tends in theory and practice towards unrestrained 
'majoritariinism' . 
Cc) The electoral system 
The South African electoral system,S the restricted franchise 
apart, has always been based on the Westminster electoral 
1. For an analysis of the executive and its relationship to parliament 
see Olivier 'The Executive' in De Crespigny and Schrire The Government 
and Politics of South Africa (1978) 17-31. 
2. See above, 2-4. 
3. That is the constitutional system as it relates to whites, within an 
overall perspective the constitution clearly involves a system of 
minority rule. 
4. See H. Adam and H. Giliomee The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner Power (1979) 
77-195; L. Baxter 'Constitutionalism, Bureaucracy and Corporatism' 
in Boulle and Baxter (eds) Natal and KwaZulu: Constitutional and 
Political Options (1981) 75 at 85ff. 
5. On the South African electoral system and process see J. Faris 
'Elections' in vol 8 The Law of South Africa (1979) 283-378. 
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arrangement of single-member constituencies operating accord-
ing to the plurality principle. 1 As has been shown already,2 
this is a thoroughly majoritarian system which tends to 
exaggerate the representation and influence of majority par-
ties, and there has been no exception to this tendency in 
South Africa. 3 The system has in the past given rise to two 
dominant parties within the 'white' political system, but it 
is doubtful whether it can be said that a two-party system pre-
vails today, and there is certainly not the alternation-in-
power phenomenon associited with Westminster political practice. 
However, the absence of any form of proportional representation 
has undoubtedly denied parliamentary representation to smaller 
parties,and in this sense the electoral system has had a simi-
lar effect to its Briti~h progenitor. 
The existing electoral ~ystem should also be _viewed in the 
1ig'ht of the constitutiOnal provision for the loading of urban 
and the unloading of rural constituencies. 4 The effect of 
this feature is to distort electoral outcomes further, in the 
sense that parties with predominantly rural support, whether 
1. South Africa Act s 32(a) and Republican Constitution Act s 40(1). 
2. At 28, above. 
3. See K. Heard General Elections in South Africa 1943-1970 (1974) 236f. 
The discrepancies in the 1981 general election can be depicted as 
follows (the first column indicates the seats won by the respective 
parties, and the second the seats they would be entitled to in a 
proportional system): 
National Party 
Progressive Federal Party 
New Republic Party 









Of the 151 seats contested in this election 12 were won by candidates 
with only a relative majority of votes in their constituency. 
(Acknowledgment is made to Professor N. Olivier MP for these statis-
tics). See also T. Ranf, H. Wei1and and G. Vierdag South Africa -
The Prospects of Peaceful Change (1981) 119-126. 
3. S 40(3) of the South Africa Act and s 43(4) of the Republican Con-
stitution Act. 
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they be minority or majority parties, can translate their 
electoral strength into a disproportionately high number of 
parliamentary seats, while the converse applies to urban-
based parties. Despite manifest objections to this princi-
ple, it has endured since the time of Union. 1 Further inter-
provincial distortions have been introduced with the provision 
made in 1980 2 that, instead of a national quota, each province 
should have its own electoral quota for the purposes of load-
ing and unloading constituencies; at the same time the gov-
ernment refrained from amending s 40(2) of the Constitution to 
accommodate inter-provincial demographic fluctuations of the 
past. 3 The net effect of these arrangements is that a rural 
seat in a relatively depopulating province (eg the Cape) can 
have less than half the voters of an urban seat in a province 
4 with a relatively expanding population (eg the Transvaal). 
But despite these local variations, the South African electoral 
system performs the same function as its counterpart in the 
Westminster system, that is it produces a government-versus-
opposition dithotomy and an adversarial political context. It 
is not designed to achieve what systems of proportional repre-
sentation achieve, namely to translate electoral support into 
parliamentaiy support. 5 In this sense it is a predominantly 
majoritarian and anti-consociational institution. 
1. Cf § 9 of the Schlebusch Report (Interim Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry on the Constitution - RP 68/1980). 
2. By s 1 of Act No 28 of 1980 which rumended s 43(1) and (2) of the 
Constitution Act. As this matter is closely related to the govern-
ment's new constitution it is dealt with in more detail at 318-321, 
below. 
3. That is the number of seats allocated to each province was not 
rumended after the general re-registration of votes in 1979-80 and 
the appointment of the 1980 delimitation commission. 
4. The provincial quotas adopted by the 1980 delimitation commission 
were as follows: Cape - 12 626; Natal - 13 283; OFS - 12 863; 
Transvaal - 15 433. In the 1981 general election the constituency 
with the most voters was Bezuidenhout (Transvaal) with 17 308, and 
with the least, Prieska (Cape) with 8 720. See House of Assembly 
Questions and Replies vol 5 pp 255-259 (26 February 1981). 




A less enduring feature of the Westminster model in South 
Africa was bicameralism,which came to an end with the aboli-
tion of the Senate in 1980. 1 Like the House of Lords the 
Senate was never popularly elected, it was 'designed to serve 
as a chamber of review,2 and it was subordinate to the elect-
ed hous -.3 Unlike the Lords, however, ~he Senat.iJ was always 
partly indirectly elected4 (and partly nominated), and ~s~ at 
~ 
various periods of its existence, designed to perform func-
tions additional to that of reviewing legislation~ amo~g the 
r-
more salient of these functions were those of representing 
and safeguarding provincial interests,S of representing groups 
excluded from the franchise,6 and of safeguarding the entrench-
ed sections .-7) While it is not intended to evaluate the per-
""-.J 
formance and role of the Senate, it can be said that none of the 
J 
four functions mentioned above were adequately performed by it 
Its abolition can be seen as a prelude to the implementation 0 
the government's constitutional dispensation and will be alluded 
to again subsequently.8 
1. By Act No 101 of 1980. 
2. ef the higher minimum age qualification provided in the former s 34(a) 
of the Constitution Act. 
3. This is a corollary of responsible government which requires govern-
mental support in the elective house. The conventional subordinacy 
of the House of Lords was enacted in the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 
1949 (1 and 2 Geo 5, c 13 and 12, 13 and 14 Geo 6, c 103) while the 
South African Senatets subordinacy was implicit from the provisions of 
s 63 of the South Africa Act but made more explicit by s 7 of the 
Senate Act No 53 of 1955,which amended s 63 and was retained in 
identical form in the Republican constitution (s 63) until its repeal 
in 1980. 
4. South Africa Act ss 24 and 25, Constitution Act s 28. 
5. This follows from the initial parity of provincial representation in 
the Senate, followed by the over-representation of the minority pro-
vinces. 
6. See the analysis in the second half of this chapter. 
7. As provided in s 152 of the South Africa Act, and s 118 of the Consti-
tution Act, until amended by s 1 of Act No 74 of 1980 in anticipation 
of the Senate's demise. 
8. At 317 to 321 , below. 
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(e) Constitutional Conventions 
The influence of the Westminster system is also apparent in 
relation to the main conventions of the South African consti-
tution 1 and reference has already been made to those conven-
2 
tions pertaining to the system of parliamentary government. 
\ The tendency in South Africa, however, has been to enact the 
'------ '-3' . 
most important conventi~ as has also been the case In the 
other export models of the Westminster system. This has re-
sulted in the conventions proper being not so. numerous in re-
lation to the codified parts of the constitution as in Britain. 
Apart from this ~important difference, the conventions in 
South Africa are ~ ignificantly weaker than their British coun-
terparts. This may be partially attributed to the fact that 
they d~t have the same theoretical rationale in South 
Africa, namely to give effect to the will of the true political 
sovereign, the majority of the people. 5 , But it is also a 
function of the South African political culture and the fact 
that many of the conventions are seldom applied in practice, 
with the result that their continued status as conventions and 
their exact scope are no longer self-evident. 6 It can also 
be said that in South Africa the conventions do not materially 
qualify the majoritarian aspects of the constitutional system. 
1. The description of the South African conventions given by Marinus 
Wiechers, Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 172-186, is the most complete and up 
to date, save for some omissions relating to ministerial responsibility. 
2. At 145-147, above. 
3. See, eg, ss 7(3), 16(2), 20(3), 26 and 64 of the Constitution Act. 
4. This is not to overlook the fact that several of the British conven-
tions have also been weakened by recent political events, as numerous 
commentators have pointed out. 
5. See A.V. Dicey An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Consti-
tution (10 ed with introduction by E.C.S. Wade, 1959) 429 - Dicey 
spoke of the electorate, but for him this was synonymous with the 
people. 
6. Various examples can be found relating to ministerial responsibility, 
but reference can also be made to the convention that if a government 
is defeated in the house the State President should dissolve parlia-
ment; this was not followed in 1939 when preference was given to an 
alternative convention. See Wiechers op cit 182. 
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3. Non-Westminster Features of the South African Constitution
1 
/'\ 
By virtue of its origins and history~e South African consti-
tution contains two variations on the Westminster paradig~ 
~ 
which do not have the practical significance of the other non-
Westminster features to be discussed below. [fhe first of 
these is that South Africa has a codified constitution, but 
the only significatit consequence of this factor is that it 
has enabled the entrenchment of two constitutional provisions; 
for the rest the constitution is as flexible as its Westmins-
ter counterpart. The second is that the South African insti-
tutions such as the presidency and Senate have not enjoyed 
the s~~e status and prestige as their Westminster counter-
par~ in Bagehot's terms they have not attracted the same 
fmotive power' as the 'dignified parts of government' in the 
British constitution. 3 This difference is of little signi-
ficance in the every-day working of the constitutio~ but is 
inclined to manifest itself at times of political or consti-
tutional crisis. 4 
The other departures from the Westminster model are of a more 
substantial nature and have had an important effect on the 
constitutional politics of South Africa. The first, and 
most obvious, is ~he franchisij and this is the constitutional 
feature which has had the most decisive role in the political 
development of the country. The progressive retractions of 
the franchise have lead indirectly to the second and third 
features, namely ~ommunal representation in joi~t and subse-
quently separate institutions, and partition~ ~hese in turn 
1. See L.J. Boulle 'The Second Republic: Its Constitutional Lineage' 
1980 CILSA 1-32, D.H. van Wyk 'Westminsterstelsel - Requiescat in 
Pace? of: kan n luiperd sy kolle verander?' 44 (1981) THR-HR 105-119. 
2. See M. Wiechers 'Grondslae vir Politieke Ontwikkeling in Suid-Afrika' 
in J. Coetzee (ed) -Gedenkbundel - H.L. Swanepoel (1976) 103. 
3. W. Bagehot The English Constitution (2 ed, 1872) (World's Classics 
ed (1928) 3-4). 
4. Examples are the manipulation of the Senate during the coloured 
voters' crisis (Wiechers in Coetzee op cit 106), and the position 
bf the State President in testifying before the Erasmus Commission 
which had to report to him (see G. Devenish 'Tne protection of the 
dignity and reputation of the state president' 44 (1981) THR-HR 136). 
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comprise the constitutional basis of the government's form of 
sham consociationalism and the foundation for its new consti-
tutional dispensation. The fourth variation relates to the 
provincial system which is of little current significance, 
and the fifth to a normative legal principle, the Rule of Law. 
The net effect of these variations has been to produce a con-
stitutional system which, even before the amendments of 1980 
and 1981, was strongly at variance with the normative West-
minster mOde'iJ 
The retraction of the parliamentary franchise in South Africa 
is the obverse of what has occurred in other political systems 
where ruling parties have sought to broaden the base of their 
electoral support by enfranchsing new strata of the popula-
tion;1 in this way democracy became 'a fulfillment of the 
liberal state,.2 The process can be illustrated briefly in 
I - , --
relation to (BrE ain where the modern [history of the parliamen-
tary franchise 3 began with the Reform Act of 1832, and within 
just under one hundred years of reform the franchise had be-
come the prerogative of all resident British subjects of 
eligible a;;t It can be said in a generalised sense that 
~ 
the franchise w s first extended on the basis of property 
qualifitations, then on the basis of residence to all males, 
then on a uniform basis to men and women over twenty-one years 
of age, and finally to all adults over eighteen years; the 
~ 
final step in the process of electoral reform was the aboli-
tion of :plural voting in 1948, since when each elector has had 
no more than a sirigle vote. Whereas in 1800 only three out 
of every one hundred adults was eligible to vote, a century 
and a half later a universal and ~qual franchise was well es-
tablished. The pitture, then, is one of a gradual but pur-
posive widening of the franchise,until the principle that the 
1. D. Welsh 'The Evolution of South Africa's Constitutional Structure' 
-(unpublished paper, Cape Town, 3 February 1978) 7. 
2. C.B. Macpherson The Real World of Democracy (1966) 10. 
3. See Wade and PhillipsConstitutional and Administrative Law (1977) 
141-143, Hood Phillips and Jackson Constitutional and Administrative 
Law (1978) 186-189, J. Harvey and L. Bather The British Constitution 
·(1966) 49-61. 
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Commons should represent 'property and intelligence' had been 
replaced by the principle of citizen representation. It is 
also clear that the main institutions of the Westminster sys-
ten were well established before the system became democratic. 
Since the introduction of self-government in the Cape in 1853 --the parliamentary franchise in South Africa has always been 
qualified in one or more ways.1 At first a property and 
later an educational qualification were used to limit the fran-
chise, but these were succeeded in time and significance by the 
racial and colour qualifications which were used to retract 
the franchise and whith remain its most important contemporary 
featu e. The developments have therefore not followed the 
pattern of the Westminster and other systems, except in so far 
as the age and gender qualifications have been modified to ex-
tend voting rights to women and young adults. In so far as 
parliament is not democratically representative, the South 
African constitution lacks a crucial attribute of the West-
minster system. 
The original Cape franchise was not racially restricted and 
extended to all Bri t ish sub j ec ts who owned property of a cer'-
tain value or received a certain annual remuneration; the 
economic qualifications were amended subsequently and in 1892 
an educational qualification was introduced for the first 
time. The effect of the qualifications in the Cape was to 
produce a predominantly white electorate. In Natal the fran-
chise was also originally non-racial and based on economic 
qualifications, but subsequent qualifications effectively ex-
cluded black, and later Indian, voters. The franchise in the 
Free State Republic extended to all burghers of the state, who 
by definition had to be white and to possess in addition cer-
tain residential or property qualifications. The constitution 
of the South African Republic expressly forbade equality be-
tween whites and persons of colour, and both citizenship and 
1. On the franchise in South Africa see H. Rahlc and E. Kahn South 
Africa: The Development of its Laws and Constitution (1960) 53ff; 
J. Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978) 17ff; 
M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 299ff. 
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the franchise were restricted to the former, but later even 
naturalised citizens were excluded from the rolls; property 
qualifications were relevant only to the attainment of citi-
zenship through naturalisation, and not to the franchise 
directly. 
One of the well-known compromises of the national convention 
preceding Union was the retention of the existing franchise 
arrangements in each colony for the purpose of electing mem-
bers to the House of Assembly from each of the new provinces. 1 
In fact the franchise issue was never properly resolved be-
cause the convention was unable to agree on a uniform fran-
2 chise for the whole country. The Union parliament itself 
was empowered to prescribe future franchise qualifications,' 
subject only to the special procedure which was required 
should future legislation disqualify existing electors in the 
Cape. 3 There was also provision that no person might be re-
moved from an existing voters l roll by reason only of factors 
of race or colour,4 and this safeguard was also entrenched. 5 
Even before further racial restrictions were made to the fran-
chise, the nature of the qualified franchise in the Cape and 
Natal had to be evaluated in the light of thre~ additional 
factors. The first is that the qualifications relating to 
electors did not apply, mutatis mutandis, to members of the 
legislature, who were required to be 'of European descent,.6 
The second is that in establishing the quota for the delimita-
1. South Africa Act s 36. The Cape also forewent the right of non-
whites to stand for election to parliament. 
2. See I. Walton Inner Histor of the National Convention (1912) 140ff 
and H. May The South African Constitution 3 ed, 1955 10-13. 
3. South Africa Act s 35(1). There was no restriction on amending the 
qualifications as such, and the special procedure was not required 
when white women were enfranchised by Act No 19 of 1930, although this 
step diminished the value of the coloured vote. 
4. South Africa Act s 35 (2) .. 
5. South Africa Act s 152. 
6. South .Africa Act ss 44(.a) and 26(a), for the House and Senate res-
pectively. Non-whites were, however, entitled to sit in the Cape 
and Natal provincial councils - South Africa Act s 70(2). 
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tion of electoral divisions the white population only was 
taken into account; which resulted in fewer seats being appor-
tioned to the Cape (in which most coloured voters were resi-
dent), and in a reduction in the value of the Cape vote vis-a-
vis that of the other provinces. 2 The third is that the 
Women's Enfranchisement Act of 1930 3 enfranchised white women 
only, and without any qualification, and this development, to-
gether with the subsequent removal of income and property 
qualifications for white males,4 led to a substantial reduc-
tion in the influence of the composite coloured vote . 5 
The subsequent qualifications to the franchise were all racial-
ly based. ' In 1936 blacks were removed from the common parlia-
mentary voters' rolls,6 except for the few in Natal who re-
mained eligible. 7 In 1946 those Indians who were registered 
on the general voters' rolls were removed,8 and coloured voters 
were removed by the Separate Representation of Voters Act of 
1. S 24 of the South Africa Act regulated the initial allocation of seats 
until membership of the House of Assembly reached 150, which occurred 
in 1931. From then s 41 was applicable, and based the quota on the 
number of white adults in the Union. This was amended by s 1 of Act 
No 55 of 1952 which provided for the first time that the delimitation 
should be based on the number of registered white voters. S 34 
was repealed by s 4 of Act No 30 of 1942. 
2. As has been shown above (147-149), the deliberate inequality in the 
weight of votes is well entrenched in South African constitutional law 
although it conflicts with one of the implied meanings of 'one man one 
vote'. See I. Duchacek Rights and Liberties in the World Today -
Constitutional Promise and Reality (1973) 194. 
3. Act No 18 of 1930. 
4. Franchise Laws Amendment Act No 41 of 1931. Before this law was en-
acted all males in the Cape were still subject to the property qualifi-
cations; after its enactment coloured males remained so, but white 
males and females did not. For the numbers of respective voters 
see Rahlo and Kahn op cit 165. 
5. This influence was also affected, though less directly, when white 
voter registration became compulsory (Act No 20 of 1940) and it became 
necessary for coloured voters to register before a magistrate, police-
man or electoral officer (Act No 50 of 1948). 
6. Representation of Natives Act 12 of 1936. This necessitated an amend-
ment to s 35 of the Constitution which was effected by s 44 of the 
Representation Act. See Ndlwana v Hofmeyr 1937 AD 229. 
7. The Electoral Act No 46 of 1946 retained this limited franchise for 
blacks (and Indians), but it was abolished by Act No 46 of 1951. 
8. Asiatic Land Tenure and Representation Act No 28 of 1946. 
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1951' which was validated in 1956 2 in the wake of the consti-, 
tutional crisis. 3 Since then the general parliamentary fran-
chise has been restricted exclusively to whites 4 for whom 
there is a system of universal, in the sense of non-qualified, 
franchise;5 and the right to be elected corresponds exactly 
with the right to elect. 6 The only subsequent extensions of 
voting rights have been made in relation to the separate and 
subordinate political institutions referred to below, thus 
introducing a new type of 'qualified franchise' for coloureds, 
Indians and blacks. 
The restrictive franchise in South Africa has clearly limited 
the representative nature of the central parliament and dis-
torted the operation of such Westminster principles as parlia-
mentary supremacy and parliamentary government, as well as all 
forms of constitutional responsibility. The undemocratic 
nature of the constitutional system has deprived it of a 
rational-legal legitimacy and contributed to the legitimation 
crisis facing the state system. The government in response 
has turned its back on the majoritarian Westminster system as 
a normative model, because that system would involve an exten-
sion of the franchise on a universal basis. Instead it has 
institutionalised various forms of communalism in its pursuit 
of a type of quasi-consociationalism. 
1. Act No 46 of 1951. 
2. By Act No 9 of 1956 
3. See Harris v Minister of the Interior 1952 (2) SA 428 (AD); Minister 
of the Interior v Harris 1952 (4) SA 769 (AD): Collins v Minister of 
the Interior 1957 (1) SA 552 (AD); and M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed, 
1981) 307-321. 
4. As regulated by the Electoral Consolidation Act No 46 of 1946 until 
this statute was superceded by the Electoral Act No 45 of 1979. The 
Electoral Laws Amendment Act No 30 of 1958 first extended the fran-
chise to whites in the age group 18 to 20 years. Registered coloured 
voters in Natal remained on the common rolls until their death. 
5. On the other hand the old franchise qualifications remained in force 
for those on the separate coloured voters' rolls. 
6. See s 46 of the Republican Constitution Act. 
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Cb ) Communal representation in common authorities 
Since 1936 various forms of communal representation have been 
adopted for those excluded from the parliamentary franchise, 
at first in common institutions, and subsequently in separate 
nominated and elected authorities. The principle of com-
munal representation is not, from a comparative constitution-
al point of view, without empirical precedent,1 and is in fact 
consistent with the normative consociational model. In re-
lation to the South African central parliament, however, the 
principle has been applied predominantly for 'compensatory' 
purposes, and it has operated within such limited constraints 
that it has had little impact on the political process. The 
developments are dealt with in relation to the different stat-
utorily defined groups, although this corresponds to some ex-
tent with their chronological sequence. 
(i) Blacks. Upon their removal from the common electoral 
rolls in 1936, blacks were placed on a communal roll to elect 
directly three white representatives to the House of Assembly 
and two white representatives to the Cape Provincial Council. 2 
The existing franchise qualifications remained in force, but 
the representation continued only until 1959 when it was dis-
continued. 3 Communal representation for blacks was also in-
stituted in the Senate in 1936 4 when provision was made for 
1. Examples of countries where it has been adopted are India, New 
Zealand, Indonesia, Cyprus, Lebanon and Zimbabwe. See I. Duchacek 
op cit 101-108; E. McWhinney Federal Constitution-making for a Multi-
National World (1966) 27-31; S.A. de Smith The New Commonwealth and 
its Constitutions (1964) 117-121. And see further at 411 to 
412 , below. 
2. Representation of Natives Act No 12 of 1936. For a description of 
the electoral process see May (3 ed, 1955) 104-106. 
3. The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act No 46 of 1959. 
4. Representation of Natives Act. Since 1910 the Constitution had pro-
vided (s 24(ii)) that four of the eight senators nominated by the 
Governor-General-in-Council should be selected on the ground mainly 
of their thorough acquaintance with the wants and wishes of the 
fcoloured races'. 
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four white 1 senators to be indirectly elected by blacks in 
four electoral divisions;2 those elected held office for 
five years regardless of any prior dissolution of the Senate. 
In 1951 3 the Governor-General was empowered to increase the 
number of black-elected senators to six~ but this power was 
never exercised and the system as a whole was also abolished 
in 1959 5 after which blacks have no longer been represented 
in common institutions. 6 The principle of ethnic differen-
tiation among blacks was never applied while their represen-
tation in common authorities persisted. 
(ii) Coloureds. The history of coloured persons' communal 
representation in the central parliament was somewhat similar 
to that of blacks, but extended over a different time period. 7 
Upon their removal from the common electoral rolls, coloured 
voters in the Cape were registered on separate rolls to elect 
four white representatives 8 to the House of Assembly and two 
to the Cape Provincial Council. 9 This representation was 
1. This followed from the requirement (s 11(1)) that these senators have 
the same qualifications as those elected under the South Africa Act 
(s 26); a further qualification was residence for two years in the 
province within which the electoral area was situated. 
2. For a description of the electoral colleges and electoral process see 
May (3 ed) 101-104; Verloren van Themaat Staatsreg (2 ed, 1967) 284. 
3. The Bantu Authorities Act No 68 of 1951. 
4. S 19 read with the Schedule; the Schedule also introduced incidental 
changes in the method of electing senators. 
5. The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act No 46 of 1959, s 15. 
6. Sitting members were not affected by the provisions of the 1959 Act 
(s 15(1)). The provision referred to in fn 4 at 158 above was re-
tained in similar form in the republican constitution (s 19(2)(b)) but 
the amended wording (introduced by s 4 of Act No 53 of 1960) restricts 
its scope to 'coloured persons', as opposed to the previous 'non-
white' persons; the provision was repealed simultaneously with the 
abolition of the Senate. 
7. The best account of the general history of coloured political rights 
is to be found in chapter 16 of the Theron Report op cit. 
8. This requirement derived from the qualifications of the representatives 
which were the same as those for members of the House of Assembly and 
Provincial Council respectively, save for the additional requirement 
of two years residence in the Cape Province (ss 10(1) and 12(1) of 
the Separate Representation of Voters Act No 46 of 1951). 
9. Ss 8(1) and 11(1) respectively, read with s 6(2). 
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terminated by the Separate Representation of Voters' Amend-
ment Act of 1968~ and the termination coincided with the 
creation of the Coloured Persons Representative Council; 
thenceforth there was no further communal representation for 
coloured persons in common authorities. 2 There had never 
been any separate representation of coloured voters in the 
Senate, although provision was made 3 for an additional white 
senator to be nominated by the Governor-General 'on the ground 
of his thorough acquaintance ... with the reasonable wants and 
wishes of the non-European population in the ... Cape Lprovinc~7'; 
this provision was retained in the republican constitution~ but 
was repealed in 1968. 5 Reference has already been made 6 to 
the expression of legislative preference for half of the nomi-
nated senators to be acquainted with the interests of the 
coloured population, but juridically this provision was only 
directory and within the overall context of 'white politics t 
its political efficacy could only be minimal. 
(i i i) Indians. In the Cape Province Indians were on the same 
voters rolls as coloured persons and shared their electoral 
fate, but in Natal, in which the majority were resident, no 
Indians could register as voters after Union. 7 Thus because 
of theii prior virtually complete exclusion from the franchise, 
Indians were never actively disenfranchised by the Union par-
liament, and there was not the same compulsion to establish 
'compensatory! communal representation for them in common in-
stitutions as there was for blacks and coloureds; when leg-
islative provision was eventually made for such representation 
1. Act No 50 of 1968. The Commission of Inquiry into Improper Politi-
cal Interference and the Political Representation of the Various 
Population Groups (the Muller Commission, RP 72/1967) recommended the 
termination of this system because of the establishment of the CPRC. 
2. The 1951 Act (s 13) did not affect during their lifetime those non-
whites in Natal who were already on the common rolls, provided they 
remained resident in the province. 
3. Separate Representation of Voters Act s 7. 
4. S 28(1). 
5. S 5 of Act No 50 of 1968. 
6. See page 158 fn 4. 
7. See M. Wiechers op cit 299, and page 154, above. 
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the arrangement was stillborn. In 1946 statutory provIsIon 
was made for Indians in the Transvaal and Natal to elect three 
white members 2 to the House of Assembly3 and for the latter to 
elect two members,4 who could be white or Indian, to the Natal 
Provincial Council;5 the franchise was restricted to males 
and qualified in respect of education and income. 6 Provision 
was also made for Indian voters to elect one white member
7 
to 
the Senate and for the Governor-General to appoint an addi-
tional white senator to represent Indians.
8 
The whole arrange-
ment, however, was boycotted by Indians,9 and the provisions of 
the statute dealing with representative matfers were repealed
10 
after the National party came to power in 1948; no provision 
has subsequently been made for direct or indirect Indian re-
presentation in the central parliament. 
~n retrospect communal representation in the central parliament 
proved in all cases to be no more than a transient phenomenon 
in the movement towards communal representation in separate 
political institution;! ~ontemporary policy statements 11 
/' 
1. Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act No 28 of 1946. 
The first chapter of the Act (ss 1-39) placed restrictions on the 
acquisition and ownership of fixed property by Indians and the second 
chapter (ss 40-58), dealing with representation, could be seen as 
something of a quid pro quo. 
2. S 48(1) prescribed the same qualifications for these members as existed 
for other members of the Rouse. 
3. S 41(b) read with s 47(1). 
4. S 50(1). 
5. S 41(c) read with s 49(1). 
6. S 43. 
7. S 46(1) prescribed the same qualifications for this Senator as existed 
for other Senators. 
a. S 41(a) read with s 45(1). 
9. See Rahlo and Kahn op cit 165. 
10. By s 2 of Act No 47 of 1948. 
11. See the policy statements of primem~n~sters D.F. Malan, J.G. Strydom 
and R.F. Verwoerd inM. Rorrell Laws Affecting Race Relations in 
South Africa (1978) 9-10. The governmentts constitutional policy was 
given added impetus by such important aspects of the 'living consti-
tution' as the Population Registration Act No 30 of 1950, the Group 
Areas Act No 41 of 1950, the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 
No 49 of 1953 and the Industrial Conciliation Act No 28 of 1956 which 
introduced statutory job reservation (s 77). 
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tended to justify these arrangements in terms of 'baaskap', 
or 'apartheid J policy, in which the ov~rt emphasis was on the 
exclusion of non-whites from institutional bases of power 
Subsequently policy statements gave greater emphasis to the 
concept of 'separate development; which was to involve the 
creation of the separate communal institutions described below. 
Even from the institutional point of view, however, and aside 
from their overt or covert political objectives, these arrange-
ments must be evaluated very negatively.1 In the first place 
the representation afforded to non-white groups was so minimal 
as to afford them no prospect of materially affecting the poli-
tical process; secondly, the system of representation oper-
ated on a vicarious basis in that the 'representatives' of 
these groups were for the most part white, and blacks and 
coloured leaders could not themselves be included in the nom-
inal form of participation afforded the two groups; and third-
ly the insecurity of the various statutory formulae in the face 
of the principle of parliamentary supremacy further diminished 
their constitutional and political significance. The consti-
tutional history of communal representation in joint institu-
tions is thus not encouraging. Nevertheless the principle 
was revived by the government when it instituted the presidentts 
council as part of its quasi-consociational programme,2 and 
there was also a recent unsuccessful attempt to apply it at the 
local gov~rnment level in Natal. 3 
1. For an inside account see From Union to Apartheid (1969) 27-140 by 
Margaret Ballinger, herself a 'native representative' for twenty-three 
years. See also H. May (3 ed) 106f£. 
2. On the president's council see below, 326 to 333. 
3. The Local Authorities Amendment Ordinance of 1979 (29 March 1979) pur-
ported to amend the Local Authorities Ordinance, No 24 of 1974 (Natal) 
to provide for the tcivic enfranchisement of Indians and coloureds and 
their enrolment on "common" voters' lists with whites'; the arrange-
ment would have involved a form of communal representation for whites, 
Indians and coloureds in certain local authorities in Natal, but the 
ordinance did not receive the State President's assent in terms \of 
s 89 of the Constitution Act. See F. Martin MEC in the Supplement 
to L.J. Boulle and L.G. Baxter (eds) Natal and KwaZulu: Constitution-
al and Folitical Options (1981) ·46. 
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Cc) Communal representation in separate institutions 
At the same time that representation in the central legisla-
ture was being restricted to whites, the institutional basis 
for the policy of separate development began to emerge with 
the creation of separate authorities, partly nominated and 
partly elected for coloureds and Indians. Insofar as these 
developments involved a devolution of authority from parlia-
ment to subordinate bodies it evidenced a deviation from the 
Westminster system, but this form of decentralisation took 
place within t f e department level of government and Wiechers 
appropriately describes it as a process of 'departmental de-
concentration 1£ activities'. 1 The government had earlier 
instituted along similar lines a communal assembly for blacks 
\ 
operating at thF national level of government; and subse-
quently,when the process of constitutional partition had begun 
to take effect, it instituted authorities for blacks at the 
sub-national level. In all these developments ultimate con-
trol was retained by the relevant minister and parliament, 
and the broad constitutional framework was left intact. An 
indispensible feature of these developments was the system of 
race classification, as regulated predominantly by the Popu-
lation Registration Act,2 which became the most important 
determinant of the constitutional and political processes. 
It is again more appropriate to deal with these developments 
in relation to the different statutorily defined groups than 
in strict chronological sequence. 
(i) Coloureds. 3 In 1943 the government created an advisory 
coloured counci14 under the wing of the Department of Social 
1. M. Wiechers in J. Coetzee op cit 107: behoort daar ... van 
departmentele dekonsentrasie van werksaamhede gepraat te word - met 
ander woorde n beperkter vorm van delegasie van regeringsmagte met 
die behoud van alle kontrole - bevoegdhede sonder effektiewe mede-
werking van die delegatus in die proses van kontrole'. 
2. Act No 30 of 1950. 
3. See the Theron Report op cit, chapter 16; M. Wiechers Staatsreg 
(3 ed, 1981) 428-433. 
4 .. ~is followed a minority recommendation (§ 1159) of the Commission of 
Inquiry into the Cape Coloured Population of the Union (The Wilcocks 
Commission, UG 54 of 1937). The majority recommendation (§ 1158) was 
that the franchise provisions in the Cape should be extended to the 
other provinces. This was not the last time that a commission's 
recommendations would be ignored. 
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Welfare,which was at the time responsible for administering 
coloured persons' interests. The council consisted of twenty-
five nominated members and had advisory, but not executive, 
powers; it met four times a year. After differences with 
the government on matters of principle the members resigned 
in 1950 and the council was dissolved shortly afterwards. In 
retrospect the council's failure can be seen as an addition 
to the inauspicious record in South Africa of nominated bodies 
with advisory powers. 
A similar, but this time partly representative institution, was 
established by the Separate Representation of Voters Act of 
1951,1 the same statute that disenfranchised coloured voters. 
Provision was made for a Union Council for Coloured Affairs,2 
to consist of fifteen members nominated by the Governor-General 
and twelve elected by coloured voters;3 its executive commit-
tee comprised five members of the Council. The functions of 
Council were to advise the government on matters affecting 
coloured persons, to act as an intermediary between this group 
and the government, and to carry out any other functions assign-
ed to it by the Governor-General. 4 The Council was officially 
opened in 1959 and held regular meetings in camera under a nom-
inated chairman. It failed, however, to have much impact on 
coloured affairs because of its limi ted powers, its widespread 
rejection by coloured organisations and community leaders, and 
partly because of the continued, albeit indirect and limited, 
coloure~ participation in 'whiter politics. 5 The Council was 
disestablished when the first Coloured Persons Representative 
Council was constituted in 1968 - the Theron report describes 
the period of its operation as a rtransitional phase' in the 
constitutional development of coloured persons. 6 
1. Act No 46 of 195i, ss 14-19, as amended by s 2 of Act No 30 of 1956. 
2. S 14. The original s 14 envisaged a 'Board for Coloured Affairs' 
consisting of eight elected and three nominated members and with sub-
stantially the same powers as those bestowed on the Council, but with 
no executive committee. 
3. Three from each of the four Union electoral divisions. 
4. S 18(1)-(d). 
5. See the Theron Report op cit ch 16 § 16.67-16.69 and Vosloo and Schrire 
'Subordinate Political Institutions' in De Crespigny and Schrire op 
cit 88. 
6. Op cit ch 16 § 16.50. 
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Provision was first made for a successor to the Union Council 
in 1964 1 in the form of a 'representative Council' of thirty 
elected and sixteen nominated members, but implementation of 
the act was delayed and it was amended 2 before it took effect. 
In terms of the amended act a Coloured Persons Representative 
Council (CPRC) could be instituted, consisting of forty members 
elected by coloured voters and twenty members nominated by the 
State President,3 all of whom had to be coloured persons. 
The careful blend of 'local' representatives and central ap-
pointees ensured substantial government influence in the Coun-
cil, and was to be a controversial feature for the duration 
of its existence. All coloured persons over the age of 
twenty-one who were South African citizens and not subject to 
any disqualification4 were liable to register as voters to re-
turn the elected component. 5 The Council would be elected 
for a five year period but might be dissolved by the State 
President at anytime. 6 It was empowered to elect from its 
own members a chairman and deputy chairman~ as well as four 
members to the executive of the Council which would be pre-
sided over by a chairman designated by the State President. 8 
The Coloured Persons Representative Council was brought into 
existence by proclamation the following year,9 and remained 
in existence for a period of eleven years. Its creation in 
1969 coincided with the termination of coloured representation 
in parliament and the Cape Provincial Council, and its aboli-
tion in 1980 10 coincided with the preliminary introduction of 
the government's constitutional dispensation. During its 
existence the Council, and its executive, had three major func-
tions. The fi~st was a legislative function, with the Council 
1. Coloured Persons Representative Council Act No 49 of 1964. 
2. By the Coloured Persons Representative Council Amendment Act No 52 of 
1968. The legislation was delayed pending the findings of the Muller 
Commission (op cit), the recommendations of which resulted in the 
Prohibition of Political Interference Act No 51 of 1968, the abolition 
of coloured representation in the Assembly, and the creation of the 
CPRC. 
3. S 1 • 4. S 5. 
5. S 4(a). 6. S 1A. 
7. S 14(1). 8. S 17(a). 
9. Proe No 77 of 1969 in Gazette 2347 of 3 April 1969. 
1 0. S 4(1) of Act 24 of 1980. 
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1 being granted law-making competence in respect of finance, 
local government, education, community welfare and pensions, 
rural areas and settlements, agriculture,2 and any other 
matters determined by the State President. 3 The jurisdic-
tion of the Council was founded on the 'personality princi-
ple ,4 and was not territorially based; this could have led 
to serious jurisdictional complications, particularly as it 
was never clear whether laws of the Council would prevail 
over other forms of subordinate legislation. 5 The Council's 
legislative power over the designated matters was described 
as being the same as that veste·d in parliament~ al though it 
clearly could not legislate repugnantly to existing statutes. 7 
In fact the Council's subordinate constitutional status was 
nowhere more evident than in respect of its legislative com-
petence, since ministerial approval had to be obtained prior to 
the intr6duction of legislation,8 the central government, 
through the State President, retained a lekislative veto 9 (not 
necessarily circumscribed by convention), and legislation would 
cease to be valid if it was repugnant to subsequent acts of 
parliament. In addition the Minister of Coloured Affairs 
could regulate the sessions, proceedings and all other matters 
relating to the Council's functioning,'O and parliament could, 
by virtue of its continued legislative supremacy, withdraw 
powers or terminate its existence - which in fact it subse-
quently did. Some indication of the Council's legislative 
1. S 21(1) read with s 17(6)(a). 
2. Agriculture was added by Proc R 185 of 1973 (Gazette 3989 of 3 
August 1973). 
3. 5 17(6)(a)(vi). 
4. That is powers were conferred Jin so far as they affect Coloured 
persons' . 
5. Theron Report op cit § 17.104 - § 17.107. 
vol 5 The Law of 50uth Africa 41. 





521(1). 7 • 5 25 (1) . 
5 21(2). Approval could only be granted after consultation with 
the Minister of Finance and the provincial Administrators (in the 
latter case presumably to prevent conflicts with provincial ordinances). 
S 23 .. 
Ss 15 and 26. For a description of additional controls exercised by 
the central government see Vosloo and Schrire in De Crespigny and 
Schrire op cit 90. 
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efficacy is evident from the fact that in its eleven years of 
existence it passed only three pieces of legislation. 
The executive function of the Council was carried out by its 
executive committee,which was also empowered to exercise all 
the functions of the Council when it was not in session, al-
though it could not itself legislate. 1 The management of 
finance was statutorily assigned to the chairman of the execu-
tive; but the other portfolios could be allocated among the 
remaining members at the chairmants discretion. The most im-
portant single task of the executive was to prepare the annual 
budget: the estimates of expenditure were prepared by the 
executive for submission to the Minister of Coloured Relations 
who, in consultation with the Minister of Finance, determined 
the amount to be submitted to parliament for appropriation; 
from the total funds allocated by parliament the Council could 
make its own appropriation b~ resolution. 3 While the execu-
tive committee was in political control of those functions 
allocated to the Council, the administration of those matters 
was entrusted to an Administration of Coloured Affairs which 
was instituted at the same time as the Council and was headed 
by a commissioner appointed by the central government; matters 
not within the executive1s purview continued to be administered 
by the Department of Coloured Relations. 4 Although there was 
some basis for administrative decentralisation, the Minister 
of Coloured Relations, who was responsible to the central par-
liament, remained in overall control of the administration of 
coloured affairs. 
1 • S 1 7 ( 6) Ca) • 
2. S 17(6)(b). 
3. Ss 22(1) and (2)(a). In anticipation of appropriation by the Coun-
cil the chairman could authorise the issue of moneys in circumstances 
of urgency. 
4. In 1951 a division of coloured affairs had been instituted within the 
Department of the Interior; it acquired departmental status in 1959 
and in 1962 its own minister. In 1969 some of its functions were 
taken over by the Administration of Coloured Affairs, the administra-
tive organ of the CPRC. 
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The third function of the Council and its executive was to 
advise the central government on matters affecting the econ-
omic, social, educational and political interests of coloured 
persons; and to make recommendations to the government regard-
ing these matters. 2 It was also intended to serve as a link 
and means of contract and consultation between the government 
and coloured persons;3 by mediation of the minister members of 
the executive had direct access to any other minister in con-
nection with matters affecting coloured persons. 4 In a sense 
these provisions attempted to overco~e some of the short-
comings in the powers and status of the CPRC and its executive 
by prescribing informal consultation and liaison as methods of 
influencing the government on matters affecting coloured per-
sons; the structural deficiencies, however, were not to be 
easily remedied in this way and the Theron reportS found 
severe inadequacies in the advisory function of the Council. 
The creation of separate and subordinate political institutions 
for coloured persons during this phase of constitutional deve-
lopment was an important step in the institutionalisation of 
the policy of 'parallel developmentr~ which involved the great-
est possible constitutional and political separation between 
whites and other groups.7 This policy was based on the assump-
tion that authentic distinctions could be drawn between matters 
in which the interests of coloured persons are decisive, matters 
1. S 20(1)(a). 
3. S 20(1)(c). 
5. Op cit § 17.109 - 17.112. 
2. S 20(1)(b). 
4. S 20(3). 
6. Theron Report op cit § 16.47 - 16.48. 
i. Further effect was given to this policy through the enactment of the 
Prohibition of Political Interference Act in the same year that the 
Council was created (Act No 51 of 1968); the act prohibited members 
of one 'population group ·' from being members of, or rendering assis-
tance to, or addressing any meeting of, a political party to which 
members of any other 'population group' belonged (s 2). Previously 
coloured teachers had been prohibited from being members of the 
United, National, Progressive or Liberal parties (GN 1375 of 1965). 
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in whith the interests of whites are decisive, and matters of 
joint interest. The first category was to be regulated by 
the CPRC, through which the political rights of coloured per-
sons would be exercised, while the second and third categories 
would continue to be regulated by the central and regional 
white institutions. Even in its early stages the CPRC was 
perceived as a prospective tcoloured parliament' with its exe-
cutive committee as a 'coloured cabinet'. 1 The next phase of 
policy implementation would have involved the enhancement of 
the Council's constitutional status and competence, and the 
creation of formal consultative mechanisms with the white par-
liament and other institutions; the government's 1977 consti-
tutional proposals were the first formulation of this phase. 
But the institutional continuity inherent in this process was 
broken in 1980 when the CPRC was disestablished,2 following 
requests for this move from both the majority and minority par-
ties in the Council. 3 
The failure of the CPRC to gain any significant support among 
coloured persons can be attributed to a number of its constit-
utional features which contributed to its lack of legitimacy. 
Among these 4 were the fact that the Council was not wholly 
elective,S the existence of "restraints on its legislative 
powers, the inadequacy of parliamentary-type privileges in res-
pect of its proceedings,6 the absence of a satisfactory terri-
1. See the Theron Report op cit § 17.1 and § 17.71. 
2. By the South African Coloured Persons Council Act No 24 of 1980. In 
terms of s 4(1) of the act the Council was deemed to have been dis-
solved, but s 4(2) made provision for its possible future reconstitu-
tion. 
3. Cf the preamble to Act No 24 of 1980. 
4". Theron Report op ci t § 17.94- - § 17. 124; Vos 100 and Schrire in De 
Crespigny and Schrire op cit 90-92. 
6. 
After the first elections in 1969 the government nominees helped create 
a legislative majority out of an electoral minority. 
There was a qualified freedom of speech (s 15 of Act No 49 of 1964) 
but this fell well short of the freedom conferred on parliament by the 
Powers and Privileges of Parliament Act No 91 of 1963 (see Kahn v Times 
Inc 1956 (2) SA 580 (W)), and that conferred on the provincial councils 
by s 75 of the Constitution Act. Cf Leon v Sanders 1972 (4) SA 637 (C). 
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torial jurisdiction for the Council, the fiscal arrangements 
which entailed financial dependence on parliament, and the 
insecurity of tenure of the Council and its subsidiary insti-
tutions. The Council's subordinacy and limitations were fur-
ther underlined when provision was made during its lifetime 
for additional and far-reaching ministerial intervention in its 
activities. To ensure the provision of revenue for the ser-
vices controlled by the Council in the event of the majority 
Labour party rejecting the budget; provision was made in 1972 
for the executive committee alone to appropriate money, and 
failing this the Minister of Coloured Relations. 3 After the 
Labour party electi6n successes in 1975 4 the minister was em-
powered to exercise any functionS of the executive, its chair-
man, or the council, if such instance failed to exercise its 
powers; alternatively ·the minister could delegate the function 
to 'any other person',6 which he subsequently did on certain 
occasions. 7 But these factors only aggravated the wider poli-
tical issues surrounding the Council - the fact that it was 
unilaterally imposed by the government, that it was perceived 
as part of a divide and rule strategy, and that it was inti-
mately related to the system of race classification, residen-
tial and educational segregation, and other discriminatory 
practices. The failure and dissolution of the CPRC was to be 
a prominent symptom of the legitimation crisis in South Africa. 
The main political recommendation of the Theron commissionS 
was that the existing pattern of constitutional development 
1. Jurisdiction was primarily personal, and territorial only in re-
lation to land owned or occupied by coloured persons (eg in terms of 
the Group Areas Act). 
2. M. Horrell op cit 31. 
3. S 22 of the main act as amended by s 6 of the CPRC Amendment Act 
No 99 of 1972. 
4. M. Horrell op cit 32. 
5. Other than the pO-wer to legislate. 
6. S 22A of the main act as inserted by s 2 of Act No 32 of 1975. 
7. Eg in 1975 the minister authorised the replacement chairman of the 
~xecutive to authorise the budget, and the same procedure occurred ~n 
1976. 
S. Op cit § 178. And see below, 263 to 265. 
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should be discontinued, and that satisfactory forms of direct 
coloured representation should be instituted at all levels of 
government. This recommendation was expl'essly rej ected by 
the government at the time,1 and was again implicitly re-
jected in its new constitutional proposals,whith involved a 
continuity in and evolution of previous constitutional develop-
ments. The subsequent dissolution of the CPRC left an insti-
tutional vacuum which was to have been filled by a fully nom-
2 inated body with executive and advisory powers only - despite 
the break in constitutional continuity this would still have 
provided an institutional basis for the evolution of a coloured 
tparliament'. But this arrangement was itself stillborn; and 
the statutory implementation of the government's proposals be-
gan with no existing representative or nominated coloured 
authorities at the national level. 
Cii) Indians. Separate communal authorities for Indians were 
slower in developing than for coloured persons and their devel-
opment was never the same source of political controversy - a 
function partially of the historically lower salience of the 
Indian franchise. 4 The development, however, is similar to 
that of the various coloured councils, since it involved the 
pursuit of the same policy of political and constitutional sep-
aration; it also made the same assumptions as to the exclusi-
vity of 'Indian interests,.5 
1. See the white paper entitled Provisional Comments by , the Government 
on the Recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry into Matters Re-
lating to the Coloured Population Group (W.P.S. - 76). 
2. Act No 24 of 1980 established a council to be known as the South 
African Coloured Persons Council consisting of 30 members nominated 
by the State President who would also appoint members to its executive 
committee. The council and its executive would have executive and 
advisory powers but the legislative powers, of the CPRC would be taken 
over by the State President. 
3. After discussions with coloured leaders in mid-1980 the government 
a~nounced that it would not continue with the epe. See M. Wiechers 
Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 432. 
4. It was only in 1962 that the government accepted that the repatriation 
scheme for Asians could not succeed. See the Minister of Indian 
Affairs in Senate Debates vol 3 col 503-520 (8 February 1962). The 
RSA Constitution Act, No 32 of 1961, vests in the State President the 
'control and administration ... of matters specifically or differen-
tially affecting Asiatics throughout the republic ... ' (s 111). 
5. See at 168, above. 
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In 1964 a National Indian Council was established consisting 
of twenty-one nominated members, and presided over by the Sec-
retary for Indian Affairs; in its early years the Council 
was an extra-constitutional body and it had advisory powers 
only. In 1965 the name of the Council was changed to the 
South African Indian Council; and it was given statutory rec-
ognition in 1968 with the passing of the South African Indian 
Council Act. 2 Membership was increased to a maximum of 
twenty-five,3 with all members being Indians appointed by 
the minister to represent the Cape province, Natal and the 
Transvaal. 4 The Council could appoint its own chairman5 and 
elect four members to the executive committee, the fifth mem-
ber and chairman of which would be appointed by the minister. 6 
At this stage of its development the Council had neither leg-
islative nor executive powers, and its main functions were to 
advise the government on matters affecting the economic, 
social, cultural, educational and political interests of the 
Asiatic community,7 to make recommendations to the government 
on these matters,B and to serve as a link and means of contact 
between the government and this group.9 
In terms of subsequent legislation10the State President was em-
powered to increase the size of the Council to not more than 
thirty members, to specify the number of appointed and elected 
members, and to provide for the qualifications of candidates 
1. M. Horrell op cit 34. 
2. Act No 31 of 196B. 
3. S 1 
4. S 2. At the time of Union entry of Indians into the Free State was 
prohibited,and their residence there ~s still prohibited. 
5. S 7(1). 6. S 10(1)(a). 
7. S 13(1)(a). B. S 1B(1)(b). 
9. S 13(1)(d). This function is similar to that of the CPRC, as des-
cribed above. 
10. SA Indian Council Amendment Act, No 67 of 1972, s 2 of which inserted 
s 1A in the main act. 
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and voters, and for the election and nomination procedures; 
this arrangement highlights the degree of administrative con-
trol which has always existed over non-white constitutional 
matters. In 1974 1 the si.ze of the Council was duly increased 
to thirty members, with parity of strength between those nom-
inated by the central government and the others indirectly 
elected by electoral colleges which comprised members of 
Indian local authorities, local affairs committees, management 
committees and consultative committees. 2 The first elections 
were held in the same yea~ and an elected member was appoint-
ed chairman of the council's executive. In 1976 3 the minis-
ter delegated4 all powers previously vested in him in regard 
to education and social welfare to the executive committee,S 
whith could then deal with these matters insofar as they 
affected Indians. 6 No provision was ever made, however, for 
legislative powers to be delegated to the Council, and its 
status was clearly inferior to that of the former CPRC. 
An evaluation of the SAIC may be made along similar lines to 
that of the CPRC, with due regard to its greater constitutional 
subordinacy and functional limitations. Its unrepresentative 
composition and minimal powers combined to undermine its legi-
timacy in the perception of those for whom it was intended as 
a political forum, although it was difficult to gauge its com-
munal support since it was never subject to popular control, 
and its elected component was only remotely responsible to the 
electorate. In what proved to be the first statutory step in 
the implementation of the government's constitutional dispen-
sation, legislative provision was made in 1978 for significant 
changes in the composition (but not powers) of the Council. 
1. Proclamation R 167 of 3 September 1974 (Reg Gaz 2031). 
2. The proclamation (sch §3) made separate provision for each province. 
3. Gov Notice R 7 of 2 January 1976 (Gov Gaz 4945). 
4. In terms of s 10A(4). 
5. S 10A(4) also provided that powers might be delegated to the executive 
by a provincial executive committee, but this never occurred. 
6. S 10A(2). This put its executive powers on the same footing as those 
of the CPRC. 
7. SA Indian Council Amendment Act No 83 of 1978. 
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Among the major changes envisaged in the amending legislation 
were an increase in the size of the Council to forty-five 
members, the majority of whom would be elected,1 an extension 
of the Council's term of office from three to five years,2 
the adjustment of qualifications of members to resemble those 
3 . 
for members of the House of Assembly , and a decrease in the 
size of the new Westminster-type executive from five to four 
members. 4 This statute anticipated the draft constitution 
bill of 1979 5 which, other than for a change in nomenclature,6 
made provision for a representative assembly and responsible 
cabinet along the lines already described. Constitutional 
and political continuity is again apparent in this transform-
ation - it involves a transition from representative to res-
ponsible government in a process of , 'internal communal decolo-
nization'. Nevertheless for administrative and political 
reasons there were numerous delays in the elections for the 
new Council, and the terms of office of the appointed and in-
directly elected members were periodically extended; so that 
the implementation of the government's constitution was again 
commenced before this stage of development had been completed. 
Elections were eventually held in November 1981 and it was 
1. S 1 of the main act as amended by s 1 of the 1978 amending act; 
forty 'members would be elected in accordance with the Electoral Act 
for Indians No 122 of 1977 as amended by Act No 41 of 1979, three 
would be nominated in proportion to party strengths in the Council, 
and two would be nominated by the State President on the advice of 
the leader of the majority party. For further references to the 
'Indian Parliament' see below, 295 to 298. 
2. S 2 of the main act as amended by s 3 of the amending act. 
3. S 3 of the main act as amended by s 4 of the amending act; cf ss 46 
and 55 of Act No 32 of 1961. 
4. S 10 of the main act as amended by s 11 of the amending act: the 
State President is to appoint the leader of the majority party in the 
council as chairman, and the other three members on the latter's ad-
vice. 
5. Ss 52-53. During the second reading of the amendment bill the 
minister referred to the new Council as being designed to fit into the 
new dispensation. House of Assembly Debates vol 17 col 8186-7 (30 
Hay 1978). 
6. .' Chamber of Deputies J for 'Indian Council'. 
7. By the State President (Proc R 271 in Gov Gaz 2548 of 21 Oct 1977, 
Proc R 288 in Gov Gaz 2685 of 3 Nov 1978, and Proc R 236/79 in Gov 
Gaz 6715 of 2 Nov 1979) in terms of s 5A of Act 31 of 1968, and by 
parliament in Act No 13 of 1980. 
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clear from the response of the Indian electorate 1 that the 
SAIC would have the same legitimacy problems as the defunct 
CPRC. The Council was to convene for the first time early 
in 1982. 
(iii) Blacks. The establishment of separate communal authori-
ties for blacks has taken place in terms of three different 
objectives which require separate analysis. The first ob-
~ ,-..,. 
jective was ~o provide a substitute for the termination of 
black representation in common authoriti ~ these developments 
are now of only historical interest. The second objective was 
~o institutionalise black political participation in the home-
./' 
lan~ system in furtherance of the policy of separate develop-
me~ in its ultimate form of constitutional independence and 
partition~is objective has been realised in elation to 
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and the Cisk i. The t ird 
and more recent, objective has been ~~ create limited black 
political participation in the 'common area' through the com-
munity council system; this arrangement involves a recognition 
of the political limi tations of the home.lands system, and~t U~-l0' 
highlights certain structural illogicalities in the government's 
constitutional proposa s. The first and third developments are 
dealt with in this section, and the second on its own in rela-
tion to partition. 
,.... 
When black voters were removed from the common electoral rolls 
~in 19 6, besides provision being made for their separate rep-
resentation2 in parliament, i Natives Representative Council 
was established as a compensatory political foru 3 This body 
consisted of twenty-three members 4 - the official members, who 
comprised the Secretary for Native Affairs and six chief 
1. The highest turn-out in the elections was 20,5% of the registered 
voters (Red Hill, Natal) and the lowest 1,8% (Fordsburg, Transvaal). 
In Natal, where the vast majority of electors reside, the average 
poll was 10 ~ 15% of registered voters. See Rand Daily Mail 5 November 
1981. 
2. See pages 158 to 159, above. 
3. Representation of Natives Act No 12 of 1936. See M. Wiechers 
Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 435ff. 
4. S 20(2); there were originally twenty-two members but the number was 
increased by Act No 45 of 1947 (s 4). 
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'native commissioners', 1 four black members nominated by the 
Governor-General,2 one for each of four electoral areas, and 
twelve black members who were indirectly elected by black 
r-
authorities. 3 The Representative Council had neither legis-
lative nor executive powers, and its functions were solely ad-
<- , 
visory It could consider and report on proposed legislation 
insofar as it affected blacks, and on any other matters re-
ferred to it by the ministe'r. 4 It could also recommend to 
parliament or a provincial council legislation which it con-
sidered to be in the interests of blacks. 5 Parliamentary or 
provincial legislation could in theory be delayed for the con-
sideration of the Council, but only if the minister submitted 
a certificate stating that the enactment would specially 
affect black interests;6 the minister's decision was based on 
his unfettered discretion, and this provision proved to be a 
dead letter. ~ven before its abol it ion in 1951 7 the Counc il 
itself had proved to be inadequate, ineffective and unaccept-
able to blacks,8 and had, of its own volition, adjourned sine 
diel For its brief and politically unremarkable existen~ 
-~- r" I 
however, ,it wa~th~ first national authority in any way repre--sentative of blacks, and in the light of subsequent develop-
ments it was significant that the principle of ethnic differen-
tiation among blacks was not a determinant of its composition. 1 --.. 
Since its demise the Representative Council has had no com-
1. S 20(3). 
2. S 20(4). 
3. Three by the general council of the Transkeian territories, two by 
the electoral college of each of the other electoral areas, and one 
by the advisory board in each of the three electoral areas other 
than the Transkeian territories (s 20(5)). The Secretary for Native 
Affairs, or the minister's nominee, presided over meetings of the 
Council (s 26(4). 
4. S 27(1). 
6. S 26(3). 
7 • By Ac t No 68 0 f 1 95 1 ( s 1 8) . 
5. S 27(2). 
8. For a critical evaluation of the Council see M. Ballinger From Union 
to Apartheid (1969) 141-218; see also H. May The South African Con-
stitution (3 ed, 1955) 497-500. 
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parable successor, although the Schlebusch commission, re-
commended, (rather cryptically), the establishment of a black 
citizens council as a counterpart to the president's council,1 
and the government reacted favourably to the suggestion. Al-
though no indication was given as to the proposed composition 
and powers of this body,the concept was reminiscent of the 
Representative Council, but it was announced in mid-1980 that 
the recommendation would not be implemented because of its un-
equivocal rejection by black leaders during discussions with 
the government. 
Between the early 1950's and 1971 the statutory basis of the 
omelands policy was laid by the South African parliament, and 
this resulted in the pr 
the mid 1970's onwards. 2 
ess of constitutional partition from 
The government's 1977 constitutional 
proposals were in fact premised on the eventual attainment of 
~ 
constitutional iridependence by all the nati nal states,3 but 
I k 
the Community Councils Act of 197 h raIded something of a 
~ 
departure from the previous constitutional development for 
blacks, and involved a contradiction of th~ major premise of 
the new proposals. 5 In the first place it made provision for 
~ 
the establishment of permanent local authorities for blacks 
outside the homeland structures, and clearly envisaged a mea-
~ 
sure of olitical autonomy for these bodie in the second 
place it abandoned the principle of ethnic differentiation 
v' 
among blacks which had been consistently applied,not only in 
respect of the national states, but also in respect of the 
Urban Black Councils which, together with the black Advisory 
Boards, were the predecessors of the new council~ Despite 
the fact that the community councils are only sub-national 
authorities whic'h afford very limited political rights to blacks 
1. Schlebusch Report op cit § 10(f)(ii). 
2. This development is described at 182 to 194, below. 
3. See the preamble to the 1979 Draft Bill. 
4. No 125 of 1977. 
5. Cf the comments of S. Bekker in F. van Zyl Slabbert and J. Opland 
\eds) South Africa: Dilemmas of Evolutionary Change (1981) 33-34. 
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in the 'common area', their significance for current constitu-
tional developments cannot be overlooked. 1 
Since 1923 provision had been made for blacks resident within 
the jurisdiction of white local authorities to have some par-
ticipation in local government. In that year black Advisory 
Boards were created for locations or villages under the control 
of urban local authorities,2 and the relevant provisions were 
retained when the legislation was consolidated in 1945. 3 
These bodies usually consisted of three members elected by 
registered occupiers of property in the location or village 
concerned, and three members and a chairman appointed by the 
fparentr local authority.4 They were empowered to consider 
and report upon any matter specially affecting the interests of 
blacks in the urban area,S and on other matters referred to them 
by the minister or relevant local authority.6 The Advisory 
Boards did not have legislative or executive powers and came 
gradually to be replaced by the Urban Black councils. 7 
Legislative provision for Urban Black Councils was made in 1961. 8 
The Councils were established by urban local authorities on the 
1. Local-government institutions for Indians and coloureds are regulated 
by the Group Areas Act No 41 of 1950 (later consolidated as Acts Nos 
77 of 1957 and 26 of 1966) and to date a small number of autonomous 
local authorities have come into existence; while these institutions 
are not unimportant for future constitutional development, particularly 
at the regional level, they do not have the same salience as the com-
munity councils and are not dealt with in this work. 
2. Black (Urban Areas) Act No 21 of 1923, s 10. 
3. Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act No 25 of 1945, s 21. 
4. Rahlo and Kahn op cit 802. 
5. S 21(2)(a)(iii). 
6. S 21(2)(a)(ii). 
7. The Promotion of Black Self-Government Act, No 46 of 1959, (s 4) pro-
vided that territorial or regional authorities (on which see pages 183 
to 185, below) could nominate a representative in one or more urban 
local authority area; these representatives (s 5) could advise the 
local authorities on matters affecting the intere~ts of the national 
unit concerned. This arrangement was later extended to self-govern-
ing black territories (Third Black Laws Amendment Act No 49 of 1970). 
~t cannot, however, be said that they replaced the advisory boards as 
is stated by RahIo and Kahn (op cit 802). 
8. Urban Black Councils Act No 79 of 1961. 
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request of an existing Advisory Board, or on the direction of 
the minister after consultation with the black community in 
the area 1 and thev could be instituted for specified residen-, ; 2 
tial areas or for members of specified national units. The 
local authority could determine the number of members of a 
council (though not fewer than six) and their method of elec-
tion or selection. 3 The councils were empowered to exercise 
the same powers and perform the same functions as the Advisory 
Boards,4 but provision was made for additional executive powers 
to be conferred on specific councils by the appropriate local 
authority, after consultation with the relevant provincial ad-
ministrator and with the concurrence of the minister. 5 In 
fact few of the additional powers were ever conferred on any 
of the councils and they remained predominantly advisory 
bodies 6 with little greater significance, save for their more 
representative features, than the boards. 
In terms of the Community Councils Act the Urban Black Councils 
are disestablis·hed when a community council is instituted in 
the relevant area. 7 The system came into operation in July 
...-... 
1977 and since then numerous councils have been proclaimed 
throughout the coun{ry.8 They are elected by blacks resident 
within their jurisdiction, and those eligible to vote and stand 
for office include not only black South African nationals but 
also nationals of the i.!!depend.ent black states 9 The act i t-
self comprises broadly enabling legislation which confers ex-
tensive administrative powers on the minister in relation to 
the establishment10 and dissolution11 of councils ~ The minister 
1. S 2(3)(a) and (b). 
2. S 2(1)(a) and (b). This second possibility is not specifically pro-
vided for in the Community Councils Act. 
3. S 3. From 1970 there could no longer be selected members (Act No 49 
of 1970). 
4. S 4(1). 5. S 4(2). 
6. M. Horrell op cit 68. 
7. Act No 125 of 1977, s 10(1) read with s 14(2). 
8. See M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 391-393. 
nearly 250 councils had been established. 
9. S 3(4) and (5). 
Within three years 
10. After consultation with the relevant Urban Council or Advisory Board -
s 2. 
11. After consultation with the relevant Administration Board - s 2. 
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may determine the size of a council, the method of its elec-
tion 1 and, after consulting the Administration Board and 
council concerned, make regulations relating to its tenure, 
committees, service conditions, the control of its financial 
affairs, and other matters necessary for the effective imple-
mentation of the act. 2 The conferment of substantive powers 
and duties on community councils is also subject to the minis-
ter's discretion, and in theory considerably greater powers 
can be conferred on these authorities than on their predece-
ssors,3 including most powers hitherto exercised by the Admin-
istration Boards. 4 The intention of the scheme as a whole 
was that the councils would eventually act independently of 
the boards, whose functions would decline as the council sys-
tem expanded. 5 
The open-ended nature of many provisions of the Community Coun-
cils Act provides the basis for a measure of autonomy on matters 
of local concern, though subject to the overall control of the 
central government. 6 The extent to which the councils achieve 
1. S 3. If fewer members than are required are elected to a council, 
the minister may himself appoint members to it. This provision was 
introduced by Act No 28 of 1978 to prevent electoral boycotts from 
frustrating the arrangement. Council elections were the subject of 
litigation in Moleko v Minister of Plural Relations and Development 
1979 (1) SA 125 (T), and Scott and others v Hanekom and others 1981 (3) 
SA 1182 (C). 
2. S 11(1). 
3. S 5. S 5(1)(n) provides that the m~n~ster may confer power over 
'any matter, whether or not it is connected with the matters referred 
to in this subsection' on a council - this is an enabling provision 
of the broadest possible kind. 
4. The Administration Boards were introduced in 1971 (Act No 45 of 1971) 
to take over the powers and functions of local authorities relating 
to black affairs in urban areas, and resorted under the then Department 
of Bantu Administration (now Co-operation and Development). Twenty 
boards were originally created, but the number was reduced to fourteen 
in 1979. 
5. The Riekert Commission (Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Legis-
lation Affecting the Utilization of Manpower RP 32/1979, §§ 210-211), 
recommended that they remain responsible for some aspects of the pro-
posed Communi~y Development Act and act as agents for other depart~ents. 
6. ef M. Wiechers op cit 392, fn 15, 'In effek is die blanke parliament 
en minister besluitnemend, en die gemeenskapraad prinsipieel uit-
voerend. ' 
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municipal status and local autonomy is, however, largely depen-
dent upon how the minister exercises the powers conferred upon 
him by the act. 'Municipal status' is itself a relative con-
cept, and includes situations that vary from those in which 
local authorities have secured powers and independent sources 
of revenue, to those in which they have delegated powers and 
are dependent on central or regional authorities for their in-
come. It is clear that the community councils do not have 
secured powers, since even those functions conferred upon them 
by ministerial delegation can be totally withdrawn and returned 
to the appropriate Administration Board. 1 As far as their 
fiscal position is concerned each council is empowered to 'im-
pose levies for specific services or purposes on the persons 
residing in its area,;2 this would seem to include the power to 
levy rates or even impose municipal income taxes. Where powers 
are transferred from an Administration Board to a council, the 
3 board must contribute towards the cost of exercising such powers. 
However, the scheme also requires loans and grants-in-aid from 
the central government, and the extent to which the councils 
achieve real powers to match their responsibilities 4 will depend 
on the extent to which they can become financially secure. 
C?he future of the community council system, however, is depen-
dent not only on its viability, but also its legitimacy. Al-
ready the legitimation crisis facing the institutions of separate 
development has been felt in council elections,S and their future 
political role would not seem to be promising. Nevertheless the 
immediate constitutional significance of the system is that it 
1. S 5(4). 
2. S 5(1)(j). 
3 • S 8 ( 1 ) (b) • 
4. An example of an important responsibility of a community council is 
the control and management of a community guard which is responsible, 
inter alia, for the maintenance of law and order and the prevention of 
crime. S 5(1)(b) read with s 8(1). 
5. In the elections for the Soweto Community Council, politically the most 
important, there were no nominations in many of the wards. In the 
contested wards the percentage polls averaged 6%, and by-elections had 
to be held to return a full complement to the Council. See 1978 
Annual Survey of Race Relations 341f. 
182 • 
makes permanent institutional provision for the decentralisa-
tion of competence to blacks at the local government level / 
" --v 
and this highlights the present constitutional shortcomings at 
1 the metropolitan, regional and central levels of government. 
Neither the homelands arrangement, nor the government's new 




And whatever the deficiencies of the community coun-
are likely to be used by the government in its future 
of quasi-consociational constitutional engineering. 2 
Cd) Partition3 
r-' 
~e legal foundations of territorial separation, and eventual 
constitutional partition, can be traced back to the Natives 
1. The community councils system, together with the 99-year leasehold 
scheme (on which see at 501, below), implies an acceptance by the 
government of the permanence of blacks in the 'common area', which 
its constitutional strategy belies. In 1980 three bills were pub-
lished, the Local Government Bill, the Laws on Co-operation and Deve-
lopment Bill, and the Black Community Bill (Gov Nots 774, 775 and 776 
of 1980 respectively - 31 October 1980), which provided a 'new deal' 
for 'urban blacks'. In the wake of extensive criticism of the bills 
they were withdrawn and submitted to the Grosskopf commission for 
further investigation. The commission was reported to have completed 
its findings towards the end of 1981, but the report had not been re-
leased by the year-end. See also below, 269. 
2. See further on this aspect chapter 7, below. 
3. See M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 435-442 and 502-524. For a 
comprehensive juridical account of this aspect of constitutional deve-
lopment see F. Venter's unpublished thesis Die Suid-Afrikaanse Bantoe-
staatsreg (Potchefstroom, 1978). Among the critical works on the con-
stitutional politics of the homelands are G. Carter, T. Karis, N. 
Stultz South Africa's Transkei - The Politics of Domestic Colonialism 
(1967); P. Laurence The Transkei - South Africa's Politics of Partition 
(1976); J. Butler, R. Rotberg, J. Adams The Black Homelands of South 
Africa: "The Political and Economic Development of Bophuthatswana and 
KwaZulu ( 1977), J. Dugard Independent Homelands - Failure of a Fiction 
(1979), N. Stultz Transkei's Half Loaf - Race Separatism in South Africa 
(1980); and for a more journalistic version B. Streek and R. Wicksteed 
Render unto Kaiser - A Transkei Dossier (1981). For the views of home-
land leaders see K. Matanzima Independence My Way (1976), L. Mangope 
A Place for All (1978), and M. Buthelezi Power is Ours (1979). 
1 83 . 
Land Act of 1913,1 but it was only in the 1950's that the 
policy of separate development came to be consistently applied , 
in its political dimensi~ With the abolition of the Natives 
Representative Council in 1951 2 the principle of ethnic differ-
entiation among blacks came to be first applied, and was hence-
forth the major determinant of black constitutional development. 
From a legal-institutional point of view there was a consistent 
evolutionary development from the early tribal authorities 
through to constitutional independence, although when the gov-
ernment's policy was first given institutional form it was not 
intended to culminate in partition. It is proposed here to 
describe only the general statutory framework within which this 
development took place. 
The Black Authorities Act of 1951 introduced a three-tiered 
~ystem of local administration for blacks. 3 At~he base of 
the hierarchical system were 'tribal authoritie~ which could 
be established by the Governor-General in respect of an area 
assigned to a chief or headman, and would consist of the chief 
or headman and tribal councillors. 4 The ~hief functions of 
these bodies would be to administer the affairs of the trib / 
r--"? 
give assistance to the chief or headman, advise the government 
\ 
and territorial and regional authorities on matters affecting 
r-- I 
the inhabitants of the are~ and perform other functions 
assigned to them by the Governor-General. S Their powers were 
to'be exercised according to traditional laws a~d customs. 6 
1. Act No 27 of 1913. See W.B. Harvey and W.E.B. Dean 'The Indepen-
dence of Transkei - a Largely Constitutional Enquiry' 1978 Journal 
of Modern African Studies 189. The 1913 Act was followed by the 
Native Trust and Land Act No 18 of 1936 which establisbed a trust to 
purchase the land earmarked as 'native reserves" which constituted 
13,7% of the country's surface area. 
2. Act No 68 of 1981, s 18. 
3. The act did not affect the system of local and general councils, to 
be referred to below. 
4. Ss 2(1)(a), 2(2) and 3(1). The method of appointment of councillors 
was prescribed by regulation (s 3(2». In practice most councillors 
were appointed by the chief and Commissioner. 
5. S 4(1). 
6. S 4(2)(a). 
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Where two or more tribal authorities had been established the 
Governor-General was empowered to establish l~ ' regional ~/L,' '-
~ ---
authorit " consisting of a designated chairman and as many 
members as determined by the Governor-General; 1 the senior 
chief would head each authority, the heads of all tribal auth-
orities would be ex-officio members, and other members could 
be appointed from among the tribal councillors. The regional 
r-
authorities were to advise and make recommendations to the 
7 minister on matters affecting blacks within their jurisdiction 
and, subject to ministerial direction, provide services relat-
ing, inter alia, to education, health, agriculture and other 
. ~' 
matters assigned to them. 2 These authorities were endowed 
r-- ~ 
with l delegated legislative power in respect of the matters with-
~ 3 - Q 
in their purview, and could levy rates of a limited amount~ 
~ 
At the apex of this hierarchical administrative system were 
"ilie f terri torial authori ti . ;~ which exercised control over two 
or more areas which had established regional authorities; and 
consisted of a designated chairman and as many members as de-
termined by the Governor-General; the chairman and members were 
all drawn from among the members of the relevant regional auth-
orities. The powers and functions of these bodies were not 
statutorily defined, but the Governor-General was empowered to 
~ . 
~ssign to them the same powers as vested in the regional auth-
orities, and any other powers relating to the administration of 
t:-7 
black affairs. 6 hese authorities were subsequently to be re-
"'-, 
placed by the ~egislative assemblies of the homelands, or 
national sta es. 
1. Ss 2(1)(b), 3(1) and 3(3). 
2. S 5(1)(a) and (b). 
3. S 5(2). Their by-laws required the Governor-General's approval. 
4.. S 6. The finances of each level of authority were statutorily regu-
lated (ss 8-11); see the description in H. May The South African 
Constitution (3 ed, 1955) 190-1. 
5 . S s 2 ( 1 ) (c), 3 ( 1) and 3 ( 3) . 
6. S 7(1). This was a wide enabling prov~s~on, but far-reaching powers 
in respect of black affairs remained vested in the minister and 
Governor-General. 
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The implementation of the scheme contained in the 1951 legis-
lation was not to be immediate and it was the subject of ex-
tensive opposition from blacks. ~~ile purporting to rein-
troduce traditional features of African public law it tended 
to re-establish tribalism and increase the power of chiefs at 
the expense of elected leaders. 1 The subordinate status of 
the various authorities, the restrictions on their powers, and 
their jurisdictional limitations, did not constitute an attrac-
tive alternative to direct participation in the central legis-
lature. 2 Nevertheless both the Ciskeian and the Transkeian 
General Councils eventually accepted the system,3 and the 
various authorities were subsequently instituted throughout the 
country; the first Territorial Authority was established in 
---J 
the Transkei in 1957. The scheme as a whole established the 
first separate communal authorities for blacks and permitted 
~ 
a certain measure of territorial decentralisation, the extent --of whith would depend upon the use made of the act's enabling 
provisions. The 1951 legislation must be seen as an important 
milestone on the road to partition. 
~ 
In 1955 the Tomlinson Commission4 called for an acceleration 
of the separate development programme, and although the govern-
ment never responded wholeheartedly -to its economic recommenda-
tions, it was soon to give further statutory effect to the policy 
1 
of political separation. In what has been described as 'the 
decisive year in the ~lution of Nationalist policy towards 
h f · 5 ~ -' teA rlcan', the government enacted the Promotion of Bantu 







See W.D. Hammond-Tooke Command or Consensus - The Development of Trans-
keian Local Government (1975) 198-215. 
Even by chiefs, who stood to benefit by the arrangement it was re-
garded with suspicion. See Butler, Rotberg and Adams ~p cit 218. 
In 1955 and 1956 respectively. M. Rorrell op cit 39. 
Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of Bantu 
Areas within the Union of South Africa (U.G. 61/1955). See further 
below, 259 to 262. 
H. Kenney Architect of Apartheid R.F. Verwoerd - An Appraisal (1980) 
160, and referred to in M. Wiechers op cit 439. 
Act No 46 of 1959. 
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sentation in parliament 1 and provided the immediate statutory 
basis for the homelandU The act further re-emphasised the 
principle of ethnic differentiation in relation to black con-
stitutional development by identifying eight 'national units',2 
each of which came to be associated in time with separate 
territorial areas 3 - the future homelands or national states. 
The powers and functions of the existing territorial authori-
ties were statutorily augment d,4 and in both the preamble to 
the act and the parliamentary debates reference was made to the 
goal of self-government through gradual progression - and even 
of ultimate independence. 5 Closer liaison with the central 
government and other 'common area' authorities was also en-
visaged through the provision for a cornmissioner-genera1 6 to 
represent the government in each unit,7 and for the nomination 
of urban representatives by the territorial authorities. 8 
By 1970 ge6graphical homelands had been set aside for each of 
'the national units identified in the 1959 legislatio;;9 and in 
\,. 
each case ribal, regional and territorial authori ties10 were 
crea ted. _ The nex , and more contemporary, stage of consti tu-
tional development is that of self-government, which is regu-
la ted by the NatiOnal Sta tes Cons t i tution Act of 1 970 11 for all 
1. 5 15(1) repealed the 1936 Representation of Natives Act. 
2. 5 2(1): the North-50tho, South-Sotho, Swazi, Tsanga, Tswana, Venda, 
Xhosa, and Zulu units. 
3. 5 7 inserted s 4 bis in the Native Trust and Land Act, No 18 of 1936, 
and provided that rights in respect of 'Trust land' could be vested in 
territorial authorities. 
4. S 12 substituted a new s 7 in the main act. In particular legisla-
tive powers were conferred, as well as powers in respect of the admin-
istration of justice and the imposition of taxes. 
5. House of Assembly Debates vol 16 cols 6215-7 (20 May 1959) and col 
6730 (27 May 1959); see also the government's white paper (no 3 of 
1959) which accompanied the bill. 
6. 5 2(2); some units shared a commissioner-general. 
7. 5 3. 8. 5s 4 and 5. 
9. With the sole exception of the Swazi group. The South Ndebele 
national unit was recognised in 1972. 
10. The dates of the establishment of territorial authorities were: Trans-
kei 1956, Ciskei 1961, Bophuthatswana 1961, Gazankulu 1969, Lebowa 1969, 
Qwaqwa 1969, and KwaZulu 1970. 
11 . Act No 21 of 1971. 
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the national states other than Transkei, which was the subject 
of independent legislative treatment 1 and which, for histori-
cal and other reasons,2 proceeded more quickly through the 
stages of self-government to independenc ; ' the Transkei t s con-
stitutional development was in fact the model for the other 
national states. 
The stages through whith the national states pass on the way to 
constitutional independence are not dissimilar to those through 
which former dependant colonies progressed on their way to in-
dependence from the colonial power;3 '~he process has in fact 
been described as one of I in-ternal decOlonisa tio , 4 though the 
h f
· ,., 
description is not wholly appropriate. At t e Irst stag pro-
~ ..--
vided for in the Constitution ActS the relative national state 
acquire~j on the request of the appropriate territorial author-
ity, ~ts own constitution, a legislative assembly and executive,6 
and legislative and executive competence in respect of the 
matters specified in the schedule. At this stage central gov-
ernment control is retained through a repugnancy provision,7 
a legislative veto vesting in the State President,8 and the 
assembly1s financial dependence on parliament;9 in addition 
the minister can resume executive control over any matter to en-
1 sure continued governance in the are This first phase has 
1. Transkei Constitution Act No 48 of 1963. 
2. See on this aspect John Dugard Human Rights and the South African 
Legal Order (1978) 91. 
3. See P. Laurence op cit 65. 
4. Cf M. Wiechers op cit 502, andL.J. Boulle The Changing Constitution 
(1979) 35f. 
5. Chapter 1 (ss 1-25). 
6. The method of appointment of the executive is determined by the South 
African government, thus enabling the latter to decide such fundamen-
tal constitutional issues as _whether the executive should be parlia-
mentary or not. See W.H.B. Dean 'Whither the constitution', 39 
(1976) THR-HR 266 at 268. 
7. S 3(1)(b). 8. S 3(2). 
9. S 8. This provision was, however, amended by s 14 of Act No 12 of 
1978, to permit the relevant legislative assembly itself to appro-
priate money. 
10. S 25. 
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. 1 
in fact been passed by all the national states. At the 
second stage \ of constitutional development, that of ' self- A. L. ~ I 
" 2 "" (.I~-""':.:.J{ 
government' p roper, the presidential legislative veto is 
retained 3 but the le~lative assembl y is empowered, within 
its sphere of competence,4 to legislate repugnahtly to acts 
of parliament,S and central legislation on scheduled matters 
does not apply within the self-governing territories to the 
citizens thereof6 - though this clearly does not detract from 
parliament's legislative supremacy. The state legislatures 
can also appropriate revenue through their own legislative en-
actments a t this stage " and they acquire personal jurisdiction 
to make laws with extra-territorial, though intra-Republican, 
effect. 7 Another innovation at the self-government stage is 
that a high court can be instituted with the jurisdiction of 
a provincial or local division of the Supreme Court and from --which appeals can be taken to the South African Appellate 
1. Save for KaNgwane. The homelands became self-governing on the follow-
ing dates: Bophuthatswana - 1972, Ciskei - 1972, Lebowa - 1972, Venda 
- 1972, Gazankulu - 1973, Qwaqwa- 1974, KwaZulu - 1977. 
2. Chapter 2 (ss 26-36). This stage is similar to that provided in the 
Transkei Constitution Act. 
3. S 31. It has been suggested that in the light of the constitutional 
conventions operating within the former British Commonwealth the 
State President might come to act in terms of the respective homeland 
cabinet's advice when taking a decision on legislation passed by a 
legislative assembly. See N.J.J. Olivier 'Implications of Constitu-
tional Development in KwaZulu/Natal for the Rest of South Africa' in 
L.J. Boulle and L.G. Baxter Natal and KwaZulu - Constitutional and 
Political Options (1981) 57 at 68; but cf the editors' rejoinder, 
ibid fn 8. 
4. Among the matters expressly reserved from legislative competence are 
defence, explosives, ammunition, posts, police and the constitution 
act itself. 
5. S 30(1)(b). 
6. S 30(3). Uncertainty over this matter was resolved by the Appellate 
Division in S v Heavyside 1976 (1) SA 584 (AD). See also S v Memke 
1976 (4) SA 817 (ECD) , S v Machebele 1978 (1) SA 569 (T), S v Matsana 
1978 (3) SA 817 eT), S v Kunene 1979 (2) SA 1153 (N), S v Sambe 1981 
(3) SA 757 (T), and F.G. Richings 'The Applicability of South African 
Legislation in the Self-Governing Bantu Territories' 1976 SALJ 119. 
7. S 30(1)(b); this power exists at the earlier stage, but is only 
exerciseable with the State President's prior approval (s 3(1)(c». 
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Di vis ion. 1 For the rest there are changes of nomenclature, 
such as 'cabinet' and 'cabinet minister' for 'executive coun-
cil' and 'executive councillor' respectively,2 and the intro-
duction of some of the symbols and trappings of self-govern-
~ 3 
ment, such as flags and anthem. 
From the perspective of the Westminster constitutional system 
the 1971 Constitution Act provides the constitutional basis 
for an ethnic-territorial decentralisation of power, and an 
un-Westminster form of ethnic-regional self-government. What 
the system does not entail is the simultaneous participation 
of the self~governing regions in the central political insti-
tutions, so that any suggestion that it involves a 'federal 
process' would be misleading. Even the notion of regional 
autonomy requires drastic qualification in the light of the 
legal and firiancial controls retained by the central government 
over the self-governing national states. Parliamentary suprem-
acy, and therefore, overall constitutional control, is clearly 
unaffected by the delegation of legislative and executive 
powers to the state authorities, while a more incongruous ex-
ample of central constitutional control is found in the re ten-
tion4 of section 25 of the Black Administration Act of 1927,5 
whic·h empowers the State President to legislate by proclamation 
for homelands on any matter not vested in their legislative 
assemblies. 6 The process of decentralisation established by 
the homelands programme, and the possibility of 'federal' 
regiOnal autonomy, would, however, have been enhanced had the 
National States Constitution Amendment Bill of 1977 7 been en-
acted. This bill provided for a third stage of self-government 
1 • S 34. 2. S 29. 
3. Ss 27 and 28 respectively. 
4. By s30 ·(4) (read with s 30(3)). 
5. Act No 38 of 1927. M. Wiechers (Administratiefreg (1973) 30) describes 
this as a 'Henry VIII' clause. See R v Maharaj 1950 (3) 187 (AD). 
6. There is, however, some academic dispute over this matter. See the 
references in M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981),441, 
7. B 91 - '77. See the government's Explanatory Memorandum WP 9 - '77. 
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short of independence, at which a national state would become 
I internally autonomous'. In constitutional terms this would 
mean additional legislative competence for the assembly of 
the relevant state, and the ability to amend or repeal, wi thin 
its sphere of competence, acts of the central parliament; 
only expressly reserved matters, such as foreign affairs or 
defence, would not be within the assembly's legislative juris-
diction. 1 The internally autonomous state would also be able 
to create its o\m administrative departments, commensurate 
with its legislative capacity, and provide for the election 
and designation of its head of government. 'Internal autonomy', 
however, would be something of a misnomer for this status: the 
State President would retain a legislative veto, and his prior 
approval would be necessary for the introduction of a bill 
which would in"cur expenditure which could not be defrayed out 
of the territory's consolidated revenue fund. 2 An 'internally 
autonomous' state would also not be able to change its own con-
stitution, whith would remain subject to unilateral amendment 
by the republican parliament. 3 But the overall significance 
of the bill was that it suggested a via media for the national 
states between subordinate dependence .and constitutional inde-
pendence, that its decentralising effect would have stood in 
contrast to the centralising trend affecting provincial powers,4 
and that its provision for regional autonomy is at variance 
with the Westminster model. 5 Despite its failure to appear on 
1. ef s 4 of Act No 21 of 1971. 
2. The South African government would also be able to demand alteration 
of a homeland bill tby reason of its implications for the Republic' -
a right which could be used to obstruct enactments abolishing legisla-
tion such as the Group Areas Act. 
3. The arrangement would not be formally unlike that of the associated 
states, eg Puerto Rico and the United States, in which Puerto Rico 
is not a member of the D.S. federation but is subordinate to the U.S. 
in the sense that the powers of autonomy which have been delegated to 
it can be unilaterally revoked. Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens and 
are subject to federal laws, but do not vote in federal elections and 
do not pay federal taxes. See I. Duchacek op cit 184. 
4. See pages 194 to 197 , below. 
5. On devolution in the United Kingdom see page 38, above. Despite 
the bill's devolutionary implications it could again not be seen as 
part of the 'federal process', insofar as it failed to provide for 
joint participation by the 'autonomous states' and their citizens 
in central authorities. 
1 91 . 
the statute book 1 its resurrection had seemed a possibility 
for those black states which would not accept independence,2 
but since the Cis~ei took this step the possibility has become 
very remote. 
~ 
The final statutory step towards partition consists of the 
Status Acts~ whith confer constitutional independence on the 
national states. 4 Juridically the transition is effected by 
excising the relevant districts from the territory of the Re-
public and declaring them to be a sovereign and independent 
state~5 by renouncing parliament's legislative capacity over 
the territory~6 and by removing the constitutional limitations 
whith had previously applied to the relevant legislative assem-
bly and empowering it, from the effective date of the Status 
Act, to enact its own constitution 7 and to legislate without 
the requirement of the State President's assent. 8 In each 
case the legislature of the relevant national state has enacted 
an independence constitution on the day of independence, to take 
effect from the same moment as the Status Act. The constitu-
tional transition from subordinate dependence to republican 
independence is characterised by legal continuity and an ab-
sence of constitutional autarchy9 for the new states. 
1. Some of its clauses were introduced in other legislation, eg s 7 in 
Act No 115 of 1977. 
2. The Quail Report (Report of the Ciskei Commission, 1980) outlined a 
number of advantages for the Ciskei in Jinternal autonomy' as an in-
terim step towards independence, or some other change in constitutional 
status (102-102, and 126). See furthe~ below, 274 to 277. 
3. Acts No 100 of 1976 (Transkei), No 89 of 1977 (Bophuthatswana), No 107 
of 1979 (Venda) and No 110 of 1981 (Ciskei ). 
4. In terms of the Transkein Public Security Act of 1977 it is a criminal 
offence to propagate a view which defies the constitutional indepen-
dence of Transkei. See S v Ncokazi 1980 (3) SA 789 (TSC); S v 
Dalindyebo 1980 (3) SA 1048 (TSC). 
5. S 1(1). 
6. S 1(2). As Harvey and Dean (op cit 194) point out, the Status Acts 
are drafted on the premise that parliament can limit its sovereignty. 
Aspects of sovereignty are dealt with in more detail at 445 to 456, 
below. 
7. S 3(1). 8. S 3(2). 
9. See K.C. Wheare The Constitutional Structure of the Commonwealth (1960) 
89, E. Kahn 'The New Constitution' 78 (1961) SALJ 244 at 252 ff, and 
L.J. Boulle 'The Turnhalle Testimony' 95 (197sr-5ALJ 49 at 51. 
10. The courts will take judicial notice of this development - Nasopie 
(Edms) Bpk en andere v Minister van Justisie 1979 (3) SA 1228 (NC). 
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Complementing the Constitution Ac t s are the statutory provi-
f h " 1 sions regulating the citizenship 0 t e natlonal state. 
The question of citizenship remains one of the most contro-
versial features of the homelands policy and certain aspects 
thereof are dealt with in greater detail subsequently.2 In 
broad outline it can be said that citizenship of one or other 
non-independent national state is peremptory for all black 
South Africans,3 but at this stage they remain South African 
- 4 ~ 
na t ion a I s for pu rp 0 s e s 0 f in tern a ": ion all w. Wh e n ea c h 
homeland becomes constitutionally independent all its citizens 
are statutorily denationalised by the Status Act, regardless 
of their place of birth, residence or employment, and in all 
cases they ha.ve been granted nationality of the newly inde-
pendent sta e in terms of its complementary statutory criteria. 
The transition has thus far involved few problems of stateless-
ness or dual nationality at municipal law,5 and will not do so 
unless an independent state subsequently changes its criteria 
for nationality; but it does raise problems of statelessness 
in international law. 6 The arrangement is of a self-perpet-
r-
uating nature in that all future generations of blacks statu-
.../' 
torily linked with an independent state will be regarded as 
nationals of that state, irrespective of their place of birth, 
residence or employment, and rega:rdless of how remote the real 
link might be. ~uth African nationality can only be regained '""--...J _ 
by denationalised blacks if they Here formerly South African 
nationals (which excludes future post-independence generations), 
1. Transkei Constitution Act s 7-8, National States Citizenship Act No 
26 of 1970, and the Status Acts (s 6 and schedule 8). 
2. At 488 to 508, below. On the juridical aspects of citizenship, see 
C. Schmidt 'Citizenship and Nationality' vol 2 The Law of South Africa 
par 449-465; M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed) 334-396; W.R. Olivier 'n 
Juridiese evaluasie van burgerskap' 1979 TSAR 212-225, and 1980 TSAR 
22-31, 127-151. --
3. Ss 2 and 3 of Act 26 of 1970. 
4. S 2(4) of Act 26 of 1970. 
see below, 488-490. 
On the national/citizenship distinction 
5. See W.R.B. Dean 'A Citizen of Transkei' 11 (1978) CILSA 57-67; W.R. 
Olivier 'Statelessness and Transkeian Nationality· 1 (1976) SAYIL 
143-154 and 'Bophuthatswana Nationality' 3 (1977) SAYIL 108-118. 
6. By reason of the non-recognition of the black states, and the inter-
national law requirement of a genuine link between a state and its 
national (Nottebohm case 1955 rCJ Reports 4). 
7. Dean loe cit. 
193. 
and on application for citizenship of a non-independent state 
1 and with ministerial approval. As a consequence of these 
provisions the main political rights of citizenship (in par-
ticular the franchise) are exercised by South Africa's black 
nationals in the homeland authority to which they are statu-
torily allocated, and by denationc>lised blacks in the political 
institutions of a constitutionally independent state; some of 
the non-political rights of citizenship however, are afforded 
to the latter group of 'statutory aliens,2 who are in a slight-
ly more advantageous position than 'foreign aliens,.3 In 
terms of the logic of the citizenship arrangements all blacks 
will eventually lose their South African nationality, and the 
rights pursuant thereto, and the government's constitutional 
proposals are premised on this eventuali~ 
This juridical outline of the homelands programme evidences, 
in the light of this chapter's theme, an un-Westminster form 
of decentralisation which evolves towards independence and par-
tition, although it has led, somewhat ironically, to the cre-
ation of a series of new Westminster systems in the national 
states themselves. 5 Ex facie th~ constitutional provisions, 
1. S 3 of the Black States Citizenship Act as amended by s 1 of Act No 
13 of 1978. 
2. Eg 'Section ten rights'. S 12 of t he Black (Urban Areas) Consolida-
tion Act No 25 of 1945 was amended by s 2 of Act No 12 of 1978 to 
exclude former South African 'citizens' (ie denationalised blacks) 
from the definition of 'alien', thus allowing them to qualify under 
s 10 of the act. 
3. See John Dugard 'South Africa I s "Independent" Homelands: An Exercise 
in Denationalisation' 10 (1980) Denver Journal of International Law 
and Policy 11-36; and pages 500 to 502, below. 
4. See the preamble to the 1979 Draft Constitution Bill. 
5. This is something of an overstatement since only the Transkeian con-
stitution can be labelled a Westminster (and South African) import 
model. See Harvey and Dean op cit 213. On the independence con-
stitutions see I. Rautenbach 'The Constitution of Transkei' 1977 
TSAR 199; M. Wiechers and D.H. van Wyk 'The Republic of Bophuthatswana 
Constitution' 1977 SAYIL 85-107; G. Carpenter 'The In1ependence of 
Venda' 1979 SAYIL 40-56; and see generally M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed) 
502-524; also at 249 to 258, below. 
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it al so evidence s an an t i -maj or ita r ian tendency, in tha teach 
(minority) national state is given exclusive jurisdiction 
over matters of concern to it. But within the wider theme 
--." 
of this work it can be asserted that the constitutional de-
velopment of the homelands has not resolved the legitimacy 
~ 
crisis facing the state system in South Afric~ Apart from 
any other evidence which might support this assertion, refer-
ence can be made to the government's o~~ proposed plans for a 
constellation of states and regioral economic organisation, 
both of which involve new forms of post-independence relation-
ships with the national states designed to resolve some of the 
political and economic problems wrich have been unaffected, or 
even aggravated, by constitutional independence. These new 
relationships all embody forms of quasi-consociationalism, and 
are dealt with subsequently. 1 
{e) Decentralisation: the provincial system 
The provincial system which was incorporated into the Union 
constitution evidenced at the time a significant variation on 
the Westminster theme;2 in overall terms it provided the in-
stitutional basis for a substantial decentralisation of power, 
and it was understandable, in the light of pre-Union history, 
that the constitution should defer in this way to the local in-
terests and needs of the new prov:nces. In fact the British 
political system has not, in its modern history, been as strong-
ly centralised as some other countries with unitary constitu-
tions,3 but decentralisation in South Africa was the result of 
indigenous, non-Westminster const i tutional features. Provin-
cial government has always comprised locally elected councils 4 
1.. See chapter 7, below. 
2. On the provincial system see H. May 'The South African Constitution 
(3 ea) 359-396; M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed) 397-424. 
3. In Britain local government has an important political function and 
allows for a significant measure of decentralisation. See C.F. Strong 
Modern Political Constitutions (8 ed, 1972) 56-57. 
4. South Africa Act ss 70-73; RSA Constitution Act ss 68-71. 
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and centrally appointed officials,1 with the provincial coun-
cils, successors to the colonial legislatures, enjoying origi-
nal legislative authority.2 Decentralised executive power 
is exercised by the administrator, a central government repre-
sentative, and the other members of the executive committee, 
who are elected by the provincial council for a fixed term 
and are not responsible to it as in a parliamentary system 
proper. 3 Wiechers 4 defines decertralisation as 'die verdeling 
van magte op n grondslag van oorhoofse kontrole en terselfder-
tyd samewerking in di~ oorhoofse }ontrole'; in the case of 
provincial decentralisation in South Africa this 'samewerking' 
was evident, inter alia, in the former method of electing 
senators, which involved provincia l councillors as well as 
praliamentarians,5 and in the other forms of recognition given 
to the provinces in the structure of the central legislature. 6 
1. Of these the most important is the administrator who exercises legis-
lative and executive powers, but members of provincial administrations 
are also centrally appointed. South Africa Act ss 68-69; RSA 
Constitution Act ss 66-67. 
2. This was laid down in the well known case of Middelburg Municipality 
v Gertzen 1914 AD 541 at 551; see also Brown v Cape Divisional 
Council 1979 (1) SA 589 (AD), In re Pennington Health Committee 1980 
(4) SA 243 (N). 
3. S 76 (1) and (2) of the Constitution Act. 
4. M. Wiechers 'Grondslae vir Politieke Ontwikkeling' ~n J. Coetzee (ed) 
Gedenkbunde1 - H.L. Swanepoel 106. 
5. S 28(3) of the Constitution Act, subsequently repealed by Act No 101 
of 1980. 
6. The separate identity of the provinces has been recognised in varying 
degrees in the composition of the central legislature. They were 
equally represented in the Senate until the constitutional crisis in 
1955, and the smaller provinces continued to be overrepresented until 
its demise (s 28(1». The smaller provinces were also originally over-
represented in the House of Assembly (as is still the case with Scot-
land and Wales in the Westminster parliament) but this gradually gave 
way to a proportional inter-provincial allocation of seats (ss 40 and 
42), until 1980,when the government refrained from updating this 
allocation according to the 1980 general re-registration of voters 
(cf the amendment to s 43 effected by Act No 28 of 1980) - this now 
results in over-representation for the relatively depopulatine pro-
vinces. Electoral divisions were never permitted to straddle provin-
cial boundaries (s 42(1)). 
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Although they provided a basis for decentralised government 
the provincial authorities were always subordinate institu-
tions in that they exercised their powers within a framework 
of control, or potential control, by the central government. 1 
This aspect has lead to the characterisation of the South 
African constitution as unitary, a characteristic it shares 
with the Westminster system: the essence of unitarianism, 
from a juridical point of view, is that sovereignty is undivi-
ded, regardless of whether government itself is centralised 
or localised. The recent attempts to devolve power in 
Britain2 showed some similarity to the provincial system in 
South Africa in that it would have left the Westminster par-
liament's sovereignty unaffected 3 - devolution in that context 
denotes the delegation of central government powers without the 
relinquishment of central supremacy, but without those exercis-
ing power being directly answerab l e to the central government. 4 
Several commentators 5 have described South Africa's unitarian-
ism in qualified terms, by reason of the reputed 'federal charac-
teristics' of the constitution, such as the 'federal' division 
of legislative power and the 'federal' composition of the for-
mer Senate,6 but this qualification tends to overlook the 
reality of the provincial authori t ies' constitutional subordin-
ation. 7 Nor did the provincial system ever give rise to the 
1. Vosloo and Schrire in De Crespigny and Schrire The Government and 
Politics of South Africa (1978) 79; among the contemporary constitu-
tional controls are the repugnancy provision (s 85), the presidential 
veto over provincial ordinances (s 89), the legislative supremacy of 
parliament (s 59(1)), the provinces' financial dependence (s 88(2)), 
the central appointment of the administrator (s 66), the restricted 
powers of the provincial councils (s 84(1)), and the flexibility of the 
constitution (s 118). 
2. See Wade and Phillips Constitutional and Administrative Law (9 ed, 
1977) 372-378, and above, 38-40. 
3. The Scottish Bill of 1978, however, empowered the Scottish Assembly 
to amend or repeal acts of parliament in relation to devolved matters; 
cf the position of the self-governing national states (pages 187 to 
189 ,above). And see D. Yardley 'Devolution in the United Kingdom' 
in Essays in Honour of Ben Beinart vol III (1978 Acta Juridica 364). 
4. Wade and Phillips ibid. 
5. Eg May op cit (3 ed) 359. 
6. See above, 150. 
7. See K.C. Wheare Federal Government (4 ed, 1963) 30f. 
'federal process' in the sense of a unitary state becoming 
differentiated into a federally organised whole. 1 
Although the basic structure and constitution of provincial 
government has not changed much bE' tween its inception and the 
present, modifications within thi s basic structure have left 
the provinces with greatly dimini shed status and powers. The 
trend has been towards a gradual, but unequivocal, centralisa-
tion of power, as the central gov~rnment has both directly 
usurped powers formerly vested in the provincial councils,2 
and begun to co-ordinate policy through administrative and 
financial controls in areas nominally under provincial control. 3 
The provinces have become 'implementors of national policy 4 
rather than formulators of specif:cally provincial politics'. 
While the draft constitution bill of 1979 left the provincial 
system intact, the internal logic of the government's constitu-
tional proposals suggests little f uture scope for elected pro-
vincial councils,S and there have been numerous indications 
that the provincial system will be radically reorganised when 
the implementation of these propo s als begins, and this despite 
various pleas for tspecial status ' provinces or regions within 
the country.6 
1. With the early predominance of party over provincial interests in 
parliament the relative strengths of the provinces lost importance 
and the 'federal flavour' of the constitution was lost; in the con-
stitutional crisis voting in both houses followed party lines, and 
there was no attempt by the Cape representatives to retain the system 
which their predecessors had sought to have entrenched at the time 
of Union. 
2. Eg in respect of Black Education (Act No 47 of 1953) and Indian 
Education (Act No 61 of 1965). 
3. Vosloo and Schrire op cit 80; L.J. Boulle The Changing Constitution 
(1979) 26. 
4. Vosloo and Schrire loc cit. 
5. See chapter 6 below. 
6. See the papers in L.J. Boulle and L.G . . Baxter (eds) Natal and KwaZuIu: 
Constitutional and Political Options (1981). 
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1 ef) The Rule of Law 
198 . 
Reference has already been made to the role of the Rule of Law 
in the Westminster system and the significance attributed to 
2 
it in the operation of the Westminster form of government. 
".---, 
The Westminster system has grown up out of the constant re cog-
./' nition of the Rule of Law, and the principle has come not only 
to qualify the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, but to in-
fluence as well the executive and judicial branches of govern-
ment. Although there have been numerous reformulations of 
the Rule of Law since Dicey's first contribution,3 the preva-
lent English law approach4 is fundamentally Diceyan, and em-
phasises that all governmental action must be authorised by 
law and that the law should conform to certain minimum substan-
tive and procedural standards of justice. In this respect 
the South African constitutional system has shown material 
deviations from the Westminster model. 5 
In the first place the Rule of Law in South Africa has not gen-
erally had a normative influence on parliament in the exercise 
of its legislative powers, and it has never emerged as an ef-
fective qualification on the principle of parliamentary suprem-
acy; any conflict between the two principles has invariably 
been resolved in favour of the supremacy of a parliament which 
has not felt restrained from making legislative incursions on 
substantive and procedural rights. 6 Secondly, the extensive 
1. On the Rule of Law in South Africa see A.S. Mathews Law, Order and 
Liberty in South Africa (1971), J. van der Vyver Seven Lectures on 
Human Rights (1976) 106ff, J. Dugard Human Rights and the South African 
Legal Order (1978) 37-49, M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 140ff. 
2. At 35 to 36, above. 
3. See A.V. Dicey An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Consti-
tution (10 ed, 1959) 183-414. 
4. Cf S.A. de Smith Constitutional and Administrative Law (2 ed, 1973) 38. 
5. See L.J. Boulle 'The Second Republic ! Its Constitutional Lineage' 1980 
CILSA 1 at 29-30; D.H. van Wyk 'Wes t minsterstelsel - Requiescat in 
pace? of: kan n luiperd sy kolle verander?' 1981 THR-HR 105 at 111. 
. , 
6. This phenomenon is not unique to Sout h Africa. Cf Hood Phillips 
and Jackson Constitutional and Admin.' strative Law (6 ed, 1978) 37f; 
see also A. Rabie's note 'The Principle of Legality and Parliamentary 
Sovereignty: Unbridled Power Behind the Throne' 1978 THR-HR 179-183. 
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discretionary powers of the executive in South Africa, and the 
imperviousness of the executive tc judicial control in many 
cases, involves a violation of the Rule of Law, as arbitrary 
and uncontrolled power is fundamentally inimical to the doc-
trine. 1 Thirdly, although an inuependent judiciary exists in 
South Africa, the doctrine of par1iamentary supremacy has per-
mitted both direct and indirect i ncursions on judicial indepen-
dence and the judiciary's powers, and the courts do not have 
the same role in enforcing the Rule of Law as is the case in 
the Westminster system. 
In short the Rule of Law doctrine has shallow roots in the South 
African constitutional system. This is aggravated by the fact 
that even when the doctrine is recognise~ it is often accorded 
the narrower meaning of 'government according to law', or the 
principle of legality,2 thus stripping it of any notions of sub-
stantive justice. When seen cumulatively with the other devia-
tions from the Westminster model, described above, this phenom-
enon can be said to have had its most striking impact in South 
African constitutional law in the areas relating to the protec-
tion of fundamental rights and liberties; the absence of a 
vigorous Rule of Law doctrine has gone hand in hand with the 
absence of ~ bill of rights and ot her constitutional guarantees 
of fundamental freedoms 
4. Consociationalism and the South A-rican Constitutional System 
The analysis in the preceding sec t ions reveals a constitutional 
tradition whic·h commenced with an attenuated export version of 
the Westminster system and which, after seven decades of amend-
ment and modification, showed more fundamental divergences from 
its prototypal constitutional mode l. To the extent that this 
tradition has embraced the basic principles of the Westminster 
system, such as parliamentary sup r emacy, parliamentary govern-
ment and the plurality electoral system, it has had a thoroughly 
1. See Mathews op cit 42-44. 
2. See the references in J. Dugard op cit 41-45. 
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majoritarian and anti-consociatioral effect on the political 
process. But it is also self-evident that there is no nece-
ssary correlation between the non-Westminster features of 
this tradition and consociationalism; on the contrary such 
aspects as the restricted franchise and the absence of the 
Rule of Law have had a decidedly anti-consociational effect 
on the political process, as consociationalism assumes both a 
representative system of government and a deep sense of con-
stitutionalism. Nevertheless it is possible to identify some 
consociational iristitutions and p: actices within this tradition, 
although it is at once apparent that they have existed both 
functi6nally and temporarily in isolation from one another, and 
they do not have the same significance and consequences as 
these features have in a fully consociational system. More 
particularly, in the South African context they have not mater-
ially mitigated the majoritarian effects of the Westminster and 
non-Westminster features already described, nor have they in-
duced a system of political power-sharing. What follows is a 
brief description of the most salient consociational and quasi-
consociational features of the constitutional and political 
system. 
There is some institutional evidence of the grand coalition 
pririciple iri South Africa but this was only of limited duration, 
namely the provincial executive committees until 1962. 1 These 
committees were elected by provincial councillors on a propor-
tional and not a majoritarian basis, which allowed for the par-
ticipation of more than one party represented in the council; 
in one case, though it was atypical, a committee consisted of 
four members from four different parties. 2 The system was in 
fact closely modelled on the Swiss federal executive 3 but its 
.1. South Africa Act s 78 read with s 134, and the original s 77 of the 
RSA Constitution Act. 
2. In the Transvaal in 1917. Rahlo alld Kahn op cit 177. 
3. Which A. Lijphart (Democracy in Plu ~al Societies (1977) 31) describes 
as one of the best examples of the grand coalition in its prototypal 
form. For comparative observation~) on the two executives see H. May 
rhe South African Constitution (3 ed, 1955) 369. 
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efficacy as a consociational inst i tution was reduced by the 
absence of the other consociationa l characteristics, such as 
the mutual veto.' The system wa s subsequently altered so 
as to conform to the majoritarian Westminster-type cabinet 
arrangement. 2 In a non-institut i onalised form the grand 
coalition principle was evident i n the political coalition of 
1933 3 in whith cabinet seats were equally divided between the 
two parties, which led subsequently, after their electoral suc-
cesses, to fusion. 4 Within the l imited framework of white 
politics this arrangement can be seen as an attempt to avoid 
the implications of majoritarianism and the government-opposi-
tion dichotomy and to effect a more coalescent and consocia-
tional style of government. In the absence of institutional 
support, however, the co-operation was of relatively short 
durati6n and in 1939 was replaced by the adversarial pattern 
of governme'nt. Finally, the inter-cabinet council which was 
established in 1976 as an extra-constitutional body displayed 
some features of an inchoate 'grand coalition'. The council 
consisted of members of the white cabinet and the statutory 
Indian and coloured executive councils,S and its main function 
was to provide a forum for the discussion of matters of 'mutual 
interest,.6 It had, however, nei t her legislative nor executive 
authority, and its informal influence also proved to be minimal 
1. Questions in the committees were determined by majority vote, although 
they endeavoured to be unanimous in their decisions. The rule of 
collective responsibility clearly did not apply. See May op cit (3 ed) 
369-370. 
2. By Act No 28 of 1962. 
3. See May op cit (3 ed) 135; this arrangement conformed to Nordlinger's 
'stable governing coalition' in that the coalition was formed prior to 
elections. 
4. Less striking examples of the coalition principle are the Unionist 
Party's 'merger' with the South African Party in 1920, the Nationalist-
Labour pact which came to power in 1924, and the support of the Afri- ' 
kaner Party for the National Party after the 1948 election. 
5. See pages 165 and 172 respectively, above. 
6. !his body had been anticipated by the then prime minister ~n 1971. 
See the Theron Report op cit § 16.48. 
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because it met irregularly and inf requently and was not gene-
rally accepted by the leadership E~ lites whom it purported to 
incorporate consociationally into the political system. The 
council ceased to meet after a re: atively short perio~ and its 
only contemporary significance is that it was the forerunner 
of the council of cabinets envisaged in the government's con-
. . 1 1 1 stltutlona proposa s. 
The principle of proportionality As a basis of representation 
has not been wholly absent from the South African constitution,2 
but its effects have been severely attenuated by a preponder-
ance of majoritarian elections. The national convention con-
sidered a system of proportional r epresentation for the parlia-
mentary elections, but preferred, and proceeded to institute, 
the plurality principle in single '-member constituencies; 3 pro-
portionality was, however, the bas is on which the provincial 
executive committees were originally elected, although the 
principle was distorted by the fa c t that provincial councillors, 
who elected the executive, were t emselves elected on the same 
majoritarian basis as parliamentarians - the popular electoral 
strength of parties was not, ther~fore, necessarily reflected 
in the composition of the executive committees. The same dis-
tortion applied in the election of senators,who were elected 
according to the proportionality principle4 but by a majori-
tarian-constituted electoral coll ege;5 this system in fact 
favoured the majority party in each province since it was able 
to fill casual vacancies 6 arising in that province, whether or 
not the vacating senator was from that party. Finally, the 
original parity of provincial rep r esentation in the Union Senate,' 
and the subsequent over-representa tion of the smaller provinces 
1 . See pages 301 to 304, below. 
2. 'See s 134 of the South Africa Act. 
3. See R.R. Brand The Union of South Africa (1909) 130. 
4. Except during the period from 1955 until 1960. 
5. S 30(3) of the Constitution Act until repealed by Act No 101 of 1980. 
6. S 30(2) of the Constitution Act, until its repeal. 
,. South Africa Act ss 24 and 25. 
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in the Union and Republican Senates,1 may also be seen as 
variations of the principle of proportionality.2 The principle 
has never, however, been used as :he basis of allocating re-
sources, public appointments and other rspoilsr of government, 
and where found in its attenuated form has not effected any 
significant deviation from the ma j oritarian rule principle. 
The veto principle has had only very limited formal application 
in the South African constitutional system, namely in relation 
to the entrenching procedure 3 wh i ch has extended a power of 
veto to a minority of one third of the members of the combined 
House of Assembly and Senate 4 in :respect of legislation affect-
ing the entrenched sections. The veto in fact delayed the 
enactment of the Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1951,5 
but it was statutorily circumvent ed in subsequent developments, 
and since then its scope has been limited and it has had less 
practical significance. The convention of joint ministerial 
responsibility implies some form of consensual decision-making 
in the cabinet, and a type of informal veto principle,6 though 
with a quite different function to that of the mutual veto in 
the consociational democracies. This characteristic can there-
fore be said to be generally absent from South Africa's consti-
tutional tradition. 
As far as segmental autonomy is concerne~ the terminology of 
separate development tends to ove r lap with that of consociation-
alism. In South Africa the cons ~ itutional provision for sepa-
rate black, Indian and coloured authorities, with each set 
1. Constitution Act s 28. 
2. Cf A. Lijphart Democracy in Plural Societies (1977) 40-41. 
3. South Africa Act s 152; Constitution Act s 118. 
4'. And since Act No 74 of 1980, to the members of the Assembly alone. 
5. Act No 40 of 1951. 
6. See the then prime minister's description of decision-making in the 
cabinet, in House of Assembly Debates vol 10 col 4552 (12 April 1978). 
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exercising personal jurisdiction over members of the relevant 
group, may be seen as an apparent concession to the principle 
of segmental autonomy, and it has been officially justified in 
terms of consociational-type concepts of 'self-determination' 
and 'group autonomy'. Thus it could be argued that, as in the 
consociational model the autonomy principle ensures that each 
minority group controls and regulates all matters of exclusive 
concern to that group, so the ins· itutionalisation of separate 
development has provided the structural basis for the same type 
of arrangement in South Africa. At the institutional level, 
however, and 'quite apart from any evaluation of the policy of 
separate development itself, there are three salient short-
comings in the South African system, when compared with the 
normative consociational model. Firstly, it is misleading to 
speak of the South African segment s as being 'autonomous', by 
reason of their constitutional subordinacy, their minimal con-
stitutional powers, and the polit i cal and economic limitations 
circumscribing those powers. Secondly, the 'segments' recog-
nised by the South African consti t ution are statutorily defined 
in terms of ethnicity and colour,1 and are not necessarily based 
on actually perceived common inte r ests; only the withdrawal of 
the prohibition on free political association2 could ensure the 
emergence of authentic segmental identities, among which the 
present divisions mayor may not be salient. The issue of 
'segmental' identity would require resolution before any of the 
consociati6nal devices could be authentically employed. 3 
Thirdly, the provision for 'autonomous segmental' institutions 
has not been accompanied by provi s ion for joint participation 
in central institutions on matter s of common concern, as is pro-
vided in the grand coalition of the consociational model. In 
the case of the black states, moreover, 'segmental autonomy' 
has led to partition4 and has internationalised the claim of 
1. Inter alia by the Population Registration Act No 30 of 1950. 
2. This would require in limine the repeal of the Prohibition of Political 
Interference Act No 51 of 1968. 
3. This point is strongly emphasised in chapter 8, below. 
4. It is partially because of this possible outcome that Nordlinger (op 
cit 32), unlike Lijphart, does not include segmental autonomy as a 
conflict-regulating device. 
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the independent states and their c itizens to a joint say on 
matters of common concern. 1 Thu~) while the premises of 
separate development and consociat ionalism may be similar in 
regard to this principle, their theoretical and practical out-
comes are widely divergent. 
It can thus be concluded that despite a predominantly anti-
consociational constitutional and political tradition, it is 
possible to discern some consocia t ional institutions and poli-
tical practices in South Africa, hut that these do not have 
great significance in the overall system. 
S. Conclusion 
In this chapter attention has been given to the main constitu-
tional developments which have occurred in South Africa since 
the time of Union. Within a single overall constitutional 
system it has been possible to identify a set of Westminster-
type institutions which serve as t he basis of the exclusive 
'white' political process, and in addition, a range of other 
institutions for blacks, coloureds and Indians, which are sub-
ordinate to the former. There has been a tendency in South 
Africa to regard the white political institutions as the real 
constitution, and to set the inst i tutions for other groups 
2 apart for constitutional purposes · this has contributed, in 
part, to the tendency to overlook the limitations of South 
Africa's 'Westminster model'. In this chapter the constitu-
tional system has been presented a s a totality, and within this 
context it becomes less easy to speak of a Westminster-type 
arrangement in South Africa. In fact the South African poli-
tical system provides democracy for one category of citizens 
1. However N. Stultz (Transkei's Half Loaf -Race Separatism in South 
Africa (1980) 150) describes the post-independence relations between 
Pretoria and Umtata as more closely resembling the consociational 
ideal - in that they require bargaining from independent power bases -
than do relations between Pretoria and other black entities. The 
implications of homeland independence for consociationalism are dealt 
with in chapter 7, below. 
2. See J.C. Bekker 'Rewriting the Textbooks: a re-evaluation of some 
traditional South African constitutional law assumptions' 1979 CILSA 
272 at 285; and see the author's rev iew of M. Wiecher's Staatsreg 
(3 ed, 1981) to appear in 1982 THR-HR. 
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and authoritarian rule for the re s t, and in overall terms 
this amounts to a system of 'unilateral conflict regulation,.2 
The majoritarian institutional features within the white 
political system have contributed towards the ability of the 
electoral majority within the minority white group to domi-
nate the overall majority. The legitimacy crisis has been 
caused primarily through the exclusion of the overall majority 
from the important political institutions, and the government 
has embarked on forms of consociational engineering in an 
attempt to resolve that crisis. But against the reality of 
the present constitutional syste~ as described in this chapter, 
any transition to a genuine conso~iational system would require 
institutional changes of a fundamental nature. 
1. See T. Ranf, H. Weiland and G. Vierdag South Africa - The Prospects 




THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
IN CONSOCIATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter a survey has been given of the main 
historical developments in the South African constitutional 
system, which in their latter stages involved the institution-
alisation of the 'Verwoerdian bluE.print'. In the chapter 
following, attention is given to the government's new consti-
tutional proposals,which involve both a continuation, and a 
culmination, of the constitutional ideologies and structures 
of the past. Apart from the government's own proposals, 
numerous alternative constitutional futures have been pre-
dicted for South Africa, either descriptively or prescriptive-
ly; these range from radical forms of partition, on the one 
hand, to military dictatorships of various persuasions, on the 
other. These alternatives have been well documented in the 
literature 1 and it is not proposed to describe and evaluate 
them here; the approach of this work is essentially analytical, 
and not prescriptive or speculative. 
Nevertheless it is appropriate to widen the constitutional per-
spective beyond the prevailing system, in order to provide a 
comparative context within which t o assess the government's 
constitutional dispensation. In t he first place, therefore, 
the excursus in this chapter provides comparative material from 
within southern Africa for those involved in a critical capacity 
in the current constitutional deba t e. But it also reveals a 
1. For the best up-to-date, if somewhat succinct survey, see D. Gelden-huys 'South Africa's Constitutional Al ternatives' 11 (1981) South Africa International 190-227; see al so the Sprocas Report No 10 South Africats Political Alternatives (1973), W.R. Thomas 1 South Africa 




range of constitutional policies and practices within the 
sub-continent, some of which might have an influence on the 
constitutional politics of South Africa. It would be naive 
to suggest that the government and its political actors will 
be inspired by the matters dealt with here; after all con-
stitutions, as has been said,1 are autobiographical and 
correspondingly idiosyncratic - they tend, like codes, to re-
flect the personality and general intellectual background of 
their drafters - and South Africa's new constitutional dis-
pensation is proving to be no exception. Nevertheless it 
would be equally misplaced to deny the potential influence on 
the government of the contemporary political, empirical and 
intellectual constitutional 'forces' in southern Africa, and, 
without extending the 'constitutional copycat' theorem beyond 
its accepted limits,2 it is appropriate to regard these fac-
tors as having some potential relevance for the country's 
future constitutional developments. 
The matters to be discussed in this chapter can be distinguish-
ed as to whether they are theoretical, that is the constitu-
tional policies of internal political parties, empirical, that 
is constitutional systems which have been agreed upon or im-
plemented by political actors in southern Africa, or specialist, 
that is the reports of commissions bearing on constitutional 
matters. 3 The ambit of this excursus is limited by the gen-
eral scope of the work - thus no reference is made to the so-
1. S.E. Finer Five Constitutions (1979) 21; cf E. McWhinney Federal 
Constitution Making for a Multi-National World (1966) 7. 
2. See I.D. Duchacek Ri hts and Liberties in the World Toda - Consti-
tutional Promise and Reality (1973 11-14. 
3. This description should be qualified to the extent that many 
'specialist' commissions of enquiry have also had a strong political 
complexion. 
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called revolutionary constitutional "models, 1 nor does the in-
vestigation extend to the contiguous constitutional systems 
in Mocambique or Angola 2 - in short the constitutional matters 
discussed fall within the pluralist framework. In what 
follows they are all examined from a consociational perspec-
tive. 
2. The Party Policies 
Apart from the policies of the governing National Party, which 
have been ins~itutionalised during the last three decades, 
there are three other political parties with clearly formulated 
constitutional policies - these are the Progressive Federal 
Party, the New Republic Party, and the Labour Party. In ad-
dition the Inkatha movement has a well-formulated political 
policy from which it is possible to deduce its basic attitude 
to constitutional matters, if not a constitutional model as 
such. 
Ca) The Progressive Federal Party 
The constitutional policy of the official parliamentary opposi-
tion is based on the report and recommendations of the Van Zyl 
Slabbert constitutional committee, which were adopted by the 
1. On which see Thomas op cit 315-6 and Royal Institute op cit 28-9. 
As Thomas points out, radical opponents of the existing regime tend 
to have no clear constitutional and socio-political strategy for 
after the initial goal of liberalisation has been reached, but he 
distils the following principles " from the relevant literature and 
policy statements: 
The complete abolition of racial differentiation; 
Introduction of a socialist economic system; 
Initiation of a new strategy for socio-economic development; 
Stipulation of equal franchise rights for all inhabitants irres-
pective of past ethnic or regional structures. 
The ANC also advocates a national convention to agree on a new con-
stitution incorporating such principles. On the constitution~l 
views of Dr Motlana of the 'Committee of Ten' see Rotberg and 
~arratt op cit 31-47. 
2. See at 14, above. 
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" 1 
federal congress of the party in 1978. This policy comprises 
two basic components, one of which deals with the proposed 
method of establishing a new constitutional structure, namely 
through a national convention,2 and the other with the sub-
stantive constitutional model which the party would present to 
the convention. 3 The concept of a national convention (or 
constitutional conference) is clearly a response to the prob-
lems of legitimacy facing political institutions in South Africa.
4 
The convention would be attended by all significant political 
groupings in the republicS which did not advocate violence or 
subversion,6 and would negotiate on a new constitution for the 
country. Decisions at the convention would be taken on the 
basis of consensus and the proceedings would continue until an 
alternative constitution had been agreed upon. Existing in-
stituti6ns would remairi intact during the constitutional delib-
erations and the supremacy of parliament would be unaffected; 
the convention would stand in an advisory relationship to par-
liament which would be responsible for the phased introduction 
of a new constitution through legislative enactment,7 after 
whic"h it would terminate its legislative supremacyB or any resid-
ual authority which it had. It is envisaged that, simultaneous-
ly with the convention's deliberations, the government of the 
day would systematically amend discriminatory laws and remove 
other inequalities affecting the constitution's wider socio-
economic context. 
1. Report of the Constitutional Committee of the Progressive Federal Party, 
197B. See also F. van Zyl Slabbert and D. Welsh South Africa's Op-
tions - Strategies for Sharing Power (1979). 
2. 
4. 
§§ 3.1 - 3.13. 3. §§ 5.1 - 5.10. 
See the discussion in the introduction to this work. 
Modern Constitutions (2 ed, 1966) 52-66. 
Cf K.C. Wheare 
5. The.convention would decide whether independent homelands, which were 
des~rous thereof, could participate in the proceedings with a view to 
being incorporated in the new constitutional structure. Blacks de-
~ationalised by the South African Status Acts, but permanently domiciled 
~n the republic, would be allowed representation at the convention. 
6. A judicial commission would be entrusted with ensuring the overall 
representativeness of the convention. § 3.6.2. 
7. The convention would appoint an advisory council to assist the govern-
ment in this process. 
B. On juridical aspects relating to the termination of parliament's 
supremacy, see 445 to 456, below. 
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The PFP's constitutional proposals evidence an attempt to in-
corporate several consociational devices into a conventional 
federal constitution. 1 In broad outline, provision is made 
for a federal division of authority between a central legis-
lature and several state assemblies, with the former having 
jurisdiction over specified matters of a national character, 
and the latter having constitutionally-secured residual powers. 
The central legislature would be bicameral with each chamber 
having equal and co-ordinate powers,2 though as in other non-
presidential federal systems it might be anticipated that 
power would gravi ta te to the lower house. 3 . The secondary fed-
eral characteristics, such as equal state representation in 
the federal chamber, the right of the states to change their 
constitutions unilaterally and to participate in the amending 
of the national constitution,4 and the institutional provision 
for decentralised government, are also found in these proposals. 5 
The judiciary, through a federal constitutional court, would 
adjudicate on constitutional matters and uphold the supremacy 
of the constitution. 
The composition of the individual states in the PFP proposals 
merits closer attention, since discussions of federation in 
South Africa are largely concerned with whether the federal 
units should be regionally or communally defined. 6 The party's 
federal structure would have a regional basis, that is it would 
conform to the conventional territorial-federal (as opposed to 
1. See L.J. Boulle 'Federation and Consociation: Conceptual Links and 
Current Constitutional Models' 1981 THR-HR 236 at 248-250, and the 
discussion of federation and consociation at 108 to 115, above. 
2. Except in respect of money bills, over which the lower house would 
have the final say - ~ 5.4. 
3. The lower house would in any event elect the prime minister and its 
composition would determine membership of the federal executive, which 
would contribute to its predominance. 
4. Constitutional amendments would require an affirmative vote in the 
Federal Assembly and Senate, as well as ~n two-thirds of the state 
legislatures. 
5. The states would have jurisdiction over all matters other than those 
which were 'essentially national' - § 5.2.3. See also § 2.3. 
6. A. du Toit Federalism and Political Change in South Africa (1974) 17f. 
See also L. Marquard A Federation of Southern Africa (1971) 71f, and 
the references cited at 108, above. 
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corporate-federal) model. The general non-discriminatory 
thrust of the proposals also indicates that the state boundar-
ies would be dra~m so as to create a symmetrical federation, 
and not so as to translate national heterogeneity into rela-
tive state homogeneity; nevertheless there are several indi-
cations that communal factors are regarded as being of some 
significance in this process. 1 In the first place, while the 
number of states would be finalised by the convention itself, 
the proposals recommend that they be small in size rather than 
large, and therefore, by implication, relatively numerous; 
given the legacy of residential segregation in South Africa 
this would tend to create an asymmetrical arrangement. 
Secondly, the state boundaries commission appointed by the con-
vention would be required to take into account, inter alia, the 
'community of interests of the population' and the 'desirabili-
ty of a high degree of homogeneity'. Thirdly, the commission 
would be required to look specifically at existing semi-autono-
mous areas to see whether, with appropriate boundary adjust-
ments, they could provide a suitable basis for federal states; 
in terms of existing constitutional realities, this would in-
volve the consolidation of the non-independent national states. 
These factors indicate the possibility of at least a partially 
asymmetrical federation emerging in the short term, and this 
would be the furthest concession which the proposals make to 
the consoc.iational principle of segmental autonomy. 
The other consociational principles are applied consistently in 
the PFP constitutional plan. The federal executive would 
accormnodate a grand coali tion along Swiss 1 ines, wi th its chair-
man (the prime miriister) being elected by the federal assembly,2 
and its members being appointed by the chairman in proportion 
to party representation in the assembly (and after consultation 
with party leaders). Membership of the cabinet would be in-
compatible with continued membership of either federal chamber. 
The close affinity of this arrangement with the Swiss federal 
1 . See § 5.6. 
2. This would tend to weaken the federal element in the executive sphere 
since the federal chamber would have no say in his election. 
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executive (which Lijphart 1 describei as one of the best ex-
amples of the grand coalition in its prototypal form) is fur-
ther evidence of the compatibility of consociational princi-
ples with a conventional federal constitution; in the case 
under discussion, however, the power-sharing aspects of the 
federal executive would be constitutionally prescribed. 
Mention should also be made of the Senate which, besides its 
conventional federal composition, would cater for the conso-
ciational incorporation of cultural groups through their 
registered cultural councils;2 this type of functional rep-
resentation would be an innovation in the South African con-
text, although it has various precedents in the empirical 
consociations. 3 Finally on this aspect, a federal Finance 
Council would comprise representatives of the federal and 
state govBrnments and non-government experts, and would consti-
tute a type of third chamber. 4 Its main function would be to 
examine federal and state budgets and to determine the amounts 
of reVBnue and loan funds which each state could claim from 
the federal treasury; its decisions would be enforceable, un-
less overridden by majorities in both the federal assembly 
and the state government concerned. As in Canada, these pro-
posals would introduce the grand coalition principle into the 
institutions which would be central to the maintenance of the 
federal system. S 
The last two consociational principles are as strongly evident 
as the coalition principle in the PFP proposals. Proportion-
ality as a basi~ of representation is envisaged for all legis-
lative bodies, federal and regional, as well as for the federal 
1. A. Lijphart Democracy in Plural Societies (1977) 31. 
2. Any 'cultural group' could establish a cultural council to promote its 
interests and which, on registration with the constitutional court, 
would be empowered to nominate one member of the Senate. § 5.4.2. 
3. The best example is found in the Belgium constitution of 1971 which 
recognises (art 3(c)) French, Dutch and German cultural communities, 
and provides for French and Dutch cultural councils which can issue 
decrees on cultural and educational matters (art 59(2). See also 
I. Duchacek Comparative Federalism (1970) 1-10. 
4. § 5.8.3. 
5. See S. Noel 'Consociational Democracy and Canadian Federalism' 4 (1971) 
Canadian Journal of Political Science 14 at 16, and at 113, above. 
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executive. 1 The power of veto would vest in any minority 
of ten or fifteen percent in the federal assembly, on all 
decisions other than those relating to money bills, matters 
of administrative detail, and the election of the prime minis-
ter; it would also operate in the federal executive, although 
it is not clear on what basis. 2 The veto would avail groups 
of states in respect of constitutional amendments,3 and both 
individual states and cultural councils in respect of legisla-
tion affecting their particular interests. 4 Finally, the 
veto would also operate within state institutions. 5 The 
overall effect is that the consociational elements inherent 
in federal theory are jointly and severally accentuated in the 
PFP constitutional policy, which gives effect to Lijphart's 
suggestion that consociational democracy should, if possible, 
be introduced in a federal form. 6 Inevitably the proposals 
would involve in practice the same problems that are associated 
with federal and consociational systems of government, but most 
pertinently they contain the potential for inefficiency, im-
mobilism and maintenance of the status quo, through their em-
phasis on consensuality, and on constitutional, as opposed to 
majoritarian, democracy.7 
Of the other general features of the PFPconstitutional policy, 
the most salient in the South African context are its general 
adult franchise 8 and the avoidance of any reference to racial 
1. There would also be a proportional allocation of federal assembly 
seats among the states - § 5.4.1. 
2. § 5.5.4. 
4. § 5.4.2. 
3. § 5.10. 
5. While the proposals envisage the states deciding on their own indivi-
dual forms of government, they stipulate the basic requirement of con-
sensus and proportionality. § 5.6.1. 
6. A. Lijphart tConsociation and Federation: Conceptual and Empirical 
Links' 12 (1979) Canadian Journal of Political Science 599 at 414, and 
see the author's own conclusions in Boulle op cit 254. 
7. ef the discussion in chapter 1, above. 
8. The party's predecessors had advocated a qualified franchise but this 
was rejected by the Slabbert committee. 
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or ethnic factors. Provision is made for a non-executive 
president to be elected jointly by members of the federal and 
state legislatures, and there is a semi-separation of powers 
between the legislature and executive' which would tend to blur, 
by Westminster standards, the lines of ministerial responsibi-
lity.2 There is also provision for a judiciary, whose members 
would be appointed by a judicial appointments commission and 
who would enjoy security of tenure and salary;3 the judicial 
branch would include a constitutional court with the ability 
to enforce the constitution and an entrenched bill of rights. 4 
An ombudsman would also be appointed. 5 In general terms this 
amounts to a constitutional model which falls strongly within 
the liberal-democratic tradition, subject to the modifications 
inherent in its consociational elements. 
Cb) The New Republic Party 
As opposed to the open-ended emphasis in the PFP's concept of a 
constitutional convention, the NRP emphasises in its constitu-
tional proposals 6 the need to use existing institutions and 
arrangements as a point of departure in future constitutional 
developments; in fact these proposals may be regarded as an 
elaboration of the government's own constitutional plan. 7 
The NRP accepts the existence of 'four main groups' in South 
African society, namely whites, Indians, coloureds and blacks. 
For constitutional purposes it makes a further distinction be-
1. In fact the proposals make repeated reference to a separation of 
powers - eg § 2.3 and § 4.2 - but this is somewhat misleading from a 
strict constitutionalist perspective. 
2. Cf ~ 5.5.4. 
4. §5.9.1. 
3. ~ 5.7. 
5. § 5.9.2. 
6. This description is taken from the party ' s submissions to the Schlebusch 
commission which were drafted by Prof D.J. Kriek; while the submissions 
are relatively comprehensive, they are reticent on several matters of 
institutional detail. 
7. A. Lijphart 'Federal, Confederal and Consociational Options for the 
South African Plural Society' in R. Rotberg and J. Barrett Conflict and 
Compromise in South Africa (1980) 51 at 69. 
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tween 'homeland blacks' and 'non-homeland blacks', and ad-
vocates the incorporation of the latter category, together 
with whites, Indians and coloureds, into a corporate-federal 
political structure. Each of the four communities would have 
its own institutions at the local, provincial and community 
(that is, national) levels of government, and there would in 
addition be joint consultative machinery at each level; the 
allocation of functions among these levels would be made sub-
ject to the 'principle of subsidiarityt - that is no function 
would be accorded to a higher authority if it could be carried 
out efficiently by a lower one. At all levels of government 
each group would have control over its own legislative, execu-
tive and administrative authorities, at the apex of which would 
be the four group parliaments. In addition there would exist 
various tfederal' authorities with specified powers over matters 
affecting all members of the corporate federation: a bicameral 
legislature with chambers of equal status,2 an executive com-
mittee elected on a proportional basis by members of the legis-
lature and with a rotating chairman (who would also be head of 
state),3 a federal judiciary, and a specialised financial com-
mittee. The constitution would be highly rigid, with amend-
ments requiring the approval of the federal legislature and 
support in a referendum from a majority of voters, and in -addi-
tion concurrent majorities within at least three communities. 
A further tconfederal' arrangement would be constructed to 
accommodate the 'federal republic', as just described, and all 
the present and former homelands. 4 This would consist of cen-
1. The basis of this distinction is not altogether clear, but the pro-
posals suggest that effect could be given to it through an amendment 
to the National States Citizenship Act No 26 of 1970. Although the 
system would depend on 'race' classification, compulsory classification 
in terms of s 5 of Act No 30 of 1950 would be discontinued, and re-
placed by 'a system of natural registration'. 
2. The lower house would be indirectly elected, with each group parlia-
ment electing one component; the upper house would comprise an equal 
number of members nominated by each of the group executives. 
3. This would be a collegial body, again modelled on the Swiss executive. 
4. The proposals assume the attainment of constitutional independence by 
all the national states, but no reference is made to the terms thereof, 
or to such matters as consolidation. 
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tral decision-making bodies to deliberate on matters of common 
interest, but the proposals provide no organisational detail 
on these matters. 1 Powers would be delegated to the confeder-
al authorities by the various member states and exact relation-
ships would be defined in a series of treaties. The NRP des-
cribes its constitutional policy as involving a 'federal-confede-
ral' arrangement for South Africa. 
The consociational elements in the NRP constitutional proposals 
are self-evident and do not require detailed elaboration -
suffice it to say that the proposals attempt to institute a 
corporate form of federalism. Because of the scheme's close 
affinity with the government's 1977 constitution and its con-
stellation proposals, it can be subjected to similar criticisms
2 
- in particular those relating to the jurisdictional complica-
tions and financial costs inherent in a proliferation of insti-
tutions with personal jurisdiction. In many respects the NRP 
proposals also fail to come to terms with the legitimacy crisis 
facing political institutions in South Africa - this is evident, 
inter alia, from the fact that they are dependent on the consti-
tutional entrenchment of colour and ethnicity. 
Cc) The Labour Party 
In 1978 the Labour Party executive of the Coloured Persons Rep-
resentative Council appointed a commission3 to investigate al-
ternative constitutional proposals, the findings of which could 
serve as a basis for negotiation with the government. The 
report of the commission was tabled in the CPRC and it was 
unanimously accepted by the Council after the opposition had 
left the chamber.4 The Labour Party was thus predominantly 
responsible for the initiation, drafting and endorsement of the 
commission's report, and it became the official constitutional 
policy of the party. 
1. Passing reference is made to a council of ministers and a secretariat. 
2. See in general chapter 6, below. 
3. The Du Preez Commission. The report of the commission is dated 14 
March 1979. 
4. Debates of the CRG vol 41 (3-5 April 1979). 
21 8 . 
Before outlining its own constitutional recommendations, the 
Du Preez report provides critical analyses of the government's 
constitutional proposals of 1977, the Progressive Federal 
Party's federal constitution, past and proposed forms of par-
tition, theories of pluralism, and the principle of majori-
tarianism. Brief reference is also made to consociationalism 
and its relevance to future constitutional developments, but 
the system is rejected on the ground that the South African 
community is not deeply divided to the point of disintegration 
and therefore in need of remedial consociational treatment. 
The nature of the conflict in South Africa is regarded as being 
not ethnic or cultural, but 'horizontal', that is political, 
social and economic, and the conflict is seen as being suscept-
ible to constitutional containment only through la process of 
democratisation'. A recurring theme in the report is that it 
has been the abuse of the Westminster system, and not the sys-
tem itself, which has been at fault in the past, and the report 
suggests that,if properly utilised to give effect to popular 
political sovereigntY,the Westminster system would be an ideal 
constitutional ~odel for the future.' 
In its constitutional recommendations the report favours a uni-
tary system of government based on a general principle of non-
discrimination. 2· This would involve a universal adult fran-
chise and common electoral rolls to elect members to an enlarged 
House of Assembly; all members of the Senate would be indirect-
ly elected by parliamentarians and provincial councillors, and 
the Senate would function as a chamber of legislative review. 
The executive would be parliamentary and majoritarian in com-
position, with traditional Westminster forms of responsibility. 
The State President would have ceremonial powers only and would 
continue to be elected at a joint session of both legislative 
chambers. Provincial councils would be retained and would not, 
by implication, enjoy any greater powers or security of tenure. 
1. There were some indications that the commission identifies the West-
minster system principally with unitarianism, as opposed to federalism, 
~lthough it does go on to recommend the institution of a Westminster-
type cabinet. 
2. This would necessitate the abolition of all race classification legis-
lation, and the Prohibition of Political Interference Act No 51 of 
1968. 
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Judicial independence from the other branches of government 
would be ensured by empowering the judiciary itself to appoint 
new members to its ranks. The system would thus not only in-
corporate basic Westminster constitutional principles, but 
would also involve a significant degree of institutional con-
tinuity with the past, save that the political system would 
b f 11 . 1 . 1 ecome u y lnc USlve. 
Three main variations on the Westminster paradigm are evident 
in the Du Preez proposals, one of which is a consociational 
characteristic, namely the extensive use of the proportionality 
principle iri parriamentary and provincial elections. In the 
case of parliament the extreme form of proportionality would be 
used, with the country being regarded as a single constituency 
and electors voting for political parties and not candidates;2 
the only qualifitation in the system would be the requirement 
of at least five percent popular support before a party could 
share in the distribution of seats, a threshold designed to pre-
vent political fragmentation. This electoral arrangement is 
justified on three mairi grounds: it would prevent a minority 
party from gaining a majority of parliamentary seats, it would 
obviate the "time-consumirig process of redelimitating the coun-
try to accorrnnodate the newly enfranchised voters, and it would 
prevent the exploitation of de facto racially exclusive constit-
uencies, the legacy of years of residential segregation. But 
it is trite that the greater the proportionality of an electoral 
system, the greater the chance of more than two strong parties 
emerging, and in this factor is to be found a basic contradic-
tion in the Du Preez proposals: while the Westminster system 
is presented as a normative model, the proportional electoral 
system would not give rise to the two-party system which is 
responsible for many features of that system. 3 In particular 
1. Before being implemented the constitution would require popular rati-
fication in a referendum. 
2. On proportional electoral systems see further at 411 to 415, below. 
3. S.E. Finer Comparative Government (1970) 158. 
at 28 to 30, above. 
And see the discussion 
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the formation of a majority party cabinet would most likely 
be impossible, yet the proposals emphasise that executive 
authority would be the sole prerogative of the parliamentary 
majority, and that the principle of proportionality should not 
apply in the formation of a cabinet. 
The other two Westminster variations are not inherently conso-
ciational, but again evidence internal contradictions in the 
Du Preez report. Firstly, the constitution would constitute 
supreme law and would be highly rigid, and secondly there would 
be an entrenched bill of rights. Both these features imply a 
judicial testing right, which is at odds with the notion of the 
political supremacy of the electorate, to which continual em-
phasis is given in the report. While the principles of popu-
lar democracy and Diceyan notions of sovereignty are espoused, 
effect is given to a system of constitutional democracy. 
The Du Preez report and Labour party constitutional policy have 
little significance from a consociational point of view, save 
for the proportional electoral system which they advocate. 
Their main significance lies in their antithesis to the govern-
ment's present and proposed constitutional policy; as the 
Labour party has in the past received the electoral support of 
a vast majority of coloured voters, this antithesis serves to 
emphasise the legitimacy problem which the government's consti-
tutional programme faces. 
(d) Inkatha 1 
In common with other black organisations, Inkatha has not adopt-
ed a fixed constitutional position, but has formulated a set of 
1. lnkatha Yenkululeko Ye Sizwe is the Zulu National Cultural Liberation 
Movement led by Chief G. Buthelezi, chief minister of KwaZulu. 
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constitutional principles as a basis for future negotiation.
1 
In terms of existing constitutional trends, and Inkathats own 
position, the most salient of these principles concerns the 
homelands programme: the maintenance of the geographical in-
tegrity of South Africa is regarded as a non-negotiable factor 
in future constitutional developments and homeland independence 
is seen as a violation of this principle; flowing from this 
are the additional demands for one nationality, one citizen-
ship, and one economy. 
As with the Progressive Federal Party, Inkatha emphasises the 
indispensibility of a representative national convention as t~e 
only acceptable way of deciding the constitutional future of 
the country. Its own constitutional proposals are presented 
in the most basic terms, as involving 'power sharing within 
one political system'; no particular form of power-sharing is 
proposed, nor is any organisational detail provided. But a 
future constitution would have to involve 'the repeal of dis-
criminatory laws as a first step towards political normality', 
the repeal of the political interference act,2 the creation of 
a 'truly free enterprise' economic system, and the constitution-
al entrenchment of minority rights. As far as the homelands 
are concerned, these could be consolidated and given provincial 
status, provided there was 'regionality without ethnicity'. 
There would in addition be a bill of rights based on the Inkatha 
'Statement of - Belief,.3 
1. This description is taken from the memorandum submitted by Inkatha 
to the Schlebusch Commission which includes the 17-point 'Statement 
of BeliefJ. The memorandum appears in W.S. Felgate 'Co-operation 
Between Natal and KwaZulu - An Inkatha View' in L.J. Boulle and 
L.G. Baxter (eds) Natal and KwaZulu - Constitutional and Political 
Options (1981) 154-165; see also G. Thula 'A Constitutional Alterna-
tive for South Africa (Inkatha), in F. van Zyl Slabbert and J. Opland 
(eds) South Africa: Dilemmas of Evolutionary Change (1980) 36-45, and 
'A Basis for the Constitutional Transformation of South Africa' in 
R. Rotberg and J. Barrett Ceds) Conflict and Compromise in South 
Africa (1980) 161-169. 
2. The Prohibition of Political Interference Act No 51 of 1968. 
3. W.S. Felgate op cit 161-2. This would include equal rights before 
the law, a redistribution of wealth, the elimination of secrecy in 
government, due process of law, and the right to form trade unions. 
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Because of their generalised nature it is not possible to 
provide a consociational analysis of the Inkatha constitution-
al proposals. At times the notion of 'power sharing' would 
seem to be understood in terms of communal representation by 
blacks and whites in common institutions, but this contradicts 
the more general insistence on the need for avoiding references 
to race or ethnicity in constitutional provisions; the refer-
ences to power-sharing and minority rights are not in them-
selves indicative of a commitment to a consociational form of 
government. On the whole the proposals appear to adhere more 
closely to traditional concepts of liberal-constitutionalism, 
as is the case with the Labour party constitutional proposals. 
The Inkatha principles are also clearly irreconcileable with 
the government's constitutional policy. 
3. The Empirical Models 
Ca) The Turnhalle experience 
Ci) Background 
Namibia's internal' constitutional affairs were regulated ex-
clus i v-ely by the South African government between 1919 and 
1978,2 and this resulted in the territory acquiring an equiva-
lent constitutional status to the South African provinces as 
far as the 'white' political institutions were concerned. 
Authority vested initially in an administrator, who had both 
legislative and executive powers, and subsequently in a legis-
lative assembly,which was first partly, and later wholly, 
elected by the white electorate; the executive committee had 
the same composition and functions as its provincial counter-
parts. By 1968 the powers of the legislative assembly were 
1. On the wider international dimensions of political developments in 
Namibia see John Dugard (ed) The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute 
(1973), G.M. Cockram South West Africa Mandate (1976). 
2. See on this development M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 445-501. 
The most important statute regulating the territory's constitutional 
affairs was the South West African Constitution Act No 39 of 1968 
which repealed the earlier constitution act. 
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marginally greater than those of provincial councils and leg-
1 islation did not require the State President's assent, so 
that there was a slightly greater measure of self-government 
for the territory, although constitutional control was retain-
ed by the republic,inter alia, through the repugnancy provision,2 
the assembly's restricted powers and i nability to amend its 
own constitution,3 and the continued legislative supremacy of 
1 · 4 par l.ament. 
As far as the constitutional status of other groups in the 
territory was concerned, the South African government's inten-
tion was to implement its policy of separate development through 
the creation of separate political institutions. This was par-
ticularly evident from the Development of Self-Government for 
Native Nations in the South West Africa Act of 1968,5 which mapped 
out a plan of self-government and constitutional independence 
for indigenous peoples in the territory, along similar lines to 
the homelands programme. By the time the Turnhalle confer-
ence commenced, the first stage of self-government had been 
attained by four of the statutorily defined groups.6 In 
addition a partially elected advisory council had been estab-
li~hed for coloured persons, who were not catered for in the 
Coloured Persons Representative Council. Thus the internal 
constitutional pattern coincided in many respects with that of 
South Africa. 
1. The administrator could approve legislation himself and could reserve laws for the State President,who had a power of disallowance. Ss 37(4) and 28 of Act No 39 of 1968. ef s 64 of the South Africa Act (before 1934). 
2. S 37(4). 
3 • Ss 2 1 and 22. 
4. S 37(1). These powers were vested in the State President (s 27(2)) except in regard to matters on which the assembly could not legislate; on these matters only parliament could legislate (s 37(3)). 
5. Act No 54 of 1968 as amended by Acts Nos 23 of 1972 and 20 of 1973. The preamble to the 1968 Act read, 'Whereas it is desirable that the native nations in the territory of South West Africa should in the realisation of their right of self-determination develop in an order-ly manner to self-governing nations and independence ... t The !urnhalle conference was to evidence a reversal of this policy. 
6. The Owambos, Kavangas, Caprivians and Basters. 
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1 (ii) The Turnhalle conference 
The Turnhalle constitutional conference was held between Sept-
ember 1975 and November 1977 and was attended by eleven invited 
delegations, each of which represented a different 'ethnic' 
group;2 for the most part delegates were drawn from institu-
tions created by the South African government. At its first 
session the conference issued a 'Declaration of Intent,3 and 
unanimously resolved that all decisions of the conference and 
its committees would be taken by consensus. The most import-
ant function of the conference was performed by its constitu-
tion committee, whose third draft constitution was accepted by 
the conference as a whole and was incorporated in a petition 
to the South African government requesting the institution of 
a provisiorial government along the lines set out in the draft 
constitution. 4 Appropriate legislation was prepared for the 
republitan parliament,but international developments prevented 
its enactment; the Turnhalle conference was terminated and its 
constitution was incorporated into the policy of the Democratic 
Turnhalle Alliance, a grouping of political parties formed 
during its closing stages. 
(iii) The Turnhalle constitution 
The Turnhalle constitutionS provided for three levels of govern-
men~, central, 'communal' and local, and a functional distri-
buti6n of authority based on the classic separation of powers 
doctririe. At the local level representative 'ethnic! authori-
ties would be given powers of traditional local concern and 
1. See M. Wiechers 'n Kritiese ontleding van die Turnhalle-grondwet vir n tussentydse regering' 18 (1977) Codicillus 4-8; L.J. Boulle 'The Turnhalle Testimony' 95 (1978) SALJ 49-62. 
2. D. Prinsloo South West Africa: The Turnhalle and Independence (1976) 11ff. The most notable absentee from the conference was the South West African Peoples Organisation, but there were also other groups absent. 
3. This is available in 1976 CILSA 277-281. 
4. The white electorate had first approved the constitution l.n a refer-endum held on 17 May 1977 (GN 122/77 in Official Gazette 3610 of S ~pril 1977). For details of the referendum see 1977 CILSA 231. 
5. See Wiechers op cit, Boulle op cit, 1977 CILSA 232-233. 
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provision was made for co-ordinating metropolitan bodies where 
necessary . At the second level of government provision was 
made for eleven elected legislatures ( the so-called represen-
tative authorities) each of which would be representative of, 
and have jurisdiction over,the relevant ethnic group. These 
authorities could be seen as the cont i nuation and extension of 
previous separate development institutions such as the home-
land authorities, the council for coloured persons, and the 
white legislative assembly. Each representative authority 
would have its o~~ executive. 
The second tier authorities would periodically serve as elec-
toral colleges, in that one of their functions would be to nom-
inate members to the central legislature (the national assembly), 
a unicameral body comprising sixty seats, of which forty-four 
would be divided equally among the eleven groups, and the re-
mainder would be allocated proportionately. 1 The division of 
powers between the national assembly and representative authori-
ties was to be relatively flexible, and liberal prov i sion was 
made for the delegation of authority in both directions, and 
also for its re-delegation. While authority on matters of ob-
viously national concern was vested in the assembly,2 the repre-
sentative authorities were given original legislative competence 
over other, not insubstantial, matters,3 and legislation on 
these matters would prevail over conflicting enactments of the 
assembly.4 In exercising its powers the assembly would operate 
on a qualified-majority basis: all decisions would require over-
all majority support, and in addition majority support within 
each component part of the assembly (that is the ethnic delega-
tions).5 Should more than three groups exercise their veto 
1. The overall distribution of seats would be as follows: Owambos 12, Whites 6, Damara 5, Herero 5, Kavango 5, Coloured 5, Nama 5, Caprivu 5, Bushman 4, Baster 4, Tswana 4. 
2. As the constitution was only intended to regulate the interim govern-ment, certain 'national' matters, such as defence and foreign affairs, would remain under South African control. 
3. Eg education, social services, r~ads, forestry, agricultural credit and land use, and environmental control. 
4. ·s 3(i)(iv) of ch Ill; in other cases of conflict central legislation would prevail. 
5. Ch Ills 3(g)(i)1. The complete absence of a particular delegation, however, would not prevent the assembly from functioning. 
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power the matter in issue would be quashed, but in other cases 
it could be referred to the relevant representative authority, 
or authorities, which could uphold or reverse the veto decision.
1 
Executive power at the central level would vest in a president 
and ministers' council,2 with the former being nominated by the 
South African government for the interim period and having the 
3 predominantly ceremonial powers of a head of state. Each 
group represented in the national assembly would be entitled to 
nominate one member to the ministers' council,4 and to discharge 
him at its discretion. 5 The chairman of the council would be 
elected by, and remain responsible, to the assembly at large,6 
but his tenure would depend on his continued membership of the 
assembly, and thus ultimately on the confidence of the relevant 
representative authority and not necessarily that of the assembly. 
All decisions in the council would be taken by consensus unless 
it was agreed, also by way of consensus, that a particular deci-
sion be taken by way of an ordinary or a two-thirds or a three-
quarters majority vote. 7 The consensus principle would apply 
in respect of all decisions, and no institutional mechanism was 
provided for resolving possible deadlocks. 
The Turnhalle constitution vested judicial power in a Supreme 
Court, the members of which would be appointed by the ministers' 
council B and would have security of tenure unless dismissed by 
special resolution of the national assembly.9 The Supreme Court 
1. See ch III sS 3(g)(i) 2 and 4. 
2. Ch III s 2. 
3. His assent would not be a requirement for the validation of assembly legislation. 
4. The minister need not belong to the nominating group, but would have to be a member of the assembly. 
5. Ch III s 2. 
6. Ch III s 2(b)(i)(a). 
7 • Ch III s 2 (f) . The chairman 
ordinary nor a casting vote. 
B. Ch Ills 4(a)(v). 
9. Ch III s 4(a). 
of the council would have neither an 
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would have traditional judicial functions, and in addition a 
testing right over all legislation enacted by the national 
assembly, representative authorities and other subordinate 
bodies, which might be invalidated for excess of jurisdiction. 1 
Provision was made for the retention of traditional courts 
(such as tribal courts) and for the institution of lower courts 
by law. A separate constitutional court 2 was empowered to ad-
vise the various legislatures, at their request, on whether 
proposed legislation was compatible with the declaration of 
fundamental rights included in the constitution; an adverse 
decision by the court would have to be tabled in the appropriate 
legislature,3 but would not preclude the subsequent enactment 
of the statute. 4 The bill of rights, which enjoyed some prom-
inence in the constitution,S was based partly on the Basic 
Rights of the Federal Republic of Germany and was a significant 
constitutional innovation, even in its unenforceable form, in 
the southern African context. Provision was also made for a 
rudimentary ombudsman-figure, the government commissioner,6 
who could investigate complaints of alleged infringements of 
the bill of rights resulting from administrative practice or 
action, and mediate, if necessary, with the appropriate authority.7 
1. Ch III s 4(a)(iii). 
2. The three members of this court would be appointed by the ministers' council - ch 11 s 15.1. 
3 . Ch II s 1 6 . 3 . 
4. Ch 11 s 18. Cf s 59(2) of the South African constitution. The second draft of the constitution made the bill of rights judicially enforceable, but the conference subsequently amended this. For empirical comparisons see Boulle op cit 59. 
5. It followed the introductory provisions (ch 11). 
6. Appointment was by the ministers' council. 
7. Ch 11 s 19. There is again an analogy with the German constitution (art 93(1)4a) which (since 1969) allows individuals with basic rights complaints against public authorities access to the Constitutional Court. See G. Brinkman 'The West German Federal Constitutional Court: Political Control through Judges' 1981 Public Law 83-104. 
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(iv) Evaluation 
As a fnational convention' exercise, the Turnhalle experience 
has some relevance for the republic in view of the many demands 
for an all-inclusive convention to consider a new South African 
constitution. 1 "~at the Turnhalle has demonstrated is that a 
convention whith does not include all the major competitors 
for power is a futile exercise, and that once political groups 
with significant support have formed in exile, an internal agree-
ment is insufficient to resolve basic constitutional issues. 
In fact the Turnhalle conference, operating according to the 
consensus principle, had a remarkable achievement in finalising 
its constitutional agreement within a relatively short time 
period, but in the end the exercise did no more than combine 
the internal parties for the purposes of subsequent negotiations 
with SWAPO. The internal settlements in Rhodesia had the same 
limited significance. 2 The Namibian experience also highlighted 
the legitimacy problems inherent in any attempt to resolve the 
constitutional dispute and institute a new system of government, 
before the holding of free elections; legitimacy would have 
been more attainable through an exercise in constitutional 
autarchy. 
As far as the Turnhalle constitution is concerned, this displays 
many of the characteristics of liberal constitutionalism, such 
as the declaration of rights, the separation and division of 
powers, a general adult franchise, the independent judiciary, 
constitutional checks and balances, and a pervasive principle of 
restraining the exercise of legitimate power - the essence of 
constitutionalism. "~en viewed from the Westminster per spec-
tive there are several obvious differences - the principle of 
group representation in the national assembly, the jurisdiction-
al limitations on that body, the provision for a strong decen-
tralisation of functions to the representative authorities, the 
avoidance of majoritarianism in the assembly and ministers' 
council, the heterogeneous composition of the council, the un-
1. Cf the views of W.Thomas 'South Africa Between Partition and Inte-gration' 3 (1979) Aussenpolitiek 305 at 316. 
2. At 239 to 240 , below. 
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likelihood of a clear government versus opposition dichotomy 
emerging in the political process, the absence of an electoral 
mandate for the legislative majority, and the 'ethnic' basis 
of the constitutional system. In particular the key determi-
nant of a Westminster system, the close inter-relationship be-
tween legislature and executive, is excluded through the pro~ 
vision that members of the ministers' council be appointed 
severally by the ethnic groups; this feature violates the 
concept of cabinet government and blurs traditional lines of 
joint and individual ministerial responsibility. 1 In short 
the constituti6n contains some of the external features of a 
Westminster-type parliamentary system, but in practice would 
involve a decidedly non-Westminster form of government. 
When viewed from the federal perspective the constitution evi-
dences a typical federal division of authority with secured 
powers for the unit governments, but without separate federal 
states with territorial jurisdiction. 2 The system could be 
described as a type of 'corporate federalism',3 with the quali-
fication that the corporate groups recognised by the constitu-
tion would be statutorily defined and based on factors of colour 
and ethnicity. Once the significance of this qualification has 
been recognised, it is possible to identify other 'federal' 
characteristics, suth as the supremacy and rigidity of the con-
stitution, the authority of the judiciary, and the provision 
for a strongly decentrali~ed system of government. It is sig-
nificant, however, that besides personal jurisdiction over mem-
bers of the relevant population group, the representative auth-
orities would also have had some territorial jurisdiction in 
relation to land owned by members of that group.4 It follows 
1. With the possible exception of the chairman of the council, who would remain dependent on the assembly's confidence. . 
2. The unicameral national assembly could also be said to have a 'federal composition' in that one component would have equal representation of the 'units' and the other proportional representation. It should be borne in mind~ however, that the assembly would be only indirectly elected. 
3. On 'corporate federalism' see '11, above. 
4. Ch III s 3(1) 3 (ii). 
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that the de iure 'corporate federation' could have been given 
asymmetrical territorial-federa1 1 form in practice, and this 
was to cause a major dispute during the closing stages of the 
Turnhalle conference because of the wide disparities in land 
h 
. 2 
ownership among the et nlC groups. 
When viewed from the consociational perspective the Turnhalle 
constitution shows a consistent rejection of majoritarianism 
at various levels of representation and decision-making. 3 
The principle of segmental autonomy, or minority rule over 
matters of minority concern, would have been institutionalised 
along separate development lines among the eleven groups 
through the deployment of the personality principle; in the 
case of the smaller and less prosperous groups, however, the 
eventuation of any degree of meaningful self-government would 
have been unlikely.4 The grand coalition principle is strong-
ly evident in the composition of the ministers' council, as 
are variants of the principle of proportionality in the form 
of minority over-representation in the assembly, and parity of 
group representation in the council. The mutual veto is avail-
able in a slightly qualified form in the assembly, but in its 
extreme form in the council. Save for one major qualification, 
namely that the 'segments' would be statutorily defined and not 
the product of free political association,S the Turnhalle con-
stitution displays all the main features of the normative con-
sociational model. It is mainly these features, however, which 
1. See L.J. Boulle 'Federation and Consociation - Conceptual Links and 
Current Constitutional Models' 44 (1981) THR-HR 236 at 239, and 109 
to 111, above. 
2. There was pressure from poorly endowed groups to remove matters from 
the second tier of government, and vest them in the central authorities, 
for fear that the well endowed groups would dominate the system from 
the second tier. See Boulle 'The Turnhalle Testimony' 54. 
3. See Boulle 'Federation and Consociation , 250-252. 
4. The system of public finance meant that each representative authority, 
apart from central loans, would have as its main independent source 
of revenue taxation on the personal income of members of the relevant 
group; this would have entailed in practice large discrepancies in the 
standards of social services. 
5. Consociationalism is indeed based on the 'good fences make good neigh-
bours' axiom but is seldom reliant on statutory fences which tend to 
codify separatism and prove problematic for persons of mixed origins. 
Free political association would allow segmental formation to occur 
along lines other than ethnicity or colour, and such freedom is an 
essential characteristic of political pluralism - see above at 78. 
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point to one of the main weaknesses of the Turnhalle model, 
namely the probability of slow, inefficient and expensive 
government, which would not be attractive features for a newly 
independent state. The pervasive limitations on the exercise 
of power, in particular, would probably have lead to protrac-
tion and immobility, both of which would have favoured the 
socio-economic status quo and lead to political frustration 
and instability. An oft-quoted political criticism of the 
Turnhalle constitution was that the system of government it en-
visaged would have been dominated by whites from the second 
tier. Justification for this viewpoint is to be found, inter 
alia, in the more substantial limitations imposed on central 
authorities than on their communal counterparts; this would 
have allowed effective dominance to those of the latter which 
were territorially and financially well endowed. In the 
Namibian context only the white group qualified in terms of 
these factors. 
Cv) Post-Turnhalle developments 
Since the termination of the Turnhalle conference the constitu-
tional development of the territory has been delayed, pending 
negotiations between South Africa and the international commun-
ity. The 1968 Constitution Act 1 had been amended 2 before the 
termination of the conference to empower the State President, 
by proclamation in the gazette,3 to legislate for the territory 
'with a view to the eventual attainment of independence'; this 
delegated authority included the power to repeal or amend any 
legal provision or act of parliament (including the Constitution 
Act) applying to the territory. This development gave the 
State President wide discretionary powers to govern the terri-
tory, and through two proclamations 4 later that year he created 
the office of administrator-general and empowered the incumbent 
1. Act No 54 of 1968. 
2. By Act No 95 of 1977 which amended s 38 of the principle act. 
3. Proclamations had to be tabJ.ed in the South African parliament and 
the State President could not unilaterally dispense with this require-
ment. See J. Faris 'South Africa1s Severence of Links with South 
\.Jest Africa f 1977 SAYIL 49-64. 
4. Proclamations 180 and 181 of 19 August 1977. 
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to legislate for the territory by proclamation in the Official 
Gazette. 1 Shortly after the appointment of the first adminis-
trator-general the office of the administrator of Namibia was 
ab 0 1 ish e d . 2 
During 1978 unsuccessful negotiations continued between the 
South African government and the five western nations 3 on the 
holding of elections for a 'constituent assembly' to draw up an 
independence constitutiOn. Towards the end of the year South 
Africa unilaterally organised elections for such a body;4 
these were held on a nation-wide, proportional basi? and re-
sulted in the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance acquiring eighty 
percent of the fifty seats. 6 During 1979 the constituent 
assembly played a minor role in the international deliberations 
on the territory and, on the initiative of the DTA, passed a 
motion that an interi~ government with legislative powers be 
established. Pursuant to this the administrator-general con-
verted the constituent assembly into a 'national assembly' with 
extensive legislative powers,7 but it was not empowered to make 
laws which would alter the status of the territory and laws 
1. In terms of Act No 95 of 1977, however, laws made by the administrator-
general required the State President's approval. Proclamation 202 of 
31 August 1980 provided for Wa1vis Bay to be administered again as part 
of the Cape province from 1 September that year. 
2. Proclamation 264 of 30 September 1977. 
3. The United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Germany and France. See J. 
Faris 'The Western Proposals and Elections in South West Africa/Namibia: 
A Summary of the Events for 1978' 1978 SAYIL 90.108. 
4. In terms of Proclamation AG 63/1978. 
5. The DIA's votes entitled it to 41 seats, Aktur's to six, and each of 
three other parties acquired a single seat. SWAPO, SWAPO Democrats and 
the Namibia National Front did not contest the elections. The main 
difference between the constitutional policy of the DTA and Aktur (the 
Aksie-front vir die behoud van die Turnha1le-beginse1s) was that the 
latter wished to retain the basic principles of the Turnha1le third 
draft constitution, while the former saw the need to create a stronger 
central government at the expense of the ethnic authorities. See 1977 
CILSA 356. 
6. It was estimated that of those eligible to register as voters between 
75 and 80% actually participated in the election - 1979 CILSA 126. 
7. Proclamation AG 21/1979 of 14 May 1979. The assembly's initial term of 
office would be one year from the effective date of the proclamation 
(21 May 1979) and its size could be increased to sixty-five members. 
In Du P1essis NO v Skrywer NO en andere 1980 (2) SA 52 (SWA) the court 
was faced with one of the problems endemic in a proportional -electoral 
system, and decided that a member did not need to retain membership of 
the party which nominated him in order to retain his seat in the assembly. 
The. case was a sequel to the passing of the Abolition of Racial Discrimi-
~~t~o~ Act:~~~T~:, d:cision was confirmed in Du Plessis NO v Skrywe~ NO 
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would require both his signature and the South African govern-
ment's approval. The validity of the proclamation instituting 
the assembly was challenged in legal proceedings which were 
somewhat inconclusive,1 but a subsequent proclamation of the 
State President placed the legality of the assembly and the 
validity of its laws beyond doubt, by providing that the admin-
istrator-general's proclamation should be deemed to have been 
issued by the State President. 2 The State President had ear-
lier provided for the establishment of a Central Revenue Fund 
for the territory.3 The result of these developments was that 
there now existed a set of institutions which coincided to a 
significant extent with those envisaged in the Turnhalle con-
stitution: a national assembly with delegated legislative 
powers, and various subordinate ethnic authorities with varying 
legislative and executive powers. 4 At first an unofficial 
council advised the administrator general in the exercise of 
his executive powers, but subsequently executive authority was 
conferred on a ministers' council, and it acquired the same 
relationship with the national assembly as that envisaged in 
the Turnhalle constitution. Towards the end of 1979 the 
assembly considered the question of the division of functions 
between the central and second-tier authorities, and decided 
to confer limited and specific powers on the latter6 and rela-
tively wide residual powers on the former, a decision which 
involved a clear variation on the Turnhalle constitution. The 
assembly proposed that elections be held for the second tier 
authorities,unless the relevant ethnic group was opposed there-
1. Du Plessis v Administrateur-Generaal vir die Gebied van Suidwes-
Afrika en andere 1980 (2) SA 35 (SWA); see also Beukes v Adminis-
trateur-Generaal, Suidwes-Afrika 1980 (2) SA 664 (SWA). 
2. Proclamation 172/179 in G.G. 6618/1979 (13 August 1979) which was made 
retrospectively effective from 14 May. This proclamation also ex-
cepted laws of the national assembly from the requirement (s 38(2) of 
the constitution act) that laws would not be effective until approved 
by the State President. 
3. Proclamation 85/1979 of 4 May 1979. 
4. Since the termination of the conference additional assemblies had been 
constituted along separate development lines. 
5. Various proclamations of the administrator-general himself have re-
sulted in the transfer of the administration of most government depart-
ments to the A-G,and of many of the white legislative assembly's powers 
to the national assembly. 
6. Land tenure, agriculture and agricultural credit, education (up to 
primary ~chool teachers' training), health services, social welfare 
and pens~ons. 
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to, in which case it could transfer its powers to the central 
government. Elections were in fact held for most ethnic 
1 
groups towards the end of 1980. 
During 1981 the DTA-dominated national assembly continued to 
legislate by proclamation and the ministers' council acted as 
the territory's cabinet. International attempts to secure a 
Namibian settlement in terms of United Nations Security Council 
resolution 435 of 1978 continued, but in spite of a multi-
party meeting in Genev2 these were. unsuccessful. It is im-
probable that the Turnhalle experience will have much influence 
when the independence constitution is eventually drafted, but 
it has provided, within the limits referred to above, the ex-
ample of a semi-consociational system in operation in southern 
Africa. Both the Turnhalle and Zimbabwean constitutional ex-
periences show that consociational institutions can only have 
limited sig~ificance if fundamental legitimation problems have 
not been resolved. 
b. The Rhodesian-Zimbabwean constitutional transition 
(i) Background 
~he modern constitutional history of Zimbabwe3 can be traced back 
to the 1961 Constitution of Southern Rhodesia which became effec-
tive while the territory was still part of the Central African 
Federation. 4 This was the first of many constitutional arrange-
ments which purported to introduce blacks into the political sys-
tem, while at the same time retaining political control in white 
1. The DTA suffered various setbacks in these elections. See A. du 
Pisani , SW A/Namibia: 1980 Review' 1981 Africa Institute Bulletin 
25-32. 
2. See A. Du Pisani 'Namibia: the Search for Alternatives' 1981 South 
Africa International 292-302. The 'internal parties' were lead at 
Geneva by the Administrator-General. 
3. On the earlier constitutional developments see C. Palley's definitive 
work The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia 1888-
1965 (1966); see also the resume in A. Blaustein and G. Flanz Consti-
tutions of the Countries of the World (1980) and references cited 
there. 
4. This was brought into being by Order-in-Council under the authority 
of the Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Act 1961. 
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hands. It provided for a legislative assembly of 65 members, 
of whom 50 would be elected by "A" roll and 15 by "B" roll 
voters; while both rolls were theoretically open to all races 
the "A" roll qualifications 1 were such as to make it predominant-
ly white, and the system amounted in practice to communal repre-
sentation for blacks and whites in the unicameral parliament.
2 
A two-thirds legislative majority was required for constitutio~­
al amendments, a figure within the reach of the white compon~nt; 
some provi~ions required, in addition,the British government's 
assent or that of the country's four 'racial! groups expressed 
in separate referenda - the latter 'concurrent majority! re-
quirement clearly involved a type of mutual veto, but was never 
---used in practice. For the rest the constitution displayed all 
the main Westminster characteristics, save for the facts that 
the country had only dependent dominion status, and legislation 
could be delayed by a Constitutional Council for six months for 
non-compliance with a detailed Declaration of Rights :
3 1 
Upon 
dissolution of the federation, Southern Rhodesia resumed all 
functions previOusly vested in the federal authorities and the 
1961 constitution remained largely intact, save for the estab-
lishment of a local Appellate Division to replace the Federal 
Supreme Court. 
~ 
Shortly after the unilateral declaration of independence in 1965, 
a new constitution was ratified by the legislative assembly,4 
1. A mixture of income, property and educational requirements. 
2. A complicated 'cross-voting' procedure allowed voters on one roll to 
influence, to some extent, elections held under the other. 
3. A two-thirds parliamentary majority could reverse the decision. The 
High Court could also grant redress to petitioners for contraventions 
of the Declaration. 
4. The legality of the 1965 constitution was upheld by the Rhodesian courts 
(Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke NO 1968 (2) SA 284 (RAD» on the grounds 
that the revolution had succeeded and an effective new order had been 
established (see also R v Ndhlovu 1968 (4) SA 515 (RAD». Leave to 
appeal was refused in Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke NO 1968 (2) SA 457 
(RAn) but the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council allowed the 
appeal and reversed the earlier decision - it upheld the legal effect of 
the British Act and Order in Council which reaffirmed Britain's authority 
in the territory. Madzimbamuto v Lardner Burke NO 1969 (1) AC 645 
(PC). The Rhodesian courts did not hold themselves bound by the Privy 
Council decision. For views on these matters see M. Wiechers Staatsreg 
(3 ed, 1981) 29-30 and 33, and the numerous references cited there. 
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and it dispensed with all forms of external contr 1, including 
those relating to the amending procedure, to accord with the , 
government's view of the country's independent status. The 
constitution now stipulated that executive power was to be 
exercised solely on the Rhodesian minister's advice,1 the legis-
lature was declared to be sovereign, and appeals to the Privy 
Council were abolished, but as far as the internal distribution 
of authority was concerned the 1961 constitution was re-enacted 
almost exact~. After several years of unsuccessful negotia-
tions between Rhodesia and Britain on the former's status, the 
Whaley commission was appointed to consider a new constitutional 
framework for the country; the recommendations of the commiss-
ion were partly incorporated into a draft constitution which was 
approved in a referendum in 1969, and at the same time the elec-
torate voted in favour of republican status for Rhodesia. 
(ii) The Republican constitution 
~he new constitution2 proclaimed Rhodesia to be a republic and 
terminated all constitutional ties with Britain, but it retained, 
and slightly strengthened, the Westminster features of the sys-
tem of goiernment. The President replaced the Queen as head of 
state and was given nominal powers only,3 and executive power 
was vested in a prime minister and cabinet drawn from and res-
ponsible to the legislature,according to established Westminster 
rules and conventions. 4 Parliament became bicameral for the 
first time, with a constitutionally dominant lower house; con-
sisting of fifty white members elected directly by voters on a 
black roll, and eight black members elected by an electoral 
college comprising traditional and elected leaders. 6 The Senate 
1. The Queen remained Head of State but was now represented by an Officer 
Administering the Government. 
2. Act No 54 of 1969, promulgated on 2 March 1970. 
3. Save where otherwise provided he had to act on the cabinet's advice 
(ss 53, 54 and 57). Somewhat unusually for a Westminster export 
model, he was also appointed by the executive council. S 3(1). 
4. Ss 56 and 55(5). 
5. Ss 10, 11 and 42. 
6. S 18(2)(a) and (b). 
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consisted of ten whites elected by the white members of the 
House, ten black chiefs (five each from Matabeleland and 
Mashonaland) elected by the Council of Chiefs, and three (later 
five) 1 senators appointed by the President. 2 The principle 
of communal repre"sentation in the legislature was more securely 
entrenched than before, because of the colour determinants of 
the voters rplls and colour qualifications for membership of 
either house. 3 1 Because of the electoral arithmetic, which was 
~ 
unilaterally imposed by the white government, black participa-
tion in the legislature was of only nominal significancd , al-
"'----J 
though there was provision for an increase in the number of 
blacks in the House, each increase being related to the level 
of income tax paid by blacks in proportion to that paid by 
whites, until there was numerical parity of representation for 
the two groups.4 The Senate, in which blacks were relatively 
better represented, could delay legislation for a maximum period 
of 180 day~.5 
The Westminster influences on the constitution were clearly 
apparent in the majoritarian cabinet, the close institutional 
lirik between cabiriet and parliament, and the legislative suprem-
acy of parliament. 6 Deference to the last principle was shown 
by the fact that the Declaration of Rights 7 was retained in the 
republican constitution, but was made non-justiciable. 8 The 
Constitutional Council was disestablished, and in its place a 
Senate Legal Committee 9 was created and empowered to report on 
the compatibility of referred bills with the Declaration;10 an 
1. Since the 1974 Constitution Amendment Act (s 2 of which amended s 13 
of the Constitution). 
2. S 13(2)(a) and (b). 
3. The Electoral Act imposed in addition differential educational, income 
and property qualifications for each roll. 
4". S 18(4). The additional members would be alternatively indirectly 
and directly elected. 
5. S 42. 
6 • Cf s 30 ( 1) • 
7. Second Schedule. 
8. See Deary NO v Acting President, Rhodesia and others 1979 (4) SA 43 (R). 
9. S 14(5). The Committee consisted of as many legally qualified senators 
as determined by the President. 
10. S 43(1) and (2). 
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adverse finding, however, would only delay enactment of the 
measur~ if confirmed by the Senate as a whole, and only then 
~ / 1 
for a temporary period. There were other limitations on 
/ '-.J 
the constitutional protection of basic rights: the Legal 
Committee could not scrutinise money or constitutional bills,2 
nor could it delay the progress of a bill certified by the 
Prime Minister as requiring urgent enactment in the national 
interest;3 furthermore differential treatment ~f persons was 
allowed, the Declaration not~ithstanding, if such treatment 
would 'promote harmoni6us relations,.4 In short, there were 
few legal restraints 'on the white-controlled political insti-
tutions. 
From the consociational point of view it is clear that the 
feature of communal representation in parliament would be hard 
put to effect a consociational type of power-sharing because 
of the minimal representation afforded to blacks and the gross 
over~epresentation of whi es - an inverse relationship to the 
demographic realities. Black representation was also in-
effective because of the absence of any veto power; a veto 
only availed the black legislative minority in respect of con-
stituti6nal amendmen~ which required an affirmative vote of 
at least two-thirds of the total membership of each house,S 
but even this could be circumvented if a bill which had not 
achieved the two-thirds majority in the Senate was re-submitted 
to that body and approved by a mere simple 'majority.6 The 
two-thirds majority in each house was peremptory in respect of 
amendments to the 'specially entrenched provisions'; but these, 
and certain entrenched provisions in other statutes,S were 
essential for the retention of the political and economic 
status quo, so that constitutional rigidity in fact favoured 
L S 44 (2) • Even such confirmation could be overruled by a subsequent 
Senate resolution that enactment was necessary in the national in-
terest. 
2. S 43(6)(a) and (b). 
3. S 45. The certificate also rendered unnecessary Senate approval of 
a bill. 
4. Eg s 19(2). 
6. S 78(2). 
7. See the Third Schedule. 
5. S 78(1)(a) and (b). 
8. Eg parts of the Electoral and Land Tenure Act. 
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r 
the white minority. The overall picture was of a predominant-
/' 
ly majoritarian Westminster-type constitution, whose variations 
on the Westminster paradigm, particularly those relating to 
the franchise and composition of parliament, served to secure 
white minority domination - the antithesis of consociationalis. . 
While the republican constitution endured, numerous unsuccess-
ful attempts were made to achieve a constitutional settlement 
acceptable to the white government, black leaders, both inter-
nal and external, and Britain. 1 On 3 March 1978 an 'internal 
agreement' was signed] in Salisbury, following talks between the 
government and lea~rs of three black po itical groupings with-
. h 2 I f h " I , 3 .. I ~n t e country. n terms 0 t e agreement, a trans~t~ona 
government was established consisting of an Executive Council, 
comprising the four signatories to the agreement,4 and a Minis-
terial Council, comprising equal numbers of black and white 
ministers. 5 Effective power remained with whites as the new 
authorities stood in an advisory relationship to the existing 
,,-
parliame t, although during the transitional period numerous .-----
discriminatory statutes were amended or repealed. I The last 
function of the outgoing parliament was to enact the Zimbabwe-
6 Rhodesian constit~ti based on the draft agreed to by an 
all-party committee, and a corresponding electoral act. 7 
The 'internal agreeme J can be regarded as a type of consocia-
./ 
tional pact among internal elites, acting in terms of the self-
denying hypothesis; but it was not a self-conscious 'union of 
1. For an account of these events see L. Sobel (ed) Rhodesia/Zimbabwe 
1971-1977 (1978). 
2. The United African National Council, the Zimbabwe African National 
Union, and the Zimbabwe United People's Organisation. 
3. This can be seen in 1978 CILSA 223-225. 
4. The prime minister Mr. I. Smith and Bishop A. Muzorewa (UANC), Rev N. 
Sithole (ZANU), and Senator Chief J. Chirau (ZUPO). The chairman-
ship rotated among the four leaders. 
5. The cabinet portfolios were held jointly by black and white ministers. 
This arrangement necessitated the Constitution Amendment Act No 18 
of 1978. 
6. Act No 12 of 1979. 7. Act No 14 of 1979. 
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opposites' in the authentic sense, because of the absence of 
the Patriotic Front, one of the ma ~ or parties to the conflict. 
This 'political deal', therefore, ~as imperfectly consocia-
tiona. The period of transition itself witnessed the quasi-
consociational incorporation of black leaders into the exist-
ing system of government, on an informal extra-constitutional 
basis. The pairing of ministers in the allocation of cabinet 
portfolios, and the rotation of the Executive Council chair-
manship (that is proportionately in the temporal dimension), 
can be seen as attempts to ensure that black participation re-
sulted in a sharing of power. Although this arrangement was 
J 
only intended to be of temporary duration, its relative fail-
ure (as evidenced, inter alia, by the short life, of the constitu-
tion which it produced) may be attributed to the unrepresen-
tativeness of the black leaders, the gros's over-representation 
of whites in the two new bod ~ es, and the informal and insecure 
basis of the whole arrangeme t - in fact the 'consociational' 
aspects of the transitional government contributed its unde-
mocratic and authoritarian qualities, and they had no material 
impact on the legitimacy crisis facing the system. 
(iii) The Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constitution 
The transitional government's constitution was published in 
January 1979 1 and came into operation on 1 June, after general 
elections had been held earlier in the year.2 For the first 
time consociational institutions became a prominent feature of 
the country's constitutional dispensation - communal repre-
sentation in the legislature, over-representation for the white 
minority, an institutionally-required coalition executive, and 
a significant veto power. These features in fact gave rise to 
a coalescent form of government, but the legitimacy problem 
remained unresolved - on the one hand a major conflict party 
was excluded from the consociational arrangement, and on the 
other the consociational features were perceived as devices to 
protect white interests against the new majority government. 3 
1. Cmd R.R.2 - 1979. 
2. On the elections see 1979 CILSA 249. The black members were elected 
on a proportional basis and Bishop Muzorewa's DANC won 51 of the 72 
seats. All elected white seats were won by the governing Rhodesia 
Front. 
3. Cf Blaustein and Flanz op cit 26. 
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As far as its main institutions were concerned the constitution 
was faithful to the Westminster model and the prior republican 
constitution. There was provision for a President with the 
nominal powers of a head of state,1 a bicameral legislature 
with a dominant lower house,2 a prime minister and executive 
council with effective executive power and. responsibility to 
the legislature,3 and a judiciary appointed by the President and 
with security of tenure. The main innovations were to be found 
in the composition of the legislature and executive. In the 
former the principle of communal representation was retained, 
with white and black voters directly electing twenty and seventy-
two members to the House of Assembly respectively, all on a con-
stituency basis;5 a further eight white members would be elect-
ed by the already returned members, sitting as an electoral 
college, from ixteen candidates nominated by the twenty elect-
ed whites. 6 The Senate consisted of ten black and ten white 
senators elected by the respective components of the House, 
and ten chiefs elected by the Council of Chiefs. For the first 
time the black majority in the country acquired a majority in 
parliament The composition of the executive complemented that 
of the legislature, in that the President was required for the 
first five years to apportion cabinet posts among the parties 
1. Ch 11. The President would be elected by members of the House of 
Assembly and Senate. 
2. Ch Ill. 3. Ch IV. 
4. Ch V. 
5. The first election of black members was held on a proportional (party-
list) basis because of the impossibility of delimiting constituencies 
timeously (third schedule). The court in Chikerema and others v 
DANe and another 1979 (4) SA 258 (ZR AD) was faced with a similar 
problem to that in Du Plessis v Skrywer 1980 (2) SA 52 (SWA), and held 
that it had no jurisdiction to force the appellants to vacate their 
parliamentary seats after resigning from respondent party, which had 
nominated them. The court found support in the English decision 
Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants v Osborne 1910 AC 87. And 
see M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 192. 
6. For the first election the sixteen candidates were nominated by the fifty 
white members of the outgoing house. 
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represented in the House. 1 This arrangement introduced ele-
ments of a grand coalition into an otherwise Westminster cabi-
net~ and resulted in the appointment of five white ministers 
to the first national government. 3 But there was no consti-
tutional provision for a veto in the cabinet, and it is a 
matter of speculation as to how long cabinet solidarity and a 
consensual type of decision-making could have been sustained 
without it; in the event this constitutional phase was only 
of short duration. 
As far as the legislative process and constitutional amendments 
were concerned, there was provision for a significant veto 
power which in practice could be exercised by the white minor-
ity.4 While the constitution stipulated only a simple major-
ity in either house for legislative measures,S the provisions 
relating to the head of state, the executive, the legislature, 
the judiciary, the service commissions, finance, the Declara-
tion of Rights, and the entrenched procedure itself, required 
for their amendment affirmative votes of at least two thirds 
of the senators and seventy-eight members of the House,6 which 
gave an accessible and conclusive veto to the white parliamen-
tarians as far as the composition and functioning of the main 
institutions of government were concerned. In addition, 
various non-constitutional statutes were also specially en-
trenched in this manner. 7 Other constitutional amendments re-
quired only a two-thirds majority in each house, and if the 
1. S 67 read with s 8 of the Third Schedule. Each party with five mem-
bers in the House would be entitled to representation in the cabinet. 
In recommending the appointment of ministers from non-government 
parties the prime minister would act on the advice of party leaders. 
2. ef s 5.5.2 of the PFP constitutional proposals. Membership of the 
council would not, however, be incompatible with membership of the 
legislature. 
j. The first cabinet posts were apportioned as follows: UANe - 11; RF-
5; ZAND - 2; UNFP - 2. The constitution prohibited the whites, for 
a five year period, from forming a governing coalition with any party 
other than the majority black party. Third Schedule, s 8(1). 
4. The constitution itself was 'supreme law' and inconsistent laws would 
be invalid (s 3); 'black majority rule' meant an end to Westminster 
notions of parliamentary supremacy. 
5. S 42. 
6. S 157 read with the Second Schedule. 
7. S 160. Among these were the Electoral Act and laws relating to school 
education and medical services. 
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Senate failed to produce this majority it could be overruled 
after a delay of six months. The effect of these amending 
procedures would have been to perpetuate the prevailing level 
1 
of white representation in parliament for at least ten years, 
after which a commission of review could recommend the aboli-
tion of separate white representation in parliament, or a 
reduction in the number of white seats; either step would 
have as a necessary consequence the curtailment of the veto 
power. Although such recommendations could be statutorily 
implemented by a simple majority vote in the assembly,2 the 
composition of the review commission would strongly reflect 
white interests,3 so that even these amendments would require 
a measure of white concurrence. Additional white control 
would have emanated from the various other commissions for 
which provision was made in the constitution. 4 The commiss-
ions would have supervisory and recommendatory functions in 
respect of the judiciary, the public service, the prison ser-
vice, the police force and the defence forces, and the comm-
ission members, as well as the permanent heads of the various 
services and other functionaries such as the Attorney-General 
and the Auditor-General, would have to be persons who had had 
senior positions for minimum periods (in most cases five years) 
before the enactment of the constitution. Previous white pre-
dominance in the bureaucracy would have resulted in few blacks 
qualifying for these positions. These provisions were also 
specially entrenched. 
The overall picture of constitutional limitations, weak govern-
ment, and potential perpetuation of the socio-economic status 
quo,was completed by the Declaration of Rights,S which was now 
made justici~ble6 and thus a further restraint on the national 
government. The rights included in the Declaration may be 
1. Or after the second dissolution of parliament within the ten year 
period. As has been shown the equivalent period for the executive 
was five years. 
2. The Senate's approval would not be required - s 159(6). 
3. Of its five members one would be the Chief Justice and two would be 
elected by the white parliamentarians. 
4. Ch 6. 
5. Ch VIII. 
6. S 134. It was in fact a substantial re-enactment of the previous non-
justiciable Declaration. 
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broadly categorised as 'liberal' in nature with particular 
1 
prominence being given, in a marathon clause, to the protec-
tion of private property; expressly exempted from the Decla-
ration for a ten year period, however, and thus immune from 
invalidation, were laws which were effective before the pro-
mulgation of the constitution and continued to be effective 
thereafter as laws of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The new government, 
therefore, would be hampered by a legacy of prior discrimina-
tory laws until their specific repeal, and could be thwarted 
in any energetic programme of economic and social reform by 
the Declaration of Rights. 2 The international non-recognition 
of the new, predominantly black, government may be partially 
attributed to those constitutional devices which were designed 
to restrain and limit the power and wishes of the popular and 
legislative majorities. The independence constitution intro-
duced significant modifications to these features. 
(iv) The Zimbabwe constitution 
The independence constitution was agreed upon by the Zimbabwe-
Rhodesian government and the external black parties at the 
Lancaster House conference, lasting from 10 September to 15 
December 1979,and held under British chairmanship.3 After a 
return to legality,4 Britain resumed direct rule over the 
country and both enacted the new Zimbabwe constitution through 







S 132(1) read with ss 136 and 75. An exception was allowed for laws 
which made provision for the taking of action during declared lperiods 
of public emergency' which could not be invalidated for non-compliance 
with certain provisions of the Declaration, notably the right to due 
process, free assembly, conscience and personal liberty, and the pro-
tection from arbitrary search. 
See the Report of the Constitutional Conference, Lancaster House, London 
Cmd RZR 3-1980. Apart from the British, the signatories were Bishop 
A. Muzorewa and Dr S. Mundawarara of the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government, 
and Mr R. Mugabe and Mr J. Nkomo of the Patriotic Front. See also 
1980 CILSA 240-1. 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe Rhodesia Act (No 44 of 1979) reversed the 
~eclaration of independence and proclaimed the country to be once more 
a British dominion. It provided for a governor to assume all legisla-
tive and executive powers. The British parliament, in turn, enacted 
the Southern Rhodesia Act 1979, which made provision for the introduc-
tion of a new constitution and for the interim governance of the country. 
The Zimbabwe Constitution Order 1979 (No 1600),made in terms of s 1 of 
the Southern Rhodesia Act of 1979. The new constitution was also 
annexed to Act No 44 of 1979 (Rhodesia). 
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ment of independence 1 and the termination of British respons-
ibility. Elections were held under British supervision during 
February 1980 2 and the constitution became fully operative on 
1 April that year. 
Once again a significant degree of institutional continuity was 
evident in the new constitution, although there was a noticeable 
movement towards majoritarianism in the removal of some of the 
legal restraints imposed by the constitution's immediate pre-
decessor. There was again provision for a President with only 
the nominal powers of a head of state,3 a bicameral legislature 
with a dominant lower house,4 a prime minister and executive 
council with effective executive powerS and responsibility to 
the lower house,6 and a judiciary appointed by the President and 
with security of tenure. 7 The main innovations again related 
to the composition of the legislature and executive. White 
representation in the house was reduced to twenty members, to be 
elected on a constituency basis by voters registered on the 
white electoral roll, with the remaining eighty members being 
elected by voters registered on the common roll. 8 The compo-
sition of the Senate, and the method of electing senators, was 
retained save that the number of non-chief black senators was 
1 . Zimbabwe Act, 1979. 
2. The twenty white constituency seats were won by Mr Smith's Rhodesia 
Front. The eighty black seats were again contested on a proportional 
basis in eight multi-member constituencies, with electors voting for 
parties, not candidates. The proportional allocation of seats was 
ZANU-PF (Mr Mugabe) 57, PF (Mr Nkomo) 20, VANe (Bishop Muzorewa) 3. 
Muzorewa's votes dropped from 64% in the internal elections to 8,1% -
commentators attributed this, inter alia, to the white constitutional 
veto and continued white control of the forces and bureaucracy during 
his term of office. 
3. Ch IV. The method of electing the President was left intact. 
4. Ch V. The Senate's -delaying power was reduced from a period of 180 
days to 80 days (s 51 read with s 3 of Schedule 4). 
5. Ch VI. The President's duty to act on the cabinet's advise was ex-
pressly stipulated. 
6. This convention, the basis of the Westminster system, also found stat-
utory expression (s 69(1». 
7. Ch VIII. 
8. S 38(1). 
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increased from ten to fourteen, and provision was made for an 
additional six senators to be appointed by the President on 
the prime minister's recommendation. 1 The new executive, 
however, could now be formed along majoritarian Westminster 
lines and the coalition features of the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia 
cabinet were omitted from the const i tution;2 nevertheless the 
coalition principle was strongly ev i dent in the first Zimbab-
b
o 3 wean ca lnet. 
While the more li~ited white participation in the legislature 
and executive would reduce the abilify of the white minority to 
influence decision-making in these institutions, constitutional 
..---
rigidity again provided some security. The constitution it-
self is the 'supreme law of Zimbabwe', and other laws incon-
sistent with its provi~ions will be void to the extent of that 
inconsistency.4 The ordinary legislative process, which op-
erates on a simple majority basis,S and constitutional amend-
ments, which require the support of seventy members in the house 
and two-thirds of the Senate 6 subject to Senate disapproval be-
ing overruled by the House,7 cannot be curbed by whites; the 
requirement of unani~ity in the House for the amendment of the 
specially entrenched constitutional provisions, however, affords 
the white legislative minority an absolute veto power; this 
power will endure for ten years in respect of amendments affect-
ing the content and enforcement of the Declaration of Rights,8 
and for seven years iri respect of the composition and functions 
of the legislature,9 and after these periods the normal amending 
1. S 33. The ten senatorships for Chiefs were again divided equally be-
tween Mashonaland and Matabeleland, despite the numerical preponder-
ance of the Shona tribe in Zimbabwe. 
2. S 69(1). The creation of a coalition between the white members of the 
lower house and any minority black party for the purposes of forming 
a government was statutorily prohibited - s 69(2). 
3. The 'cabinet of national unity' consisted of 23 members, of whom 4 were 
from Nkomo's PF and two from Smith's RP. This development contradicted 
the theory that in zero-sum conditions coalitions tend toward the mini-
mal winning side. W. Riker The Theory of Political Coalitions (1962) 
28-32. 
4. S 3. ef S v Tekere and others 1981 (1) SA 878 (ZAD). 
5. S 56. 
7. S 52(6). 
9. S 52(5). 
6. S 52(3)(a) and (b)(ii). 
8. S 52(4). 
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procedure will apply. The content of the Declaration of 
Rights,1 and its method of enforcement,2 has not been changed 
significantly in the new constitution, but an additional pro----. 
vision 3 introduces a broad judicial discretion to overrule 
official reliance on the savings clauses contained in many 
provisions 4 of the Declaration; a law, or action taken under 
authority thereof, can be declared to be in contravention of 
the Declaration if reliance on the savings proviso could not 
be 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society'. This 
innovation can be seen as imposing additional, though slightly 
vague, restraints on the government. 5 Finally, white influence 
in the bureaucracy has again been ensured, though in less pro-
nounced form, through the requirements relating to the composi-
tion of the commissions controlling various branches of the ad-
ministration, as well as the qualifications of other influential 
ff · . 1 - 6 o lCla . 
In institutional terms the constitutional transition from 
Rhodesia to Zimbabwe was characterised by a remarkable degree 
of continuity as the political system became progressively more 
inclusive. The main changes related to the franchise, the 
racial composition of parliament, the availability and effect 
of the veto power, and the status of the bill of rights, but 
these occurred within the same broad constitutional framework. 
During the transition black attention tended to be focussed on 
parliament, while white attention tended to shift towards the 
bureaucracy and armed forces; there was a corresponding tension 
between the notitins of majoritarian and constitutional democracy. 
This tension is still apparent in the Zimbabwean constitution, 
but its provisions have been adhered to during the first two 
years of independence. 
1. It is now given greater prominence in ch III (ss 11-26) of the con-
stitution. 
2. S 24. Petitioners may approach the Appellate Division for redress, 
but the court will not adjudicate on academic matters - see Mandirwhe 
v Minister of State 1981 (1) SA 759 (ZAD). 
3. S 24(5). 
4. ~e ss 16(7),19(5),20(2) and (4),21(3), and 22(3)(a) to (e). 
5. Existing laws would be immune from invalidation for non-compliance with 
the Declaration for a period of five years - ss 25(2) and (3). 
6. Ch VII. 
248. 
Cv ) Evaluation' 
The virtual exclusion of blacks from the main political insti-
tutions in Rhodesia meant that the main constitutional issue 
during the period under discussion was perceived from all sides 
as being black participation, and i t s extent, in these insti-
tutions. In the constitutional debates blacks and whites were 
regarded as cohesive groups - in a consociational perspective, 
they were regarded as the communal segments. But this, apart 
from any other factors, mitigated against the chances of a fully 
consociational arrangement, because instead of a favourable mul-
tiple balance of power,there was an unfavourable imbalance be-
tween two groups only.2 Furthermore the 'consociational' ac-
commoda tion reached in the 'internal agreement', and the conso-
ciational devices adopted during the transitional period and in 
the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constitution, were not successful because 
the crisis of legitimacy had not been resolved; if anything the 
consociational devices may have exacerbated the conflict during 
this unrepresentative phase of government. But once the accom-
modation of legitimacy had been reached at Lancaster House the 
position changed significantly. This agreement was itself a 
consociational accommodation, a self-conscious 'union of oppo-
sites', iri whith accepted leaders reached a constitutional com-
promise which was more acceptable to all parties than a contin-
r uation of the political and military cqnflict. \I t was still not 
possible to make the constitution fully consocia~al, because 
in relation to the black and white 'segments} there was still a 
massive demographic i~balance Nevertheless it was possible 
\ to include in the independence constitution several consociation-
al devices, such as the over-representation of whites in parlia-
ment and the legislative veto, and although these have created 
serious tensions they have been politically successful, at least 
in the short term, because the basic legitimation problem had 
already been overcome. For the same reason it was possible to 
form a coalition cabinet without any institutional inducement, 
1. See L.J. Boulle 'Federation and Consociation - Conceptual Links and 
Current Constitutional Models' 1981 THR-HR 236 at 252. 
2. Blacks outnumbered whites by approximately twenty-five to one. 
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although this must also be attributable to the remarkable degree 
of statesmanship and moderation displayed by the prime minister. 
The only characteristic of consociationalism whith was not in 
evidence was segmental autonomy, but this was an inevitable ex-
clusion in view of the sparsity of whites in a large territory, 
and the need for a strong national government. Without going 
so far as to draw constitutional lessons for South Africa from 
the Zimbabwean experience, it is relevant to observe that the 
consociational institutions in that country only became effec-
tive after the legitimacy crisis had been resolved; 1 this point 
alone is of comparative relevance for constitutional develop-
ments in South Africa. 
Cc) The National States 
A new source of comparative constitutionalism in southern Africa 
has been provided by the conferment of constitutional indepen-
dence on the national states since 1976, which has resulted in 
the enactment of an independence constitution in each case. 
The first example was not promising from a comparative point of 
view, as the relevant model for Transkei was clearly the South 
African constitution; moreover it has been said of the Trans"-
keian constitution that, 
' ... it i~ impossible to detect any feature adopted 
or adapted from the numerous constitutional exper-
iences elsewhere in the new nations of sub-Saharan 
Africa or Asia.,2 
The Bophuthatswana and Venda constitutions proved to be slightly 
more exotic, although they have little direct significance from 
the consociational perspective. Nevertheless, without provid-
ing a detailed description of the various constitutional systems, 
1. Cf M. Hirsch 'Lessons from Rhodesia for Constitutional Change in 
South Africa' in F. van Zyl Slabbert and J. Opland (eds) South Africa: 
Dilemmas of Evolutionary Change (1980) 54-70. 
2. W.B. Harvey and W.H.B. Dean 'The Independence of Transkei - A Largely 
Constitutional Inquiry' 16 (1978) Journal of Modern African Studies 
189 at 213. 
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it is proposed to refer to three matters of indirect relevance 
to this work. 1 
Ci) Parliamentarianism and presidentialism combined 
~~ile the Transkei constitution prov ided for the traditional 
Westminster diffusion of executive power between the head of 
state and head of government, and relied on Westminster consti-
tutional theory and practice to resolve possible conflicts be-
tween the two, the Bophuthatswana constitution -combined aspects 
of parliamentarianism and presidential ism within a single sys-
tem;2 with a few unimportant exceptions this arrangement was 
followed iri the Venda constitution as well. The Bophuthatswana 
President is elected for a five year period by an electoral 
college consisting of the members of the national assembly,3 and 
he must himself be a member of the assembly.4 He is subject to 
dismissal during his term of office on impeachment by the assem-
bly,S and is eligible for re-election unless the assembly re-
solves to the contrary.6 The President is both head of state 
and head of the executive government. 7 In exercising the latter 
functions he must consult the members of his executive council~ 
who are appointed by him from the ranks of the legislature. 9 
No constittitional provision is made for a prime minister, and the 
speaker of the assembly serves as acting President when the office 
is vacant or the executive council considers the incumbent to be 
unable to perform his duties. 10 
1. See generally M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 502-524. A perceptive 
article on the Transkei constitution is I. Rautenbach 'The Constitution 
of Transkei' 1977 TSAR 199; see also Harvey and Dean op cit, Booysen, 
Wiechers, Van Wyk & Breytenbach 'Comments on the Independence and Con-
stitution of Transkei' 1976 SAYIL 1. On Bophuthatswana see M. Wiechers 
and D.H.van Wyk 'The Republic of Bophuthatswana Constitution' 1977 
SAYIL 85, and on Venda, G. Carpenter IThe Independence of Vend a , 1979 
SAYIL 40. The Ciskei acquired constitutional independence in December 
1981 and it had not been possible to obtain a copy of the constitution 
by the cut-off date of this work. 
2. See Wiechers and van Wyk op cit 94ff. 
3. Except for the three members whom he can appoint personally to the 
assembly. Bophuthatswana Constitution Act s 39(1). 
4. S21(4). 
6. S 23(2). 
8. S 31. 
5. S 25. 
7. Ss 19 and 20(1). 
9. S 35. 
10. S 26. It has been suggested (Wiechers and Van Wyk op cit 96) that 
because of the President's dual status the conventional position of a 
senior or prime minister, who would preside over cabinet sessions, 
could arise, but this could not lead to the full Westminster cabinet 
system of government. 
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The relevance of this arrangement from a consociational point 
of view is that the semi-separation of powers whith it intro-
duces is a favourable institutional feature for a consociation-
al system. 1 The system is not fully presidential, in that the 
President has no mandate separate to that of the legislature 
and he is constitutionally limited in the choice of his cabinet, 
but in relation to the grand coalition principle it combines 
the advantages of both presidentialism and parliamentarianism. 
Thus the fact that the President is elected for a five year 
term, and that he and his cabinet are not dependent on the con-
tinued support of the legislature, provides the insti~utional 
leeway for a coalition cabinet to act as a 'conspiratorial 
elite cartel' and to effect compromises for which they will 
not be directly accountable in' parl i ament. And the fact that 
the cabinet has to be chosen from members of the legislature 
facilitates the formation of a grand coalition, in that all par-
ties represented in parliament could be drawn into the cabinet. 
On the other hand the major disadvantage of this arrangement is 
the predominant institutional position of the President: un-
like the Swiss system, with which it has several similarities, 
there is no rotation of the presidency,and this would prevent 
the emergence of a collegial cabinet. 2 In practice the 
Bophuthatswana President dominates the political process and 
the system of government is unconsociational. Nevertheless 
the comparati~e value of these features remains. 
(ii) Traditional and modern combined 
The Transkei, ' Bophuthatswana and Venda constitutions all afford 
signifitant recognition to traditional leaders in the legisla-
ture and purport to balance their authority and power with that 
of the representative leaders. 3 In all cases the arrangements 
correspond to some degree with those in force before indepen-
1. The optimal constitutional framework for consociationalism is described 
at 400 to 405 ~ below. 
2. The position is exacerbated somewhat by the fact that, with certain ex-
ceptions, the dignity and reputation of the President is protected -
s 28 (cf s 13 of Act No 32 of 1961 and S v Beyleveld 1964 (1) SA 269 
(T)); this provision could be abused in relation to his political 
functions. In Transkei the anomaly does not apply - cf S v Dalindyebo 
1980 (3) SA 1049 (TK). 
3. See Rautenbach op cit 206f. 
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dence,1 which have in turn often had a crucial bearing on the 
pre-independence power structure and the very decision to 
accept independence;2 there has also been a consistent avoid-
ance of bicameralism,witb its potential for institutionalising 
the potential opposition between traditional and modern rulers. 
The Transkeian independence constitution makes provision for 
parity of representati6n between chi~fs and elected members in 
the unicameral legislature. 3 All paramount chiefs are auto-
matically entitled to seats, and the remaining chiefs are 
appointed according to a procedure provided in the constitu-
tion;4 the former category may also be represented by nominees 
in the proceedirigs of the assembly.5 The status of chiefs is 
thus constitutionally secured in this arrangement, but they 
become ordinary members of the legislature and, where appro-
priate, the executive. The Bophuthatswana constitution also 
provides for the equal representation of chiefs and elected 
members iri the legislature, although in this case the latter 
are iri an overall minority because there is provision for 
three additional members to be nominated by the President. 6 
The chiefs are appoirited by the twelve regional authorities in 
the country,7 and although they become ordinary members of the 
unitameral legislature they can exercise a veto power vis-~-vis 
the elected component. This can be effected if thirty members 8 
of the assembly petition the speaker for any decision (save in 
respect of an appropriiti6n bill) to be decided separately by 
1. These in turn built upon the 'Bantu Authorities' system described in 
chapter 4 (above) in which the election principle had been superceded 
by one of ascription. 
2. See P. Laurence The Transkei - South Africa's Politics of Partition 
(1976) 63-78; L.J. Boulle The Changing Constitution (1979) 38. 
3. Transkei Constitution Act, s 22 read with s 29(1). 
4.. S 29 (2) • 5. S 28(1). 
6. S 38(1). The nominated members do not have voting rights. A similar 
pos~t~on prevails in Venda where the elected members constitute an 
overall minority in parliament (cf ss 24 to 41 of the Venda Constitu-
tion Act). 
7. S 38(2). 
8. There are altogether forty-eight elected and forty-eight ex officio 
members. 
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the elected and ex officio components of the house, in which 
case a concurrent majority in each component is required for 
1 the matter to be approved. This consociational institution 
provides the chiefs with a strong source of influence in the 
legislative process; on the one hand it could be used to 
secure legislative compromises, but on the other to obstruct 
progressive legislation whith might threaten their aristocratic 
position. A second device is provided to promote 'obligatory 
conciliation,2 between the traditional and modern elements, 
namely the requirement that they must jointly and seve~ally 
approve a -motion calling for the removal of the President. 3 
This ensures, in the eventuality of political polarisation, a 
mutual veto for the two groups4 in relation to the tenure of 
the most important political figure. Thus apart from the 
vantage arising from their numerical strength, the Bophuthats-
wana chiefs are given additional sources of potential influence 
through a consociational veto device. 
The formal status of traditional elements in African indepen-
dence constitutions has shown great variation from country to 
country,and has at times been an-issue of contention. 5 It can 
be said that in most jurisdictions the political power of tra-
ditional rulers has been eclipsed in the immediate post-colonial 
period; in some cases they have been left with the forms of 
authority but deprived of effective power, and in only a few 
cases have they retained the forms of authority and been allo-
cated a power-sharing role. 6 Even the ideal of bestowing on 
such rulers powers commensurate with those they possessed before 
independence 7 is somewhat illusory, because of the distortions 
1. S 49(3). The veto is only effective for one year. In theory it 
also avails the elected members, though their need for it seems more 
remote. 
2. Wiechers and Van Wyk op cit 94. 
3. S 24(2)(c). 
4. It also entails that the President is protected from removal if he en-
joys only majority support of either group~ but this could prejudice 
his re-election for which approval by a majority of all assembly mem-
bers is required. 
5. For an overview of some of these countries see S.A. de Smith The New 
Commonwealth and its Constitutions (1964) 155-166. 
6. Ibid. 
7. ef Rautenbach op cit 206. 
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which may have occurred in the status of the chiefs, and in 
traditional concepts of public law, during the colonial period. 
In the comparative African context, however, the position of 
the chiefs in the homeland states, as measured by their poten-
tial influence in the legislature, is strikingly unique. In 
those African states which uncharacteristically opted for bi-
cameralism there was even an avoidance of placing chiefs in a 
weak upper house, in spite of the initial attraction to this 
arrangement. 1 In the case of the more preponderant unicameral 
systems there was also little express provision for traditional 
leaders and, where there was, never to the same extent as in 
the homeland constitutions. 2 
In political terms it is difficult t o evaluate the attempted 
integration of traditional and modern elements in the national 
states positivel~ because of the numerical strength of chiefs 
and the impossibility of the electorate gaining a legislative 
majority through the electoral process. While it is argued 
that the chiefs are the 'natural leaders' in these states, it 
has been pointed out 3 that when chiefs came to be included in 
the hierarchy of tribal, regional and territorial authorities 
in the 'Bantu Authorities' system4 they began to lose their 
prestige, as they represented the white bureaucracy, often 
against their own people. With the advent of self-government 
they became salaried administrators in the homeland administra-
tion, susceptible to administrative removal, and understandably 
sensitive to the wishes of the homeland and Pretorian govern-
1. M.H. de Minon 'The Passing of Bicameralism' 23 (1975) American Journal 
of Comparative Law 236. The Botswana constitution instituted a House 
of Chiefs with advisory powers but no formal legislative function. 
See J.C. Bekker 'Kapteins in die Wetgewende vergaderings van Botswana 
en Transkei t 1978 (3) TSAR 268. 
2. Outside southern Africa only G~bia and Sierra Leone expressly accommo-
dated chiefs in the 1egislature~ most pronounced1y in the latter case 
with twelve chiefs out of one hundred members. Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swazi1and also made some constitutional reference to chiefs. Bekker 
op cit 269; W. Breytenbach 'Kapteinskap en Po1itieke Ontwikkeling ~n 
die Tuislande' 1975 Afrika-Instituut Bulletin 328 at 329. On the 
position of chiefs in the Zimbabwe Senate see above, 236 to 247. 
3. W.D. Hammond-Tooke Command or Consensus - The Development of Transkeian 
Local Government (1975) 206-215; see also N.M. Stultz Transkei's Half 
Loaf - Race Separatism in South Africa (1980) 50-54. 
4. By Act No 68 of 1951. See the description in chapter 4, above. 
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ments. 1 Likewise in terms of the independence constitutions 
chiefs are dependent for their appointment and powers on the 
2 homeland governments. It is also ironic that the chiefs have 
been accorrnnodated in legislative authori ties, when the chief's 
original position was that of an upholder of tradition and sel-
dom a legislator or initiator of change. 3 But from a compara-
tive constitutional point of view these factors draw attention 
to the over-neglected principles of African public law; accord-
ing to these principles consensuality was an important feature 
of the political decision-making process,4 and authority itself 
had to be 'consensually legitimated,.5 Both these aspects are 
more in accordance with consociationalism than majoritarianism. 
(iii) Constitutionalism and a bill of rights 
The Bophuthatswana constitution embodies an institution wholly 
alien to the Westminster and South African constitutional tra-
ditions, a justici~ble bill of rights: 6 enjoying prominence 
after the introductory provisions is a 'Declaration of Rights,7 
comprising eleven sections. In content the Declaration is 
modelled on the European Convention on Human Rights,8 and the 
rights therein may be broadly classified as liberal. As com-
mentators 9 have observed, the Declaration avails all inhabitants 
of the territory, whether they are nationals or aliens, thus 
precluding parlia~ent from favouring nationals in any legisla-
tion; conversely, however, the approximately fifty percent of 
Bophuthatswana nationals permanently domiciled outside the 
territory (and most pertinently those in South Africa) will 
derive no benefits from these constitutional guarantees in their 
1. See Stultz op cit 52. 
2. See, eg, s 66 of the Transkei Constitution Act. 
3. Hammond-Tooke op cit 212. 
4. Ibid 67. 
5. Ibid 74. 
6. See on this subject Wiechers and Van Wyk op cit 88-93. 
7. Ss 8-17. 
8. Noticeably, the Bophuthatswana Declaration makes no reference to the 
right to form trade unions nor a right of conscientious objection, as 
does the European Convention. 
9. Wiechers and Van Wyk op cit 89. 
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places of residence and employment. The fundamental rights 
are declared to be binding on the legislature, executive and 
judiciary, and their enforceability is entrusted to the Sup-
reme Court; in terms of section eight of the constitution any 
person may apply to the Supreme Court in the appropriate manner 
to enforce any constitutional rights, and the court is empower-
ed to adjudicate in such matters and make the necessary orders. 
The rights and freedoms referred to in the declaration may only 
by restricted by a law of parliament with general application, 
but not to the extent that a right or freedom is totally abol-
ished or encroached upon in its essence; 1 it could also be 
argued 2 that any legislatiie restriction of a fundamental right 
amounts to a constituti6nal amendment, and should therefore be 
effected according to the rigid amending procedure. 3 In this 
connecti6n the overall supremacy of the constitution and the 
implied system of judicial review,4 both hallmarks of constitu-
tionali~m, should be mentioned as salient innovations in the 
southern African constituti6nal tradition. S The relevance of 
these factors to the theme of this work is that consociationalism 
assumes a deep sense of constitutionalism, and if South Africa is 
1. S 18. 
2. Cf Wiechers and Van Wyk op cit 93. 
3. S 79. The amendment of the first ten chapters of the constitution 
requires a two-thirds affirmative vote in the assembly unless the s 49(3) 
procedure is petitioned for, in which case a two-thirds majority is re-
quired in each component group of the assembly. Amendments to ch 11 
(transitional and savings provisions) can be made by the ordinary legis-
lative process, subject to the s 49(3) petition. 
4. S 7. Laws inconsistent with the constitution will be void, but only if 
passed after independence. As many of the inherited South African laws 
(s 93(1)) ·would contravene the declaration of rights, a law revision 
commission was set up shortly after independence with the task of in-
vestigating such laws and suggesting appropriate reforms. In S v 
Marwane 1981 (3) SA 588 (BSC) the court declined to invalidate the South 
African Terrorism Act No 83 of 1967 for repugnancy to the Declaration, 
on the grounds that it was not passed subsequently to independence. 
5. The legal and moral authority of these features was seen to derive from 
the 'national convention' attributes of the Bophuthatswana assembly when 
it performed its first task, namely the enactment of the independence 
constitution, and this factor is specifically alluded to in the preamble. 
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ever to adopt a consociational form of government, it will have 
to modify its constitutional system accordingly. 
But the Bophuthatswana bill of rights, and its related features, 
has greater constitutional significance for South Africa than 
merely providing a more accessible comparative example than its 
European inspiration, for it introduced a new constitutional 
function for the South African Appellate Division. The Appell-
ate Division was constituted as final appellate tribunal in res-
pect of all decisions of the Bophuthatswana Supreme Court, on 
the same basis as appeals from the South African provincial 
division. 1 While this position endures, the Appellate Division 
will thus become the ultimate upholder of the constitution and 
enforcer of its provisions on fundamental rights, a situation 
of some irony in view of the alien nature of such a function in 
the South African and Westminster constitutional traditions. 
The position is, however, not without precedent: the relation-
ship between the Bophuthatswana Supreme Court and the South 
African Appellate Division is analogous to that between the 
latter and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council up to 
1950, an analogy which has been expressly dra~~ by the Bophuth-
atswana court;2 and as far as constitutional review is con-
cerned,this was also an 'alien' function for the Privy Council 
when it acted as appellate tribunal on certain constitutional 
matters emanating from the dominions, in particular the federal 
states of Canada and Australia. 3 From the South African point 
of view this arrangement will afford the court an opportunity 
to adopt a more activist approach to statutory interpretation, 
as befits a fundamental constitutional document embodying nume-
rous formal limitati6ns on government. The Privy Council has 
been accused of 'incurable positivism' in constitutional 
matters,4 and to avoid this danger the Appellate Division would, 
1. S 91(e). 
2. S v Moloto 1980 (3) SA 1081 (BSC) at 1084 D (per Hiemstra CJ). 
3. See E. McWninney Judicial Review in the English-Speaking World (2 ed, 
1960); L.P. Beth 'The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the 
Development of Judicial Review' 24 (1976) American Journal of Compara-
tive Law 22. 
4. McWhinney op cit 29. 
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in its new constitutional function, have to depart from its 
tendency towards positivism in the process of ordinary stat-
1 . hI· utory interpretation. It would requlre t e re-eva uatlon, 
in their application to Bophuthatswana, of such doctrines as 
'separate but equal' which have been accepted in relation to 
South African laws 2 but would seem incompatible with the 
Bophuthatswana Declaration of Rights. 3 In general it would 
require the Appellate Division to interpret and enforce the 
Bophuthatswana constitution, and in particular its provisions 
on fundamental rights, without undue interference with that 
countryf s own interpretations and evaluations of social cir-
cumstances. 4 This could be a valuable experience in the prac-
tice of constitutionalism for South Africa. 
4. The Commissions 
A large number of commissions of enquiry has, over the years, 
provided a significant contribution to the political and consti-
tutional debate in South Africa, but the extent to which the 
recommendations of these commissions have materially affected 
political policies and constitutional developments is probably 
meagre. This may be attributed to factors such as the outright 
, rejection by the government of the recommendations, including 
those of commissions appointed by the government itself, to the 
acceptance of the recommendations but the failure to implement 
them for financial or party political reasons, or to the accep-
tance of recommendations but the implementation of them in a 
1. See J. Dugard Human Rights and the South :African Legal Order (1978) 
393-397, and 'Judicial Power and a Constitutional Court' in L.J. Boulle 
and L.G. Baxter Natal and KwaZulu - Constitutional and Political Options 
(1981) 189-211. 
2. Minister of Posts v Rasool 1934 AD 167; R v Abdurahman 1950 (3) SA 136 
(AD); R v Lusu 1953 (2) SA 484 (AD). In the first case the court 
countenanced equal facilities for different colour groups as being not 
per se bad in law, and in the other cases set aside regulations which 
resulted in substantially unequa~ facilities. 
3. S 9 of the Declaration of Rights could, through the process of judicial 
interpretation, be given the same scope as the 'equal protection' clause 
(Fourteenth Amendment) of the United States constitution. 
4. The Bophuthatswana court (S v Moloto at 1084 C-E) has, on the Privy Coun-
cil analogy, indicated that it considers itself bound by post-independence 
~ecisions of.the.Appellate Division, but this will have relevance mainly 
~n non-const1tut10nal matters. 
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manner not intended by the commission. Nevertheless some of 
the commissions have been influential in the broad constitu-
tional field, and a description of their reports complements 
the institutional and comparative background against which the 
government's constitution is analysed. The reports could be 
distinguished as to whether they are official or non-official, 
and national or sub-national, but in what follows they are 
dealt with chronologically, and in a consociational perspective. 
Ca) The Tomlinson Commission 1 
The terms of reference of the Tomlinson Commission were to report 
on a comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation of black areas 
with a view to developing them within a social structure in keep-
ing with black culture and based on effective socio-economic 
planning. 2 The commission gave a wide interpretation to its 
terms of reference, as is clear from its recommendations bearing 
on the political framework of South Africa. 
The findings of the Tomlinson commission were all based on its 
perception of the fundamental dichotomy facing South Africa, 
namely complete integration, or the separate development of the two 
main racial groups.3 The commission's recommendations involv~d 
an unequivocal acceptance of the latter option, and it suggested 
certain steps for the practical realisation of separate develop-
ment for blacks and whites, which would involve the full-scale 
development of black areas to provide for a diversified economy 
and the creation of development opportunities there. It recom-
mended the consolidation of existing black areas on an ethnic 
basis into seven blocks, each of which would form the basis for 
black political development and in which blacks would be grad-
ually incorporated into the administrative process. Several 
recommendations were made in relation to the financial require-
ments of the development programme, the conscientious implemen-
1. The Commission ou the Socio-Economic Development of Native Areas within 
the Union of South Africa was appointed by the government in 1950 and 
presented its report in 1954. An official summary of the report was 
published in 1955 (UG 61/1955) and all references are to the summary. 
2. Report Summary xviii. 
3. On this section see ch 50 of the Report Summary (194-208). 
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tation of which, it was pointed out, would result in dramatic 
increases in the proportion of the black population living in 
black areas. 1 
The commission was of the opinion that its socio-economic de-
velopment programme would derive its driving force from the 
prospects it would offer blacks for forms of political ex-
pression. 2 It indicated as the first step in political develop-
ment the assumption by blacks of responsibility for village 
boards, town councils and municipalities; thereafter adminis-
trative responsibility could be increased to government on a 
regional basis, which might eventually evolve into a system 
similar to the then provincial system in each of the seven black 
areas, with locally elected 'provincial governments'. No sug-
gestion was made as to the possible independence of these areas. 
As a corollary to local and regional black political development 
in black areas it envisaged the loss of any claim to political 
rights in non-black areas, into which blacks would only be allow-
ed entry as temporary migrant workers. 3 The Tomlinson commiss-
ion saw its development programme as the 'logical implementation 
of state policy as laid down in 1913 and 1936',4 a reference to 
the acts of those years5 which restricted the use and occupation 
of land by blacks to certain specified areas. The partial geo-
graphic segregation established by those acts would now be com-
plemented by economic development of black areas and a gradual 
1. The report cites proportions of 60% by 1981 and 70% by 2000 (Report 
Summary 203). In 1973 the following estimations of blacks in the home-
lands and 'common area' were made: 
1980 1985 
Homelands 9 675 300 11 221 700 
Common area 10 406 200 11 708 200 
Mostert, Van Eden, Van Tonder Population Projections for the Black Pop-
ulations in the Different Homelands and the White Areas of South Africa, 
1970 - 2010 (1973). 
2. Report Summary 211. 
3. Here the Tomlinson report differed fundamentally from the earlier Fagan 
report (Report of the Native Laws Commission, 1946-48 (V.G. 28}1948)) 
which recognised that total segregation, in the sense of partition with 
the transfer of populations, was impossible, and recommended the accep-
tance of the full implications of a permanent urban black population. 
For an approving account of the Fagan report see H. Brotz The Politics 
of South Africa (1977) 132-150. 
4. Report Summary 195. 
5. The Natives Land Act No 27 of 1913, and the Native Trust and Land Act 
No 18 of 1936. 
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accretion of black political rights, so that separate develop-
ment, as advocated by the commission, would lead to geograph-
ical, economic and political separation of blacks and whites. 
In its white paper 1 on the commission, the government accepted 
2 some and rejected other parts of the report. It rejected as 
impracticable and unacceptable the consolidation of the exist-
ing black areas into single cohesive blocks, and it rejected 
the majority view that white entrepreneurs should be able to 
establish industries in the reserves and that 'white' capital 
be used generally in the economic development programme.
3 
Those sections of the report which were accepted were never 
funded over the years according to the commission's estimates, 
and the administration was never capable of carrying out the 
measures necessary for the projected economic development. 4 The 
result was that the social and economic reorganisation of the 
reserves, which were essential to the attainment of 'ultimate 
separate development', was never achieved along the lines recom-
mended by the Tomlinson commission. 5 
Economic underdevelopment, however, was not seen by the govern-
ment as irreconcilable with political advancement in black areas, 
and the vague political guidelines set out in the Tomlinson report 
were to be rigidly pursued as far as the future constitutional 
development of the homelands was concerned. The Promotion of 
Bantu Self Government Act of 1959,6 an elaboration of the earlier 
1. White Paper on the Development of Bantu Areas, published in May 1956. 
2. On the black response to the ' report see Carter, Karis and Stultz South 
Africa's Transkei (1967) 18. 
3. It thereby accepted the minority recommendation (of two of the nine 
commissioners) which ~iewed white participation in the economic develop-
ment of the re.serves · as contrary to the policy of separate development. 
4. See Butler, Rotberg and Adams The Black Homelands of South Africa (1977) 
160. 
5: On the contemporary economies of the national stat~s see J. Nattrass 
The South African Economy (1981) 190-224. In 1975 the homelands pro-
duced 3% of South Africa's total economic output, although they contained 
35,8% of the total population. 
6. Act No 46 of 1959. 
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Black Authorities Act,1 became an important statutory step in 
the implementation of separate development policy and the 
homelands programme,2 and the preamble to this act showed the 
unmistakeable influence of the Tomlinson report. In the strat-
egy to reduce the number of blacks who could demand political 
rights in the republic, great emphasis came to be placed in the 
ensuing years on the forms of political structures and consti-
tutions,3 so that independence was eventually obtained without 
th'e 'reorienta tion of the economic structure' which the comm-
ission correctly perceived to be necessary to alter the process 
of integration. 4 The legitimacy crisis of the 1980's may be 
partially attributed to the failure of 'ultimate separate de-
velopment', through the outpacing of social and economic reali-
ties by constitutional development; the government's 'constella-
tion of states' and 'regional economic organisation' strategies 
of the 1980's may be seen as a response to this failure. 5 
In calling for a serious rethinking of the reports of various 
commissions, Wiechers 6 has suggested that the recommendations of 
the Tomlinson commission, as well as those of the Pagan and 
Theron commissions, 'point to kinds of consociational arrange-
ments which include elements of federalism and group accommoda-
tion' . Reference has already been made 7 to the affinity between 
separate development and consociationalism, as well as the dif-
ferences between them. The consociational elements of separate 
development, however, have been conceived and implemented on an 
authoritarian, rather than a democratic basis, and their contem-
porary fate are further illustrations of the fact that consocia-
tional institutions, such as homeland 'segmental autonomy', will 
not in themselves resolve the legitimacy crisis in South Africa 
and tha t a prior accommodation of legi timacy is a necessary, though 
by no means a sufficient, condition of their success. 
1. Act No 68 of 1951. 2. See above, 182-194. 
3. Carter, Karis and Stultz op cit 54. 
4. Report Summary 194. 5. See thapter 7, below. 
6. M. Wiechers 'Possible Structural Divisions of Power in South Africa' 
in J. Benyon (ed) Constitutional Change in South Africa (1978) 107 at 
115. 
7. See above, 203 to 205. 
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Cb) The Theron Commission 1 
The Theron commission had wide-ranging terms of reference re-
lating to the past and future development of coloured persons 
in the social, economic, constitutional and cultural fields. 
While it was empowered to make recommendations relating to the 
development of coloureds in these fields, the prime minister
2 
emphasised shortly before the release of the report that the 
commission had not been appointed to devise an alternative to 
the government's existing policy on coloured persons, but to 
suggest ameliorations which could be effected in terms of that 
policy. In the event, the government was to reject several 
of the key social and political recommendations of the commiss-
ion which came in conflict with its existing policy. 
Of the one hundred and seventy-eight recommendations made by the 
Theron commission, only one had a direct bearing on the consti-
tutional question of political rights for coloured persons. 3 In 
view of the subsequent distortions of this recommendation it is 
appropriate to quote it in full: 
'Since the Coloured population has no direct share or say 
in the decisive legislative institutions of the Republic 
of South Africa Cie Parliament, provincial councils, muni-
cipal councils and rural local authorities), and the 
successful development of the alternative measures taken 
for purposes of Coloured representation and self-determina-
tion is being hampered by strong opposition from the vast 
and effective majority of Coloureds, as well as by consti-
tutional anomalies which in the opinion of the Commission 
cannot be eliminated satisfactorily and adequately, the 
Commission recommends that: 
Ca) with a view to the further extension of the political 
civil rights of Coloureds and the creation of opportuni-
ties for more constructive participation and co-operation, 
provision be made for satisfactory forms of direct Colour-
ed representation and a direct say for Coloureds at the 
various levels of government and on the various decision-
making bodies; 
1. The Commission of Enquiry into Matters Relating to the Coloured Popula-
tion Group was appointed on 23 March 1973 (Proc 81 Gaz Notice 442) and 
its report (RP 38/1976) was tabled on 18 June 1976. The commission 
consisted of twelve whites and six coloured persons. 
2. House of Assembly Debates vol 12 cols 5133-4 (21 April 1976). 
3. Para 178. 
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Cb) ¥ith a view to the implementation of the proposal 
above, a committee of experts be appointed to make more 
detailed proposals in regard to the organisational and 
statutory adjustments required, provided that due re-
gard shall be had to all the problems and considerations 
set forth fully in Chapters 17 and 21 of this report; 
Cc) in the process of constitutional adjustment it will 
have to be accepted that the existing Westminster-founded 
system of government will have to be changed to adapt it 
to the specific requirements of the South African plural 
population structure.' 
The first part of this recommendation was approved by a majority 
of eleven commissioners to seven but was not accepted by the gov-
ernment in its white paper,1 and would clearly have involved a 
major deviation from prevailing policy. In its new constitution-
al proposals, which were first publicised the following year, 
the government underlined its rejection of this recommendation, 
by providing for an increase in the status and powers of the 
Coloured Persons Representative Council and making no provision 
for coloured participation in existing political institutions; 
this involved a continuation, rather than adjustment, of past 
constitutional trends. The second part of the recommendation was 
formally accepted by the government, but instead of appointing the 
'committee of experts' envisaged in the report, it formed a cabi-
net committee 2 whose findings formed the basis of the government's 
1977 constitution. The third part of the recommendation was more 
enthusiastically accepted by the government and has been contin-
ually restated in various forms since 1976, despite its rather 
dubious assumption. 3 Another feature of the reformulations of 
this recommendation of the Theron commission is that they inevi-
tably involve a reversal of the commission's priorities,4 in that 
emphasis is given to the need to move away from Westminster, in 
contrast to the commission's own emphasis on the need for a direct 
coloured voice in government, which is often ignored;5 this 
1. Provisional Comments by the Government on the Recommendations of the 
Commission of Inquiry into Matters Relating to the Coloured Population 
Group W.P. S - '76. A second, and 'final' white paper was tabled in 
1977 - W.P.D. - '77. 
2. The committee comprised the following cabinet ministers: Mr P.W. Botha 
(chairman), Dr C.P. Mulder, Mr J. van der Spuy, Mr D.P. Horwood, Mr 
M.C. Botha, Mr S.J. Steyn and Mr H. Smit (secretary). The coloured 
commissioners had emphasised that the committee of experts should include 
coloured persons. 
3. See the analysis in chapter 4, above. 
4. See H. Brotz The Politics of South Africa (1977) 96. 
5. See, for example, the National Party pamphlet New Political Dispensation 
~"' .... T .. Th':~_ r"_' __ .. __ .l __ ...l .... _ .-1 .! _ /,... . .."" ...... ,,. 
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phenomenon gives (unwitting) support to the dissenting minority 
of commissioners, for whom the need to move away from the West-
minster system was a point of departure, and not a corollary. 
The Theron report was not to have any immediate effect on the 
constitutional development of the republic since its main consti-
tutional recommendations were inconsistent with the government's 
existing policy. Nor was the government prepared at the time 
to accept other recommendations which would have necessitated 
changes to matters closely related to the constitutional system -
amendments to group areas legislation, termination of the mixed 
marriages prohibition, the opening of separate amenities, and 
the combining of separate administrations. When the CPRC was 
discontinued in 1980 and its successor, the Coloured Persons 
Council, was still-born the same year, the notion of future 
coloured representation in parliament became prevalent - at 
least in the speculations of the media - and it seemed that the 
Theron political option might be accepted after all. But since 
then the government has indicated its intention to implement the 
1977 constitutional proposals, albeit in slightly modified form, 
and the Theron option seems a more remote eventuality. 
Little can be said of the consociational implications of the 
Theron report's constitutional approach for reason of the absence 
of any institutional detail. It shares with consociationalism 
a rejection of the Westminster system of government, but to imply 
an acceptance of the main consociational principles' would not 
be possible on the evidence available. 
(c) The Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions 
In 1977 the government appointed two commissions of enquiry whose 
reports were to have a direct bearing on the government's politi-
cal strategy in the late 1970's and early 1980's. The Wiehahn 
1. Cf M. Wiechers 'Possible Structural Divisions of Power in South Africa' 
in J. Benyon (ed) Constitutional Change in South Africa (1978) 107 at 
115. 
266. 
commission 1 was empowered to investIgate the country's labour 
legislation as administered by the Department of Labour and 
Mines; so that effective provision could be made to meet chang-
ing needs. The Riekert commission3 was appointed to enquire 
into all legislation directly or indirectly affecting the econ-
omic use of manpower, excluding that being investigated by the 
Wiehahn commission; it was in fact to examine statutes with a 
close bearing on constitutional matters, such as the Community 
Councils Act, 4 the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act,5 the 
Group Areas Act~ and the Black Trust and Land Act. 7 
The Wiehahn commission, which has been described as the most 
representative commission that the National Party government has 
ever appointed,8 issued a series of reports in 1979, 1980 and 
1981, of which the first part was the most important. 9 It recom-
mended the repeal of nearly all statut~s which discriminated in 
the area of industrial relations, and advocated a .unified system 
of collective bargaining and complete freedom for workers in 
their choice of trade union. In the statutory reforms which 
followed this report a National Manpower Commission was created 
to investigate labour matters and make appropriate recommendations, 
an Industrial Court was instituted to replace the Industrial Tri-
bunal, statutory job reservation was abolished, provision was 
1. Commission of Enquiry into Labour Legislation and Other Related Matters. 
2. Inter alia, the Industrial Conciliation Act No 28 of 1956, the Black 
Labour Relations Act No 48 of 1953, the Wage Act No 5 of 1957, the 
Factories, Machinery and Building Works Act No 22 of 1941, and, after 
its term had been widened, the Mines and Works Act No 27 of 1956. 
3. Commission of Enquiry into Legislation Affecting the Utilisation of Man-
power. 
4. Act No 125 of 1977. 
6. Act No 36 of 1966. 
5. Act No 25 of 1945. 
7. Act No 18 of 1936. 
8. S. van der Horst 'Employment' in S. van der Rorst and J. Reid (eds) 
Race Discrimination in South Africa (1981) 34. 
9. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Labour Legislation - Part I 
R.P. 4771979. The government's response was contained in White Paper 
W 5/1979. And see A. de Kock fThree Commissions' 1 (1980) Industrial 
Law Journal 26ff. 
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made for the recognition and registration of black trade unions, 
and provision was made for the general inclusion of blacks in 
the statutory system of collective bargaining. 1 On one issue 
of relevance to this work the government hesitated in accepting 
the Wiehahn strategy, which was that of regulating all employees 
in South Africa, regardless of race or nationality.2 The gov-
ernment responded by amending the definition of 'employee' 
(which determines eligibility for trade union membership) in the 
Industrial Conciliation Act,3 but only so as to include blacks 
with South African nationality and with permanent residence 
rights in the republic outside the homelands. 4 This arrangement 
excluded foreign blacks, statutory aliens (that is those denation-
alised by the various Status Acts), and 'frontier commuters' 
(that is employees working in 'white' areas but without section 
ten rights). Subsequently the position was amended by minister-
ial proclamation5 so as to incorporate all black South Africans, 
as well as nationals of states which previously formed part of 
the republic, but their right to join unions continues to exist 
by virtue of ministerial exemption. In taking this step the 
government appeared to contradict its own meticulous denationali-
sation process affecting blacks associated with the independent 
homelands,6 preferring instead the strategy of regulating the 
whole labour force located within the republic. 7 Another recom-
mendation .only subsequently accepted by the government was the 
right of trade unions to determine whether their membership would 
be multiracial or not, without any need for ministerial permission. 
1. These changes were effected mainly by the Industrial Conciliation 
Amendment Act No 94 of 1979, which amended the Industrial Conciliation 
Act No 28 of 1956. See S. van der Horst op cit 35; W.B. Gould 'Black 
Unions in South Africa: Labour Law Reform and Apartheid' 17 (1981) 
Stanford Journal of International Law 99-162. 
2. For the commission's majority and minority views on this matter see the 
Wiehahn Report Part I § 3.43 - § 3.63. 
1. S 1. 
4. In terms of s 10 of Act No 25 of 1945. 
5. Notice R 2167 in Gov Gaz No 6679 (28 September 1979). 
6. This matter is dealt with in detail at 495 to 498, below. 
7. That is apart from foreign nationals who continued to be excluded, 
although they comprise a significant proportion of the labour force. 
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The report of the one-man Riekert commission
1 
was published in 
1979 and its recommendations were purportedly designed to accord , 
a better deal to urban blacks and to create stable urban black 
communities. In common with the Wiehahn report it advocated 
the repeal of discriminatory legislation, in this case relating 
to the employment and training of labour, and entry into white 
South Africa, which should become dependent on the availability 
of employment and housing. 2 The report recommended that a new 
composite statute, the Black Community Development Act, be en-
acted for the positive development of urban and rural black 
communities outside the homelands and to replace several exist-
ing statutes. 3 Part of the Ri~kert strategy was to give urban 
blacks preference over migrant workers in regard to existing 
facilities,and it accordingly recommended measures to tighten up 
influx control;4 a number of specific recommendations were made 
in respect of section ten of the Black (Urban Areas) Consolida-
tion ActS the effect of which would be to link influx control to 
the availability of work and approved housing. 6 The report also 
recommended increased formal mobility for qualified urban blacks 
by allowing secti6n ten qualifications to be transferred from one 
urban area · to another; although this recommendation was imple-
mented by the government 7 it was not a significant inn~vation as 
inter-city mobility was made dependent on the availability of 
housing, the shortage of which was, in the commission's own find-
ings, a major problem. 
Although the government accepted most of the Riekert recommenda-
tions,theii statutory implementation was to be much slower than in 
1. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Legislation Affecting the Uti-
lisation of Manpower RP 32/1979. The government's response was contained 
in White Paper WP T - 1979. 
2. S. van der Horst op cit 52f. 
3. Such as the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act No 25 of 1945, the 
Black Affairs Administration Act No 45 of 1971, and the Community Coun-
cils Act No 125 of 1977. 
4. Thus, eg, the fines for employing unregistered blacks were increased by 
the Laws on Plural Relations and Development Second Amendment Act No 98 
of 1979, which amended s 10 bis of the 1945 Consolidation Act. 
5. Act No 25 of 1945. 
6. A number of these recommendations, eg the repeal of the 72 hour provision, 
were not accepted in the white paper. 
7. GN R1208 GG 7068 of 13 June 1980 (Reg Gaz 3018) amended reg 14 of the 
Black Labour Regulations of 1975. 
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the case of the Wiehahn report. In October 1980 the govern-
ment published, for discussion and comment, three bills
1 
which 
were designed to give effect to those recommendations approved 
by the government. While the bills included provisions re-
lating to inter-city mobility, leasehold property rights and 
increased powers of local government for blacks, a closer ex-
amination revealed several harsh innovations such as the pre-
clusion of any blacks from acquiring urban residence rights in 
the future. The bills clearly did not give effect to the prin-
ciples on which the Riekert recommendations were premised, and 
they were withdrawn in early 1981 for further investigation. 2 
By the end of that year they had still not reappeared. 
The Wiehahn and Riekert reports embody several apparent devia-
tions from the Tomlinson commission strategy and the government's 
own constitutional policies of the past. In the first place 
they involve the recognition that, whateven the feasibility of 
separate political institutions for blacks and whites, there can 
never be complete physical or economic separation; both commiss-
ions accept the permanence of blacks outside the homelands and 
make some provision for their econom~c and social development in 
their place of residence and employment. Secondly, they intro-
duce certain inconsistencies into the constitutional distinction 
between nationals and aliens, in that 'statutory aliens' who 
qualify for residence rights would be entitled as well to some 
other non-political rights normally restricted to South African 
nationals. Thirdly, the Riekert report in particular draws 
sharper distinctions between those qualified for urban residence 
rights and those not so qualified; while the position of the 
former is designed to be improved, the opportunities of access 
for the latter to the 'white economy', and consequent benefits, 
are decreased. And fourthly, the Riekertreport again accepts 
and reinforces the principle that urban blacks should have poli-
tical rights in autonomous local government institutions in the 
1. The Black Community Development Bill, the Local Government Bill and 
the Laws on Co-Operation and Development Amendment Bill (Gov Gaz 7280, 
7281 and 7282 of 31 October 1980 respectively). 
2. By the Grosskop£ commission, which had reportedly finalised its report 
by the end of the year. 
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'common area', a change of policy first introduced in the com-
munity councils legislation.' To the extent that the govern-
ment has accepted these recommendations, it has committed itself 
to their future statutory implementation. A sense of perspec-
tive should be given to these apparent variations in policy, 
however, by emphasising that they have been accepted within the 
constraints of the existing constitutional framework - in parti-
cular they do not involve any accretion of political rights to ' 
blacks outside the homelands, other than at the local government 
level. Nor, it may be added, do they address themselves direct-
ly to the legitimacy problems affecting the existing institutions 
on whith they build. 
From a consociational perspective the Wiehahn and Riekert com-
missions have no direct relevance, but there is some indirect 
relevance in the repeal of discriminatory statutes in the indus-
trial relations field. This allows workers the freedom of 
choice in joining trade unions, which is consistent with the con-
sociational model; and the provision for free collective bar-
gaining between employers and employees creates a type of func-
tional autonomy which corresponds to the segmental autonomy of 
consociationalism. On the other hand the state has imposed new 
all-embracing forms of control over labour, and the principles of 
consociationalism have found no further application in this field. 
(d) The Schlebusch Commission 
The government's 1977 constitutional proposals were embodied in 
draft legislation and published in bill form in April 1979 2 and 
immediately referred to a joint select committee of both houses;3 
the terms of reference of the committee were to consider the in-
troduction of a new constituti6n for the republic. At the end 
1. See above, 179 to 182. 
2. Republic of South Africa Constitution Bill Gov Gaz vol 166 No 6386 
(3 April 1979). 
3. House of Assembly Debates vol 8 col 3666 (30 March 1979). 
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of the parliamentary session the committee was converted into 
a commission of enquiry1 consisting of twenty-four members of 
the House and Senate and with similar terms of reference. 
Both the committee and the commission had powers to take evi-
dence and call for papers, and public sittings of the commiss-
ion were held in various centres. Witnesses representing a 
range of political opinion testified before the commission and 
a wider range of memoranda was submitted to it. The commission 
was named after its chairman,2 who subsequently became the first 
Vice-State President of the republic. 
The Schlebusch commission presented a short interim report3 in 
May 1980 whi~h was to result in several deviations from the gov-
ernment's 1977 constitution. As \\rith the Theron commission, it 
rejected the Westminster system as a normative model for the new 
South African constituti6n, and did so in the following terms: 
t ••• the Westminster system of government, in un-
adapted form, does not provide a solution for the 
constitutional problems of the Republic and under 
the present constitutional dispensation the so-
called one-man-one-vote system will probably lead 
to minorities being dominated by majorities and to 
serious conflict among population groups in the 
Republic, with disastrous consequences for all the 
people in the Republic, and does not provide a frame-
work in which peaceful co-existence in the Republic 
o • 0bl ,4 
1S POSS1 e ... 
This again involved an unmotivated rejection of the Westminster 
system and an impli~it assumption as to the Westminster nature 
of the South African constitutional system; the report went on 
to recommend the termination of the b icameral system in South 
Africa5 which was heralded at the time as a decisive step in the 
mo~ement away from Westminster, despite the fact that the West-






Gov Not R1540 (6 July 1979). Regulations applicable to the commission 
were promulgated in Proclamation No 141 of 1979. 
Mr A.L. Schlebusch, then Minister of Justice and of the Interior. 
Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Constitution R.P. 
68)1980. 
§ Ba. 
T~e ~ep?rt emphasised th~t this reco~endation did not imply the com-
m~ss~on s long term commltment to un~cameralism. 
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In paragraph ten of the Schlebusch report several recommendations 
1 
were made in relation to the abolition of the Senate, the en-
trenched clauses of the constitution, the appointment and role 
of a Vice-State President, the institution of a president's coun-
cil, its composition and functions, and adjustments to the size 
of the House of Assembly. Each of these recommendations result-
ed in statutory amendments which are dealt with subsequently in 
this work in a consociational perspective, and they do not require 
specific analysis here. It should be observed, however, that 
none of the recommendations were motivated in the report, nor was 
a government white paper issued between the publication of the 
report and the enactment of constitut i onal amendments shortly 
thereafter. 
The most significant feature of the Schlebusch recommendations 
were that, despite the commissiOn's wi de terms of reference, they 
related only to the constitutional development of non-blacks. 
The only reference to blacks was in oblique terms, namely that a 
committee of the president's counci l could, as one of its func-
tions, consult with a council consist i ng of 'black South African 
citizens' to be established under an act of parliament, and al-
though the government accepted the concept of a black council it 
dropped plans for its institution after vigorous objection from 
homeland and other black leaders. Implicit in the Schlebusch 
recommendations, therefore, was an acceptance of the Tomlinson 
vision that black political rights would be restricted to black 
f 
areas. In relation to the president's council, however, they 
did contain a partial endorsement of the Theron commission's 
standpoint that coloured persons should participate on all deci-
sion-making bodi~s, although the non-representative nature of 
this body and its limited powers2 rendered this a minimal con-
cession within· the overall context of the Theron recommendations. 
A further noteworthy feature of the Schlebusch report was its 
formal deference to constitutional legitimacy and the importance 
1. See below, chapter 6. In their implementation some of the recommen-
~ations were also significantly adapted. 
2. See below, 326 to 333. 
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of an authentic process of constitution-making. 
states, 
The report 
in the process of designing future constitu-
tional structures there should be the widest 
possible consultation and deliberation with and 
among all population groups, in an attempt to 
raise the level of acceptability of any .proposals 
in this regard ... ,1 
\fuile there was no further elaboration of these sentiments (and 
they in fact contain certain implicit qualifications), they do 
stand in contrast to the government's previous assumptions about 
the process of constitution-making; nevertheless the Schlebusch 
commission itself was an unrepresentative body and its recommen-
dations were themselves tainted with illegitimacy.2 The min-
ority report 3 was more elaborate in its recommendations on the 
constitutional process, and emphasised the need for urgent ne-
gotiation (as opposed to the majority's 'consultation and delib-
eration') among the recognised leaders and representatives of 
all groups in the country; it stressed that where the unilateral 
creation of new constitutional structures was imperative, these 
should be only interim in nature, and should be limited in func-
tion to matters relevant to constitutional development. Con-
sistently with this view-point the minority recommended the es-
tablishment of an interim advisory 'Constitutional Council' con-
sisting of members of all population groups, in order to advise 
on the development of a new constitution, and it rejected the 
establishment of the president's council in the form recommended 
by the commission. The minority also rejected other recommen-
dations of the majority.4 
1 • § 8 (b) • 
2. See the views of Inkatha in its memorandum to the commission, § 1. 
(In ·W. Felgate 'Co-Operation Between Natal and KwaZulu - An Inkatha 
View' in L.J. Boulle and L.G. Baxter (eds) Natal and KwaZulu - Consti-
tutional and Political Options (1981) 154 at 158). 
3. Annexure B. This was signed by the four PFP members of the commission. 
On the PFP's concept of a national convention see above, 210. 
4. That is the creation of a Vice-State President, and the increase in the 
size of the House of Assembly. 
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(e) The Ciskei (Quail) Commission 
In 1978 the Cis'keian government appointed a commission 1 to en-
quire into and made recommendations on the practical feasibility 
of independence for the Ciskei, in the light of all relevant 
political, economic and social considerations. In membership 
the commission was more specialist than representative, but it 
did achieve unanimity despite a divergence of political views 
among its members. 2 The commission's programme was far-ranging 
and included enquiries into education, social welfare, nation-
ality and citizenship, agricultural, economic and fiscal matters, 
and labour and industry; its report also included attitude sur-
veys of blacks and whites towards the various options open to 
the Ciskei and Ci~kei~ns. 
The main constituti6nal recommendation contained in the Quail 
report 3 was that the Ciikei should seek an improvement in its 
existing political status by requesting additional powers from 
the central government,with a view to the attainment of 'inter-
nal autonomy,4 and an eventual federal arrangement with the rest 
of the republic. The commission advised strongly against in-
dependence for the Ciskei, inter al i a on the following grounds: 5 
that the terms on which separation was available (as evidenced 
by the cases of Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda) were not 
favourable, that in terms of size and economic viability the 
Ciskeiwould be a poorly endowed state, that international recog-
nition would not be forthcoming, that the attitude surveys showed 
a large majority of Ci~keians rejected independence, and that 
from a tactical point of view it would be unwise to accept con-
stitutional independence and the loss of a claim to political 
and economit rights in South Africa while the republic itself was 
entering a phase of constitutional change. In the commission's 
1. Gov Not No 14 in Ciskei Official Gazette vol 6 no 177 (4 August 1978). 
2. The members were G.P. Quail (chairman), P. Kilby, C.R. Lalendle, E.J. 
Marais, R.I. Rotberg, A.W. Snelling, M. van den Berg and R. Proctor-
Sims (secretary). 
3. Report of the Ciskei Commission (Conference Associates) 1980. 
4. On this aspect see § 270-275 of the repor~ and pages 189 to 191, above. 
5. § 306-332 and § 347. 
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view the political evolution of the Ciskei should rather be 
planned withiri the context of the new political arrangements be-
ing mooted for the rest of the country. In the light of these 
factors the report recommended 1 that the Ciskei should only opt 
for independence if the following conditions could be satisfied: 
a referendum of all Ci~keians indicated acceptance of this step, 
satisfactory citizenship arrangements affecting the new state 
were negotiated with South Africa, additional land was added to 
the Ciskeian territories, residential and employment rights of 
Ciskeians in the republic were expressly preserved, and South 
Africa agreed to provide equitable financial support. In the 
opinion of the commissi6n2 acceptance of independence would prove 
fatal to the emergence of any South Afritan federal arrangement 
involving the Ciskei, and it is suggested that even a loose 
association, such as a confederation, should be settled onsimul-
taneously with independence, and not thereafter. Similarly, in 
relation to the 'constellation of states' concept, which the 
South African government began promoting in 1978, the commission 
recommended3 that, if this seemed an attractive prospect to the 
Ciskei government, it need not necessarily take independence as 
a means of attaining that particular goal. 
From a consociational perspective the most significant aspect of 
the Quail report was the suggestion of a 'multi-racial condominium,4 
consisting of the unconsolidated Ci~kei (including the white-
owned areas earmarked for future incorporation), the 'corridor',5 
and East London - an area stretching from the Great Fish river in 
the south to the Great Kei in the north, and from the Stormberg 
mountains to the sea. Constitutionally this area would remain a 
part of South Africa, and all its inhabitants would remain South 
African nationals, for an experimental period of approximately a 
decade. It would have a high degree of internal autonomy, great-
er than that of the self-governing Ciskei but not as great as 
that of an independent state, and the discriminatory legislation 
of South Africa would not be enforceable within its boundaries. 
1 . § 348. 2. § 282. 
3. § 283-287. 4. § 333-339. 
5. That is the strip of land between the Ciskei and Transkei, and including 
Queenstown in the north and East London in the south. 
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The form of internal government for the condominium would be 
subject to negotiation prior to its formation, but an essential 
feature would have to be the institutional provision for power-
sharing between blacks and whites - without offering a consti-
tutional blueprint the report suggested possible ways of achiev-
ing this objective. 1 These suggestions clearly have a strong 
affinity with the principles of consociationalism. 
As far as fiscal and economic matters are concerned, these would 
be arranged in negotiations with the republican government, but 
the condominium concept would be based on the premise that, by 
remaining part of South Africa, the area would have the right to 
an appropriate share of the taxation and economic wealth of the 
whole country. The economic development of the broader region · 
would be a decisive motivating factor of the condominium concept 
- it would allow the area to be treated as a single economic unit, 
it would satisfy the Ciskeian demands for consolidation, and it 
would allow East London to become a free port and the centre of 
an export manufacturing zone. In its political manifestation it 
would provide all the advantages of increased autonomy, without 
any of the disadvantages inherent in independence. 2 
Apart from the consociational system of government implicity ad-
vocated for the Ciskeian condominium, the Quail report also made 
passing reference to the desirability of a consociational system 
for South Africa generally.3 In an analysis of unitarianism as 
a constitutional option for the republic (including the Ciskei), 
the report briefly compared and contrasted consociationalism with 
majoritarian and adversarial political systems. In a somewhat 
1. Eg a bicameral legislature with whites and blacks represented in sep-
arate houses of equal size and strength; a universal or qualified 
(but non-racial) franchise with each voter being able to vote for a 
black and a white candidate in each constituency, a legislative process 
involving minority vetoes and the need for close co-operation between 
the two houses, and a parliamentary government with the prime minister 
and cabinet being responsible to both houses. 
2. The commission was unable to point to any close precedents for the type 
of arrangement it advocated, other than an Anglo-French condominium in 
the South Pacific and a former Anglo-Egyptian condominium in the Sudan. 
3. § 292-293. 
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inconclusive fashion the report tended to discard consociational 
democrac y as a realistic possibility for South Africa, on the 
grounds of its slow and cumbersome procedures and its probable 
unacceptability (as a species of power-sharing) to whites. But 
the report went on to suggest that on the basis of the govern-
ment's commitment to the consociational incorporation of coloureds 
and Indians into the 'white' political system, and the market-
ability of consociationalism as a system for preventing the white 
minority from becoming powerless vis-a-vis the black majority, 
consociationalism could over time come to gain greater acceptance 
among whites; this approach tends to display a rather one-sided 
attitude to the question of legitimacy. However, the Quail 
report had little effect on the eventual terms of Ciskeian inde-
1 pendence, let alone on the government's national and regional 
constitutional programme. 
(f) The Lombard Commission 2 
In 1980 a commission of enquiry was appointed by the private 
sector 3 to investigate alternative solutions to the problems which 
the South Afritan government sought to solve through the 'consoli-
dation of KwaZulu,.4 The government had appointed its own con-
solidation committee, the Van der WaIt commission, the previous 
year,5 but the Lombard report was finalised and released well be-
fore the other,6 and it strongly affirmed that the basic realities 
of KwaZulu were suth as to preclude any consolidation formula 







For a full discussion of this matter see the parliamentary debates on 
the Status of Ciskei Bill: House of Assembly Debates vol 9 cols 4933-
5159 (2nd reading, 28 September 1981) and vol 10 cols 6293-6337 (3rd 
reading, 9 October 1981). In fact the government's earlier response 
to the report had seemed favourable - House of Assembly Debates vol 12 
col 5864 (7 May 1980). 
Alternatives to the Consolidation of KwaZulu : Progress Report Bureau 
for Economic Policy and Analysis, University of Pretori~ Special Focus 
No 2 (1980). The report became better known under the name of its 
final editor, Prof J.A. Lombard. 
+be commission was appointed by the South African Sugar Association and 
the Durban Chamber of Commerce (although no mention is made of this ~n 
the report), and it consisted wholly of academics. 
Lombard Report 3. 
See House of Assembly Debates vol 10 cols 4464-5 (19 April 1979). 
By the end of 1981 the Van der Walt report's findings had still not been 
made public. 
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tutional independence of KwaZulu.' It suggested that future 
deliberations should move away from the concept of consolidation-
related transfers of land,towards the creation of legitimate 
political institutions which would al l ow the effective partici-
2 
pation of the governed in the process of government. The re-
port recommended that the search for a new constitutional order 
in South Africa should be confined to a spectrum of options that, 
' ... do not discriminate politically on grounds of 
colour as such, but at the same time avoid the 
spectre of colour majoritarianism in a unitary 
political system. Solutions might be found for 
the problems of our 'deeply divided society' in 
approaches that start at the regional level of 
such prob lems . ' 3 
h~ile it has a regional orientation, the report is not restricted 
to alternatives for the region of KwaZulu and Natal, but approach-
es the matter from a national constitutional perspective. 
The bulk of the Lombard report4 is devoted to a description of 
the 'basic realities' of Natal/KwaZulu, including the existing 
system of government, the legal system, demographic patterns, 
education, economic institutions and activity, and the political 
dynamics. It is on the basis of these realities, and particular-
ly the economic interdependence of Natal and KwaZulu, that the 
report rejects the consolidation option. The next sectionS of 
the report is devoted to the 'basic ideas, values or principles' 
within which alternative solutions for the future of Natal/Kwa-
Zulu might be sought. These principles include the retention of the 
1. Ibid. The views of the commi.ssion can be seen as a partial extrapola-
tion of the prime minister's earlier statements on consolidation. 
House of Assembly Debates vol 1 cols 241-4 (7 February 1979) and sum-
marised at page 5 of the report. 
2". Lombard Report S. 
3. Lombard Report 7. The rejection of majoritarianism is, however, sparsely 
motivated: ' .•. majoritarianism under the present unitary constitution 
of the Republic is an extreme world ... beyond the bounds of realism. 
The various social cohesions in South Africa are deeply divided and, as 
in all other "deeply divided societies", majoritarianism has no chance of 
a democratic outcome.' 
4. Section 11. 
5. Section Ill. 
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1 
integrity of the republic as a sovereign state, constitutional 
2 
government and democratic participation, limited government 
and free enterprise, and the division and separation of powers. 
The most important of these principles, and the one which the 
report recommends as the 'appropriate constitutional philosophy' 
for South Africa, is that of confederal government. 3 The main 
purpose of a confederation would be to solve the problem of 
political power-sharing by all peoples in the southern-African 
region (including the independent national states) and to strength-
en the process of decentralisation of economic activities. It 
would also, in the commission's perception, resolve the citizen-
ship issue, in that each citizen of the participating states 
might, 'in terms of his subordination to the circumscribed con-
federal institutions', also claim the protection of certain of his 
rights by these institutions. 4 In the South African context the 
confederal process would require the devolution of responsibility, 
authority and power on a meaningful regional basis, with only 
powers pertaining to truly common functions being retained at the 
central institutional levels. The constitutional · form of the 
confederal political system would be 'a multilateral agreement 
between otherwise sovereign governments', with the qualification 
that each government's obligations under the agreement would be 
properly entrenched within its own constitution. 
There is little in the way of direct motivation of the confederal 
alternative in the Lombard report. In part it builds on the 
'confederal direction' evident in the government's homeland poli-
cy, which it describes as a form of political reform; it also 
1. This does not, however, seem to denote territorial integrity, but the 
authority of existing institutions. The report is confusing in its 
reference to the 'legitimacy of the Republic as a sovereign state' since 
legitimacy is not a feature of existing structures. 
2. That is, limited government in the economic and not the constitutional 
sense. For Lombard's views on 'limited government' see his book 
Freedom, Welfare and Order (1978) 19-40. 
3. Lomhard Report 41-43. 
4. Amidst this circumlocution the report seems to be implying that there 
could be a 'confederal nationality', in terms of which citizens of the 
~onstituent states would have certain rights, eg to a passport. 
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finds some justification for confederalism in terms of pluralist 
theory. 1 But it refrains from discussing the 'delicate prob-
lem t2 of defining the geographic borders of the respective 
states in the confederation, which it leaves open to negotia-
tion, and merely suggests certairi guiding principles for this 
task - economic viability for each region, historical patterns 
of settlement, socio-cultural ties, and the importance of natural 
constituencies. 
It is against the background of its recommendation of regional 
decentralisation as the means of creating a South African con-
federation that the Lombard report looks briefly at possible 
political configurations for the NataljKwaZulu region. 3 In the 
light of the basic political and socio-economic realities of the 
region, and the principles already referred to, it suggests that 
three geo-political areas could serve as the 'building blocks,4 
for the area: the KwaZulu area, the white-owned rural area 
along the main transport corridors, and the Durban metropolitan 
area. Three levels of government would exist in the region -
the local government level, which would include all municipal and 
submunicipal institutions, a subprovincial level serving each of 
the three abovementioned areas, and the Natal/KwaZulu regional 
level. At this last level legislative power would vest in a 
representative assembly, the members of which could be elected by 
the three subprovincial authorities which could, in the initial 
stages,be equally represented; the assembly would only have 
powers over matters truly common to the region. There could be 
a fixed-term executive council at this level, elected either by 
popular vote or by the assembly, and a judiciary could be appoint-
ed by the assembly or council and cou l d have constitutionally-
founded authority to invalidate acts of both these bodies. In 
addition a bill of rights could be incorporated into the regional 
constitution. Discriminatory legislation would be constitution-
ally outlawed in the region, although 'group rights' would be ex-
pressly recognised in the constitution. There is some uncer-
1. Pluralist language is used ~n various parts of the report (eg at 7 and 38). 
2. Lombard Report 43. 
3. Section IV. 
4. Op cit 49. 
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tainty as to whether local government would be territorially 
based, as the report refers to the desirability of 'communities' 
governing themselves at this level; 1 it is clear, however, 
that individuals would have unrestricted mobility, in terms of 
entry and establishment, among the three sub-provincial areas. 
As far as the constitutional relationship between an internally 
autonomous NataljKwaZulu and the republic is concerned, the 
report suggests 2 that this could range from a federal arrange-
ment with a 'weak' territorial distribution of power, through 
to partition with limited bilateral ties. 
On the Lombard commission's own admission3 its discussion of the 
constitutional alternatives for NataljKwaZulu is tentative and 
incomplete. 4 Its recommendations are made in terms of general 
principles on which proposed new structures could be based, and 
no mention is made of electoral systems, public administration 
and fiscal arrangements. Its main significance lies in its 
suggestion of economic and political decentralisation along 
territorial-regional lines, which stands in contrast to the pre-
vious trends of a centralisation of power on the one hand, and 
the partial devolution to unconsolidated ~thnically-based author-
ities on the other. Decentralisation in a confederal arrange-
ment permits, by implication, regional differentiation in consti-
tutional status and organisation, and while for the Natal/KwaZulu 
region a strong devolution of power with a three-tiered internal 
division of authority is recommended, there could be alternative 
arrangements for other regions; on this aspect the Lombard 
approach coincides with that of the Quail commission. In 
Natal/KwaZulu, furthermore, the constitution would be non-racial, 
discriminatory legislation would be outlawed, and 'race' classi-
fication as a basis of political representation would be avoided. 
There would be a strong spirit of constitutionalism and some re-
sort would be had to consociational devices. 5 
1. Op cit 50. 2. Op cit 51. 
3. Op cit 48. 
4. More concrete alternatives were examined at the Workshop on Constitutional 
lssues in KwaZulu and Natal, University of Natal, 27/28 October 1980. 
The papers of this conference are included in L.J. Boulle and L.G. Baxter 
(eds) Natal and KwaZulu: Constitutional and Political Options, (1981), 
and the edited proceedings in the Supplement to Natal and KwaZulu (1981). 
5. The government was reported to have rejected the Lombard proposals be-
cause they envisaged a 'power-sharing' arrangement between whites and 
blacks - 1980 Annual Survey of Race Relations 9. 
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(g) The Buthelezi Commission 
In 1980 the chief minister of KwaZulu appointed a commission of 
enquiry to 'consider the collective destiny of all people in 
Natal, with a view to making proposals which will add a new di-
mension to the political evolution of South Africa'. 1 The 
commission consisted of over forty members representing a wide 
range of backgrounds, academic disciplines, economic interests 
and political ideologies;2 however neither the National Party 
nor the African National Congress served on the commission, al-
though both were invited. 3 The terms of reference of the com-
mission were broad and open-ended, and it was asked to make 
recommendations on the constitutional future of Natal and KwaZulu, 
and to relate these recommendations to the constitutional future 
of South Africa as a whole. 
The findings of the Buthelezi commission were finalised in Octo-
ber 1981 but the report had not been released by the end of the 
year. According to press reports 4 the commission rejects con-
stitutional independence for KwaZulu, and calls instead for the 
merging of Natal with KwaZulu in a regional federation. It 
also advocates a multi-racial system of power-sharing based on 
a universal franchise, a system of proportional representation, 
guaranteed representation for all groups in all branches of gov-
ernment (including the executive), a bill of individual and group 
rights, a minority veto, and an independent judiciary to test all 
legisla t ion against the b ill of rig"h ts . In the trans i tion 
period the report is said to recommend a merger between the Natal 
Provincial executive committee and the Kwa"Zulu cabinet. If this 
speculation is correct, then the Buthelezi commission will be ad-
vocating a constitutional arrangement for the region which bears 
the strong influence of all the principles of consociationalism. 5 
1. See 1980 Annual Survey of Race Relations 50-51. 
2. The chairman was Prof G.D.L. Schreiner, vice-principal of the University 
of Natal. 
3. The NP declined the invitation (see House of Assembly Debates vo1 11 cols 
5131-4 (29 April 1980» but attendance by the ANC was never a practical 
po ssibi1i ty. 
4. See the Daily News 21 September 1981. 
5. Professor Arend Lijphart was one of the overseas members of the 
commission. 
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Ch) Other commissions 
Brief reference has already been made to two other commissions 
investigating matters of constitutional significance for South 
Africa - the Van der WaIt committee on the consolidation of the 
national states,1 and the Grosskopf commission on urban blacks.
2 
Of the other constitutionally-related commissions the most im-
portant is the departmental Niewoudt commission,which investi-
gated aspects of nationality and citizenship. It has been 
speculated3 that this commission recommended a 'confederal 
nationality' for all citizens of the constituent parts of the 
proposed constellation of states, to overcome problems caused by 
the denationalisation of homeland citizens and the international 
non-recognition of the national states;4 the recommendations 
were submitted to the cabinet but were never publicized, and it 
appears that the concept of a 'confederal nationality' has been 
dropped, at least for the short term. Another recent report 
with implications for constitutional matters was that of the 
cabinet-appointed Human Sciences Research Council investigation 
into education;5 this recommended, inter alia, a single depart-
ment of education and a uniform national educational policy, but 
with a strong degree of organisational and functional decentra-
lisation. In rejecting this recommendation6 the government re-
affirmed that, in terms of its policy that each population 
group should have its own schools, it was essential that each 
group should also have its own education authority or department; 
the government further emphasized that the recommendations on 
education would only be implemented within the government's con-
stitutional framework, a clear commitment to the 1977 constitu-
tion. Finally in late 1981 a committee of the president's coun-
1. At the end of 1981 prov~s~on was made for the size of the commission to 
be increased with the intention of enlarging its scope to deal with 
matters relating to non-homeland blacks as well. See the Laws on Co-
operation and Development Act No 111 of 1981. 
2. See above~ 269. 
3. See eg the Natal Mercury, 23 October 1979. 
4. On nationality and citizenship see below, 488 to 508. 
S.Report of the Main Committee of the HSRC Investigation into Education 
(19~1). This became known as the De Lange Report, after the investi-
gat~on's chairman. 
6. Interim Memorandum on the Report of the HSRC on the into the Pro-
visi~n of Education in the RSA October, 1981). The government delayed 
deta~led comment on the report until after March 1982. 
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cil recommended the reproclaiming of certain group areas, a 
matter dealt with subsequently.' 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter a broad southern African comparative background 
to the government's 1977 constitution has been provided. Atten-
tion has been given to the constitutional policies of internal 
political parties, to various empirical constitutional practices 
in the region, and to the main recommendations of commissions of 
enquiry having a bearing on constitutional matters. The single 
theme which these diverging policies, experiences and recommen-
dations have in common, is a rej ection, in its consti tutional 
dimensions, of unqualified majority rule; while the government's 
past and present constitutional policy also excludes the prin-
ciple of majority rule, it also diverges from all the express or 
implied constitutional models which have been referred to. 
Apart from these factors it is not possible to synthesise the 
?ubject-matter of this chapter, which has revealed widely differ-
ing approaches to constitutionalism, consociationalism and 
legitimacy. The most consistent acceptance of consociational 
principles was encountered in the Progressive Federal Party's 
constitutional proposals, but in view of the remote chances of 
thei~ implementation, notwithstanding the party's election suc-
cesses in 1981, they have no greater immediacy or relevance than 
the other constitutional matters referred to. The political 
realities of South Africa indicate that the constitutional 
development over the next few years will be designed and imposed 
by the existing government as it responds to the various forces 
operating on the system. The government's first major response 
consisted of its 1977 constitution, as it has come to be known, 
and attention is gi~en to this in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE GOVERNMENT'S 1977 CONSTITUTION 
1. Introduction 
Most commentators find the genesis of the government's 1977 con-
stitutional proposals in (the Theron commission repo~ which 
~ecommended that provision should be made for direct coloured 
participation in the existing institutions of government, that 
a committee of experts should be appointed to advise on the stat-
utory amendments necessary to achieve this end, and that in the 
process of constitutional change the Westminster-founded system 
of government might have to be modified. 1 While the government 
rejected the first recommendation in favour of its existing 
policy of .parallel development for coloured persons, it accepted 
the third, and ostensibly approved the second. Instead of 
appointing the committee of experts recommended in the Theron 
report, however, it appointed a cabinet committee to make recom-
mendations on appropriate amendments to the existing constitu-
tion. 2 This response of the government was to have two import-
ant consequences - firstly, it placed the emphasis on the short-
comings iri South Africa's so-called Westminster constitution, 
instead of on the shortcomings in the policy of parallel devel-
opment, which were the main concern of the Theron commission; 
it in fact reversed the priorities of that body. In the result 
the new constitution sought to enshrine the premises of parallel 
development, namely that whites, coloureds and Indians have such 
different spheres of interest that these can form the basis of 
separate political institutions,3 and thereby to entrench the 
existing power configurations whith had been criticised in the 
Theron report. Secondly, its contents apart, the new constitu-
ti6n was to suffer seriously in terms of legitimacy because of 
1. See above, 263-265. 
2. ~ee 1977 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 7. 
3. See M. Wiechers 'Current Constitutional Proposals - A Critique' (paper 
presented at 28th Summer School, Centre for Extra-Mural Studies, Uni-
versity of Cape Town, 8 February 1978) 8. 
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the way in which it was conceived, formulated and presented: 
the findings of the cabinet committee 1 were first divulged to 
the National party caucus and then at closed sessions of the 
four provincial congresses of the party during 1977, before 
being publicly released on a piecemeal basis. From their in-
ception the proposals were therefore perceived as part of a 
party political programme, and were presented as such by the 
government during the general election in November 1977. Only 
in April 1979 were the proposals embodied in bill form, and 
rendered susceptible to general analysis and discussion. 
Although reference is made to the 'government's 1977 constitu-
tion' there has never been a definitive constitutional model as 
such, and the constitutional proposals have made their appear-
ance iri three distinct phases. The first phase extends from 
the early disclosures of a new constitutional dispensation in 
1976, until April 1979; the second phase extends from the 
promulgation of the draft constitution bill in April 1979 to 
early 1980; and the third phase begins with the publication of 
the Schlebusch report in May 1980 and includes all the subse-
quent statutory developments. While there has been an obvious 
consistency in this revelation process, each succeeding phase 
has also introduced several variations in the overall plan. 
One of the factors of irony in these developments is that during 
the first phase the proposals presented a clear constitutional 
picture with an internal logic of its own, despite various ob-
scurities and uncertainties, whereas by the third phase the 
verall plan had become uncertain, despite the fact that indivi-
dual parts of it had taken statutory form. It is proposed to 
deal with the government's new constitution in terms of these 
three phases. 
1. The committee did consult some extra-parliamentary experts. 
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2 . The Earl y Formulations 
The basic principles of the government's constitutional proposals 
were announced before the general election of 1977 and further 
disclosures were made during the following year. During this 
period the main public sources of information were National 
1. . db 2 I" Party publications, the parllamentary e ates, extra-par lamen-
tary communications by government spokesmen,3 and media reports 
and commentaries. Despite various inconsistencies in these 
sources,the broad outline of the new arrangement was reasonably 
clear. 
In the new dispensation there would be three parliaments with 
equal constitutional status and powers, one each for whites, 
coloureds and Indians. The parliaments would be predominantly 
elective bodies, they would have personal jurisdiction over mem-
bers of the relevant population group in respect of matters of 
exclusive concern to that group, and they would be sovereign 
4 
within their spheres of competence. Each parliament would have 
its own Westminster-type cabinet with traditional executive func-
tions, and a bureaucracy to administer matters within its juris-
diction; each parliament would also have its own budget. Sub-
ordinate to each community parliament would be separate regional 
and local authorities for each group. At the joint level of 
government there would be an electoral college comprising certain 
members of the three parliament~; the college's sole functions 
would be to elect the president and, if necessary, discharge him. 
The presidency would be the most important institution in the 
1. Eg G.P. Terblanche MP (ed) The New Political Dispensation for White, 
Coloured and Indian (1977), and Questions and Replies on Constitutional 
Plan (1977). See Also Pro-Nat (November 1977 - Information sheet of 
Cape National Party) and The Department of Information South Africa's 
New Constitutional Plan (1978). 
2. See House of Assembly Debates vol 1 cols 19-384 (30 Jan - 3 Feb 1978), 
the censure debate; vol 5 cols 2254-2306 (3 March 1978) (in which a 
private motion was moved calling for the appointment of a joint select 
committee to consider changes in the powers, privileges and functions 
of parliament in the light of the constitutional changes proposed by 
the government); and vol 10 cols 4548-4555(12 April 1978). 
3. Eg JThe South African governmentJs 1977 constitutional proposals' by 
D. Worrall in J.A. Benyon (ed) Constitutional Change in South Africa 
(1978) 127-135. 
4. See House of Assembly Debates vol 1 col 67 (30 January 1978). 
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new dispensation - for the first time in South Africa
1 
there 
would be an 'executive president' taking an active role in the 
political process. He would be assisted in his tasks by a 
council of cabinets consisting of ministers drawn from the 
three community cabinets; the executive president would be 
chairman of this body and would ensure that all its decisions 
were taken on a consensus basis. The members of the council 
would exercise executive powers in respect of matters of common 
concern to all three groups - in fact since most matters would 
be of common concern,2 extensive powers would vest in this body. 
Legislation on joint-concern matters would be initiated by the 
council of cabinets and then submitted to all three parliaments, 
which together would constitute a composite tricameral legis-
lature. The council of cabinets wou l d also co-ordinate the 
legislative activities of the three community parliaments. It 
would be assisted by two advisory bodies, a presidential council 
to be elected by the three parliaments, and a nominated finan-
cial council, and where it was undecided on a specific issue 
could submit it to an ad hoc advisory committee for decision; 
all these bodies would include white, Indian and coloured members. 
No express references were made to the judiciary, save that 
coloureds and Indians would qualify for appointment to the bench 
under the new constitution. 
From a constitutionalist's point of view several aspects of this 
early formulation of the government's 1977 constitution were in-
complete or obscure. These included the fiscal arrangements, 
the division of functions between the joint and communal levels 
of government, the exact composition of some bodies and their 
modus operandi, the status of existing constitutional conven-
tions, the amending procedure, the judicial function, and consti-
tu t i On all in e s 0 f res p 0 n s i hi 1 i t y . I t wa s ne v er th e 1 e s s po s sib 1 e 
to identify all the mairi characteristics of consociationalism 
within the new scheme: the grand coalition principle was evi-
dent in the council of cabinets and its subsidiary institutions, 
1. That is s~nce the hoer republics, a comparison which was drawn ~n the 
media. 
2. See Worrall op cit 128. 
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the presidential council, financial council and joint advisory 
committees; the proportional sizes of the white, coloured and 
Indian populations' determined the number of members in each 
parliament, as well as the composition of the joint institutions -
the electoral college, council of cabinets
2 
and presidential 
council; the consensus basis on which the council of cabinets 
would operate implied a mutual veto power, which would also be 
available in the presidential council;3 and the three parlia-
ments,with their subordinate institut i ons, would provide the basis 
for the segmental autonomy of whites, coloureds and Indians. 
Within its defined limits the new system would also be democratic, 
and it implied full citizenship for whites, coloureds and Indians 
within a single political structure - a point emphasised by gov-
ernment spokesmen on several occasions. 4 It was thus possible 
to present the system as a form of consociational democracy which 
involved genuine power-sharing (or magsdeling) among the three 
groups involved. 5 
But even in terms of this first formulation the government's con-
stitutional proposals were never fully consociational. 6 Most 
obviously, the complete exclusion of blacks from the whole scheme 
meant that the new political institutions would not be accommo-
dationist and conflict-regulating bodies in the true consociation-
al sense, quite apart from the democratic implications of this 
factor. The other major shortcoming from the consociational 
perspective was that the 'segmental' definitions were statutorily 
imposed by the white government, and were a source of controversy 
among those for whom the new deal was specifically designed; 
,. The ratio of 4:2:1 which permeated the plan was based on the mid-1976 
population estimates of 4 320 000 whites, 2 434 000 coloureds and 
746 000 Indians; the comparable figure for blacks was 18 629 000. 
2. In fact coloureds and Indians would be over-represented in the council 
with 4 and 3 members respectively; there would be 7 white ministers and 
the (white) chairman. 
3. See Worrall op cit 133. 
4. See House of Assembly Debates vol 4 col 1474 (20 February 1978),vol 9 
col 3923 (1 March 1978), vol 16 col 7923 (26 May 1978). 
5. See eg Worrall's (op cit 132-134) references to E. Nordlinger Conflict 
Regulation in Divided Societies (1972). 
6. See L.J. Boulle 'The New Constitutional Proposals and the Possible 
Transition to Consociational Democracy' in F. van Zyl Slabbert and J. 
Opland (eds) South Africa: Dilemmas of Evolutionary Change (1980) 
14-28. 
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furthermore, the whole scheme implied the retention of the 
political interference act 1 and the continued prohibition on 
free political association. There were also various institu-
tional factors which were not favourable from a consociational 
point of view: the majoritarian electoral systems, the majority 
party community cabinets,2 and the exclusion of minority parties 
from the joint institutions such as the electoral college and 
council of cabinets, all reflected a strong majoritarian bias in 
the whole arrangement. Furthermore, the fact that the composi-
tion of the electoral college would be entrenched,3 as well as 
the sizes of the three parliaments,4 indicated an unfavourable 
rigidity in the proportionality principle. And the fact that 
consensus would not be an institutional requirement in the coun-
cil of cabinets and other joint institutions was not a favourable 
basis, against South Africa1s political background, for achieving 
compromises and a coalescent style of politics. In short, the 
presentation of the new constitution as consociational in nature 
proved to be more a favourable interpretation, than an analytical 
assessment. Thi~ interpretation, however, was to persist well 
beyond the first phase. 
Even before the draft bill was published it had become apparent 
that the early formulations of the new constitution were not only 
incomplete, but also inaccurate. This may be partially attri-
buted to a tendency to read into the new scheme more than had been 
1. The Prohibition of Political Interference Act No 51 of 1968. 
2. Majoritarianism at the intra-segmental level is an acceptable feature 
of the consociational model, provided the segments are based on volun-
tary association. Where they are statutorily defined, as in South 
Africa, it has the effect of excluding minority parties from the joint 
institutions, where they might have an important brokerage role. It is, 
however, a reality of South Africa's constitutional politics that the 
National Party will not provide the basis for collusion between white 
opposition and non-white parties, for fear of being outvoted; during 
all three phases of the 1977 constitution the government has sought to 
strengthen its own institutional position within 'white' politics, 
while providing some basis for contestation with the new coloured and 
Indian 'opposition'. 
3. The electoral college would consist of 50 whites, 25 coloureds and 13 
Indians, and any changes would require the approval of all three par-
~iaments. 
4. That is 185~ 92 and 46 members for the white, coloured and Indian 
assemblies respectively. 
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intended by the government, but it was also clear that the gov-
ernment itself had not perceived the full implications of the 
new arrangement. Thus it came to be said that the sovereignty 
1 of the white parliament would be unaffected by the new scheme, 
that the coloured and Indian parliaments would be mere 'talking 
shops' and real power would vest with the (whi te) ~President, 2 
that members of the council of cabinets would have no portfolios 
and would exercise no executive power in that capacity, and 
that there would be no joint bureaucracy to administer matters 
of Jcommon concern,.3 There was also a discernible shift in 
general emphasis from the notion of power-sharing (magsdeling) 
to that of dividing power (magsverdeling); the council of cabi-
nets in particular was presented as a forum for consultation and 
co-responsibility, as opposed to negotiation and power-sharing. 
These changes in emphasis may have reflected the strains which 
the constitutiOn was generating within the National Party, but 
they presaged the shape which the constitution would take in the 
second phase. 
The response of coloured, Indian and black leaders to the gov-
ernment's constitution, as it was presented during the first 
phase, ranged from outright rejection, to conditional acceptance 
as a basis for further negotiation. 4 The response of coloured 
persons, for whom it was primarily designed, was apparent from 
the Du Preezreport~ which rejected the new proposals in all mater-
ial respects. Nevertheless, acting on a 'mandate' received from 
the white electorate in the 1977 general election, the government 
took the first step in their implementation even before the draft 
constitutiOn bill of 1979 had been published - it made statutory 
provision for changes in the structure and composition of the 
South African Indian Council. 6 The minister emphasized during 
1.. House of Assembly Debates vol 10 col 4546-8 (12 April 1978). 
2. House of Assembly Debates vol 1 col 34 (30 January 1978). The 'De Gaulle analogyt was used frequently during the first phase. 
3. See the discussion in J.A. Benyon (ed) Constitutional Change in South Africa (1978) 152-159. 
4. See 1978 Annual Survey of Race Relations 3.' 
5. See above,217-220. 
6. The South African Indian Council Amendment Act No 83 of 1978. 
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the parliamentary debates 1 that the enactment was being passed 
with the new constitutional dispensation in mind, and it pro-
vided for a predominantly elective assembly with a parliamen-
tary executive, which anticipated the subsequent draft bill. 
No provision was made at this stage for an increase in the 
SAle's powers, and the intention was that this act, together 
with the Indians Electoral Act of 1977,2 would provide a new 
representative institution to which powers would be allocated 
when it was integrated into the new dispensation. For various 
reasons,3 these elections were delayed, and the Council was still 
in its non-representative form when the post-Schlebusch report 
implementation of the new constitution commenced. 
3. The Draft Constitution Bill 
Ca) General 
From a constitutional law_point of view, the government's 1977 con-
stitution assumed a more tangible form with the publication of 
the draft constitution bill in April 1979. 4 The bill was immed-
iately referred to a joint select committee of both houses,S 
whic'h at the parliamentary recess was converted into the Schle-
busch commission of enquiry. The bill itself was submitted as 
evidence to the Schlebusch commission by the government. 
The first striking feature of the draft bill was that, although 
it reduced the new constittition to statutory form, it left many 
aspects as vague or obscure as they had previously been, and 
omitted others altogether from its scope. With almost no excep-
1. House of Assembly Debates vol 17 col 8186 (30 May 1978). 
2. Act No 122 of 1977. 
3. See House of Assembly Debates vol 2 cols 730-742. 
4. Gov Gaz 6386 (3 April 1979). 
5. House of Assembly DeLates vol 8 cols 3666-76 (30 March 1979). 
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tion constitutional commentators 1 had difficulty coming to 
grips with the bill, and in elucidating and evaluating the 
powers of the various authorities and their relationships with 
one another. The second striking feature of the bill was 
that the new constitution was closely modelled on the existing 
constitutional system;2 insofar as the Westminster system had 
hitherto been applied in South Africa, it was left sub.stantially 
unaffected by the bill, and many of the constitutional features 
anticipated during the first phase were not in evidence. Thus 
no provision was made for an executive president, and the par-
liamentary form of government was retained; the three legisla-
tive assemblies were not accorded equal status, nor was there 
provision for a composite tricameral legislature, and the white 
House of Assembly remained sovereign; most powers were not 
vested at the 'joint' level of government, but remained with the 
white institutions; and the bill did not introduce equal citi-
zenship rights for whites, coloureds and Indians, but reinforced 
their differential status. Many features of the constitution 
were left wholly intact, including the provincial councils, the 
state presidency, judicial and financial matters, the constitu-
tional conventions,3 and the national symbols. Far from 
heralding a new constitutional deal, the draft bill rather re-
furbished the old with the few innovations described below. The 
third striking feature, although this was not unexpected, was 
1. See on the draft bill Boulle op cit, and 'A Critical Analysis of the 
New Constitutional Proposals', paper presented at the symposium on The 
Defects and Merits of the Government's Constitutional Proposals, Uni-
versity of the Western Cape, 26-27 June 1979; N.J.J. Olivier 'Die 
Regering se Konstitutionele Voorstelle', unpublished paper, Cape Town, 
1979; M.P. Vorster and H.P. Viljoen 'Die Nuwe Grondwetlike Bedeling in 
Suid-Airika' 1979 TSAR 201; G. Devenish l A Critical Evaluation of the 
Theoretical and Political Implications of the New Constitutional Pro-
posals' (University of the Western Cape, 1979); M. Wiechers Staatsreg 
(3 ed, 1981) 218-221; and the contributions in S.C. Jacobs (ed) n Nuwe 
Grondwetlike Bedeling vir Suid-Afrika (1981), some of which are referred 
to below. 
2. Vorster and Viljoen op cit 203. 
3. See on this matter M.P. Vorster 'Die vraag met betrekking tot die voort-
bestaan van konvensies in die nuwe grondwetlike bedeling' in Jacobs op 
cit 171-194. 
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the complete omission of blacks, which was impliedly justified 
in the bill in terms of the homelands policy;1 the existing 
constitutional arrangements for blacks, including the communi-
ty councils, were left unaffected by the bill, and it became 
clear that future constitutional developments would occur 
along the black/non-black axis, as opposed to the previous 
white/non-white axis. Finally, the draft bill, as the analy-
sis below shows, incorporated fewer consociational elements than 
had originally been claimed for the government's constitution. 
Cb) Description of the Draft Bill 
In broad terms the draft bill provided for the quasi-consociation-
al incorporation of coloureds and Indians into the constitutional 
system, while maintaining overall white supremacy. It left in-
tact the existing white political institutions, modified the 
status, composition and functions of the separate institutions 
which had been created for coloureds and Indians, and established 
new joint institutions for consultation and co-ordination. While 
the bill envisaged three tiers of government Cover and above the 
local level to which no reference was made),attention need only 
be given to the so-called joint and community levels of govern-
ment - in fact the only regional constitutional matters referred 
to in the draft bill were the provincial institutions, which were 
left intact. 
Ci) Community level 
At the community level provision was made for three predominantly 
elective assemblies for each of the white, coloured and Indian 
groups, and an executive council for each assembly. In effect 
the existing House of Assembly was retained for whites,2 save 
tha tits membership was increased to accommodate twelve indirectly 
1. See the preamble: 'We declare that whereas we .•. believe that the 
Black nations of the Republic should each be given separate freedom in 
the land allotted to them for the exercise of the political aspirations 
~f all the members of those nations ... r. This clearly premised the 
bill on the attainment of independence by all the national states, as 
well as the denationalisation of all blacks (on which see below, 493-498). 
2. Draft bill s 27. 
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elected and eight nominated members,1 while for coloureds and 
Indians the Coloured Persons Representative Council (which was 
then still in existence) and the South African Indian Council 
were replaced by assemblies called the House of Representatives 2 
and Chamber of Deputies respectively,3 and comprising compara-
ble proportions of elected, indirectly elected and nominated 
members as applied in the restructured House of Assembly.4 
No provision was made for upper chambers, and each assembly 
would be a unicameral legislative body - it had in fact been 
clear from the early formulations of the constitutional plan that 
the existing Senate would be disestabli~hed. As far as most 
legislative-related matters were concerned, those previously per-
taining to the House of Assembly were retained in the draft bill, 
and extended mutatis mutandis to the two new assemblies. Among 
these matters were the electoral system,5 (including the delimi-
tation arrangements, single-member constituencies and the plural-
ity principle), the franchise qualifications, the qualifications 
and disqualifications of assembly rnembers,6 the voting, quorum 
and dissolution aspects, and the domestic arrangements. 7 Pro-
vision was made for an annual session of each assembly.8 As far 
as legislative competence was concerned, that of the House of 
Assembly was left unaffected, while the House of Representatives 
1. Of the 12, 3 would be elected by the already elected MP's in each pro-
vince, an arrangement modelled on the Senate; the prime minister would 
nominate the other 8, 2 from each province. 
2. S 49. 3. S 52. 
4. 82, 6 and 4 members respectively for the House, and 40, 3 and 3 for the 
Chamber. 
5. Ss 49(2) and 52(2) read with ss 32-35. 
tution Act. 
Cf ss 40-45 of the RSA Consti-
6. Ss 49(2) (and s 50) and 52(2) (and s 53) read with ss 36 and 45. 
Cf ss 46 and 55 of the Constitution Act. 
7. Ss 49(2) and 52(2) read with ss 37-44. Cf ss 50, 51 and 58 of the 
Constitution Act. 
8. Ss 49(2) and 52(2) read with s 29. Cf s 26 of the Constitution Act. 
297 . 
and Chamber of Deputies were allocated the legislative powers 
1 
of their respective predecessors - a somewhat vacuous pro-
vision since the South African Indian Council had no legisla-
tive powers at that stage. Provision was also made for addi-
tional legislative powers to be conferred on the coloured and 
Indians assemblies by the council of cabinets,2 but they would 
clearly remain constitutionally subordinate to the House of 
Assembly. The distribution of competence at this level was an 
important feature of the constitution, and is referred to again 
below. 
The draft bill made provision for three executive councils which 
would serve as Westminster-type cabinets for each assembly.3 
Each cabinet would be headed by a prime minister, to be appointed 
by the State President in accordance with existing conventions; 
the prime minister would in turn advise the President in respect 
of other ministerial appointments and, where appropriate, dis-
missals. Each cabinet would be parliamentary, subject to the 
three months' grace period;4 the members of the community cabi-
nets would be the 'ministers of the republic' and they would ad-
minister the various departments of state. 5 . While no further 
reference was made to the powers of the cabinets, it was clear 
from the respective numbers of ministers,6 and indeed from the 
general direction of the constitution, that the coloured and In-
dian cabinets would have jurisdiction over only those 'separable' 
matters which affected the respective groups exclusively, while 
all other matters would fall within the control of the white 
cabinet. This is again a virtually no-change situation from the 
existing constitutional system, and is evaluated further subse-
quently.7 
1. S 26(1)(a). 
t. S 26(1)(a)(i). 
3. S 19(1). 
4. S 19(3). 
5. S 19(2). 
6. That is (a maximum of) 17 white, 5 coloured and 3 ministers respectively -
s 19(1)(b). Provision was also made for deputy ministers - s 20. 
7. Below, 308-310. 
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~~at became evident at the community level of government was 
that there would be nominally equal political institutions for 
whites, coloureds and Indians in a more consistent application 
of the policy of parallel development. Far from this involving 
a departure from the Westminster model, it actually entailed a 
replication of Westminster parliamentary institutions for the 
latter two groups. The majoritarian bias of the Westminster 
system was also retained and extended, and slightly strengthened 
through the provision for non-elected elements in the three 
assemblies. These aspects further detracted from any consocia-
tional claim which might be made in respect of the government's 
constitution. 
(ii) The joint level 
The draft bill made provision for all the joint institutions en-
visaged during the first-phase formulations of the government's 
1977 constitution, save for the advisory financial council. It 
was at this level that the main constitutional changes were found, 
in the form of the electoral college, the council of cabinets and 
the president's council. "~ereas the changes at the community 
level were essentially modifications of existing structures, 
those at the joint level were institutional innovations, osten-
sibly designed to allow consultation and co-operation to take 
place among group leaders. 
(aa) The State President' 
The draft bill made provision for a State President to serve as 
head of state and nominal head of the executive government, as 
had previously been the case,2 and iri addition to preside over 
the council of cabinets. 3 All the powers and functions of the 
existing State President were left intact,4 including his pre-
rogative powers as head of state. 5 The only new function ex-
pressly conferred on the President related to the appointment 
of the community cabinets, including the three prime ministers; 
1. See M.P. Vorster and H.P. Viljoen 'Die nuwe grondwetlike bedeling vir 
Suid-Afrika' 1979 TSAR 201 at 204f; M. Wiechers 'Die uitvoerende 
staatshoof: tnkele opmerkings' in S.C. Jacobs (ed) n Nuwe Grondwetlike 
Bedeling vir Suid-Afrika (1981) 139-143. 
2. Ss 7(1) and 18(1) respectively. 
3. S 16(1). 
4. See especially ss 7(2) and (3), 19, 20, 21, 58 and 104. 
5 • .s 7(4). 
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1 
here his powers were circumscribed by convention and statute. 
Several other provisions required that he follow the existing 
2 b . . conventions in exercising his powers, ut lt was not StlPU-
lated as to whether he should follow the council of cabinet's 
advice or that of the white cabinet. The indications were that 
he would continue to function predominantly, if not exclusively, 
as a ceremonial head of state, and the retention of section 13 
of the Constitution Act supported the view that he would not be 
an executive president. 3 The powers attaching to his new posi-
tion as chairman of the council of cabinets are best understood 
from an analysis of that body and its functions. 4 
Most of the ancillary matters relating to the State President 
were also left intact in the draft bill,S but his tenure of 
office was reduced from seven to five years6 and there was pro-
vision for his election by a differently-constituted electoral 
college. 
ebb) The electoral college 
One of the most contentious matters to arise during the first 
.phase of the government's constitution concerned the election of 
the new 'executive' president. It had been emphasised from the 
start that qualified whites, coloureds and Indians would be eligi-
ble for the presidential office, but it had also appeared that 
the arithmetic of the presidential electoral college would effect-
ively preclude the election of a coloured or Indian. Both as-
pects were borne out by the provisions of the draft bill. 
The qualifications for presidential candidates were made identi-
cal to those for the three communal assemblies,7 thus nominally 
opening the office for the first time to coloureds and Indians. 
The electoral college, which had previously consisted of members 
of the white Assembly and Senate,B was also modified to incor-
porate coloured and Indian members of the new assemblies. 9 Each 
assembly was empowered to 'designate' members to the college from 
1. S 19(1). In relation to deputy mi~isters see s 20(1). 
2. S 7(5). 
3. That is the provision safeguarding the State President's dignity and 
reputation, also s 13 in the bill. 
4. Below, 301 to 304. 
5. Ss 11, 12, 14 and 15. 
7. S B(4) 
6. S 10. 
B. S 8 of Act No 32 of 1961. 
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its own ranks - fifty whites, twenty-five coloureds and thir-
teen Indians. 1 It was not expressly stipulated that these 
members should be exclusively representative of the majority 
party in each assembly, but this was implicit in the provisions, 
and was clearly the government's intention as indicated during 
the first phase formulations. 2 The bill also purported to en-
trench the size and composition of the electoral college, by 
requiring the approval of all three assemblies for its amend-
ment, although from a juridical point of view it is doubtful 
that this provision would have been binding on the House of 
Assembly;3 however, on either interpretation it would be impos-
sible to increase the sizes of the coloured and Indian components 
in the college without white approval. The electoral college 
would be an ad hoc body and would convene only to elect the presi-
dent,or, if necessary, to dismiss him before the termination of 
his peri6d of office. 
In purely arithmeti~al terms it is clear that the electoral col-
lege would be dominated by the majority party in the white assem-
bly. This dominance would be facilitated by the electoral 
arrangements within the college, as only an absolute majority of 
votes would be required by a presidential candidate to secure 
election;4 without the requirement of a qualified majority the 
coloured and Indian members would not be able to secure a compro-
mise white candidate, by preventing the election of the white 
assembly's nominee. On the other hand the 'impeachment' process 
could only be initiated by a majority vote in the college~ thus 
placing the dismissal of the President beyond the reach of the 
non-white groups. In both cases the majoritarian aspects 
favoured the whites. In terms of this analysis the participa-
tion of coloureds and Indians in the electoral college would be-
come a matter of form and not substance, their participation be-
ing required to legitimate the 'new' presidency. The possibility 
1. This conformed to the 4:2:1 ratio on which the constitution was based. 
2. Eg D. Worrall 'The South African government's 1977 constitutional pro-
posals' in J. Benyon (ed) Constitutional Change in South Africa (1978) 
127 at 129. 
3. That is in terms of s 111 read with s 55 of the bill. 
4. S 8(5). 
5. S 10(1)(b). 
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of a boycott strategy by these groups was also pre-empted, in 
terms of the provision 1 which allowed the college to function 
notwithstanding a shortfall of members - a similar 'no-
quorum' provision was encountered in respect of the other joint 
institutions. 
The position of the State President in the new constitution has 
been described as 'niks anders ... as die handlanger van die 
Blanke parlement nie,.2 In terms of the provisions of the 
draft bill this is an apposite description, but it also makes 
assumptions about the presidency which are not justified in 
terms of the actual powers bestowed on the office. In other 
words, the draft bill failed to provide for an executive presi-
dent in two respects - it did not provide for his popular elec-
tion and independence from the legislature 3 (together with the 
checks and balances associated with presidential government), 
nor did it confer any substantial executive powers on him. 
While these factors showed clear departures from the early for-
mulations of the government's constitution, they were mutually 
consistent and, together with other factors, exposed the new 
arrangement as involving merely changes of constitutional form, 
and not political substance. 
(cc) The council of cabinets 
The draft bill made constitutional provision for the first time 
for a council of cabinets, a successor in title, if not in func-
tion, to the then existing inter-cabinet council, an ad hoc 
extra-constitutional body.4 In the absence of any joint repre-
sentative and deliberative assembly, it was inevitable that the 
council would be the focal point of interest in the government's 
constitution. According to the first phase interpretations it 
would have extensive executive and quasi-legislative powers, and 
in these matters would be the principle forum for elite co-
operation and accommodation; in other words, it was presented as 
1. S 8(1)(b). 
2. M. Wiechers 'Die uitvoerende staatshoof: Enkele opmerkings' in Jacobs 
9P cit 141. 
3. Another alternative would be election by all members of the three assem-
blies sitting together (that is, along the lines of the Bophuthatswana 
presidency, above 250), although presidentialism usually revolves around 
the president having a separate mandate to that of the legislature. 
4. See above, 201-202. 
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both a functional political institution, and as the main source 
of consociational practices. In this case neither contention 
was borne out by the provisions of the bill, although the first 
phase interpretations tended to be projected onto it. 
The chairman of the council of cabinets would be the State Presi-
dent; 1 it would also include the three prime ministers, ex 
officio, and eleven other ministers delegated by them from the 
respective community cabinets - six whites, three coloureds and 
two Indians. The arithmetic of the council would ensure equal 
I 
representation for the white and non-white components, with the 
balance of power vesting in its (white) chairman. It was un-
clear, however, whether ministers could be dismissed by the 
chairman, or even by the relevant prime minister, although con-
tinued tenure in a community cabinet was a sine gua non for mem-
bership of the council, and the President could dismiss members 
of the former after consultation with the relevant prime minis-
ter. 2 As with the electoral college, only majority parties 
would be represented on the council, so that its members would 
be . severally responsible, in the cons t itutional sense, to the 
majorities within each community assembly. 
As far as its functions were concerned, the bill vested no exe-
cutive powers in the council of cabinets - in fact one of its 
anomalies was that it did not state specifically where executive 
power would lie in the new constitutional system. Following 
from this was the fact that no provision was made for the divi-
sion of cabinet portfolios among council members, which meant 
that they would have no executive powers in that capacity but 
only as members of the various community cabinets. On the 
other hand several functions relating to the legislative process 
were conferred on the council - these are analysed in more de-
tail below. 3 Only three other functions were expressly men-
tioned in the bill - the council could request the president's 
council to advise it on matters of national interest,4 it could 
1. On the council of cabinets see s 16 of the draft bill. 
2. S 19(2). 
3. At 305-308~ 
4. S 25. 
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authorise partlclpation by a minister in the proceedings of a 
1 
community assembly of which he was not a member, and a coun-
cil member had to countersign instruments executed by the 
State President. 2 In effect the council of cabinets would 
have been a joint consultative forum for the community cabinets, 
and a co-ordinator of legislative programmes. 3 Without execu-
tive power, or a joint administration to execute its decisions, 
it would have been a relatively insignificant body, politically 
subordinate to the white cabinet. 
No indication was given in the bill as to how decisions would be 
taken in the council of cabinets; there was no suggestion of a 
veto right, nor was there any other institutional requirement of 
4 consensus. Nevertheless, much was made by government spokesmen, 
and even some constitutional commentators, of the consensus 
approach which would prevail in this body, and the corollary of 
joint responsibility for its members i n respect of all council 
decisions. This was clearly an attempt to project the workings 
and conventions of one-party parliamentary cabinets, including 
that in South Africa, onto a composite, multi-party cabinet. 
But the comparison is clearly inappropriate. 5 Even where multi-
party cabinets do exist in parliamentary systems, they are in-
variably based on political coalitions or pacts and, while this 
agreement endures, there is an inducement to achieve consensus in 
the cabinet and it is justifiable to hold ministers responsible 
for cabinet decisions. By contrast, the members of the council 
of cabinets would be drawn from three separate assemblies and would 
represent three unconnected political parties; there would be 
no similar inducement to achieve consensus on all decisions, and 
it would not be constitutionally justifiible to hold ministers 
1. S 44 (2) • 
2. S 18(1). 
3. See Vorster and Viljoen op cit 207. 
4. Eg Worrall op cit 133; House of Assembly Debates vol 10 cols 4549-4555 
( 1 2 Ap r i 1 1 978) . 
5. ~ee s.c. Jacobs 'n Juridiese analise van die konstitusionele voorstelle 
vir n nuwe grondwetlike bedeling in Suid-Airika' in Jacobs (ed) op cit 
88 at 98. 
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jointly responsible for council decisions.
1 Nor would the 
position of the State President in 'determining the consensus' 
be comparable in any way to that of the prime minister in a 
Westminster cabinet. There would also be further anomalies -
the concept of joint responsibility is closely related to that 
of individual ministerial responsibility,2 which would not be . 
applicable in this context; and because members of the council 
would be bound by the convention of joint responsibility in 
their community cabinets (as well as the oath of secrecy3), they 
might be constitutionally responsible for two possibly conflict-
ing decisions. 
(dd) The president's council 
Of lesser importance in the early formulations of the govern-
ment's constitution was the president's council, which, according 
to the draft bill, would consist of fifty-five members, appointed 
by the State President in consultation with the three prime 
ministers. 4 The main qualification for appointment was eligi-
bility to be registered as a voter for one of three assemblies, 
which effectively excluded blacks from membership. The func-
tions envisaged for the president's council at this stage were to 
advise the council of cabinets, at the latter's request, on any 
matter of national interest, and, in its own discretion, to en-
quire into any matter related to such request. 
In view of the subsequent establishment of the president's council 
in slightly modified form, further description or evaluation of 
the bill's provisions is unnecessary here. Suffice it to say 
that during all three phases of the government's constitution it 
1. The reliance by advocates of the government's proposals on Nordlinger's 
concept of the 'stable governing coalition' (E. Nordlinger Conflict 
Regulation in Divided Societies (1972) 21f) is misleading because he . ' restr1cts the concept to coalitions formed between political parties 
prior to elections with the avowed aim of regulating conflict. 
2. E.C.S. Wade and G. Phillips Constitutional and Administrative Law (9 ed, 
1977) 108. 
3. S 19(4). 
4. Ss 23-25. 
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has been presented as a prestigious, non-political body, which 
would attempt to resolve contentious issues in an elite non-
public forum; it was thus envisaged as having a consociational 
form and function. 
(iii) The implications of the draft bill 
Before examining the constitutional dispensation envisaged in 
the draft bill from a consociational perspective, it is nece-
ssary to provide a more detailed analysis of its probable prac-
tical implications in respect of legislative and executive power. 
This task is complicated somewhat by the meagre, and at times 
ambiguous, details provided on these matters. Nevertheless it 
is possible to describe in general terms how the system would 
have operated, and then to evaluate this in terms of the princi-
ples of consociationalism. Lest this be seen as a purely aca-
demic enterprise it should be emphasised that the government's 
commitment to this broad constitutional framework has not wavered, 
although its implementation has been delayed by intervening poli-
tical events. 
(aa) Legislative competence and the legislative process 
The internal logic of the draft bill was dependent on a notional 
'federal' division of competence between the joint and community 
institutions. 1 During the first phase it was indicated that 
most powers would be exercised at the joint level, and, in the ab-
sence of a national legislature, the theory of a 'tricameral parlia-
ment' was constructed to acconnnodate the legislative function at 
this level. In one symbolic respect the draft bill perpetuated 
this theory by providing different nomenclature for the three 
assemblies,2 but it continued to vest legislative power in the 
first instance in the House of Assembly;3 it also gave the Assem-
bly the sole power to appropriate monies from the state revenue 
fund,4 and the primary power to amend the constitutionS (which 
1. The possibility of a list of concurrent functions was also mentioned -
see Worrall op cit 128. 
2. That is House of Assembly, House of Representatives and Chamber of 
Deputies, which~ so the argument ran, together constituted a national 
parliament. On the importance for constitutionalism of the skilful 
handling of symbols see C.J. Friedrich Constitutional Government and 
Democracy (4 ed, 1968) 168f. 
3. S 20(1)(-a). 4. S 91(2). 
5. S 111. The other assemblies could apparently amend the constitution 
if so empowered by the council of cabinets. 
1 
remained highly flexible ). 
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As far as the House of Represen-
tatives and the Chamber of Deputies were concerned, they re-
tained the legislative powers of their predecessors,2 which 
would have meant, in 1979, a few limited areas ~f competence for 
the former only. Beyond this allocation of original legisla-
tive competence, provision was made for what appeared to be a 
flexible delegation of powers to the coloured and Indian assem-
blies. 3 Thus the council of cabinets could, in its own discre-
tion, confer delegated legislative competence over any matter on 
these bodies, or it could refer a specific piece of legislation 
to one of them (or the Assembly) for enactment on an ad hoc basis. 
As far as the distribution of legislative competence was con-
cerned, there was little change with the past, save that the 
powers of the coloured and Indian assemblies could, at the dis-
cretion of the council of cabinets, be extended on a flexible 
basis. The legislative predominance of the white assembly was 
underlined by the fact that its enactments would be immune from 
judicial invalidation,4 which would not be the case with laws of 
the other assemblies unless the council of cabinets had specifi-
cally referred legi~lation to them. 5 In other words, the legis-
lative supremacy of the white parliament was left intact, in-
cluding, by implication, its power to amend the 'new' constitu-
tion. While there are various theoretical problems relating to 
the termination of sovereignty in South African constitutional 
law,6 the retention of the white parliament's supremacy in the 
draft bill should be seen as a deliberate political decision, and 
not as a consequence of these juridical problems. 
As far as the legislative process was concerned, the prevailing 
arrangement was left substantially intact for community legisla-
1. Only ss 101 and 111 were entrenched, requiring the familiar two-thirds 
majority. 
2. S 26(1)(a)(i). 
3. S 26(1)(a)(ii) and (iii). 
4. S 55. In the light of this section it is submitted that the assembly 
could even have amended s 8(1)(d), which purported to entrench itself. 
5. ~other aspect of relevance was that provincial ordinances would continue 
to be void if repugnant to laws of the assembly (s 79), but not, by im-
plication, if repugnant to laws of the other two bodies. 
6. For a full discussion of this matter, see below 445-456. 
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tion; thus each cabinet could, by implication, initiate such 
legislation in the relevant assembly, and it would become ef-
fective after the assent of the appropriate prime minister and 
the State President had been received. 1 No express mention was 
made in the bill of matters which would require 'joint legisla-
tive action', although in terms of the internal logic of the 
constitution such legislation would have required the attention 
and approval of all three assemblies for its validation. But 
if the council of cabinets considered a bill to be of 'common 
concern' it could refer it to all three assemblies for their 
'consideration and views,;2 if differences of opinion were 
to arise among the assemblies, a decision on the matter could be 
taken by the council of cabinets, or it could be referred to a 
joint advisory committee for its views, and if the latter body 
could also not reach agreement, the State President, in his 
capacity as cabinet council chairman, could take a decision. A 
decision taken at any stage of this process would finalise the 
contents of the legislation, and would be binding on the minister 
concerned. Such legislation would still require parliamentary 
enactment, but it could be disposed of by a single community 
assembly as specified by the council of cabinets. This proce-
dure cannot be constitutionally justified on the same basis as 
the normal arrangement in a bicameral system where, in cases of 
deadlock, one chamber (in the Westminster systems the lower repre-
sentative house) can prevail over the other (usually a hereditary 
or indirectly elected house); in the governmentts constitution 
all three 'houses' would be directly representative of different 
segments of the electorate, and any legislation enacted according 
to the procedure described above would be lacking in terms of 
representative support and legitimacy. It should be remembered, 
however, that the above procedure was only permissive and not 
peremptory, and the council of cabinets could in its discretion 
submit 'common concern' legislation directly to one or other 
assembly for enactment, without its taking the legitimising route 
just described. A final significant aspect of 'common concern' 
legislation is that it would be initiated by the white cabinet 
and not the council of cabinets, a point alluded to again below. 
1. S 58. 
2. S 26(1)(a)(iv). 
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The anal ysis has shown that the House of Assembly would have a 
dominant role in the legislative process in terms of the bill's 
distribution of competence, the amendment procedure,and the 
financial arrangements, and it would be neither constitutionally 
circumscribed nor judicially controlled (despite the fact that 
the constitution as a whole implied a judicial testing-right). 
The other assemblies would not be co-ordinate 'parliaments', 
but subordinate legislatures, with predominantly delegated and 
not original authority. The council of cabinets would have a 
co-ordinating function in relation to the preparation and settle-
ment of legislative programmes; it would also have a potential 
legislative function in relation to 'common concern' legislation, 
but in the light of its composition and the chairman's method 
of election, this would not be likely to obstruct legislative 
proposals emanating from the white cabinet; in this sense it 
would serve more as a legitimising agent, than as a 'first legis-
lative chamber'. 1 In overall terms, there would be no signifi-
cant shift in the locus of legislative power. 
(bb) Executive power 
In the light of the above analysis on legislative power it is un-
necessary to provide as detailed an analysis of the draft bill's 
implications for executive power. Although the bill was surpris-
ingly non-committal on this question, it is clear that the coun-
cil of cabinets would have had no executive functions and there 
would have been no distribution of 'national' portfolios among 
its members. 2 The bill provided3 that persons appointed to the 
community cabinets would be the ministers of the republic, and 
that they would administer the state departments in that capacity. 
From the sizes of the respective cabinets 4 it is also clear that 
all 'national' or common concern departments would be administered 
by white ministers, and the same would apply to most of the State 
President's powers (for example in respect of black affairs5 ). 
In short, all executive power would remain with the white cabinet, 
1. Cf J. van der Vyver 'Prospects for the Future Political Development of 
South Africa' in De Crespigny and Schrire (eds) The Government and Poli-
tics of South Africa (1978) 245 at 255. 
2. S 18(1) created the seeming anomaly that members of the council of cabinets 
had to countersign for the State President when he acted as head of the 
executive government, although in their capacity as members of the council 
they had neither executive nor administrative powers. 
3. S 19. 
4. That is 17 white ministers, 5 coloured ministers and 3 Indian ministers. 
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save for that relating to matters of exclusive concern to 
coloureds and Indians which would be vested in the other two 
cabinets. The implications of this arrangement for the politi-
cal system are again clear. 
Brief reference should be made, in this context, to the admin- o 
istration. It is a measure of the rigidity in contemporary 
constitutional thinking that the draft bill made so few refer-
ences to the composition, functions and control of this branch 
of government. It is by now a trite observation that we are 
living in the age of the administrative state, in which the 
gravitation of power from the legislature to the executive has 
been succeeded by a similar trend from the executive to the ad-
ministration. Constitutional theory has been slow to accommodate 
this development, let alone the modern phenomenon of corporatism. 1 
In the bill only incidental references were made to the establish-
2 ment of departments of state, and the only other provisions on 
this subject 3 empowered the State President to make appointments 
in the public service, and to appoint the members of an adminis-
tration commission which would perform certain functions relating 
to the appointment, discipline and retirement of public servants. 4 
By default, as it were, the existing white-dominated bureaucracy 
would have been left intact, although, insofar as administrative 
power follows the executive, this clearly fitted into the general 
scheme. 5 This factor further weakened the 'tricameral legisla-
ture' theory, because the execution of common concern legislation 
would have been undertaken by officials accountable to only one 
component of the 'composite parliament'. 
1. On corporatism, see above, 41. 
2. Ss 18(1)(b) and 19(6). 
3. S 21. 
4. That is, similar functions to the existing Public Service Commission. 
The bill did not explicitly restrict membership of this commission to 
whites. 
5. Reference has been made to the importance attached to the administration 
in Zimbabwe's constitutional development. See above, 234-239. 
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(cc) The draft bill and consociationalism 
It can be said in general that the draft bill would have produced 
a decidedly less consociational form of government than that en-
h ," 1 visaged during the first phase of t e government s constltutlon. 
Nevertheless it still contained several consociational elements -
the concept of an institutionalised grand coalition was embodied 
in the council of cabinets and its subsidiary institutions, the 
president's council, financial council and joint advisory com-
mittees; the principle of proportionality determined the compo-
sition of the electoral college, the council of cabinets, the 
president's council and the joint advisory committees, and the 
sizes of the community assemblies were also proportionately cal-
culated. The institutional basis for segmental autonomy was pro-
vided in the form of the community assemblies and cabinets, elect-
ed by and responsible to separate electorates,and having juris-
diction over the respective segments. A closer analysis of the 
consociational elements, however, supports the views of Hanf, 
Weiland and Vierdag that,2 
' ... some of the structural features of consociation 
have been adopted, as well as its vocabulary. But 
its essence is missing: the regulation of conflict 
remains unilateral, rather than being worked out by 
all the parties concerned. Power remains in the 
hands of the white group.' 
In the fi~st place the exclusion of blacks from the arrangement 
made it not only undemocratic, but also imperfectly consociation-
aI, in that an important conflict group would have had neither 
segmental autonomy nor a share in political power. For the 
government the consociational option was only feasible, from a 
demographic point of view, if blacks were excluded, and it was 
able to justify this exclusion in terms of the homelands policy. 
1. See L.J. Boulle 'The New Constitutional Proposals and the Possible Trans-
ition to Consociational Democracy' in F. van 2yl Slabbert and J. Opland 
(eds) South Africa: Dilemmas of Evolutionary Change (1980) 14-28, and 
'Federation and Consociation: Conceptual Links and Current Constitution-
al Models' 44 (1981) THR-RR 236; W.B. Vosloo 'Consociational Democracy 
as a means to accomplish peaceful political change in South Africa: an 
evaluation of the constitutional change proposed by the National Party 
in 1977' 6 (1979) Politikon 13-28; A. Lijphart 'Federal, Confederal and 
Consociational Options for the Sputh African Plural Society' in R. Rotberg 
and J. Barratt (eds) Conflict and Compromise in South Africa (1980) 51-
76. 
2. T. Ranf, R. Weiland and G. Vierdag South Africa: The Prospects of Peace-
ful Change (1981) 412. 
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Nevertheless the government had disturbed its own pattern of 
constitutional development when it instituted the community coun-
cil system,1 and there were persistent rumours during 1980 that 
it was considering the creation of a fourth assembly for blacks 
to complete the 'consociational' arrangement. But even this 
development would have had drastic implications for the arith-
metical equilibrium of the government's constitution, and the 
concept of a black parliament was gradually dropped. 
A second major weakness, in terms of consociational theory, is 
that the 'segments J in the government's constitution would be 
predetermined by existing legislation 2 and would not be self-
defined in terms of commonly-perceived interests; there would 
thus be no possibility of 'inter-segmental' mobility. Neither 
could there be political alliances or co-operation between mem-
bers of different 'segments' in terms of the Prohibition of Poli-
tical Interference Act,3 the retention of which was implicit in 
the whole scheme. Only the removal of the government-imposed 
'segmental' definitions 4 and the allowance of free political 
associationS would permit the emergence of the homogeneous seg-
ments on which consociationalism depends. 6 
1. See above, 179-182. 
2. le the Population Registration Act No 30 of 19S0, referred to in the 
definition provision (s 112) of the draft bill. 
3. Act No 51 of 1968. 
4. Lijphart (op cit 68) regards this factor as being a 'practical problem' 
rather than as being inimical to consociational theory. But where 
political organisation does not follow 'segmental' boundaries (as in 
South Africa) then significant minorities within each 'segment' will 
be excluded from the joint power-sharing institutions, particulary where, 
as in the government's constitution, the majoritarian principle is 
applied at the intra-segmental level. Thus the 'grand coalition' 
would be a coalition of majority parties only, to the exclusion of 
opposition parties. Furthermore leadership-elites would be conscious 
of the need to preserve their 'majority' status, which might inhibit 
them from agreeing to compromise arrangements - this problem would not 
be so acute where each segment was represented by a single political 
party. 
5. See below, 390-394. 
6. On free political association and pluralism see above, 78. 
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The third major deviation from consociational theory relates to 
the absence of an effective veto power for coloureds and Indians.1 
Thus must be seen in conjunction with the fact that, in relation 
to the combined white, coloured and Indian electorate, the 
whites constitute an overall majority - at this level there is 
no notional 'multiple balance of power ' ,2 which is a favourable 
condition for consociationalism. The basic structure of the 
constitution translated this majority proportionately into a white 
majority in the electoral college, the president's council and 
the joint advisory committees, so that in these institutions the 
coloureds and Indians, the new 'opposition' to the wh i te govern-
ment, would have constituted, jointly and severally, permanent 
minorities. Despite their presence in these bodies their minor-
ity position would have made them powerless to influence the 
decision-making process without a veto right. ~~ere coloureds 
and Indians were over-represented in a joint institution, namely 
the council of cabinets, they also had no veto power,as the Presi-
dent was empowered to take binding decisions. Proponents of 
the scheme emphasised that despite the absence of a constitution-
al veto power, consensus could become a fundamental norm in the 
political process, but this prediction would seem over-optimistic 
in the light of South Africa's political background. In Dahl's 
terms,3 the constitution would have given rise to a more inclu-
sive political system (in terms of increased citizen participa-
tion), but would not have involved greater political contestation 
because of the new opposition's institutionalised minority status 
and lack of veto power. 
In several other respects the government's constitutional system 
fell short of the consociational requirements. The earlier ana-
lysis of legislative and executive power4 shows that 'segmental 
autonomy' for coloureds and Indians could not have materialised 
in practice. The bill purported to entrench the number of repre-
sentatives for each group in the joint institutions, instead of 
1. Lijphart op cit 68. 
2. See above, 120. 
3.- R. Dahl Polyarchy - Participation and Opposition (1971) 5ff. 
4. See above, 305-309. 
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allowing for a flexible adjustment to accormnodate future demo-
graphic changes. As far as the propor tionality principle is 
concerned, this would not have mitigated the influence of the 
white majority, but would have emphasised it; proportionality 
was also not contemplated as the basis of making public appoint-
ments or allocating the 'spoils' of government. The constitu-
tion would have retained that feature of the Westminster system 
which is most anti-consociational in effect, namely that success 
in one decisive site - the elections for the white assembly -
would permit domination of the whole political system. 
(dd) The government's constitution and legitimacy 
The first two phases of the 1977 constitution saw the commitment 
of the government to the terminology, and to a lesser extent the 
form, of consociationalism, in its search for a new legitimising 
ideology. The preceding analysis has shown that the 1977 con-
stitution provided for the consociational incorporation of 
coloured and Indian leaders into the political system on a dif-
ferential basis,which would have given rise, at the most, to a 
system of sham consociationalism, or consociational authoritar-
ianism. The negative response to these proposals from coloured 
and Indian leaders,and the failure of the government itself to 
implement them, shows that they could have made little impact on 
the legitimacy crisis facing the state system in South Africa. 
Thus it was not consociationalism itself, but the government's 
distorted version thereof, which can be negatively evaluated in 
terms of these developments. Nevertheless, the question of con-
sociationalism and legitimacy deserves further attention at this 
stage. 
The legitimacy of the new constitution was undermined by a number 
of factors. These include the unilateral way in which it was 
drafted and presented to coloureds and Indians,1 an inauspicious 
propagation for a consociational system, the exclusion of blacks, 
to which references have already been made,2 the dependence of 
the system of race classification, and the fact that, in spite 
1. See Lijphart op cit 68; Ranf, Weiland and Vierdag op cit 412. 
2. See above, 310-311. 
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of the inclusion of consociational elements, it did not affect 
the real distribution of political power. Some of these as-
pects could have been rectified through a more consistent appli-
cation of consociational principles, but it is submitted that 
the real legitimation problem arose from the fact that the gov-
ernment's constitution provided a new institutional framework 
for the same policy of political separatism. It was inevitable 
that the legitimacy problem affecting this policy should be 
transferred to the new constitution when it became apparent that 
it involved no fundamental change in policy. It is important 
to note that the same legitimation problem would "affect any con-
sociational arrangement which incorporated and institutionalised 
that policy. This can be illustrated by pursuing the line of 
analysis adopted by Olivier. 1 The government's policy is based 
on the assumption that it is possible to draw a distinction be-
tween matters which affect each of the white, coloured and Indian 
groups exclusively, and others which affect them all generally. 
In accordance with this distinction each group should have ex-
clusive legislative and executive control over those separable 
matters which exclusively affect it, and the institutions exer-
cising that control require both personal and territorial juris-
diction. In the South African context both types of jurisdic-
tion are inherently dependent on existing discriminatory statutes, 
namely the Population Registration Act 2 and the Group Areas Act,3 
both of which are politically and economically unacceptable to 
most non-whites. 4 From a functional point of view there are 
very few powers which can be exercised by institutions which have 
only personal jurisdiction - education is one such matter, but 
apart from others relating to linguistic or cultural affairs, the 
list is comparatively short. Jurisdiction over a territorial 
area is the only basis on which separate institutions with sub-
stantial powers can be justified. There are indications that 
the government intended to devolve relatively substantial author-
ity to the coloured and Indian institutions, but this could only 
1. N.J.J. Olivier 'Die Regering se Konstitusionele Voorstelle' (unpublished 
paper, Cape Town, 1979) 24-26. 
2. Act No 30 of 1950. 3. Act No 36 of 1966. 
4. The analysis could be extended to show that other statutes, such as the 
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act No 55 of 1949, would also be in-
dispensible to the functioning of the 1977 constitution. 
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have been exercised with the group areas legislation providing 
the jurisdictional base, a statute which is not only discrimi-
natory per se, but is also enforced by whites. The only way in 
which this aspect of the legitimacy problem could be avoided is 
by conferring most powers on the joint authorities - and the 
consistent ~pplication of consociational principles at this 
level would have significant implications for white political 
power. 
4. The Schlebusch Report and its Sequel 
1 Ca) Pre-Schlebusch commission developments 
Reference has already been made to the first statutory steps 
taken in the implementation of the 1977 constitution, even before 
the publication of the 1979 draft bill;2 however, by the time 
the Schlebusch report was published the legislation had not been 
put into effect, and the post-Schlebusch implementation of the 
constitution began with the South African Indian Council still in 
its original non-elected form and without any significant powers. 
Concurrently with the investigations of the Schlebusch commission 
in 1979 and early 1980, three political developments of constitu-
tional significance were taking place. The first related to the 
position of urban blacks, and involved the government's accep-
tance,and partial implementation, of the Wiehahn and Riekert re-
commendations; and the phasing in of the community council system; 
whatever the political limitations of these changes, they evi-
denced a greater official acceptance of the permanence of blacks 
in the tcommon area' than the government's constitutional policy 
suggested. The second development involved changes in the state 
administration, which were made with the intention of · co-ordinating 
policy~makirig and its implementation; this included a reduction 
in the number of state departments, changes to the structure and 
1. On the Schlebusch commission, see above, 270-273. 
2. See above, 173-175. 
3. These commissions have been referred to above, 265-270. 
316. 
functions of cabinet committees, and the rationalisation and 
streamlining of the public service. 1 The third development was 
the promotion of the 'constellation of states,2 concept, which 
was perceived mainly in terms of economic co-operation in south-
ern Africa, but which had implications for constitutional devel-
opment. 
Mention should also be made of a constitutional development of 
consequence which occurred before the Schlebusch report was pub-
lished, namely the abolition of the Coloured Persons Representa-
tive ·Council. 3 The significance of this step was that it evi-
denced a movement away from the principle of representative gov-
ernment, as it had hitherto been applied in South Africa, towards 
a more managerial system of government;4 this trend was also 
evident in the earlier rationalisation of the state administra-
tion, as well as in subsequent constitutional developments. 
This also meant that the consociational incorporation of colour-
eds into the political system could not take place via a repre-
sentative institution, and after the government had announced 
later in the year that the Coloured Persons Council would not be 
established, it could not even take place via a nominated in-
stitution. It was therefore inevitable that there would be a 
change in emphasis when the constitution came to be implemented; 
this change was already evident in the Schlebusch report which 
recommended the creation of a president's council which could be 
used to incorporate individual coloured elites into the political 
process. 
Cb) The Schlebusch Commission recommendations 
Five specific constitutional recommendations were made in the 
majority report of the Schlebusch commission. These were: 
1. The number of cabinet committees was reduced from 22 to 6, and the 
number of state departments from 40 to 22. For a summary of these 
changes see 1979 Annual Survey of Race Relations 5-6. 
2. On the constellation of states see below, 348-352. 
3. By Act No 24 of 1980. 
4. On the topic of 'managerial government' see the excellent paper of H. 
Giliomee 'Structural Change and Political Options' Platform 80 series, 
University of Natal (13 February 1980). 
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1. That the Senate be abolished (although this did not imply an 
acceptance of the principle of unicameralism); 
2. That, in view of the recommendations on the Senate, the en-
trenching procedure be placed within the jurisdiction of the 
House of Assembly alone; 
3. That a Vice-State President be elected on the same basis as 
the President to serve ex officio as chairman of the presi-
dent's council; 
4. That a president's council, consisting of sixty 'nationally 
acknowledged experts' appointed by the State President, be 
established, to advise the State President on various matters; 
s. Tha t the House of Assembly be enlarged to accommodate twenty 
additional members to be nominated by party leaders on a pro-
portional basis. 
It is immediately apparent that the majority recommendations are 
all reconcilable with the broad principles of the 1977 constitu-
tion, and in fact amount to a selective endorsement of it. 
There is also, hbwever, the change in emphasis necessitated by 
the disestablishment of the Coloured Persons Representative Coun-
cil: for the first time the president's council assumes a prom-
inent position, and it is necessary for the implementation of the 
1977 constitution to be commenced at the highest tier of govern-
ment. A Vice-State President had not been mentioned in the 
first two phases of the government's constitution, but was nece-
ssary to add prestige to the president's council and to avoid the 
State President being drawn into the political arena. The gov-
ernment accepted all the majority recommendations and proceeded 
to implement them within a short period; while the constitution-
al amendments described below did not all chronologically follow 
the publication of the report, they are all closely related to 
the new direction of constitutional development suggested by the 
commission. 
(i) The abolition of the Senate 
One of the unanimous recommendations of the Schlebusch commission 
was that the Senate should be abolished with effect from I Jan-
uary 1981, and appropriate legislation was passed fOT this purpose. 1 
1. S 16 of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Fifth Amendment Act No 
101 of 1980 repealed those sections of the Constitution relating to the 
Senate; in terms of s 37(1) of the act s 16 came into operation on 1 
"January 1981. 
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This recommendation clearly accorded with the early formulations 
of the 1977 constitution and the 1979 draft bill - had the Senate 
been retained it would have been necessary to establish two ad-
ditional upper chambers for the coloured and Indian 'parlia-
ments' . The abolition of the Senate was generally perceived as 
an important step in the movement away from the Westminster con- . 
stitutional model, whereas in reality bicameralism is only a 
1 . 
secondary feature of that model and the Senate's demise had 
more of a symbolic than a practical significance. In theoret-
ical constitutional terms it involved a weakening of the re-
straints on the legislature's powers, but in practice the Senate's 
role as a chamber of review had been very limited. 2 It had also 
not been conspicuous in representing provincial interests or the 
interests of those excluded from the franchise,and even in its 
more specialised role as curator of the entrenched sections it 
had been manipulated by the House of Assembly. But although it 
was performing no important constitutional function there is some 
merit in the view that the Schlebusch commission could have inves-
tigated the pos~ibility of a radical reformation of the Senate,so 
as to build upon its institutional legitimacy.3 The abolition 
of the indirectly-elected Senate was further evidence of the 
trend away from representative institutions in South Africa, the 
Senate's 'substitute', the president's council, being a fully 
nominated body. 
In anticipation of the abolition of the Senate the entrenching 
procedure had been statutorily altered4 to enable the entrenched 
provisions to be amended by the House of Assembly and State Presi-
dent only, the tradition of rigidity being retained in the re-
quirement of a two-thirds majority in the House. This act was 
itself passed at a joint sitting of the Senate and the House of 
Assembly and approved by the required two-thirds majority,S and 
·1 . See above, 24. 2. See above, 150. 
3. See on this theme M. Wiechers 'Grondslae vir Politieke Ontwikkeling in 
Suid-Afrika' in J. Coetzee (ed) Gedenkbundel H.L. Swanepoel (1976) 102. 
4. S 1 of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Fourth Amendment Act No 
74 of 1980, which amended s 118 ·of the constitution. See M. Wiechers 
Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 267-8. 
5. That is in terms of s 63 of the Constitution. In fact all parties 
a?pr?ved the three readings of the bill. See the Debates of the Joint 
S~tt~ng of the Senate and the House of Assembly cols 1-43 (21-22 May 1980). 
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when the act became effective 1 it relegated the joint sitting 
procedure, a focal feature of the constitutional crisis in the 
1950's, to constitutional history. As this legislation was 
enacted prior to the abolition of the Senate 2 the entrenched 
procedure was not required for the later action, which was 
effected through the normal bicameral process. 
The abolition of the Senate had been preceded in 1980 by another 
constitutional amendment 3 which could also be said to have in-
directly anticipated it, although the amendment was not motivated 
in those terms. 4 The act provided5 that for delimitation pur-
poses resort should henceforth be had to a provincial, and not a 
national, quota for determining the size of each constituency, 
subject to the discretionary loading and unloading. The quotas 
would be obtained by dividing the number of voters in each pro-
vince by the number of members to be elected therein in terms of 
section 40 of the Constitution. This meant that the quotas in 
each province, and the number of voters in each constituency, 
could come to dtffer, thus affecting the value or weight of the 
vote in different provinces. This development should be seen 
against the historical conflict between the 'pegging principle' 
(namely that each province should have a constitutionally-fixed 
number of seats in the House of Assembly), and the 'national 
quota principle' (namely that all constituencies in ,the country 
should be of approximately equal voter strength). 
Under the South Africa Act each province was guaranteed a minimum 
number of seats~ and it was therefore appropriate to use a pro-
1. S 2 of the act provided that it would come into operation immediately 
after the Senate ceased to exist. 
2. It was approved by the State President on 17 May 1980. 
3. The Republic of South Africa Constitution Third Amendment Act No 28 of 
1980,which was the first of the 1980 amendments to come into operation. 
The fact that this amendment was passed before publication of the Schle-
busch report was criticised by opposition members in the debates (eg 
House of Assembly Debates vol 8 col 3391 (24 March 1980)). 
4. See the deputy minister's motivation House of Assembly Debates vol 8 
col 3378-9 (24 March 1980). 
5. S 1 amended s 43 of the Constitution. 
6. This was regulated by s 33 of the South Africa Act and resulted in the 
following inter-provincial distribution of constituencies - Cape Province 
58, Natal 12, Orange Free State 14, Transvaal 37; Natal and the OFS 
were both over-represented. 
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vincial quota system to delimit the constituencies within each 
province. 1 As the size of the Assembly increased the provinces 
with growing populations acquired additional seats,2 until the 
3 various provincial quotas were approximately equal. In 1941 
the pegging principle was discarded, and the delimitation com-
mission was empowered to allocate constituencies among the pro-
vinces in proportion to their voter strength;4although the pro-
vincial quota system was retained it had little practical signi-
ficance,since the quota in each province now approximated a 
notional 'national quota,.5 In 1965 a national quota system 
was introduced for the first time,6 and there was no need to re-
fer to the inter-provincial allocation of seats, because it was 
provided that the country would be divided into 165 constituen-
cies of approximately equal size; this arrangement was implicitly 
based on the principle that like constituencies should be of 
equal size throughout the country, and that the value of indivi-
dual votes should also be equal. But in 1973 the pegging prin-
ciple was reintroduced,7 and the Constitution purported to en-
trench the inter~provincial allocation of seats for a decade. 8 
There was now an apparent incompatibility between the pegging and 
quota principles, but in practice the former prevailed over the 
latter and the national quota lost all its significance - con-
siderable inter-provincial discrepancies arose between the number 
1. Provided for in s 40(1) of the South Africa Act (later amended by s 22 
of Act No 20 of 1940, read with s 1 of Act No 10 of 1946). 
2. S 34. 'The size of the House could be increased to 150 members, which 
was reached in 1931. 
3. See H.J. May The South African Constitution (3 ed, 1955) 82. 
4. The Electoral Quota Consolidation Act No 30 of 1942 amended the relevant 
provisions of the South Africa Act. 
5. This system of delimitation and inter-provincial allocation of seats was 
retained in the republican constitution - ss 40, 42 and 43. 
6. The Constitution Amendment Act No 83 of 1965 which amended ss 40 and 43 
of the Constitution; the quota would be calculated by dividing the total 
number of voters in the country by 165 (the act also increased the size 
of the House to this number). The only deference to the provincial 
system was that constituencies could not straddle provincial boundaries. 
7. The Constitution and Elections Amendment Act No 79 of 1973, s 81 of 
which substituted a new s 40 in the Constitution. S 83 provided for 
the first time that the large size constituencies could be unloaded to 
70 per cent of the quota. 
8. That is Cape Province 55 seats, Natal 20 seats, Orange Free State 14 
seats, Transvaal 76 seats. 
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of voters in like constituencies because seats could no longer 
be withdrawn from the depopulating provinces to be allocated 
elsewhere. The 1980 amendment dispensed with the national 
quota altogether, and buttressed the pegging principle by intro-
ducing the provincial quota system. The 1980 delimitation was 
done on the basis of widely differing quotas for the different 
provinces" and the pegging principle ensured that the Transvaal 
was, in proportional terms, under-represented in the Assembly; 
the system of loading and unloading further aggravated the dis-
. . 2 
crepancies in constltuency Slzes. 
The relevance of this excursus to the abolition of the Senate is 
that the new arrangement compensated the smaller provinces in 
some measure for the minimal representation which they had lost 
in the upper chamber. In this sense the over-representation of 
the minority provinces can be seen as a variation on the conso-
ciational principle of proportionality, although to see the 
amendment in these terms would involve an ex post facto ration-
alisation. 3 From a democratic point of view it involves a sig-
nificant departure from the 'one vote one value' principle: 
which the consociational model attempts to uphold by translating 
electoral support into proportional legislative representation. 
Thus while the abolition of the Senate is of no particular sig-
nificance . in terms of consociational theory, one of the related 
constitutional amendments can be said to have negative implica-
tions from a consociational perspective. 
(ii) The restructuring of the House of Assembly 
As partial compensation for the abolition of the Senate, and in 
conformity with the principles embodied in the government's 1977 
constitution, the size of the House of Assembly was increased in 
1. That is the Cape 12 626, Natal 13 283, Orange Free State 12 863, and 
rransvaal 15 433. And see above, 149. 
2. In the 1981 general election the largest constituency was Bezuidenhout 
(urban, Transvaal) with 17 308 voters, and the smallest Prieska (rural, 
Cape) with 8 720 - a ratio of 1,98:1. See above, 147-149 . 
3. The relevant legislation waE perceived by many political commentators 
as being a product of the internal divisions within the National Party, 
as it affected the power of the conservative faction whose strength lay 
in the Transvaal. 
4. See I. Duchacek Rights and Liberties in the World Today (1973) 194. 
On the reapportionment decisions in the United States, see below, 459. 
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1980 to 177 members,1 and provision was made for the first time 
for non-elected members of this body. The directly elected 
component of 165 members was retained, as was the method of 
delimitation and the inter-provincial pegging principle; pro-
vision was made for an additional four members to be nominated 
by the State President, one from each province,2 and for a third 
component of eight members to be elected on a proportional basis 
by an electoral college comprising the directly elected members. 3 
The nominated and indirectly elected members would require the 
same qualifications for membership of the House as the elected 
members, and their membership would be co-terminous with the 
life of the House; casual vacancies would be filled by nomina-
tion or election, according to whether the vacating member had 
himself been nominated or indirectly elected. 4 
This restructuring of the House of Assembly involved several 
minor deviations from the 1979 draft bill and the Schlebusch 
report. The former made provision for twelve additional mem-
bers, of whom three would be elected on a proportional basis by 
each provincial electoral college consisting of the elected mem-
bers from that province, and for eight members to be nominated 
by the white prime minist-er, of whom two would be from each pro-
vince. 5 The latter recommended that all twenty additional mem-
bers should be nominated, but that this be done by the State 
President on the recommendation of party leaders and in propor-
tion to the parties' representation in the House. 6 The amend-
ment followed the draft bill, save that the numbers of nominated 
and indirectly elected members were reduced, and the provincial 
factor in the election of the latter members was dispensed with. 
The new arrangement was modelled on similar features pertaining 
to the former Senate, and its principles were sometimes supported 
in those terms. 7 
1. The Republic of South Africa Constitution Fifth Amendment Act No 101 of 
1980, s 17 of which substituted a new sub-sec (ii) in s 40 of the Con-
stitution Act. 
2. The amended s 40(1)(b) of the Constitution Act. 
3. The amended s 40(1)(c) of the Constitution Act. For the regulations per-
taining to these elections see No R 2501 Gov Gaz 7325 (5 December 1980). 
4. The amended s 40(1B) of the Constitution Act. 
5. Draft bill s 27(1)Cb) and Cc). 
6. Schlebusch Report 7. 
7. See, eg, House of Assembly Debates vol 16 col 8057 (4 June 1980). 
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The main justification given by the government for increasing 
the size of the House of Assembly with nominated and indirectly 
elected members was that it would enable knowledgeable persons 
and specialists in various fields to be brought into the House 
if they were unable to obtain seats by way of ordinary election.' 
A second justification was that it would allow a better repre-
sentation to be achieved in the House in respect of otherwise 
unrepresented groups or interests. 2 A comparative constitu-
tional precedent for the proportionately elected component is 
found in the Federal Republic of Germany, where half the members 
of the Bundestag are directly elected in constituencies accord-
ing to the plurality principle, and the other half are elected 
on a proportional basis through a party list system.
3 
But pre-
cedents for cabinet-nominated members of a non-secondary legis-
lature are less easy to discover, save in respect of the Venda 
and Bophuthatswana parliaments. 4 
The main crItIcIsms of these amendments are that they tend to 
make the House lundemocratic' ,5 they distort the balance of power 
between the political parties, and they increase the extent of 
executive control over the legislature. The first criticism is 
prima facie the strongest, particularly in relation to the nomi-
nated members. What may be appropriate for a second and second-
ary chamber, is less easily justifiable in respect of a uni-
cameral sovereign legislature. While the total non-elective 
component at present constitutes only a small minority of the 
members of the House, the introduction of this feature involves 
a further movement away from representative government which 
could be accentuated over time, even at the parliamentary level. 
The usual rejoinder to this criticism is that the undemocratic 
features of the new system are offset by the better all-round 
representation which can now be achieved; it is worth noting, 
however, that the statute prescribes no additional qualifications, 
in terms of background, experience or specialisation, for either 
1. See the minister's second reading speech, House of Assembly Debates 
vol 16 col 8037-8 (4 June 1980). 
2. House of Assembly Debates vol 16 col 8740 (4 June 1980). 
3. Hand, Georgel and Sasse European Electoral Systems Handbook (1979) 58ff. 
4. See above, 250-251. 
5. That is within the confines of the 'white' political system. 
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group of additional members, and the experience of the Senate 
suggests that party loyalties will inevitably predominate over 
other considerations when these members are chosen.
1 
The 
possible implications of this arrangement should be seen in 
conjunction with the government's recently-acquired ability to 
draw 'specialists' directly into the cabinet for a full year, 
which also entitles them to participate, short of voting, in the 
proceedings of the Assembly.2 
The second criticism relates to the inter-party relationships 
within the House, although in terms of South Africa's political 
realities this operates at a somewhat theoretical level. The 
four 'nominated' members give the government an increased major-
ity unrelated to its popular support or parliamentary strength, 
and in a situation where there was a delicate balance of power 
between government and opposition they could maintain the govern-
ment in power, despite losses in by-elections or changes of 
party allegiance by elected members which would normally unseat 
it. The government's position has been further strengthened 
by a subsequent amendment 3 which allows all non-elected members 
of parliament to retain their seats, notwithstanding the disso-
lution of parliament and the holding of such election, for at 
least 180 days after a general election; this could also, in 
theory, lead to a defeated government remaining in power. 4 Apart 
from the distortions which these factors involve for the Westmin-
ster system of parliamentarianism, they also have an anti-conso-
ciational effect in that they strengthen the influence of the 
majority white party, and any future increase in the size of the 
1. The first election of members by the electoral college took place on 
22 January 1981 and resulted in the return of seven additional govern-
ment members and one from the official opposition. Of the government 
members, six were former senators and one was a party organiser; the 
opposition member was a political researcher and former MP. The four 
nominated members were all active National Party politicians. After 
the 1981 general election, the government chose two members with 'special 
expertise'. See H. Rudolph 'Nominated Members of Parliament and the 
Demise of the Entrenched Sections' 98 (1981) SALJ 346 at 348. 
2. See below, 333-336. 
3. South Africa Constitution Amendment Act No 40 of 1981. 
4. See the example in H. Rudolph op cit 350. 
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nominated component would accentuate this phenomenon. As far 
as the eight proportionately elected members are concerned, their 
presence would not distort the party power-balance within par-
liament, save insofar as the majoritarian electoral system dis-
torts the initial representation of political parties, and they 
reflect this distortion; thus from a consociational point of 
view this is a false 'proportionality'. Proportionality can 
serve an independent consociational purpose if it exists along-
side majoritarianism,1 but not where it is built onto majoritar-
ianism, in which case it involves merely an extension of the 
latter. The proportionality principle introduced into the 
structure of the House of Assembly cannot, therefore, be regarded 
as a consociational feature. 
The third criticism is that the amendments increase the cabinet's 
ability to dominate the legislature, thereby distorting the recip-
rocal relationships of control and responsibility traditionally 
associated with the Westminster form of parliamentary government. 2 
This criticism also tends to operate at the level of constitu-
tional theory because the gravitation of power from the legisla-
ture to the executive, and the dominance of the latter over the 
former, are common features of modern systems of government. In 
relation to this theory the nominated members, and to only ~ 
slightly lesser extent the government's proportionately elected 
members, ensure greater direct control for the cabinet over the 
legislature, since these members are 'responsible', not to con-
stituents, but to the government, on whom they depend for re-
appointment; even the partial separation of powers of a parlia-
mentary system is distorted by this arrangement. Secondly, the 
constitutional responsibility of the cabinet to the legislature, 
as envisaged in a parliamentary system, is affected by the above 
factors; and thirdly, the responsibility of the executive to the 
1. For example in the West German electoral system each voter has a second 
vote for the party of his choice, irrespective of whether there is a 
party candidate contesting the constituency in which he is entitled to 
vote. The proportional allocation of seats from party lists thus bears 
a close arithmetical relationship to the popular support of the parties. 
2. See above, 26. 
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electorate, as mediated through a representative legislature, 
becomes more remote when the mediating institution is only 
partly elected. These changes involve a move away from the 
principle of constitutional government, and, insofar as conso-
ciationalism presupposes a deep sense of constitutionalism, they 
are not favourable developments from a consociational point of 
view. 
(iii) The Vice-State President and the president's council 
The Schlebusch r~port recommended the creation of a new office 
of Vice-State President, and this recommendation was accepted by 
the government and given effect in the Fifth Constitution Amend-
ment Act of 1980. 1 Although the two earlier formulations of 
the government's 1977 constitution had made no provision for this 
position, it was to assume some significance in view of the em-
phasis placed on the president's council in the post-Schlebusch 
developments. It also suggested that the government wished to 
retain a 'non-political' presidency, because from a functional 
point of view there was no reason why the President could not 
perform the tasks conferred on the Vice-State President. But 
perhaps the most compelling reason for the creation of the new 
position was that it would give added status and prestige to the 
president's council, of which the Vice-State President would be 
chairman; ' in fact the amendment act provided that the qualifica-
tions, election, tenure of office and removal of the Vice-State 
President would be the same as those relating to the President, 
and the provisions pertain to his remuneration and pension were 
also similar. 
Two basic functions have been allocated to the Vice-State Presi-
dent. The first is to substitute for the State President when 
the latter i~ unable to perform the duties of his office;2 in 
this respect he is a replacement for the president of the former 
Senate, who had previously served as acting State President. 
The second, and more significant, function is to preside over the 
1. The Republic of South Africa Constitution Fifth Amendment Act No 101 
of 1980, s 5 of which inserted a new s 10A in Act 32 of 1961; other 
sections of the Constitution were correspondingly amended. 
2. S 6 of the amending act substituted a new s 11 in the Constitution. 
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president's council at all times, other than when he is serving 
as acting State President. 1 This arrangement involves several 
deviations from the draft bill of 1979, according to which the 
chairman of the president's council would be nominated from its 
members by the President, who would himself have been elected 
by a composite electoral .college. It was clearly not possible 
to use the same kind of electoral college for the Vice-State 
President, since it depended on nominations made by representa-
tive coloured and Indian assemblies. Resort was thus had to the 
same electoral college used for the presidency, comprising the 
members of the now unicameral white parliament, and in terms of 
the applicable qualifications the Vice-State President would also 
have to be white. The first election resulted in the appoint-
ment of a cabinet minister, the former chairman of the parliamen-
tary constitutional commission. 2 One of the contentious aspects 
of the new office was that the scope of section 13 of the Con-
stitution was broadened to include the Vice-State President, ir-
respective of which of the two basic functions he performs;3 
the protection from criticism would seem anomalous in respect of 
his activities on the president's council, which is expected to 
deliberate on sensitive political issues. In general terms the 
innovation of the vice-presidency, and the matters relating to 
the new office, highlight the significant role envisaged for the 
president~s council during the current stage of constitutional 
development, and it also emphasises the government's commitment 
to maintaining centralised white control over the process of con-
stitutional change. 
In relation to the president's council itself, there were several 
deviations from the draft bill, but the Schlebusch recommendations 
were substantially adhered to. The act provided4 that the coun-
L The new s 10A (3) of Act No 32 of 1961. 
2. Mr A.L. Schlebusch. 
3. S 8 of the amending act. 
4. S 34 of Act No 101 of 1980 inserted Part VIlLA in the Constitution Act 
in substitution for certain provisions relating to the South African 
Railways and Harbours (ss 102-106). 
328. 
cil would consist of sixty members,' excluding the Vice-State 
President, to be appointed by the State President 2 for five year 
periods, subject to the dissolution of the Council within ninety 
days after a general election. 3 There were three basic quali-
fications for membership of the council4 - a minimum age of 
thirty years, South African citizenship, and membership of the 
white, coloured, Indian or Chinese groups,S and there were two 
incompatibilities, membership of a supra-local legislative body 
and governmental employment. 6 Of these factors the most signi-
ficant is the qualification which ensures that the president's 
council is exclusively non-black in composition;· of secondary 
significance is the express reference to Chinese persons for the 
first time iri South Africa's constitutional history.7 The State 
President is empowered to divide members of the council into 
standing committees for 
planning, and community 
additional committees;8 
can be held by a single 
constitutional affairs, economic affairs, 
relations, and, in his discretion, any 
membership of more than one committee 
councillor. The council has itself been 
empowered to dr~ft rules and orders relating to its proceedings, 
and those of the committees,9 save that a deficiency in the 
1. This was an increase of 5 over the draft bill which might have seemed 
necessary to accomodate the Chinese component; however only one 
Chinese person was appointed to the first council. 
2. The State President would clearly act on the advice of the white cabinet 
in exercising this power; in terms of the draft bill (s 23(1)) he 
would have had to consult the three prime ministers. 
3. S 105(1). This arrangement is reminiscent of the Senate and allows a 
new government to reconstitute the council. 
4. S 103. 
5. As with the bill, but unlike the first phase formulations, no quotas for 
the different groups are stipulated. 
6. Subject to the s 55(.d) exceptions. 
7. The first official indication that Chinese persons would receive con-
stitutional recognition was in the majority report of the Schlebusch 
commission which recommended their inclusion in the president's council. 
In 1980 there were 8 000 Chinese in the republic, most of whom were 
resident in the Johannesburg-Witwatersrand area. See the Official 
Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa (1980/81) 77. 
B. S 104(2). 
9. S 104 (1) • 
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number of members of the council or a ' committee will not affect 
1 
these bodies in the exercise of their powers. 
The terms of reference of the president's council proved to be 
wider than those contained in the draft bill, according to which 
it could only function on the initiative of the council of cabi-
nets. 2 It was, however, still restricted to advisory functions, 
and no legislative or executive powers were conferred on the 
council, nor were the powers of ~ny bodies transferred to it. 
Its main function 3 is to furnish advice to the State President, 
either at his request, or in its own discretion "if it considers 
a matter to be of public interest. Although this power is only 
of an advisory nature the enabling provision is of the broadest 
kind, and the cabinet can make use of the council in respect of 
any matter, regardless of whose jurisdiction it normally falls 
under; at the same time the legislative supremacy of the House 
of Assembly is left unaffected and reports must be tabled in the 
House within fourteen days of receipt by the State President. 4 
The second, and~$econdary, function of the council is to advise 
any supra-local legislative body, at the latter's request, on 
any draft legislation;; this gives it a type of leg i slative-
vetting function, although the views of the council are not of 
binding force, nor do they have to be tabled before the legisla-
ture conc~rned can enact the legislation. 6 Despite its limited 
role in the legislative process,and the fact that the council is 
predominantly an instrument of the executive, the government 
decided in 1981 to extend to the president's council a wide range 
of powers and privileges normally restricted to the sovereign 






S 102(7). This proviso was carried over from the draft bill, and its 
purpose is to prevent boycott tactics from obstructing the operation 
of the council. 
Draft bill s 25. 
S 106(5). 
3. S 106(1)(a). 
5. S 106(1)(b). 
ef the position ~n terms of the Turnhalle constitution, above 224-228. 
See the Powers and Privileges of the President's Council Act No 103 of 
1981 which is closely modelled on the Powers and Privileges of Parlia-
ment Act No 91 of 1963, which in turn shows the strong influence of the 
Westminster parliamentary privileges. The previous year the government 
had intimated that the council would function very much unlike a legis-
lature - see House of Assembly Debates vol 17 col 9126 (12 June 1980). 
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freedom of speech in relation to council matters,1 but the coun-
cil can summon witnesses to appear before it, and failure to res-
pond can result in a criminal conviction. 2 In the performance 
of their functions the council and its committees are empowered 
to consult with individuals or state institutions, and to estab-
lish consultative committees for this purpose;3 provlsl0n was 
also made, as had been recommended in the Schlebusch report, for 
consultation with a council of 'black South African citizens' to 
be established by act of parliament,4 but shortly after the leg-
islation was passed the government announced that such a council 
Id b · . d 5 wou not e lnstltute . 
In the political deliberations preceding the institution of the 
president's council its composition was perceived as its most 
controversial feature, and less ~ttention was devoted to either 
its status or functions. When it was established, the exclusion 
of blacks from the council was justified by the government in 
terms of the different historical constitutional development of 
blacks, and mor~ ' particularly on the grounds that their existing 
constitutional structures were adequate and their inclusion in 
the council would involve a duplication of the channels of poli-
tical communication. 6 This two-fold argument was restated a 
year later,7 and the prime minister added that even if the presi-
dent's council itself recommended the inclusion of blacks, the 
governmen~ would not take this step.8 The same rationale has 
underlain all the formulations of the 1977 constitution, which in 
the government's, view is designed to complement the homelands' 
constitutional structures, and not to modify them. Thus the 
current phase of constitutional development can be seen as a con-
tinuation of the developments which have taken place since the 
early 1950's, and it involves no material change in the govern-
ment's political policies. In particular, it emphasises the new 
black/non-black axis of constitutional development,and the fact 
that the political rights of blacks will be exercised only through 
1. Ss 2 and 3 of Act No 103 of 1981. 
S 11 read with s 15 of Act No 103 of 1981. 





See M. Wiechers Staatsre~ (3 ed, 1981) 245. 
See House " of Assembl~ Debates 
7. House of Assembly Debates vol 
8. House of Assembly Debates vol 
vol 16 cols 8250-5 (5 June 1980). 
cols 246-7 (28 January 1981). 
col 30 (26 January 1981). 
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1 the national states. The 'black citizens council' referred 
to in the legislation was perceived by the government, not as 
an alternative to the homelands structures, but as the institu-
tionalisation of the existing consultations which take place 
among the leaders of non-independent national states, and it 
was envisaged that consultation would take place between this 
body and the council through a committee system. 2 The exclusion 
of blacks from the president's council has implicatio~s for 
future constitutional developments in another sense, because the 
government now regards the council as the prime vehicle for con-
stitutional change in the country;3 by definition, as it were, 
it is likely to see constitutional issues in black/non-black 
terms. 
Less attention was given in the parliamentary debates and politi-
cal columns to other features of the council. It was intended 
to comprise experts in various disciplines and recognised com-
munity leaders,4 although no requirements along these lines were 
stipulated in the enactment. As far as the appointment of mem-
bers is concern~d, the enabling provision is of a broad kind5 and 
gives the sole effective discretion in the choice of members to 
the cabinet. 6 The movement away from representative institu-
tions is again apparent here, and it has involved severe setbacks 
for the legitimacy of the new institution. The constitutional 
status of the president's council also has implications for its 
legitimacy, in that it is subordinate to the white parliament 
and wholly dependent on that body for its powers and continued 
existence, and it is further dependent on parliament and the 
white-controlled executive and bureaucracy to give effect to its 
recommendations. Even in relation to the defunct Senate, for 
1. Some supporters of the council, however, suggested that the exclusion of 
blacks was a temporary aberration which would be rectified in due course. 
See the analysis of the leader of the opposition in House of Assembly 
Debates vol 17 col 9052-9060 (12 June 1980). 
2. See House of Assembly Debates vol 15 cols 8251-8252 (5 June 1980). 
3. See further on this matter below, 342-345. The last report of the Schle-
busch commission (4 February 1981) recommended that in view of the est-
ablishment of the council the commission be relieved of its task. 
4. See House of Assembly Debates vol 16 cols 8035-8036 (4 June 1980). 
5. S 102(1). 
6. Subject only to the s 103 requirements. 
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which it is a partial substitute, it has an inferior constitu-
tional, and probably political, status, and it would take some 
time for it to acquire a performance-related legitimacy of its 
own. 
Of all the constitutional amendments passed in 1980 those relat-
ing to the president's council were regarded by the government 
as the most important. The councii was first constituted early 
in 19:811 and was divided into five standing committees.
2 
Of 
these, th~ most prominent is the constitutional committee, which 
was given all the evidence submitted to the Schlebusch commission 
and proceeded to take evidence of its own. The council as a 
whole meets in public,3 but the committees, in which the actual 
work of the council is done, conduct most of their sessions in 
camera. In view of the importance of the council in relation 
to constitutional development it is referred to in greater detail 
in the following chapter. It is, however, relevant to mention 
here that it was conceived both structurally and functionally as 
a consociational-type body - a 'grand coalition' of white, colour-
.' 
ed and Indian elites,which could depoliticise contentious issues 
and resolve them along accommodationist lines. The consociational 
aspects were emphasised in several symbolic respects - the coun-
cil's seating is arranged in concentric semi-circles, rather than 
in an (adversarial) horse-shoe shape, and little physical pro-
vision ha~ been made for the media and public. 4 On the other 
hand several features expose the limitations of the consociation-
al comparison: its unrepresentative nature, its limited pow-
ers, and the absence of proportionality and a veto system. The 
comparison with other consociational institutions, such as the 
Dutch Social and Economic Council, is only of limited value; 
while these are also appointed advisory bodies, they exist along-
side representative institutions and are functionally specialised, 
"I. It consisted of 43 whites, 12 coloureds, 4 Indians and one Chinese. 
During the course of the year 2 whites and one Indian resigned. 
2. Apart from those mentioned in the legislation, a scientific committee 
was also established. 
3. S 7 of Act No 103 of 1981 provides that all sessions must be in public, 
unless the relevant chairman provides otherwise. 
4. Nevertheless verbatim reports of the council's sessions are published 
in Hansard form. See Reports of the President's Council vol 1 (3-12 
February 1981) and vol 2 (19-21 May 1981). 
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whereas the president's council is a 'substitute' for represen-
tative institutions, and one of its most salient functions is 
that of deliberating on fundamental constitutional issues. 
Above all any 'consociational accommodation' achieved by the coun-
cil will only have a contingent political relevance,because ef-
fective power continues to vest in the white political institu-
tions. 1 Against the unimpressive background of other nominated 
and advisory bodies in South Africa's constitutional history its 
future political efficacy would not seem hopeful, but it may be 
used by the government as a legitimising agent for its constitu-
tional policies and as a device for bypassing a recalcitrant 
National Party caucus and provincial congresses.
2 
Civ) Changes in parliamentary government 
Among the constitutional amendments of 1980 was one which was not 
specifically related to the government's 1977 constitution, but 
which fitted closely into the general trend of constitutional 
developments in the immediate post-Schlebusch report era. This 
change went to the heart of the Westminster form of parliamentary 
government. 
It has been shown in this work3 that the Westminster constitution-
al system is characterised by a close institutional inter-rela-
tionship between the legislature and executive, which accounts 
for several other features of that system. In Britain it is con-
vention alone which prescribes that ministers should be members 
of either house of the legislature, in spite of the prominence of 
this principle in British constitutional law. The convention 
permits a minister to hold office for a limited period before 
gaining membership of either house, but does not specify the maxi-
mum duration of such period. 4 In the Westminster export models 
it has been customary to enact the convention that ministers be 
members of the legiSlature, subject to a period of grace which has 
varied from case to case. In the South Africa Act 5 this period 
1. On the government's response to the first recommendations ' of the 
president's council see below, 344--345. 
2. See below, 344. 
3. See above, 9-12. 
4. See E.C.S. Wade and G. Phillips Constitutional and Administrative Law 
( 9 ed, 1 977) 4 8 - 5 0 . 
5. S 14. 
334. 
was limited to three months, with a similar period in the repub-
lican constitution,1 but after nominal interludes a minister 
could, in theory, be re-appointed for an indefinite number of 
periods. During the period of grace ministers could not par-
ticipate in any proceedings of either house, and were accorded 
none of the privileges of members of parliament. In South Afri-
ca it was customary for such ministers to be nominated to vacan-
cies in the Senate, and the phenomenon of a non-legislative mem-
ber of the cabinet was not frequently encountered. 
In terms of the 19~O amendment 2 a minister may hold office for 
a period of twelve months before becoming a member of the legis-
lature, but if he has so held office (regardless of the duration) 
he cannot be re-appointed as a non-legislative minister. 3 For 
the first time such ministers are allowed to participate in all 
parliamentary proceedings, save for voting,4 and are accorded all 
the powers and privileges of members of parliament. 5 
These amendment~ · were motivated by the government in terms of the 
need to introduce persons with exceptional ability or talents 
directly into the cabinet, without their having to undergo the 
inconvenience and disruption of contesting an election immediate-
ly thereafter,6 thereby providing greater flexibility for the 
prime min~ster in regard to ministerial appointments. 7 During 
the life of the Senate this flexibility had been provided in a 
different way, but with its abolition the three month period was 
1. S 20(3); see also s 21(3) in respect of deputy-ministers. 
2. S 1 of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Amendment Act No 70 
of 1980, which amended s 20(3) of the Constitution Act. 
3. This qualification was only introduced at the committee stage of the 
bill (see House of Assembly Debates vol 13 col 6425 (14 May 1980)) and 
without it re-appointment for additional twelve-month periods would have 
been possible. 
4. S 2 of the amending act altered s 54 of the Constitution Act. 
5. S 3 of the amending act amended s 1 of the Powers and Privileges of 
Parliament Act No 91 of 1963 so as to include non-parliamentary ministers 
within the definition of 'members' of parliament. 
6. House of Assembly Debates vol 10 col 4713 (23 April 1980). 
7. House of Assembly Debates vol 10 col 4562 (22 April 1980). 
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perceived as inadequate,' despite the - government's new ability 
to appoint members directly to the House. In theoretical con-
stitutional terms, the amendment gives the cabinet greater in-
dependence vis-a-vis the legislature, and tends to blur tradi-
tional lines of ministerial responsibility to the legislature, 
and via the latter to the electorate. Even the twelve-month 
limit could be circumvented by appointing a minister to the House 
under the s 40(1) Cb) nomination procedure, and the cabinet could, 
at anyone time, consist of a significant proportion of s 20(3) 
ministers and nominated members of parliament. Some control was 
provided by allowing non-elected ministers to participate in the 
proceedings of the House, and thereby be subjected to questioning 
and criticism in relation to legislation and the administration 
of their departments, but the new arrangement involved a clear 
deviation from the principles of parliamentary government: 
The significance of the ' amendment under discussion should be 
viewed in the light of the other constitutional amendments of 1980, 
and in particulJr the increase in size of the cabinet to twentymem-
bers,2 the provision for nominated members of parliament, the 
transition to unicameralism, and the creation of the non-elected 
president's council. In this perspective it makes a small, but 
_not unimportant, contribution to the movement away from represen-
tative goyernment towards a more managerial system. The trend 
was continued in 1981 3 when the State President was empowered to 
assign any statutory power conferred on a specific minister to 
any other minister, for any reason whatever;4 in addition the 
prime minister was empowered to assign his own powers and functions 
to other ministers on the same basis. The extension of executive 
power without the introduction of new devices for controlling and 
1. At the end of 1980 Dr D.J. de Villiers was appointed directly to the 
cabinet in terms of the s 20(3) procedure. He lost the Gardens constit-
uency in the April 1981 general election, but was able to remain in the 
cabinet under the 12-months provision until he won a by-election later 
that year. 
2. S 11 of Act No 10' of 1980 which amended s 20(1) of t~e Constitution Act. 
3. Republic of South Africa Constitution Second Amendment Act No 101 of 
1981, s 3 of which inserted a new s 20A in the Constitution Act. S 10 
of the Interpretation Act No 33 of 1957 was appropriately amended. 
4. Previously the State President had been able to empower one m~n~ster to 
perform the functions of another, but only where the latter was unable to 
perform those functions - s 20(4). 
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checking the exercise of such power can be seen as a movement 
away from the principles of constitutionalism. Insofar as these 
developments involve the concentration of power in the white 
cabinet they are also anti-consociational in effect. On the 
other hand this very concentration of power would enable the gov-
ernment more easily to embark on the consociational engineering 
discussed in the next chapter. The following example may be 
given of the new theoretical options which the amendments under 
discussion have made available to the government: as the consti-
tution prescribes no qualifications for cabinet members, other 
than those pertaining to membership of the House of Assembly, it 
is now constitutionally possible to appoint blacks to the cabinet for 
twelve-month periods. In this sense the institutional basis al-
ready exists for the adoption of consociationalism as a political 
crisis model. 1 
s. Conclusion 
During the immediate post-Schlebusch phase it was evident that 
the government had committed itself to two types of constitutional 
arrangements for South Africa - partition, and quasi-consociation-
alism. Partition ensures that the political rights of blacks 
will be exercised through the independent national states, save 
for the limited local government rights in the 'common area'; 
the 1977 constitution involves the creation of joint institutions 
along consociational lines for non-blacks, but without affecting 
overall white control. 
One of the clear themes of this chapter is the political and in-
stitutional continuity evident in the 1977 constitution, which 
has provided a new constitutional framework for the same politi-
cal policy. To some extent there was a movement away from the 
Westminster features of the constitutional system, towards a fur-
ther concentration of power in the executive. The various amend-
ments also strengthened the National Party's institutional posi-
tion to ensure that it would be in an overall majority in any new 
joint institutions, and thereby remain in control of the process 
of constitutional change. 
1. See on this matter below, 520-524. 
33 7 . 
During all three phases of the 1977 constitution the government's 
commitment to some structural features of consociationalism has 
been evident, and since the Schlebusch report it has conceded 
that constitution-making itself should not be unilaterally under-
taken by the government. But the analysis has shown that the 
government's constitution, particularly in its later stages, is 
both undemocratic and imperfectly consociational. From the con-
sociational perspective the essential shortcoming is that power-
sharing is not an institutional requirement. But beyond that, 
there are more fundamental problems relating to the legitimacy of 
any constitutional framework which institutionalises the govern-
ment's original policy. These problems beset the implementation 
of the government's ' constitution,with the failure of the repre-
sentative institutions on which it depended; but they are likely 
to apply a fortiori to attempts to implement the scheme through 
the consociational co-operation of non-elected individuals. This 
has led to the view that the government's 1977 constitution might 
be no more than a point of departure for the process of consocia-
tional engineerjng, and this is dealt with in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROSPECTS - NON-DEMOCRATIC 
CONSOCIATIONAL ENGINEERING 
1. Introduction 
Part of the government's response to the economic, political and 
security pressures being exerted on the South African system has, 
in the late 1970's and early 1980's, been to embark on a strat-
egy of non-democratic consociational engineering which has be-
come apparent, inter alia, in recent constitutional amendments. 
1 
It has been pointed out that many of these amendments show a 
basic continuity with the constitutional trends of the last three 
decades, and tha~ they involve adaptations within the constitu-
tional and political system, and not deviations from it. In 
this process th~ National party is depicted as the vehicle for 
political reform,2 and the constitutional adaptations take place 
under the overall legislative control and political domination of 
whites. In this chapter an attempt will be made, without being 
unduly speculative, to describe the likely constitutional develop-
ments which will succeed this early quasi-consociational phase, 
given a reasonable consistency in the forces operating on the sys-
tem, and continued white control. These developments will be 
analysed from a consociational perspective. 
With the publication of the Schlebusch report, and the constitu-
tional amendments which followed it, the government appear~d to 
have shelved its 1977 constitution, at least as far as such fun-
damental aspects as the three parliament arrangement were con-
cerned. But the government's basic commitment to this constitu-
tion has not wavered, despite the setbacks in its implementation 
1. This corresponds to the third of the options referred to by F. van 2yl 
Slabbert and D. Welsh (South Africa's Options - Strategies for Sharing 
Power (1979) 3-8), that is the politics of siege under a modernizing 
oligarchy; the other two options are the politics of repressive siege, 
and the politics of negotiation. See also A. du Toit 'Different Models 
of Strategy and Procedure for Change in South Africa' in F. van 2yl 
Slabbert and J. Opland (eds) South Africa: Dilemmas of Evolutionary 
Change (1980) 2-13. 
2. Du Toit op cit 3. 
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brought about by the abolition of the CPRC in 1980 and the con-
tinual delays in obtaining a fully elected SAIC; in fact the 
government reaffirmed this commitment several times during 1981.' 
The future implementation of the 1977 constitution, however, is 
likely to occur on a piecemeal basis, commencing at the lowest 
level of government, and in this process there are likely to be 
several modifications of the original plan. The government is 
also likely to show greater deference to the legitimacy of its 
constitutional system during this next phase. In this chapter 
attention will be given not only to the likely prospects of the 
government's 1977 constitution, but also to constitutional de-
velopments for blacks, and the relationship between the two. 
Although the analysis whith follows is premised on the government 
retaining control over the initiation and implementation of con-
stitutional change, it is clear that in this process it will be 
responding to a variety of · internal and external pressures. 
These pressures will require varying degrees of coercive force 
to maintain gov,~Tnment control and the overall stabili ty of the 
system. While the nature and effect of the pressures and co-
ercion, and their implications for constitutional development, 
will not be analysed, brief mention should be made of the stra-
tegic options whic'h this process will create for non-whi te lead-
ers, whos~ responses could influence the pace, if not the nature, 
of constitutional change. On the one hand, the new and restruc-
tured institutions created by the government will provide blacks 
with a constitutional base and a legitimated platform, as has 
been the case with the homeland institutions. 2 In terms of the 
credibility of its own policy the government will not be able to 
dismiss or ignore those who opt to participate in these institu-
tions, and, although the extent of their leverage will not be 
great, the participants will have some bargaining strength, at 
least in terms of the government's need for their continued par-
ticipation. On the other han~ there is the possibility that 
participants will be discredited among their communities, if they 
1. See eg the prime minister in 'House of Assembly Debates vol 1 col 63 
(3 August 1981). 
2. ef J. Butler, R. Rotberg and J. Adams The Black Homelands of South Africa 
(1977) 224£. 
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are seen as collaborators who are being manipulated by the gov-
ernment to give the system some credibility and stability.1 
Participants are also likely to be discredited if they are given 
responsibilities without power, the classical political impasse, 
which could arise, inter alia, if the functions devolved to sub-
ordinate institutions are not accompanied by the devolution of 
control over the resources required to perform those functions.
2 
The alternative strategic options of collaboration of non-
collaboration will present themselves in respect of all future 
constitutional changes, and a variety of factors will determine 
which strategy is adopted by non-white leaders. However, the 
historical empirical evidence, as well as the extensive patronage 
at the government's disposal, suggests that the organisational 
positions created by the government will in fact be filled, and 
that a boycott strategy will not materially affect the general 
direction of constitutional change during this period. 
/ 
2. The Parameters of Constitutional Change 
In restricting the discussion in this chapter to 'government-
controlled' constitutional changes,it is necessary to refer 
briefly to the parameters of such change. There is a large num-
ber of restraints operating on the government which severely re-
stricts its future constitutional options - these include the 
demands of the economic system, the need to preserve National 
Party unity and prevent a right-wing reaction, and the disposi-
tion of the bureaucracy to fundamental political change. Atten-
tion will, however, be restricted to three other factors which 
will have a significant influence on future constitutional deve-
lopments. 
The first factor is the government's basic approach to the con-
stitutional politics of South Africa. Whatever the underlying 
rationale for this phenomenon, the government has defined the 
1. Du Toit Cop cit 3) points out that participation could take the form 
of self-interested collaboration or collaborative opposition, and 
suggests that the latter has been adopted by Chief Buthelezi. 
2. Cf Butler, Rotberg and Adams op cit 222. 
I 
341 • 
main political problem in South Africa as the 'race' issue and 
f
. 1 
the background of all politics is presented as 'race' con llct. 
The government has been able to use concepts of pluralism as a 
legitimising ideology for this approach,2 and other sources of 
conflict, such as class structure, have not featured on the 
political agenda. Moreover the government makes use of stat-
utory classifications of race and ethnicity,3 and it is in terms 
of these classifications, regardless of their real relevance to 
the conflicts in South African society, that constitutional 
adaptations will be made. The official groups provide the gov-
ernment with a convenient basis for consociational engineering, 
but have disadvantages in terms of the prospects of a fully con-
sociational system. 
The second factor is that constitutional changes brought about 
under government control will inevitably involve the sequential 
evolution of existing political and administrative institutions. 
It is therefore convenient to analyse future constitutional pros-
pects in terms ~f the dual institutional arrangements currently 
/ 
in existence: those which have been created for blacks in the 
application of the policy of 'separate development', and those 
created for whites, coloureds and Indians in the application of 
the policy of 'parallel development'. Evidence of the govern-
ment's continued commitment to these complementary policies is 
to be found in the prime minister's ' twelve poin-t plan' which was 
first announced in 1979, and was subsequently endorsed by the 
National Party congress. 4 Most of these points have broad con-
stitutional implications, the following being the most important: 
1. The recognition of a multi-national society and the existence 
of minority groups in South Africa (point 1); 
-
2. The acceptance of 'vertical differentiation', with the built-
in principle of self-determination on as many levels as pos-
sible (point 2); 
1. Cf H. Adam Modernizing Raeial Domination (1971) 19; V. Razis Swords or 
Ploughshares? (1980) 53. 
2. See above, 84. 
3. In partieular the Population Registration Act No 30 of 1950, and the 
National States Citizenship Act No 26 of 1970. 
4. See 1980 Annual Survey of Race Relations 10-11. The plan was a promi-
nent feature of the government's policy manifesto in the 1981 general 
eleetion. 
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3. The creation of constitutional structures which make pro-
vision for the full independence of the national states, 
their meaningful consolidation, and the acceptance of a 
socio-economic programme for their development (point 3); 
4. A division of power between whites, coloureds and Indians, 
with a system of consultation on and joint responsibility 
for matters of common interest (point 4); 
5. The acceptance of the principles of separate schools and 
communities, wherever possible (point 5); 
6. A recognition of the economic independence of southern 
African states (point 7); and 
7. The pursuit of a peaceful constellation of southern African 
states (point 8). 
Although each of the principles in isolation is open-ended and 
susceptible to a variety of interpretations, cumulatively they 
provide a good indication of the basic policy which the govern-
ment is likely to implement in the ensuing years. 
The third factoJ orequires greater elaboration. It has become 
clear that as far as the government is concerned the main forum 
for constitutional consultation, recommendation and initiation 
will be the president's council, itself a consociational-type 
body which will take over the functions of the Schlebusch consti-
tutional commission. 1 This circumstance has several implications 
for the type of constitutional development which can be antici-
pated. In the first place the council is government-appointed, 
and its composition gives an indication of the type of class, 
ethnic and cultural interests which will be represented in its 
deliberations, and those of the constitutional committee. 2 
Secondly, the council operates through a committee system which 
depends for its efficient functioning on well-formulated inputs 
and draft proposals, which are likely to emanate, in the first 
instance, from the respective chairmen and their staff and ad-
1. See Debates of the President's Council vol 1 cols 5-6 (3 February 1981). 
2. The composition of the first council has been described above (332). 
Of the 16 members of the constitutional committee, 9 are white ex-
politicians and 3 white academics. Of the 5 committee chairmen, 4 are 
former National Party politicians, and 1 an academic (the scientific 
committee). Nine members of the Schlebusch commission were appointed 
to the council, 7 of them to its constitutional committee. 
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visers. ~~ile use will be made of outside experts, it can also 
be expected that a significa~t input will be provided by the 
prime minister's department, which has been organised into five 
branches which correspond functionall y with the committees into 
which the council is divided. The committee system also favours 
those in the committee with specialist constitutional expertise, 
and this is not evenly distributed among its members. Thirdly, 
it is the government's intention' that the council will deliber-
ate only on constitutional matters affecting whites, coloureds 
and Indians, which places it squarely in the Tomlinson-Schlebusch 
tradition - in other words, the council is not likely to trans-
verse the black/non-black axis of constitutional development, and 
it will be primarily concerned with constitutional structures for 
non-blacks to replace the government's shelved 1977 constitution. 
Finally, the president's council's priority is likely to be with 
local government institutions, in accordance with its first 
directive 2 to investigate local and regional management systems 
in the light of the reports of several prev.ious commi ssions on 
local authoriti~s; what can be anticipated, therefore, is an ini-
tial recommendation relating to local authorities for whites, 
coloureds . and Indians. 3 The cumulative significance of these 
factors is that the constitutional proposals of the president's 
council are likely to involve the logical continuation of the 
last thir~y years of constitutional development, and to involve 
the gradual incorporation of coloureds and Indians into the poli-
tical process on a corporate basis, from the local government 
level upwards. It will therefore act more as a legitimising 
agent for the government's version of constitutional reform,than 
as an independent initiator of more fundamental political or 
economic changes. 
,. As evidenced by the State President's opening address to the council. 
See Debates of the President's Council vol 1 col 5 (3 February 1981). It is 
of interest to note that this address again involved a distortion of 
the Theron report's priorities in that it gave precedence to the need 
to move away from the Westminster model, rather than to provide for 
coloured participation in existing political institutions. 
2. Debates of the President's Council vol 1 col 6 (3 February 1981). 
3. See below, 374-376. 
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Although no fundamental conflicts can be expected between recom-
mendations of the president's council and government policy, it 
is appropriate to look briefly at the status of the council vis-
a-vis the National Party caucus and congresses; this has some 
relevance to South Africa's constitutional politics in that the 
council's recommendations are likely to involve changes to 
social segregation and white privilege which have a high symbol-
ic importance for many whites. Two theoretical possibilities 
can be suggested. The first is that the council will come to 
rival and surpass the caucus and congresses as far as its in-
fluence on the cabinet is concerned; this possibility may be 
supported by reference to the government's need to increase the 
council's legitimacy by being seen to be responsive to its 
recommendations, and to the recent decline in the influence of 
the caucus and congresses in the movement towards a prime-minis-
terial form of government. 1 The second is that the caucus, the 
provincial congresses, and even the parliamentary select com-
mittee appointed to report on proposals to amend the constitu-
tion,2 might re _~ist recommendations emanating from the council 
and prevent the cabinet from implementing them. This possibili-
ty may be supported by reference to the apparent strength of the 
'anti-reform' factions in the caucus and congresses, and the 
need to maintain National Party unity.3 Both the rhetorical 
and empirical evidence suggests that the latter possibility will 
prev"ail in practice. The government has repeatedly stated that 
it will not c~untenance certain constitutional changes even if 
these are specifically recommended by the president's council, 
for example the inclusion of blacks on the council itself,4 and 
1. In personal discussions with the writer a senior member of the council, 
and veteran politician, pointed out that South African prime ministers 
have always been able to dominate their caucuses, even on major issues. 
Such dominance will be facilitated by the additional patronage afforded 
the prime minister by the 1980 constitutional amendments. 
2. See House of Assembly Debates vol 2 col 730 (5 February 1981). The 
select committee replaced the Schlebusch commission, which also origi-
nated as a (joint) select committee. 
3. In addition may be cited the growth in the anti-reform Herstigte 
Nasionale Party and National Conservative Party which increased their 
electoral support from 34 061 votes in the 1977 general election to 
210 398 in 1981, though without securing any parliamentary seats. On 
the option of 'siege pOlitics' or the 'garrison state' see A. du Toit 
op cit 2-3, H. Adam 'When the Chips are Down: Confrontation and Accom-
modation in South Africa' 1 (1977) Contemporary Crises 417-435. 
4. House of Assembly Debates vol 1 col 30 (26 January 1981). 
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that other recommendations involving a 'drastic departure' from 
its constitutional policy will be submitted to the party con-
gresses, and ultimately to the electorate in a referendum. 
1 
It 
might be argued that if the cabinet gives the lead to the con-
gresses and electorate the proposals will be endorsed, but this 
legitimising process nevertheless tends to weaken the argument 
that the president's council will be used to bypass the anti-
reform factions within the National Party. The argument based 
on the need of the president's council for credibility was also 
weakened by the government's response to the recommendation of 
the ' council's communi ty relations committee that District Six 
and Pageview"be reproclaimed as group areas for coloureds and 
Indians respectively. This proposal would not have involved a 
change in government policy, but merely a modification in the ap-
plication of that policy, but it was rejected by the government 
almost in its entirety.2 If this empirical response is project-
ed into the constitutional arena, then it suggests that the gov-
ernment, whether under the influence of the supposedly reaction-
ary caucus and ~6ngresses or not~ will entertain only constitu-
tional recommendations which involve minor modifications or 
adaptations of its established constitutional policy. 
3. The Separate Development Framework 
Ca) Self-government 
The constitutional development of the national states has resulted 
in the emergence of partly-representative political institutions 
for each of the statutorily-delineated black groups in South Afri-
ca; within the limits of their powers these authorities have 
both territorial and personal jurisdiction, but they operate with-
ih a system of control, or potential control, by the central gov-
1 . House of Assembly Debates vol 1 cols 217-8 (27 February 1981), and re-
iterated in vol 1 col 66 (3 August 1981). By implication this refers 
only to the white electorate. The referendum is a decidedly anti-
consociational institution - see above, 117. 
2. The government agreed to reproclaim a minor portion of District Six 
(Natal Mercury 25 October 1981). 
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ernment. Reference has already been -made in this work to the 
degree of autonomy exercised by the national states at the 
second stage of self-government,1 and to the extent to which 
this corresponds to the 'segmental autonomy' characteristic of 
the consociational model. The government's policy, however, 
is that self-government should be no more than an interim con-
stitutional phase, and that each national state should achieve 
republican status, thereby severing all constitutional ties with 
South Africa and ensuring a legal-institutional system of poli-
tical separation for blacks. As is well-known this policy has 
already resulted in Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and the 
Ciskei attaining constitutional independence. 
It is unlikely that the government will consider any alternative 
constitutional status for the self-governing national states. 
In 1977 the concept of 'internal autonomy' was introduced for 
the first time, to denote an enhanced form of autonomy for the 
national states short of constitutional independence. 2 Al-
though the legi~lation in question was never enacted, there seem-
ed to be a growing movement in the ensuing years for the confer-
ment of internal autonomy on national states who were unwilling 
to accept independence, and for reconsidering the nature of their 
constitutional links with the central authorities. 3 This move-
ment was generated in part by the Ci~kei and Lombard reports, and 
in part by the problems encountered with homeland consolidation, 
and particularly at the regional level there was a demand for 
'special status regions' within the country,incorporating a home-
land and surrounding geo-political areas. The Ciskei govern-
ment's decision to accept independence, however, significantly 
weakened the 'special status region' lobby.4 
From the government's point of vi~w internal autonomy, or any 
other alternative status for the national states, has always been 
a remote possibility. The government has repeatedly stated that 
those homelands whith do not accept independence will retain their 
1. See above, 188-189. 2. See above, 190-191. 
3. See generally on this possibility L.J. Boulle and L.G. Baxter (eds) 
Natal and KwaZulu: Constitutional and Political Options (1981). 
4. The demand may, however, be revived after the release of the Buthelezi 
commission report early in 1982. 
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present constitutional status indefinitely. 1 The new policy 
of 'regionalism,2 is intended to affect only the economic, and 
not the political, aspects of self-government, and there is 
little possibility of deviation from this aspect of the separate 
development programme. It is also worth noting that internal 
autonomy would have involved only an adaptation of existing con-
stitutional arrangements, and would not have affected the central 
political institutions at all; apart from the greater degree of 
'segmental autonomy' which it implied, it also had little rele-
vance from the consociational perspective. 
Cb) Partition 
While the overt objectives of the government's policy of separate 
development are realised when constitutional independence is con-
ferred on the national states, the government has for some time 
articulated an intention to institutionalise the post-partition 
relationships between these states and the republic. 3 The gov-
/ 
ernment's terminology for this arrangement is the 'constellation 
of states', which, in more conventional constitutional terms is a 
type of confederation operating at the 'supra-national' level of 
government. Before turning to the constellation concept speci-
fically, however, it is worth observing that in general the post-
partition relationships between South Africa and the national 
states, have some affinity with the principles of consociationa-
lism. This assertion may appear contradictory, since indepen-
dence is the consequence of a non-consociational option for solv-
ing the political problems in a plural society, namely partition. 
Partition is an attempt to depluralise a society by replacing it 
with two or more relatively non-plural societies,4 whereas con-
sociationalism is a method of overcoming the divisive forces in 
1. For a recent example see House of Assembly Debates vol 1 col 271 (28 
January 1981). 
2. See below, 354-357. 
3. See point 8 of the 'twelve point plan' at 342, above. 
4. In South Africa, 'partition' has only been consistent in its political di-
mension and has never involved complete physical or economic separation. 
No attention is given in this work to the numerous forms of 'radical par-
tition' incorporating these two elements which have been advocated for 
South Africa. For one of the best recent analyses of partition, with 
reference to previous studies, see G. Maasdorp 'Forms of Partition' in 
R. Rotberg and J. Barrett (eds) Conflict and Compromise in South Africa 
(1980) 107-146. 
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such a society by institutionalising a form of power-sharing. 
If one looks beyond the concepts of international law, however, 
the contradiction is less striking. Stultz,1 for example, 
suggests that the relations between Pretoria and Umtata after 
Transkeian independence more closely resemble the consociational 
ideal than do relations between Pretoria and the non independent 
black entities, because they req~ire bargaining from independent 
power bases. ~~ile this view over-estimates the bargaining 
power of the homeland states it does highlight the consociational 
aspects of these 'relationships - the emphasis on leadership 
el i tes, the nominally equal par'ticipa ting parties, the international 
'summit diplomacy' dimensions, 2 and the 'independence' of the dif-
ferent 'segments'. The citizenship provisions applying to the 
national states give a large formal constituency to each of the 
independence governments, which serve as a nominal source of pro-
portional influence in the negotiating process. The consocia-
tional analogy, however, cannot be taken too far, and the system 
as a whole operates on a strongly authoritarian basis. 
/ 
The 'constellation of states' concept was launched by the govern-
ment in the late 1970's3 and has been a prominent feature of its 
political agenda since then. The same concept has been used to 
refer to both the 'grand constellation', comprising the republic, 
the national states and other countries in the sub-continent, and 
the 'inner constellation', comprising only the republic and the 
national states; the government has in recent times come to accept 
the term 'confederation' for the latter arrangement. 4 This dis-
tinction is not of immediate significance as the emphasis in both 
arrangements will be on forms of economic co-operation, at least 




N.M. Stu1tz Transkei's Half Loaf - Race Separatism in South Africa (1980) 
150. 
On the similarities between consociationa1ism and international poli-
tics see A. Lijphart The Politics of Accommodation (2 ed, 1975) 104, 
112-115, 131-134. 
Most prominently at the 'Car1ton conference' at which the government met 
with business leaders in November 1979. On the constellation see W.H. 
Thomas 'A Southern African "Constellation of States": Challenge or Myth?' 
1980 South Africa International 113-128; D. Ge1denhuys The Constellation 
of States (S .A. Foundation, 1980). 
See, eg, the prime minister in House of Assembly Debates vo1 1 col 53 
(3 August 1981). The 'confederal' dimension was given particular em-
phasis in the debates on the Status of Ciskei Bill - see the minister's 
second reading speech in House of Assembly Debates vo1 9 cols 4933-4944 
(28 September 1981). 
349. 
in their initial stages. However, in respect of the national 
states the constellation concept gives implicit recognition to 
the fact that their independence has operated only at the con-
stitutional-juridical level, and not at the economic or political 
levels; while the constitutional provisions have formally chan-
nelled black political activity into the national states, they 
have not resolved the socio-economic problems of many blacks in 
their places of residence and employment. The constellation 
concept also involves a reassertion of the fundamental economic 
unity of South Africa, despite the statutorily-induced political 
separation. 
In terms of its emphasis on regional economic co-operation the 
constellation concept is not in fact new. Forms of functional 
co-operation have been in existence for some time on matters such 
as currency, customs, soil conservation, tourism and health,1 
mostly with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, but in some cases 
with other countries in the sub-continent. More recently a 
Small Business pevelopment Corporation and a Development Bank have 
been establis'hed, as well as various mul tila teral commi ttees wi th 
the independent national states. 
As far as the institutional aspects of the constellation are con-
cerned, t~ese will be arranged in a series of bilateral and multi-
lateral treaties resulting in the establishment of functionally 
specialised bodies with delegated jurisdiction; as in the confed-
eral model these bodies will operate through the member govern-
ments and will have no direct jurisdiction over the state con-
cerned. In fact even when the constellation is given greater 
institutional support it is unlikely to involve the creation of 
supra-national bodies with an independent jurisdiction, or a sep-
arate constitutional entity; the emphasis has consistenly been on 
the subordinate nature of the confederal authorities and the con-
tinuing independence of the member states. The concept has also 
1. That is the Rand Monetary Union, the South African Customs Union, the 
South African Regional Commission for the Conservation and Utilization 
of the Soil, the Regional Tourism Board for Southern Africa, and the 
Regional Health Organisation of Southern Africa. For references to 
these, and other . forms of co-operation, see House of Assemb ly Debates 
vol 1 cols 51-3 (3 August 1981) and vol 7 cols 4226-7 (18 September 1981). 
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been promoted in consociational terms~ as involving continued 
autonomy over matters of exclusive concern for the individual 
states, and co-operation on matters of joint concern; 1 the par-
ticipating states will have nominally equal status Ca variation 
on the proportionality principle) and decisions will be taken 
on a consensus basis. The 'international' dimensions of the 
constellation concept also have a close affinity with the grand 
coalition of consociationalism - deliberations by an elite 
cartel in a non-public forum. 2 The consociational comparison, 
however, cannot be extended too far and, as with the homelands 
policy on which it is based, the constellation can be seen as a 
device for avoiding power-sharing by internationalising political 
relationships. 3 Any notion of equality between the republic and 
independent national states is also simplistic, in the light of 
the former's economic dominance of the whole region. The con-
stellati6n's legitimacy will also be clearly affected by these 
factors, as well as the fact that it does not presuppose any 
forms of 'internal' political or economic reform. 
/ 
The attraction of the constellation of states from the South Afri-
can government's point of view is that it is a logical progress-
ion from previous constitutional developments and does not affect 
the principle of political separation inherent in separate devel-
opment policy; that it is not an alternative to independence is 
shown by the government's insistence that self-governing national 
states will be deni~d full participation in the constellation, 
and will at most acquire associate status. 4 It would also be in 
the particular economic and strategic interests of South Africa 
to have matters such as defence, communications, agriculture and 
health regulated at the constellation level, and it would afford 





See House of Assembly Debates vol 1 cols 53-4 (3 August 1981). 
Because it would be concerned with 'international' politics the con-
stellation would have the 'summit diplomacy' dimensions of consocia-
tionalism. See Lijphart op cit 112-115. 
The constell~tion, according to Geldenhuys, attempts to 'join together 
what aparthe~d has put asunder' - quoted in W. Breytenbach op cit. 
See the Ciskei (Quail) Report (1980) 107. 
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will be indefinitely dependent on South Africa for the majority 
of their budget revenue.' But as far as the constellation's 
ability to effect significant social and economic changes in the 
member states is concerned, there must be serious reservations; 
the loose nature of the arrangement, the constitutional subor-
dinacy of its institutions, and continued white domination,would 
severely circumscribe its reform potential. Schlemmer has said 
of the confederal option in South Africa: 
'A major consequence of this type of arrangement would be 
that differential rates of growth would be maintained by 
the different units. The 'White' core unit would have 
most of the developed infrastructure, most productive 
capacities, and the most fully-developed market economy. 
It would be highly unlikely that the peripheral units 
would narrow the gap in development; in fact, the gap 
would probably widen as a consequence of the magnet ef-
fects of emplo~ent opportunities, industrial linkages 
and consumer attractions in the 'White' area. Both as 
a conseqaence of lack of development and the demonstra-
tion effects of the nearby wealthier economy, the peri-
pheral units would tend to have severe problems in con-
trolling popular discontent. Unstable or authoritarian 
forms of intra-state government could easily emerge, 
whith would further exacerbate the regional inequalities. 
South Africa would end up with a number of relatively 
very poor hostage units locked up in a confederation 
which would become increasingly unstable. ,2 
A similar prognostication can be made for the constellation of 
states. 3 
1. The issue of economic colonisation is clearly relevant here, but falls 
outside the scope of this work. The 'constellation' metaphor is per-
haps not the most appropriate - see the prime minister's explanation in 
the report of the 'Carlton conference' - Op Weg Na n Konstellasie van 
State in Suider-Afrika (1980) 19. 
2. L. Schlemmer 'Social Implications of Constitutional Alternatives in South 
Africa' in J.A. Benyon (ed) Constitutional Change in South Africa (1978) 
258 at 270; see also N. Rhoodie 'Federalism/Confederalism as a Means of 
Black-White Conflict Resolution: Conceptual Dissonance in White Nation-
alist Ranks' 7 (1980) Politikon 101-110. 
3. The future prospects of the 'grand constellation' were affected by the 
creation in 1980 of a Southern African Development Coordinating Confer-
ence consisting of 9 states in the sub-continent, including Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland. One of the specific aims of the conference is to 
lessen the members' economic dependence on South Africa. See 1980 Annual 
Survey of Race Relations 628. 
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Closely related to the constellation concept are issues pertain-
ing to nationality and citizenship; the juridical implications 
of these matters are dealt with in greater detail below. 1 It 
has been suggested that the problems arising from the denational-
isation of blacks at the time of homeland independence, and the 
international non-recognition of the national states, could be 
resolved through the creation of a southern African constellation 
nationality.2 All constellation nationals would have the same 
status in international law and would be entitled to travel docu-
ments and diplomatic protection in terms of their national status. 
There would exist, in addition, a separate citizenship for each 
member-state of the constellation, and this would determine access 
to political rights within that state. Apart from the problems 
relating to the international recognition of this system, it was 
always a remote option for the government as it involved a con-
tradiction of the notion of 'homeland independence', which is a 
crucial feature of its policy. The government has resorted in-
stead to bilateral agreements with individual homelands, in terms 
of whic'h the nationals of either state can acquire travel docu.;. 
J" 
ments and diplomatic protection from the other. 3 In addition the 
government has mitigated the effects of denationalisation by allow-
ing nationals of the independent homelands some of the rights, 
mainly in the economic sphere, not usually accorded to aliens. 4 
This arrangement, however, operates on a flexible basis and can 
be unilaterally revoked at any stage. 
1. See below, 488-508. 
2. It was speculated that the Niewoudt , commission (on which see above, 283) 
had made a recommendation along these lines but the report was not made 
public by the government. A similar recommendation had been made earlier 
by a cabinet committee on urban black affairs - see 1980 Annual Survey 
of Race Relations 300-1; see also the Lombard Report 42 and the Ciskei 
(Quail) Report 47. 
3. See the Independence Convention between the Government of the Republic of 
South Africa and the Government of Ciskei in House of Assembly Debates vol 
9 cols 4940 - 2 (28 September 1981). 
4. See John Dugard's 'South Africa's "Ind.e.pendent" Homelands: An Exercise 
in Denationalisation' 10 (1980) Denver Journal of International Law and 
Policy 11-36; and below, 500-506. 
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Cc ) Black local authorities 
The community council system established for blacks in 1977 1 
has involved two deviations from the otherwise consistently ap-
plied separate development policy. Firstly, it has resulted in 
the creation of permanent political institutions for blacks in 
the 'common area' of South Africa; secondly, the principle of 
ethnic differentiation among blacks has not been applied in the 
constitution of these bodies. Two other features of the system 
show some variation on the current trends in constitutional devel-
opment: the community councils operate at the lowest level of 
government, and they are elective institutions. 2 In terms of 
these factors the community councils are in a somewhat incon-
gruous position in relation to future constitutional develop-
ments, despite their subordinate status, financial dependence 
and, thus far, political unimportance. 
On the other hand it is clear from all versions of the government's 
1977 constituti~n that there is no intention to incorporate the 
community councils into the wider political system. The govern-
ment's stated policy is quite clear in this regard. 3 The com-
munity councils will acquire full municipal status, and in some 
cases their powers will even be greater than those of existing 
white local authorities;4 they will also be empowered to cooperate 
with other local authorities on matters of common concern, and 
even to participate at the 'regional co-ordinating level,.5 But 
beyond these levels black political rights will only be exercised 
through the self-governing and independent national states, and 
if necessary steps will be taken to strengthen the constitutional 
links between the councils and the homeland structures~ In 
terms of this policy there is no possibility of the community coun-
cils providing the institutional infra-structure for the establish-
ment of a fourth 'parliament' for blacks, although this possibility 
1. The Community Councils Act No 125 of 1977. 
system see above, 179-182. 
On the community council 
2. That is in terms of the statutory prov~s~ons; it would not be possible 
to call them 'representative' bodies - see above, 181. 
3. See the prime minister - House of Assembly Debates vol 1 col 1246-7 (28 
January 1981) and vol 1 col 54 (3 August 1981). 
4. Ibid; thus, eg, the community councils are likely to acquire some 
authority in respect of educational matters. 
5. Ibid. 
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was mooted during the early formulations of the government's 
1977 constitution. The only future developments are likely to 
be within the departmental structure, where a co-ordinating body 
could be established, consisting of nominated or elected members 
of the various councils. If this body were to be institution-
alised and given executive functions it might even be represented 
at the constellation level, where its presence would not conflict 
with the notion of a black/white division of political power. 
Within the constraints of government policy, therefore, the com-
munity councils are not likely to be used in the process of con-
sociational engineering, save at the metropolitan, and possibly 
regional, levels. 1 Here they might participate in nominated co-
ordinating authorities with functionally limited powers, and 
these might even be composed and operate along consociational 
lines. But this would involve essentially a rationalisation of 
existing structures within the same constitutional framework. 
It would be based on existing discriminatory statutes and would 
tend to perpetuate the present allocation of land and amenities. 
/ 
These factors, together with the already low-credibility of the 
community council system,2 suggest that developments along these 
lines would have little political significance. 
(d) Regiorialism 
Since mid-1980 a new item on the government's political agenda 
has been that of 'regionalism',3 and although the concept has 
primarily to do with economic matters it also has implications 
for constitutional development. The concept of regionalism is 
closely related to the issues of consolidation of the national 
states and the government's proposed constellation of states. 
As far as consolidation is concerned, a change in the government's 
policy was induced partly by the economic non-viability of the 
independent homelands and the potential non-viability of the other 
1. On 'regionalism' see below. 
2. See above, 182. 
3. See 1980 Annual Survey of Race Relations 390-392. 
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national states. 1 In terms of the new approach
2 consolidation 
would be related to the economic development of the national 
states, and this would require a re-examination of the economic 
structure of the whole country on a regional basis. This could 
lead to the creation of regional areas of economic growth and 
development, and economic co-operation across homeland borders. 3 
This would allow land to fall within a decentralised regional 
economic structure, without actually being incorporated into a 
homeland, which, according to the government's reasoning, would 
allow the homelands to benefit economically from developments 
outside their borders. At the same time the government affirm-
ed its preparedness to move beyond the 1936 land proposals 4 in 
the actual consolidation process, provided the additional land 
would be used 'responsibly and productively,.5 
The main feature which the policy of regionalism has in common 
with the constellation concept is that it is perceived by the 
government primarily in economic, and not in constitutional or 
political, term~'. What is envisaged is functional co-operation 
outside existing political institutions, and it has been assert-
ed 6 that regional economic developmen~ will not affect the 'poli-
tical self-determination' and 'independence' of the national 
states. This development is thus premised on a rigid notional 
distinction between political and economic power; while main-
taining a system of political separation it, like the constella-
tion concept, reasserts the fundamental unity of the South African 
1. The government was able to assume more direct control over consolidation 
by removing it from the jurisdiction of the Department of Co-operation 
and Development, and vesting it in the Commission for Co-operation and 
Development under the chairmanship of Mr H. van der Walt, the first MP 
to be appointed by the government in terms of the amended s 40(1)(b) of 
Act No 32 of 1961. 
2. See eg the prime minister in House of Assembly Debates vol 1 col 238-243 
(28 January 1981); at col 243 he emphasises the 'close relationship be-
tween the consolidation processes and the policy of establishing a con-
federation or constellation of states'. See also vol 1 col 50 (3 August 
1981). 
3. The government announced the creation of the first regional economic 
growthpoint (north of Bronkhorstspurit) in 1980. See 1980 Annual Survey 
of Race Relations 390. 
4. The Native Trust and Land Act No 18 of 1936. 
5. House of Assembly Debates vol 1 col 240-1 (28 January 1981). 
6. By the prime minister - ibid. 
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economy. Regionalism can also be depicted as an extension of 
the 'border industries' system of the past, whereby industries 
were offered inducements to locate themselves in the vicinity 
of a homeland labour supply; under the extended system blacks 
would reside in the national states where they would have poli-
tical rights,and would commute on a vast scale across state bor-
ders to their places of employment, where they would be politi-
cally rightless. 
In institutional terms the policy of regionalism would require 
the creation of joint regional agencies to co-ordinate and ad-
minister matters of regional economic interest. There could be 
a functional delegation of power to these bodies by the homeland, 
provincial and other sub-national authorities within their juris-
diction. Members of these bodies are likely to be nominated by 
the relevant political institutions and bureaucracies, and they 
would deliberate in private on a consensual basis; the princi-
ples of consociationalism could thus have application at the 
regional level .. 
/ 
But the development of these agencies into 
structures for political power-sharing in the region is incom-
patible with present government policy.' In this sense the 
policy of regionalism can be distinguished from those aspects of 
both the Lombard and Quail reports which contained specific pro-
posals fo! a system of regional power-sharing, the latter by way 
of the condominium arrangement, and the former through the three-
tier system of regional government. Predominantly because of this 
incompatibility with existing policy their recommendations were 
unacceptable to the government. The extent to which economic 
and other realities could induce changes to the government's 
regional policy is of course unpredictable. It can be seen that 
where consolidation would have drastically affected a regional 
economy, that is in Natal and KwaZulu, the private sector emerged 
as a powerful lobby against consolidation 2 and forced a reassess-
ment of this aspect of government policy, but corresponding pre-
sure for a form of regional political power-sharing seems more 
1. See N. Olivier 'Implications of Constitutional Development in KwaZulu/ 
Natal for the Rest of South Africa' in Boulle and Baxter op cit 57 at 73. 
2. The Lombard Report Cop cit) was commissioned jointly by the South African 
Sugar Association and the Durban Chamber of Commerce. 
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remote at this stage. The main significance of the regional 
policy is its emphasis on decentralisation along territorial 
lines, which, in isolation from other factors, would be an im-
portant development in terms of future constitutional reform. 
But at present it involves essentially a rationalisation of 
economic relationships within the existing constitutional frame-
work and is likely to be of limited political significance. 
4. The Parallel Development Framework 
The constitutional framework which has been created for the 
'parallel development' of whites, coloured and Indians provides 
an obvious basis for future consociational engineering within the 
'common area'. This was evident from the government's 1977 con-
stitution, which has been referred to in this work as a form of 
'sham consociation', and also from subsequent constitutional de-
velopments. The 1977 constitution provided for the co-ordina-
/ 
tion along consociational lines of the main institutions of para-
llel development - the central parliament, the Coloured Persons 
Representative Council, the South African Indian Council, and 
the respective executive authorities. It elevated the coloured 
and Indian institutions in nominal status, provided for the 
future augmentation of their powers, and established joint con-
sultative machinery, in the form of the council of cabinets and 
president's council, in which to co-ordinate their activities 
with those of their white correlates. As has been shown, how-
ever, these changes would not have materially affected the con-
stitutional and political supremacy of the white parliamentary 
institutions, nor the bureaucratic control of the predominantly 
white administration. The post-Schlebusch report developments 
also showed the government's commitment to the forms of consocia-
tionalism, and its use of consociational concepts in the con-
struction of a new legitimising ideology for its policies. Des-
pite the setbacks in the implementation of the 1977 constitution 
the government's commitme~t to the system has not wavered, and 
it is likely to be implemented in the coming years, albeit in 
slightly modified form. The disestablishment of the CPRC is 
lik~ly to cause at least one change in emphasis: greater atten-
ti6nis likely to be given to sub-national authorities, with the 
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constitution being implemented from the lowest level of govern-
ment upwards. This necessitates an examination not only of 
the institutions for which provision was made in the 1977 con-
stitution, but also of local authorities for whites, coloureds 
and Indians. 
(a) The president's council 
Apart from having a deliberative and initiating function in the 
process of constitutional change, the president's council could 
itself be subject to modification and adaptation during the 
period under discussion. In spite of its cursory treatment of 
the first recommendations to emanate from the president's coun-
cil,1 the government continues to have a strong vested interest 
in it, and is likely to tolerate changes in the council's compo-
sition and status which do not affect the supremacy of the par-
liamentary institutions. It is also possible that pressure will 
be exerted from/within the council itself, or from one of its 
committees, to effect changes which would enhance its legitimacy. 
Adaptations could also be used to give credibility to the gov-
ernment's recent acknowledgement that constitution-making should 
be a multilateral process. 
The two areas of possible development for the president's coun-
cil are in relation to its composition and functions. Logically 
the composition could be broadened beyond the ethnic groups to 
whom it is presently restricted, but closer analysis reveals that 
the inclusion of blacks is not even a remote option during a 
period of government-controlled constitutional change. In the 
first place the government has frequently excluded this possi-
bility, on the grounds that, in terms of its basic policy, there 
a.reto be separate constitutional structures for blacks and non-
b1acks;2 even a request by the council itself for black repre-
sentation would not be acceded to. Secondly, such a develop-
ment would involve a reversal of a long process of constitution-
al evolution, from which the council is a continua tion and not a 
1. In relation to District Six and Pageview - see above, 345. 
2. See above, 330 and references cited there. 
'twelve point plan' at, 342 above. 
See also point 4 of the 
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deviation. Thirdly, the inclusion of blacks would disturb 
the arithmetical 'equilibrium' of the council and place the 
whites in a minority position, a development which no white gov-
ernment would concede until the political system had so destabi-
lised as to provide a wholly new function for the president's 
council. In the light of this major restraint on its composi-
tion, the president's council could never become a fully conso-
ciational institution, because one of the major conflict groups 
will be permanently excluded from it; at the most it could have 
a semi-consociational function in respect of whites, coloureds 
and Indians. Other probable constraints on its future composi-
tion will also have negative implications for consociationalism -
for example the fact that its composition is likely to remain 
based on statutory group classifications, without provision for 
any other type of membership. The composition of the council is 
only likely to be broadened significantly if the government saw 
the need for a 'political crisis model' to stabilise the politi-
cal system, but even then it would be more likely to modify the 
cabinet (or cou~cil of cabinets) along consociational lines, than 
the president's council. 1 In short, while the government re-
tains the initiative in the constitutional process it seems un-
likely that the group-basis of the council will be altered, or 
that its membership will be made more inclusive. 
Within the limits of its present composition, however, the gov-
ernment is less likely to resist moves to make the president's 
council more representative, as this would involve no major con-
tradktion of previous constitutional developments - although it 
has been shown that in embarking on the consociational option .the 
government has tended to depart from the principle of represen-
tative government, insofar as it has hitherto been applied in 
South Africa. The government has also not excluded the possi-
bility of the council becoming more representative, although if 
its composition was made dependent on the participation of colour-
ed and Indian leaders it could suffer the same fate as the CPRC. 
Within the constraints of the government's constitutional policy 
1. See below, 368-371 and 520-524. 
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there are three logical alternatives for making the council 
more representative. The first would be to retain the system 
of nomination, but to require the State President to appoint 
those with community support. This would correspond to the 
position under the draft bill, 1 according to which the State 
President was obliged to act on the prime minister's advice, but 
it would be impossible to institute in the absence of represen-
tative communal institutions and a system of constituency poli-
tics. The second possibility would be for the members to be 
indirectly elected by the respective communal institutions, as 
was envisaged in the first phase formulations of the 1977 consti-
tution;2 this would require the establishment of the communal 
assemblies envisaged in the government's constitution to act as 
electoral colleges,3 together with the white House of Assembly.4 
The third possibility would be for each component of the council 
to be directly elected by the relevant section of the electorate, 
in which case it would assume a new status as a 'national'S de-
liberative assembly. It would be speculative to suggest which 
of these thr~e pussibilities might materialize in practice; 
suffice it to say that, in terms of present realities, the third 
is somewhat remote because of its apparent propinquity to the 
notion of power-sharing which has consistently been rejected by 
the government, and because it would provide the greatest oppor-
tunities for the non-collaboration tactics which lead to the 
discontinuation of the CPRC. It is also relevant to observe 
that the more representative the council was made, the more 
overtly 'political' it would become, and this would tend to de-
tract from its 'depoliticised' consociational character. 
1. S 23(1). 
2. See D. Worrall 'The South African government's 1977 constitutional pro-
posals' in J. Benyon (ed) Constitutional Change in South Africa (1978) 
127 at 129. 
3. Another logical possibility is that members be indirectly elected by 
representative local institutions. 
4. At present, however, membership of the pres i dent's council is incompati-
ble with membership of other legislative bodies (s 103(d)) of the Con-
stitution Act), and this would require modification for the first-phase 
arrangement to be adopted. 
5. That is in respect of non-blacks. 
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The second logical area of development for the president's coun-
cil would be in relation to its functions and powers. At present 
the council has formal constitutional status,1 but can function 
only in an advisory capacity to the State President and parlia-
ment - which means effectively to the white cabinet. Despite 
the open-ended nature of its advisory powers, the council is 
threatened with potential impotence in the absence of substantive 
powers of its own. 2 Some vindication for the council's constitu-
tional subordinacy and lack of legislative or executive powers 
can be derived from consociational institutions in other juris-
dictions,3 but the comparison is somewhat superficial - whereas 
the other bodies exist alongside representative institutions and 
have a relatively low political load~ the president's council will 
be a substitute for representative bodies and therefore will have 
a potentially high load. The government may therefore deem it 
necessary to give the council a more direct role in the political 
process to avoid it being perceived merely as a legitimising ' 
agent for the government's own innovations. 
/ 
One method of extending the council's powers would be to incor-
porate it into the legislative process. It can already perform 
a quasi-legislative advisory function at the request of a legis-
lative body,S and it has many of the 'powers and privileges' of 
a conventional parliament. 6 But its exact role in the law-
making process would depend on other developments in the legisla-
tive field, particularly in relation to the coloured and Indian 
assemblies provided for in the 1977 constitution. It is improb-
able that it would be given power to initiate legislation inde-
pendently, as this would enable it to bypass the cabinet and 
caucus, and it would also usurp the proposed functions of the 
council of cabinets. On the other hand it is not impossible 







Against South Africa's constitutional background this factor should not 
pass unnoticed; a number of earlier institutions (from the Native Repre-
sentatives Council to the National Indian Council) have existed extra-
constitutionally, but have tended to be of limited duration and to have 
had little political significance. 
Cf M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 245. 
Eg the Dutch Social and Economic Council. 
Cf A. Lijphart 'Consociational Democracy' 21 (1968) World Politics 207 
at 218. 
Constitution Act s 106(1)(b). 
'~~n~~~r~~ ~~Q~~e :~~e::_a~~_~:iv~~~ges of the President's Council Act, 
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it could be seen as a reconstituted Senate - which the presi-
dent's council succeeded chronologically, if not functionally. 
This development would have some symbolic importance if the 
council were empowered to review legislation of the white House 
of Assembly, because it would entail non-white participation in 
the central legislative process for the first time in South 
Africa's constitutional history; it would also be of some juri-
dical significance because it would affect the Assembly's legis-
lative supremacy. On the other hand the council would inevi-
tably be a secondary chamber, subordinate to the Assembly, with 
at most a suspensive veto over legislation passed by that body; 
in this context its review function would have only a limited 
political importance, despite its symbolic and juridical signi-
ficance. The president's council could also serve as an upper 
chamber to a future joint parliament for whites, coloureds and 
Indians, however this might be constituted. 1 
It is unlikely that the president's council would be granted 
executive powers ' during a period of government-controlled consti-
tutional change, as this would distort existing constitutional 
patterns and would not conform to the 1977 constitutional model. 
If the grand coalition principle is to be institutionalised in 
the future~ it is likely to be in relation to the council of 
cabinets . . Any adaptation of the president's council is likely 
to occur within the broad framework of the 1977 constitution and 
have only a limited significance; and there may even be a reluc-
tance to extend its powers, lest it lose its character as a 
'depoliticised' accommodationist institution. 
Cb) Legislative authorities 
The analysis of the government's 1977 constitution showed that 
most problems would be encountered in relation to the 'three par-
liament' arrangement, on which the whole system was ultimately 
dependent. On the political level it required the support and 
participation of at least a significant proportion of the colour-
ed and Indian electorates, despite the inherent legitimation 
problems from which it suffered. On the constitutional level 
it was beset with jurisdictional problems, which highlighted the 
1 • See be low, 3 6 3 - 368 . 
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difficulty of providing for a functional division of competence 
between coordinate authorities operating within a single terri-
torial area. The government's continued commitment to the 
'three parliament' system is evident not only from its policy 
statements, but also from its legislative activities: the adap-
tation of the South African Indian Council in 1978
1 
and the 
House of Assembly in 1980 2 to conform with the broad principles 
of the 1977 constitution, and the abolition of the Senate. 3 The 
government's present priority appears to be to provide institu-
tional support for the triple parliamentary arrangement in the 
form of a system of local, and possibly regional, authorities, 
from which the super-ordinate bodies might evolve. 4 However, 
any subsequent parliamentary arrangement would have to cope with 
similar problems to those encountered in the 1977 constitution. 
The first logical possibility would be for the government to es-
tablish the three community assemblies along the lines envisaged 
in the 1977 constitution, but this would introduce the same dif-
ficulties ident~fied in that system. In particular, the colour-
ed and Indian assemblies would have legislative competence over 
only 'exclusive concern' matters and would remain subordinate to 
the white parliament, which would continue to predominate on 
matters of 'common concern'. Because of the limitations on leg-
islative jurisdiction inherent in the personality principle, as 
well as the fact that most legislative matters are of 'common 
concern' to whites, coloureds and Indians, there would be very 
limited scope for consociational engineering with a system of 
three separate parliaments. The internal logic of the 1977 consti-
tution suggests the need for a tricameral parliamentary arrange-
ment, and this would also be more favourable for the consociation-
al option. 
The establishment of a three-chambered legislature need not nece-
ssarily involve any structural deviation from the 1977 constitu-
1. The South African Indian Council Amendment Act No 83 of 1978. 
2. Republic of South Africa Constitution Fifth Amendment Act No 101 of 1980. 
3. Ibid. 
4. See, eg, the State President's opening address to the President's Coun-
cil - Debates of the President's Council vol 1 col 6 (3 February 1981). 
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tion, but would require a significant· change in the legislative 
process. The draft bill in fact made provision for 'common 
concern' legislation to be submitted to all three legislative 
assemblies by the council of cabinets,1 and this led some com-
mentators to read into the constitution a tricameral parliamen-
tary procedure. 2 But in terms of the provisions of the draft 
bill this reasoning was unconvincing - the procedure in question 
was directory not peremptory, and the council of cabinets could, 
at its discretion, bypass up to two assemblies completely in the 
enactment of 'common concern' legislation; moreover, even if 
the 'tricameral' procedure was adopted, a deadlock could be broken 
through the action of a solitary assembly designated by the coun-
cil of cabinets for the purpose, an arrangement which could not 
be justified in terms of normal bicameral parliamentary proce-
dures. The 'tricameral' theory could not, therefore, be sus-
tained in respect of the draft bill. 
The single modification which would be required to the 1979 bill 
to give more sU9stance to the tricameral theory would be the 
stipulation that all 'common concern' legislation had to be 
passed by all three assemblies; this would be a iogical exten-
sion of the principles of bicameralism to the 'tricameral legis-
lature'. This would be a strong consociational development in 
that 'con~urrent majorities,3 would be required in each of the 
three assemblies, and, conversely, each would have a legislative 
veto. But although this arrangement would involve only a small 
adaptation of the 1977 constitution, it would be irreconcilable 
with the continued legislative supremacy of the white assembly, 
and would involve a threat to white political control. It could 
not be expected to materialise, , therefore, without some constitu-
tional 'safeguards' for whites. One such possibility would be 
to allow the white assembly to overrule a veto applied by either, 
1. S 26(1)(a)(iv). 
2. See G. Devenish 'The Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Pro-
posed New Constitution' 42 (1980) THR-HR 15 at 18ff, and 'Specific legal 
problems concerning a three-parliamentary system in the proposed new 
constitutional dispensation with specific reference to parliamentary 
sovereignty and executive sovereignty' in S.C. Jacobs (ed) n Nuwe Grond-
wetlike Bedeling vir Suid-Afrika (1981) 113 at 120f. 
3. On the 'concurrent majority' principle see J. Calhoun A Disquisition on 
Government (1953) 20-21, and above, 101. As the term implies, each 
assembly would operate on a majoritarian, and non-consensual basis. 
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or both, of the other bodie s, al thoug-h this would emphas ise 
the subordinacy of the latter, and subvert the theory of tri-
cameralism. A second possibility would be a joint sitting 
procedure, which is precedented in South Africa's constitutional 
history; 1 in spite of the symbolic implications of such a sys-
tem it could still be dominated by the whites, and probably also 
by the National party if decisions were taken on a majoritarian 
basis, although this would be to abandon the assumptions of con-
sociationalism. A third possibility, which derives from the 
consociational model, would be to appoint representative joint 
committees of all three houses,2 or to make use of other accom-
modationist institutions, to resolve legislative deadlocks. 
But in terms of the realities of South Africa's constitutional 
politics the latter two possibilities would have only a remote 
chance of materialising because of their implications for white 
political control. And it is likely that any concessions made 
by the government in the direction of a three-chambered legis-
lature would be accompanied by new forms of constitutional 
rigidity, designed to maintain existing power relationships.3 
From the constitutional point of view the main advantage of the 
tricameral model would be in the jurisdictional sphere. The 
model implicitly, ~nd appropriately, acknowledges that most 
matters requiring legislative treatment are of joint concern and 
should fall within the jurisdiction of joint authorities; by 
down-grading the role and functions of the individual assemblies 
it would avoid most of the difficulties inherent in the princi-
pIe of personal jurisdiction. From the consociational point of 
view it could provide the institutional basis for power-sharing 
on these matters, and could also provide the basis, i n the form 
of the communal assemblies, for 'segmental' autonomy over those 
exceptional matters of exclusive concern to each of the white, 
1. Before the Senate Act No 53 of 1955 was passed, a joint sitting of the 
Assembly and Senate was necessary to resolve a conflict between the two. 
After 1955 the Assembly was able to prevail over the Senate. For ref-
erences to joint sittings see M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 293-4. 
2. The 1979 draft bill made provision for a joint committee procedure -
s 26 ( 1 ) ( a) (v) . 
3. Cf s 8(1)(d) of the draft constitution, and the references to the trend 
towards constitutional rigidity as the Zimbabwe political system became 
more inclusive at 236-249, above. 
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coloured and Indian groups. One of the main practical impli-
cations of the tricameral model is that it would necessitate 
the establishment of joint executive and administrative insti-
tutions,1 which might be composed and function along consocia-
tional lines; while this development would have a lower politi-
cal salience than legislative 'integration', it would occur in 
the principle institutions of the modern administrative state, 
and would not be without practical significance. 
From the tricameral arrangement just described it would involve 
a small institutional step to the creation of a single tripar-
tite parliament, a possibility which became widely mooted in 
late 1980 and early 1981. What was envisaged was communal re-
presentation for whites, coloureds and Indians in a unicameral 
legislature, with separate voters' rolls being used for the pur-
pose of electing the three different components. This would in-
volve a partial reversion to the pre-1955 position when the 
principle of communal representation in a single parliament was 
applied on a li~ited basis;2 it would also involve a belated 
endorsement of the main constitutional recommendation of the 
Theron commission. And in a comparative context the arrangement 
would find some support in the Turnhalle and Zimbabwean constitu-
tions, as well as the empirical consociations. 
From an institutional point of view the tripartite parliamentary 
arrangement would again involve a continuation of, rather than a 
substantial deviation from, previous constitutional developments. 
In particular, it would perpetuate the black/non-black constitu-
tional dichotomy, which is the most important constitutional fac-
tor in the contemporary political system; in fact the same 
dichotomy would persist even if the parliament were to become 
fully 'integrated' on the basis of a common franchise, although 
the government has frequently rejected the possibility of a com-
mon voters' roll for whites, coloureds and Indians. 3 From the 
consociational point of view a tripartite parliament would also 
1. See S.C. Jacobs 'n Juriediese analise van die konstitusionele voor-
stelle vir n nuwe grondwetlike bedeling in Suid-Afrika' in Jacobs op cit 
88 at 105. 
2. See above, 158-162. At that stage coloured voters could elect only 
white parliamentary representatives. 
3. See, eg, House of Assembly Debates vol 1 col 63 (3 August 1981). 
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be a favourable constitutional arrangement for power-sharing 
along consociational lines, provided it did not operate on a 
simple majority basis and some type of veto was constitutionally 
permitted. Despite the absence of separate communal assemblies, 
it would also provide some institutional basis for segmental 
autonomy,in that each component part of the parliament could be 
empowered to take binding decisions on matters of exclusive con-
cern to the group; here the Belgian constitution provides a 
favourable comparative precedent. 1 This arrangement would have 
the same implications for the executive and administrative 
branches of government as the tricameral model. 
The reservations concerning the government's acceptance of the 
tricameral model apply, a fortiori, to the tripartite arrangement. 
Apart from its immense symbolic significance,. a single composite 
legislature would clearly involve the termination of the white 
assembly's legislative supremacy and the conferment of 'separate 
but equal' political rights on previously disenfranchised per-
sons. Realist~tally, the government would only accept this sit-
uation in return for various constitutional 'safeguards' designed 
to maintain white political control, but thes~ would in turn af-
fect the legitimacy of the system, which would already be preju-
diced by its statutory group basis. 2 A sine qua non from the 
government's point of view would be the entrenchment of the pro-
portional sizes of the component parts of the parliament; this 
trend was evident in the 1979 draft bill,3 and in terms of the 
present demographic realities 4 would ensure continued white con-
trol of the legi~lature. This would be an unfavourable feature 
from a consociational point of view,as the precedents for en-
1. The 1971 Belgian constitution makes provision for two cultural councils, 
comprising respectively the French- and Dutch-speaking members of both 
legislative houses; each council can issue decrees on cultural and 
educational matters which have the force of law in respect of the rele-
vant group (art 59(b)). And see below, 426. 
2. Not only race classification, but also other discriminating practises, 
such as residential and educational segregation, would be compatible with 
this arrangement. Even the Prohibition of Political Interference Act 
No 51 of 1968 could be retained because of the separate electoral rolls; 
on the other hand it would be difficult to preclude the emergence of 
post-electoral parliamentary coalitions. 
3. S 8(1)(d). 
4. If based on the estimated mid-1976 population figures the ratio for 
whites, coloureds and Indians would be 4:2:1. 
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trenched 'proportionality' in the empirical consociations are 
not favourable. 1 Another likely requirement would be that 
decisions be taken in the legislature on a simple majority 
basis; this would deny a veto right to coloureds and Indians, 
and would also have an anti-consociational effect. On the other 
hand if the composition of the legislature were altered to re-
flect demographic changes, the government would be likely to in-
sist on qualified majoritarianism and constitutional rigidity to 
afford it a veto power with which to contain majority rule. The 
government's attitude to consociational devices will be coloured 
by its electoral and legislative strength, a phenomenon also en-
countered in the Zimbabwe constitutional transition - from a 
minority perspective the principle of concurrent majorities and 
the mutual veto assume a new significance. 
In the future implementation of its constitutional proposals the 
government will have to introduce some variations on the legisla-
tive arrangements provided in the 1977 constitution. The ana-
lysis has shown/a number of alternatives for consociational en-
gineering in the legislative field, most of which involve a 
basic continuity with past constitutional developments and are 
compatible with government policy. While these alternatives can-
not be ev~luated in isolation from other constitutional develop-
ments, they all involve changes within the political system, and 
not of it. It has been shown that while consociational struc-
tures can be used to incorporate ~oloureds and Indians into the 
political system without affecting overall white control, genuine 
consociationalism has serious implications for white political 
power if consistently applied - even within the limits of the 
'non-black political system'. 
Cc) Executive authorities 
Any further implementation of the government's 1977 constitution 
would require the creation of new executive authorities. The 
draft bill made provision for three Westminster-type cabinets to 
serve each of the communal assemblies, and a council of cabinets 
1 . See above, 11 8 • 
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with various co-ordinating functions, ' mainly in the legislative 
sphere. But as far as the distribution of executive authority 
was concerned the white cabinet would have retained all its 
existing powers, save for the few matters falling within the 
jurisdiction of the other two cabinets. The same problems and 
shortcomings identified in the legislative field would have been 
evident here. 
The nature of future executive authorities would depend largely 
upon which configuration of legislative institutions was adopted, 
but in any system the joint executive would be of focal import-
ance. In the 1977 constitution there was a nominal joint exe-
cutive, the council of cabinets, consisting of the State Presi-
dent and various members of the community cabinets, but the 
council had no executive powers as such. Continued dominance 
of the executive field by the white cabinet would be irrecon-
cilable with the assumptions of the 1977 constitution, and a 
futu~e joint executive would have to have more substantial func-
tions and power$ ', particularly if there is a development towards 
a tricameral or tripartite legislature. As most executive 
powers would logically fall within the jurisdiction of this body, 
the justification for separate community cabinets would diminish, 
although until their abolition altogether there would be an in-
evitable political and jurisdictional tension between the joint 
and community executives. 
From a constitutional point of view a joint executive would in-
volve a significant departure from the South African norm of 
one-party majority cabinets, and it would require a reassessment 
of several constitutional principles, such as joint and indivi-
dual ministerial responsibility. Whether it would have any 
real implications for white political power would depend on how 
it was composed and operated. On the one hand it could evolve 
into a consociational-type institution with proportional repre-
sentation for each group1 and decisions being taken on a consen-
sus basis; in this form it could become the main accommodation-
ist institution in the constitutional system, exceeding the 
1. The draft bill (s 19(1» actually provided for the slight over-repre-
sentation of the minority coloured and Indian groups. 
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president's council in political importance. But what is more 
probable is that the government would avoid the full implica-
tions of consociationalism, by entrenching the composition of 
the council to ensure white numerical dominance, and by pro-
viding for decisions to be taken by majority vote, or to be 
determined by the (white) chairman. This would again introduce 
a consociational structure, namely a 'grand coalition' cabinet, 
without the essential consociational feature of power-sharing. 
Mo r e ove r, th ego ve rnme n t m i g"h t we 11 in si s t on a form 0 f joint 
ministerial responsibility operating within the council, to be 
enforced by an- oath of secrecy' and the President's ability to 
dismiss dissenting ministers. This Westminster convention would 
be quite mi~placed in the context of a multi-party executive, and 
could have the e~fect of giving coloured and Indian ministers 
co-responsibility for decisions over which they had little formal 
control. 2 Thus although the council of cabinets would provide 
scope for consociational engineering, this would not necessarily 
lead to any material change in the distribution or exercise of 
execut i ve power. ' 
/ 
The practical role and significance o.f a joint executive would 
depend on the broader constitutional system in which it operated, 
and in particular the future of the 'executive presidency'. One 
of the un~ulfilled expectations of the 1977 constitution was that 
it would provide for an executive president, but the draft bill 
gave the State President only a minor political role in a pre-
dominantly non-presidential system. In the creation of the pres-
ident's council the government also avoided drawing the President 
into the political process by making provision for a Vice-State 
President to preside over the council. Nevertheless the notion 
of an 'executive presidency' along the lines envisaged in the 
1977 constitution was revived shortly after the 1981 general elec-
tion. 3 It was in fact possible to discern a trend away from the 
principles of the parliamentary executive in the 1980 constitu-
tiOnal amendments, which increased. the prime minister's power and 
1. Cf s 16(3) of the draft bill. 
2. Cf point 4 of the 'twelve point plan' at 342, above. 
3. See Die Burger 14 May 1981, The Natal Mercury 15 May 1981. 
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patronage, gave him greater constitutional freedom in choosing 
the members of his cabinet, and freed him slightly from the 
restraints of cabinet, caucus and parliament. While it would 
be misleading to describe these developments in themselves as 
a movement towards presidential ism, they should be seen together 
with the tendency for the prime minister to have much greater 
1 
political power within modern parliamentary systems. With 
the general movement towards a managerial system of government 
in South Africa, it may not be unrealistic to anticipate the es-
tablishment of an executive presidency, which would involve a 
substantial departure from the Westminster system. 
In terms of conventional concepts of presidential government 2 
an executive president would require a popular mandate, a fixed 
term of office, institutional independence from the legislature, 
and a free discretion in the selection of his cabinet. Among 
the conventional functions and powers of an executive president 
are the initiation of legislation, the making of public appoint-
ments, the formylation of policy on domestic and foreign affairs, 
and the control and co-ordination of the administrative branch 
of government. The South African government, however, seems 
more attracted by the hybrid or semi-presidential system, and the 
presidency under the French Fifth Republic constitution has fre-
quently been referred to as a model for a South African executive 
presidency. In this arrangement there is a division of execu-
tive power between the President, directly elected by universal 
suffrage, and the government, which derives its mandate from par-
liament although its members cannot retain their parliamentary 
seats. 3 While the formal powers of the President are relatively 
limited and the constitution empowers the government to 'deter-
mine and direct the policy of the nation',4 in practice the in-
fluence of the President is greater than that of the prime minis-
t.er. 5 While the stability of this system demands a delicate 
1. See, eg, J. MacKintosh The British Cabinet (3 ed, 1977) 541-3 and 
628-631. 
2. See above, 41-46. 
3. See Jean Blondel The Government of France ( 2 ed, 1974) 129-148. 
4. Art 20. 
5. Blondel loc cit. See in particular the emergency powers provided in 
art 16 of the constitution. 
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balance between the two competing claims to executive power, 
its relevance in the South African context is that it provides 
for the same non-territorial division of competence which under-
lies the government's policy for whites, coloureds and Indians. 
The multiple executive system which the 1977 constitution pur-
ported to introduce would in fact have had more in common with 
the dual executive system of the semi-presidential model, than 
with either the parliamentary or presidential models - though in 
reality it provided for continued dominance by the white cabinet. 
The most important factor in an executive presidency in the 
South African context would be the president's method of elec-
tion. The draft bill made provision for a joint electoral col-
lege for appointing and dismissing the President, but the numeri-
cal composition of this body would have ensured the domination 
of the white majority party in both functions. While the proto-
types of both the presidential and semi-presidential systems, 
the United States and French constitutions, also made provision 
for presidentia~ · electoral colleges, a similar trend towards pop-
ular election occurred in both, in the former case by convention 
and in the latter through formal constitutional amendment. In 
fact from the government's point of view popular election by the 
white, coloured and Indian electorates would increase the legi-
timacy of .the presidential office, and at the same time maintain 
the presidency under white control. A white executive president, 
freed from parliamentary forms of political responsibility, could 
be used to retain and legitimate white control even despite the 
existence of a joint executive, and could also be used to pursue 
the government's reform option, including the constitutional 
changes which it involves. 
The preceding analysis highlights a salient feature of presiden-
tialism, namely that it is not a favourable form of government 
from a consociational point of view. 1 This is because it con-
centrates power in a single individual who is at arm's length 
from the legi~lature; collegial or coalition cabinets, which are 
more favourable settings for a consociational grand coalition, 
are easier to establish in a parliamentary system where all par-
ties represented in the legislature can be drawn into the cabinet. 
1. See A. Lijphart Democracy in Plural Societies (1977) 224, and below, 
400-405. 
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There are, however, various ways of making the presidential sys-
tem more consociational. One method is to require a qualified 
majority for the president's election - this would ensure only 
the election of compromise candidates who had the support of 
coalition groups. A second method is to provide for the rota-
tion of the presidential office among nominees of the main par-
ties at frequent intervals,1 and a third is to combine the office 
of president with other high posts which could be proportionately 
allocated. But in relating these possibilities to South Africa, 
it is realistic to assume that the government would accept no 
modification to an executive presidency which would affect its 
overall control of the political system. While consociational 
features may be introduced in the parliamentary system or the 
council of cabinets, the stakes in an executive presidency would 
be too high to depart from the majoritarian principle - which 
could benefit only whites. It is therefore submitted that, des-
pite the consequences for its legitimacy, an executive presidency 
would be likely to remain a fundamentally non-consociational in-
stitution in the " government's constitutional sy~tem. 
Brief reference should be made to a more drastic alternative re-
lating to executive power. The institutional basis already 
exists for the direct incorporation of non-whites into the cabi-
net for a twelve month period. 2 This eventuality would clearly 
only occur iri a crisis situation where the political system had 
been seriously destabilised, and it would inevitably be the pre-
ludeto fundamental political and constitutional changes which 
would terminate white supremacy. But if the crisis option were 
used, it would clearly constitute a form of authoritarian conso-
ciationalism, with at least some of the conflict leaders being 
drawn into a coalition cabinet. Remote as this eventuality is, 
it is worth emphasising that there is no institutional restraint 
on the creation of a temporary 'grand coalition' along these lines, 
and it would involve little greater distortion of the principles 
of parliamentary government than has already occurred. 
1. That is, proportionality in the temporal dimension. 
2. S 20(3) of the Constitution Act, as amended by Act No 70 of 1980. And 
see above, 336. 
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Cd) Local authorities 
Wfiile there is a fully developed system of white local authori-
ties in South Africa~ the same is not true in respect of colour-
2 eds and Indians. The various group areas enactments, as sup-
plemented by provincial ordinances, provide the statutory basis 
for coloured and Indian pa~ticipation in local government, but 
development along these lines has been slow. 3 The legislation 
makes provision for three stages of development. The first 
stage involves the creation of advisory committees comprising 
nominated members, whose main function is to make recommendations 
to the local white authorities. The second stage involves the 
creation of partly-elected management committees which, in ad-
dition to the advisory powers, have limited executive functions. 4 
The final stage involves the creation of autonomous municipali-
ties for coloured and Indian ratepayers, but very few of these 
institutions have been established to date. Constitutional con-
trol of the whole system is maintained by the cabinet, parliament 
and the white provincial councils. The relative insignificance 
/ 
of this system must be seen in terms of its inherent constitu-
tional limitations, the absence of any independent fiscal sources, 
and political opposition to the concept of separate political in-
stitutions for coloureds and Indians,S problems it shares with 
the more prominent community council system for blacks. 6 
1. For a comprehensive account of this system see J. Meyer Local Government 
Law vo 1 1 ( 1 978), vo 1 2 (1 979) . 
2. Acts Nos 41 of 1950, 77 of 1957 and 36 of 1966. For references to the 
provincial ordinances see Meyer op cit vol 2, part 5, ~~ 11-1 to 11-3. 
3. On the development of coloured local government see ch 19 of the Theron 
Report op cit. 
4. See Meyer op cit vol 2, part 5. In Natal the advisory committees are 
known as Local Affairs Committees and in some cases their members par-
ticipate in proceedings of town councils, but without voting rights. 
5. See R. Schrire 'Subordinate Political Institutions' in De Crespigny & 
Schrire op cit 77 at 86f; M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 430. 
6. See above, 179-182. 
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Against the background of this under-developed system, it was 
understandable that the government's 1977 constitution should 
focus on the national coloured and Indian institutions, the 
Coloured Persons Representative Council and the South African 
Indian Council, and attempt to combine them, with modified status 
and functions, with the white parliamentary institutions in a 
single constitutional system. ~%en this strategy was frustrated 
with the abolition of the CPRC the government adopted the alter-
native strategy of incorporating individual coloureds and Indians 
directly into constitutional bodies, the most obvious being the 
president's council. 1 But it has also given evidence
2 
of a con-
current strategy to create representative institutions for colour-
eds and Indians at the local level, and it can be expected that 
these will be of central importance in the process of consocia-
tional engineering. In many ways the constitutional options for 
whites, coloureds, and Indians at the local government level are 
similar to those at the national level. The government could 
pursue its existing policies more consistently with the object 
of establishing separate and nominally autonomous local authori-
/ 
ties for each group. But in view of the historical inadequacies 
of this system, it is likely to place greater emphasis on co-
ordinating metropolitan authorities. There would be various 
possibilities for consociational engineering in this arrangement -
in compos~tion the metropolitan authorities could be elected or 
nominated on a group basis, there could be porportional represen-
tation for each group, and a veto system could operate in the 
decision-making process. Developments along these lines would 
have a number of advantages for the government. The participa-
tion of coloureds and Indians is likely to be less problematic at 
the local than at the national level of government, and their 
participation would serve to legitimise the government's parallel 
development policy. It would perpetuate the dichotomy in consti-
tutional structures between blacks and non-blacks, and would 
1. But the strategy was also evident in relation to the stillborn coloured 
persons' and black citizens' councils. 
2. See the State President's opening address to the presidentTs council -
Debates of the President's Council vol I col 6 (3 February 1981). It 
would be speculative to suggest the nature of the council's recommenda-
tions, but they could bear some similarity to the frustrated local 
government plan for Natal - see above, 162. 
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avoid the issue of the national franchise. In relation to the 
1977 constitution it would provide the institutional infra-
structure for the whole system, and in many ways would facili-
tate the subsequent establishment of the three parliament sys-
tem. And if the metropolitan authorities had only limited 
powers delegated to them by the various local authorities, they 
could probably incorporate the consociational principles of pro-
portionality and the mutual veto more consistently than at any 
other level of the constitutional system. 
But in over.all political terms developments along these lines 
would have only a limited significance. Co-ordinating metro-
politan authorities could not alone resolve the existing problems 
affecting separate local authorities for coloureds and Indians -
economic non-viability, jurisdictional limitations, dependence on 
race classification and group areas legislation, and the creation 
of responsibility without power. Even the consociational ele-
ments would have limited significance if the metropolitan bodies 
had narrowly circumscribed functions relating to the co-ordina-
/ 
tion of shared services, and they were not able to take basic 
policy decisions, such as the allocation of scarce resources. 
In terms of the existing availability of resources and amenities 
most services within the metropolitan area would have to be pro-
vided on an agency basis by the white authorities. The system 
would also perpetrate the black/non-black constitutional distinc-
tion, even if additional co-ordination were undertaken by joint 
committees of the metropolitan authorities and black community 
councils. Finally the system would operate within an overall 
system of white constitutional control. Thus while there is 
scope for consociational engineering at the local government level, 
it would, within the constraints of the present political system, 
have only limited significance. 
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4. Other Constitutional Developments 
The constitutional debate in South Africa has been largely re-
stricted to alternative structures for the legislative and exe-
cutive branches of government, with a corresponding neglect of 
the bureaucracy and judiciary. The latter branches of govern-
ment have been least affected by the various constitutional 
developments since Union, and were also substantially unaffected 
by the government's 1977 constitution and subsequent statutory 
developments. They will, however, clearly require attention in 
any future programme of constitutional change. 
The neglect of the bureaucracy is in keeping with traditional 
constitutional theory whith has been pre-occupied with the com-
position, functions and inter-relationships of the legislature, 
executive and judiciary, to the virtual exclusion of the admin-
istrative branch of government. While this theory has been be-
latedly updated to take into account the shift of power from par-
liament to the c~binet, it has not kept pace with the subsequent 
shift of power from the cabinet to the administration. 1 With 
the rise of the modern bureaucratic-administrative state the 
functions of the administratiun range far beyond the adjudicative 
role of the 'nightwatchman state,2 and include the development of 
infrastructure, the provision of services and the regulation of 
private activities. The power which has gravitated to the ad-
ministrative branch of government most immediately and intimately 
affects individuals in their daily lives and deserves closer at-
tention in any process of constitutional change. 3 This is par-
ticularly the case in South Africa where the government itself has 
alluded to the obstructionist tactics of public servants vis-a-vis 
the government's reform programme. 4 
1. On the implications of this trend for constitutional theory see Baxter 
'Constitutionalism, Bureaucracy and Corporatism' in L.J. Boulle and L.G. 
Baxter Natal and Kw~Zulu: Constitutional and Political Options (1981) 
75 at 77ff. 
2. See M. Wiechers Administratiefreg (1973) 19. 
3. The importance which whites attached to the top public service posts in 
the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe transition has been shown above, 247. 
4. Cf Baxter op cit 91 for references to the tortoise metaphor used by Dr. 
P. Koornhof in relation to the bureaucracy. See also Zander's descrip-
tion of the role of public servants in formulating legislation - M. 
Zander The Law Making Process (1980) 29, and his references to R. Cross-
man vol 1 The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister (1975) 628-9. 
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The bureaucracy in South Africa operates at the central, pro-
vincial and local levels of government 1 and has a relatively 
high degree of decentralisation. 2 The greatest proliferation 
of departments and institutions is at the central level - since 
the 1980 rationalisation of the public service there have been 
twenty-two government departments, and the two special depart-
ments of Transport Services 3 and Posts and Telecommunications;4 
the departments in turn have numerous adjuncts, such as the ad-
visory boards, professional councils and administrative tribu-
nals. The public sector, however, is considerably wider than 
these departments, and includes the public corporations created 
in terms of specific legislation,S the public companies regis-
tered in terms of the Companies Act,6 and the national research 
institutions, the agricultural control boards and the universities. 
At the regional level are found the four provincial bureaucracies 
consisting of the provincial departments and their adjuncts, as 
well as the separate bureaucracies of the self-governing states. 
At the local level are found the municipal administrations attach-
ed to the various elected and appointed local government auth-
.. 7 / 
orl.tl.es. 
The majority of administrative, clerical and professional posts 
in government departments are filled by whites,8 although the 
1 . . See J.N. Cloete 'The Bureaucracy' in De Crespigny & Schrire op cit 54-76; 
B. Roux 'The Central Administration, Provincial and Local Authorities and 
the Judiciary' in D. Worrall (ed) South Africa: Government and Politics 
(2 ed, 1975) 75-132. These studies do not take account of recent 
changes in the central bureaucracy. 
2. See M. Wiechers Administratiefreg (1973) 17-18. However, in respect of 
non-white affairs the bureaucracy has been highly centralised, and even 
constitutional matters have been subject to a high degree of central 
control and regulation. See W.H.B. Dean 'Whither the Constitution' 1976 
THR-HR 266. 
3. Formerly Railways and Harbours. See SA Transport Services Act No 65 of 1.981. 
4. The creation of departments and allocation of ministerial portfolios are 
effected by the cabinet in conjunction with the State President. See 
ss 20(4) and 21(1) of the Constitution Act No 32 of 1961 and ss 10(4) & 
(5) of the Interpretation Act No 33 of 1957; and see M. Wiechers Staats-
reg (3 ed, 1981) 248-9. 
5. Eg the Electricity Supply Commission (The Electricity Act No 40 of 1958) 
and the Industrial Development Corporation (Act No 22 of 1940). 
6. Act No 61 of 1973; an example is the South African Coal, Oil and Gas 
Corporation (Sasol). 
7. In June 1978 there were 1 386 388 employees in the public sector in South 
Africa. House of Assembly Questions and Replies vol 4 cols 253-5 (28 
February 1979). 
8. 'Cloete op ci t 66. 
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Public Service Act' does not prevent the appointment of non-
whites to even the highest position in these departments.
2 
The 
same can generally be said for the adjuncts of the departments, 
although there are often other requirements, relating to quali~ 
fications, experience or skills, for appointment to these bodies. 
The members of the Commission for Administration,3 which has 
extensive functions relating to the organisation and administra-
tion of the bureaucracy, are in practice white, though this also 
is not a statutory requirement. 4 There is also a preponderance 
of white officials in the non-departmental public institutions, 
as well as the regional and municipal bureaucracies, with the 
exception of the government departments of the national states 
and the black, coloured and Indian local authorities. 
In terms of conventional notions of bureaucratic organisation the 
government's 1977 constitution would have required separate 
bureaucracies for each of the white, coloured and Indian groups, 
each falling under the political control of the relevant cabinet; 
in addition an integrated bureaucracy would be required to admin-
ister matters of joint concern. 5 This arrangement would have 
involved similar problems and difficulties to those inherent in 
the triple parliament and triple executive systems. As with the 
Constitution Act, however, the 1979 draft bill made scant refer-
ence to administrative authorities, although for the first time 
constitutional provision was made for the Administration Commiss-
ion,6 which was empowered to perform various functions relating 
to members of the public service. The Commission was to consist 
of five members appointed by the State President and the inten-
tion seemed, in the context of the draft bill, to have coloured 
and Indian members, as well as whites. The draft bill also for-
mally vested in the State President the power to establish depart-
1. Act No 54 of 1957. 
2. The political and administrative heads of state departments, cabinet 
ministers, must be white by virtue of their membership of the Rouse of 
Assembly (Constitution Act s 20(3)). 
3. The new name for the Public Service Commission, which is regulated by 
the Public Service Act No 54 of 1957. 
4. S 4 of Act No 54 of 1957. 
5. Alternatively these matters could be regulated on an agency basis by 
one of the three ethnic bureaucracies. 
6. S 21. 
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ments of state and to appoint or remove persons in the service 
of the state. 1 For the rest the bureaucracy was left intact, 
and reforms in this branch of government would have been depen-
dent on the new legislative and executive branches. The con-
stitutional amendments of 1980 and 1981 also involved no statu-
2 tory changes to the bureaucracy. 
The problems encountered in the implementation of the government's 
1977 constitution have further delayed any reforms of the bureau-
cracy. It is clear, however, that even within the existing con-
stitutional framework the number of non-whites in the public sec-
tor could be increased,through open employment opportunities in 
the government departments and additional appointments to admin-
istrative- tribunals, professional and trade councils, control 
boards and the other statutory bodies. 3 These developments could 
be effected through the joint actions of the cabinet and the Com-
mission for Administration, and, on their directives, subordinate 
administrative bodies. Developments along these lines would 
have several ad¥antages for the government. By avoiding the sen-
sitive issue of the franchise they would have a relatively low 
political salience, and, insofar as no parliamentary activity 
would be required, they could not be directly frustrated by the 
caucus and congresses. They would also have a stabilising and 
system ma~ntenance function, in that leadership elites of groups 
excluded from the franchise would come to share administrative ob-
ligations and responsibilities. 4 
The most appropriate consociational principle which could be ap-
plied in the reform of the bureaucracy is that of proportionality. 
In the consociational model public sector appointments are made 
on a proportional basis among the different segments , with the 
purpose of avoiding the winner-takes-all effects of majority 
1. See ss 18(1)(b) and 21(1) respectively; cf ss 20(1) and 22 of the Con-
stitution Act. The control and administration of ,black affairs con-
tinued to be vested in the State President, s 104 (cf s 111 of the Con-
stitution Act). See also ss 7(3)(k) and 106. 
2. No express provision was made for the president's council to have an 
'integrated' staff, and from personal observations it appeared to be pre-
dominantly, if not wholly, white. 
3. In 1980 the first black was appointed to the management committee of the 
Natal Parks Board, with considerable publicity. 
4. Wiech:rs (Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 245) observes that the president's 
counc1l has 'staatsregtelik die geaardheid van n statutere raad'. 
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rule. 1 But \\Thile the South African government may resort to 
the consociational incorporation of individuals into the admin-
istrative system on~ebasis of their group affiliations, it is 
unlikely to apply the proportionality principle in this process 
during a period of government-controlled constitutional change; 
there is rather likely to be a series of unilateral and reversi-
ble concessions motivated by the need for stability and legiti-
macy.2 As this would be done on a selective and individual 
basis it would affect only a small elite of non-white leaders 
and bureaucrats, and it would create the possibility, which is 
endemic in an authoritarian consociational system, of opponents 
of the government being co-opted into the bureaucracy. In short, 
there seems only a limited prospect of consociational engineer-
ing in the bureaucratic branch of government, and any changes 
that are made would have little political significance unless 
accompanied by other more fundamental constitutional changes. 
Even less attention has been given in the current constitutional 
debate to the fyture position of the judiciary; . this can be par-
tially attributed to the feeling that the judiciary should not be 
drawn into the 'political arena', although the consociational 
literature also makes very few references to this branch of gov-
ernment. The government's 1977 constitution, and consociation-
alism generally, imply additional functions for the judiciary to 
those it performs in the Westminster system; in particular they 
imply a power of judicial review, which is dealt with in greater 
detail subsequently in this work. 3 The other area of relevance 
which consociationalism has for the judiciary is in relation to 
its composition and appointment; according to the normative con-
sociational requirements the judiciary should include represen-
tatives from all 'segments', and appointments should be made on 
an objective depoliticised basis. At present membership of the 
South African juditiary is theoretically open to all qualified 
1. A. Lijphart Democracy in Plural Societies (1977) 38-9. 
2. They could also be seen as a response to the drastic staff shortages in 
the public service which became apparent in 1980, and increasingly so 
in 1981. 
3. See below, 456-469. 
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persons,1 although in fact all the judges are white. Accord-
ing to the first-phase formulations of the 1977 constitution 
coloureds and Indians would also be eligible for judicial ap-
pointments,2 but the 1979 draft bill made no reference to the 
judiciary.3 Apart from this potential broadening of its member-
ship, it seems improbable that the composition of the judiciary 
will be changed during a period of government-controlled consti-
tutional change, or that judges will come to be appointed on a 
proportional ,basis.4 The judiciary, therefore, offers itself 
as the least likely branch of government for consociational en-
gineering, despite the fact that it could serve as ta means of 
diffusing conflict and competition between groupst~ or in con-
sociational terms as a depoliticising agent. 
5. The Extra-Constitutional Process 
It is trite that , many of the most important political processes 
take place outside formal constitutional structures and that 
these can have a considerable influence on a system of govern-
ment. It has also been shown in this work that, in their em-
pirical application, the principles of consociationalism are 
often found in extra-constitutional bodies and have no foundation 
other than convention or agreement. While the South African gov-
ernment is involved in a process of quasi-consociational engineer-
ing various forms of informal consultation can be anticipated, 
1. S 10(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Act No 59 of 1959 empowers the State 
President to appoint 'fit and proper persons' to the bench. 
2. See D. Worrall 'The South African government's 1977 constitutional pro-
posals' in J. Benyon (ed) Constitutional Change in South Africa (1978) 
127 at 130. 
3. Cf ss 87 and 88 of the draft bill. 
4. The Cyprus consociational constitution made provision for a Supreme Con-
stitutional Court comprising a Greek judge, a Turkish judge and a neutral 
president. See S.A. de Smith The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions 
(1964) 202-3; see further F. van Zyl Slabbert and D. Welsh South Africa's 
Options (1979) 154-157, J. Dugard 'Judicial Power and a Constitutional 
Court' in L.J. Boulle and L.G. Baxter Natal and Kwa Zulu: Constitutional 
and Political Options (1981) 189 at 199, and the discussion below, 417-420. 
5. W.R.B. Dean 'Discussion' in Benyon op cit 87. 
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principally between the government and various strata of non-
government elites. While not all these developments would be 
government-initiated they could be used by the government, in 
the absence of representative institutions and a system of con-
stituency policies, to stabilise the political system through 
the direct incorporation of leadership elites into joint con-
sultative bodies. There would also be other advantages for 
the government: these developments would involve no constitu-
tional changes and would therefore have a relatively low politi-
cal salience, they would not affect existing power relationships 
and could be terminated or disregarded by the government if 
necessary, they would provide a barometer of political and soc-
ial pressures, and they could be institutionalised by the govern-
ment on an eclectic basis. A recent example of the institution-
alisation of formerly informal or semi-formal processes is the 
president's council, which gave constitutional form to the prior 
informal and irregular consultations between the government and 
coloured and Indian leaders. 1 The same trend is discernible in 
respect of the ~ndependent national states, whose relations with 
the republic are destined to be formalised along quasi-consocia-
tional lines in the constellation arrangement. 
There have been other government-initiated developments involving 
informal or semi-formal consultations which might be institution-
alised over time. In 1975 the government announced the estab-
lishment of 'public relations committees' consisting of coloured 
and white leaders, and operating under the auspices of the Depart-
ment of Coloured Relations. The official aim of the project was 
to promote sound relations and eliminate points of friction be-
tween the two communities, and by 1980 there were 148 relations 
committees in existence with 2664 members. 2 These committees 
have had a low general profile and no noticeable political impact, 
hut could be incorporated more closely into the political system 
if the government saw the need therefore In 1979 six regional 
1. The council could also be seen as a successor to the informal inter-
cabinet council - see above, 201-202. 
2. House of Assembly Debates vol 15 col 7441 (28 May 1980). 
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committees were created to advise the . cabinet committ~e on black 
urban affairs; 1 the committees consisted of government-appointed 
members of all ethnic groups, including urban blacks and home-
land leaders, and had wide terms of reference on matters ,relat-
ing to urban and rural blacks resident outside the national 
states. The credibility of the committees was affected by the 
refusal of several significant black leaders to participate in 
them, and by the subsequent resignation, through disillusionment, 
of other prominent black members - as a product of separate de-
ve10pment this venture posed the same options and problems for 
blacks as did the president's council for coloureds and Indians. 
These committees can be said to have provided very limited scope 
for the articulation of black interests and for inter-group 
negotiation, and to date they have had little prominence or im-
pact. And on an even more informal footing have been the gov-
ernment-initiated discussions with the Labour party, which have 
occurred notwithstanding the establishment of the president's 
council. None of these developments has much consociational 
significance in itself, but they do reveal forms of ~lite con-
/ 
sultation which could have an effect on the constitutional process. 
An informal process initiated by a provincial government was the 
establishment of a cons~ltative committee in Natal, consisting of 
the four Natal executive committee members, the provincial ad-
ministrator, two members of the KwaZulu cabinet, and two Indian 
and two coloured leaders. 2 The committee's main function is to 
discuss matters of mutual concern and it has only advisory powers, 
but it is clearly a consociational-type body which could be in-
corporated more. closely into the constitutional process if the 
political will was present. There have also been reports of an 
eleven-member committee in the same province, consisting of pro-
vincial, KwaZulu and central government representatives, with the 
function of co-ordinating all planning in Natal and KwaZulu. 3 
1. 1979 Annual Survey of Race Relations 386-387. 
2. See the description of F. Martin MEC in L.J. Boulle and L.G. Baxter 
Supplement to Natal and KwaZulu: Constitutional and Political Options 
(1981) 41. 
3. The chief minister of KwaZulu, however, reacted with 'surprise' to the 
announcement of this committee, although it had been said to have his 
support. See The Daily News 24 November 1981. 
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Other developments which could have an influence on the process 
of consociational engineering are the various government and 
non-government commissions of inquiry, which themselves provide 
the basis for a type of accommodationist_ process. The Theron 
commission 1 consisted of twelve whites and six coloureds and made 
constitutional and socio-economic recommendations with far-reach-
ing political implications; unfortunately it is a reality of 
South Africa's constitutional politics that important recommen-
dations of commissions, even those appointed by the government, 
are disregarded, and this was the case with the Theron report. 
The Schlebusch constitutional commission was restricted to white 
parliamentarians, although its composition was broadened when it 
was institutionalised as the president's council. Of the non-
government commissions the most significant are those appointed 
by the Ciskeian and KwaZulu governments, the Quail and Buthelezi 
commissions respectively. While the former 2 was more in the 
nature of a specialist committee, the latter3 was representative 
of a much wider divergence of views and had a greater potential 
for inter-group/ bargaining than any other contemporary process. 4 
·But in terms of present political realities the real accommoda-
tionist role of bodies such as the Buthelezi commission is 
severely circumscribed by the non-participation of the National-
ist party, since its recommendations could only be implemented to 
the exten~ of the legislative competence of KwaZulu, and possibly 
a compliant provincial council. The main significance of the 
commission is that it would serve to support and legitimate stand-
points adopted by the KwaZulu government in consultat i ons with the 
central government, and thereby acquire some indirect influence 
~n the political process. 
Of the other informal developments one of the most significant 
was the well-publicised contact between members of the National 
party and the Inkatha movement in 1979 and 1980. 5 In terms of 
1. See above, 253-265. 
2. See above, 274-277. 
3. See above, 282. 
4. Cf the views of C. Crocker 'South Africa: Strategy for Change' 59 (1980) 
Foreign Affairs 323 at 340. 
5. See 1979 Annual Survey of Race Relations 41 and 1980 Annual Survey of 
Race Relations 50. At the fourth such meeting the initiative seemed 
to founder on policy differences. 
386. 
the present policies, constituencies and strengths of the in-
ternal South African political parties this represented the 
apogee of inter-elite consultation, and took place along funda-
mentally consociational lines; it was the nearest that white 
and black nationalism have approached to the 'self-denying hypo-
thesis'. Similar discussions have taken place between Inkatha 
and white opposition parties, 1 though necessarily with less 
political significance. Discussions were also held during 1980 
between the Inkatha Youth Brigade and the University of Stellen-
bosch Students' Representative Council,2 and subsequently be-
tween the Inkatha central committee and the Afrikaanse Studente-
bond executive. 3 As the Zimbabwe experience shows, however, 
there will be an inverse relationship between the significance 
of these 'internal agreements' and the growth of 'external' poli-
tical parties. 
What the processes referred to in this section have in common is 
the fact that they involve various sections of leadership elites 
in informal consociatioruU-type consultations, albeit with vary-
/ 
ing degrees of political significance. Apart from having some 
influence on South Africa's constitutional poLicies, these deve-
lopments could also be institutionalised over time as part of the 
government's programme of consociational engineering. They could 
also have a demonstration-effect in relation to the consociation-
al option. But like all the other matters referred to in this 
chapter they are not likely to affect the government's overall 
control over the political system and constitutional development. 
1. A permanent Progressive Federal Party-Inkatha steering committee was 
established in 1980. 
2. 1980 Annual Survey of Race Relations 50. 
3·. According to press reports this contact was formalised in 1981 in the 
establishment of a South African Youth Foundation. See the Natal 
Mercury 26 November 1981 . 
38 7 . 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter attention has been given to the likely constitu-
tional developments during a period of government-controlled 
consociational engineering. Most of these developments involve 
the evolution of existing constitutional structures in the con-
tinued application of orthodox government policy. They suggest 
a commitment to new forms of sham consociationalism which do not 
materially affect overall white control. It is indeed under-
standable that while the government is in a position of strength 
it should refrain from pushing the consociational principles to 
the point of genuine power-sharing, even among whites, coloureds 
and Indians, as this would inevitably affect its position of 
dominance. Thus consociational engineering in South Africa is 
faced with the constraining paradox that the government wishes 
to embark on a process of constitutional reform, without losing 
overall control of that process. ~~at sham consociationalism 
entails is that the government can get other groups to share 
political responsibility for the exercise of power, without ac-
tually sharing in the exercise of that power. This subterfuge 
is not without adverse implications for the long-term prospects 
of consociationalism; as Hanf, Weiland and Vierdag observe,1 
' ... sham consociation will preserve white rule in South 
Africa in the medium term, but reduce the long-term 
prospect of genuine consociation. Changes of a purely 
decorative nature have taken place too often and for 
too long in South Africa ... So we can assume that the 
majority of blacks will simply regard "consociation" or 
"plural democracy" as more new labels for apartheid, and 
that sham consociation will thereby destroy the pros-
pect of a genuine and acceptable regulation of conflict 
in the future.' 
An indication is given in the following chapter of the disjunc-
tion between South Africa's form of sham consociationalism and 
genuine consociationalism. 
1. T. Ranf, H. Weiland and G. Vierdag South Africa: The Prospects of 
Peaceful Change (1981) 419. 
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CHAPTER 8 
DEMOCRATIC CONSOCIATIONALISM - EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES 
1. Introduction 
The system of consociational democracy is not being applied 
prescriptively to South Africa in this work, mainly because the 
conditions favourable to its emergence and operation are not 
present here - elite commitment to the maintenance of the sys-
tem, prior traditions of elite accommodation, a deferential 
citizenry, a multiple balance of power, an absence of external 
threats, and a low degree of socio-economic inequalities. 1 Nor 
has the government shown any indication of. accepting consocia-
tional democracy , as a normative goal, and its strategy of non-
democratic consbciational engineering is compatible with its 
own long-standing policies, as well as its continued political 
he~emony. To the extent that this strategy involves changes to 
the political institutions it shows a commitment to the Burkean 
tradition, which prescribes piecemeal adjustments and reforms to 
a continuing set of institutions. 2 In these circumstances the 
transition from authoritarian quasi-consociationalism to demo-
cratic consociationalism is improbable, albeit not impossible. 3 
Nevertheless in this chapter attention is given to the main re-
quirements of a democratic consociational system in South Africa. 
This will serve both to hig'hlight the wide divergences between 
the present forms of consociationalism and genuine consociation-
alism, and to illustrate the range of institutional alternatives 
which could be adopted if legitimate leaders came to find and ac-
commodate one another in a temporary joint coalition, and sought 
constitutional mechanisms for institutionalising that relation-
ship. While these consociational structures and procedures would 
1. See above, 130-133. 
2. See F. van Zyl Slabbert and D. Welsh South Africa's Options (1979) 134. 
3. See T. Ranf, R. Weiland and G. Vierdag South Africa: The Prospects of 
Peaceful Change (1981) 418-9. 
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not in themselves be a sufficient means to achieve stable demo-
cracy, it is probable that if there is to be any democracy in 
1 
South Africa it would have to be of the consociational type. 
At the political level consociational democracy would require 
two fundamental types of changes - those which would contribute 
to democratising the polity, including a system of universal 
franchise; and those which would introduce a process of real 
power-sharing and negotiated conflict regulation, namely a per-
manent grand coalition with its subsidiary institutions. How-
ever, a constitutional system incorporating these deve'lopments 
could not exist in a societal vacuum, and authentic consocia-
tionalism would require additional statutory, social and econom-
ic changes before it could be operative in the South African con-
text. A description of these changes is provided in the first 
section of this chapter. Although they are fairly broadly 
stated, they must be regarded as minimal preconditions, and 
would therefore have to be implemented during a pre-consociation-
al 'transitiona~1 period; but as these changes could themselves 
only be the outcome of mutual negotiations this period could 
also be seen as part of the consociational process, so that it 
serves no useful purpose to attempt delineating a 'transitional' 
period. 2 In the section following an overview is given of the 
basic con$titutional optirins facing the designers of a consocia-
tional system, and this is followed by a brief outline of the 
optimal constitutional framework for consociationalism. Atten-
tion is then given to some of the wide-ranging institutional 
alternatives which could be adopted to support consociationalism, 
given the fact that its principles can be applied in a variety 
of constitutional frameworks. Unlike the essential precondi-
tions, these alternatives comprise a wide range of optional in-
stitutions, but they would have 'to be adopted in one or other 
combination for the operation of a consociational system. 
1. See A. Lijphart Democracy in Plural Societies (1977) 236. 
2. There is clearly a 'cause and effect' problem here; ef C.B. Macpherson 
The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (1977) 100. 
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2. Extra-Constitutional Preconditions 
.The necessary pre-conditions for a democratic consociational 
system in ~uth Africa can be referred to in two categories. 
The first category relates to a legitimate leadership; conso-
ciational democracy places a heavy premium on the role of auth-
entic and effective leadership elites, without which it would 
be unrepresentative and rest on unstable foundations. In South 
Africa a wide range of statutory amendments would be required 
to allow the emergence of a legitimate leadership, but they must 
be regarded as the sine qua non of an authentic consociational 
system. The second category relates to socio-economic con-
ditions; consociationalism would require the removal of the 
major contemporary economic inequalities in the South African 
society, which could not be effected through statutory amend-
ments alone, and would require a re-appraisal of the economic 
foundations of the constitutional system. These changes are 
necessarily somewhat relative, for although there is no single 
reform which ca~ ' be described as an absolute pre-requisite, sub-
stantial socio-economic reforms would be necessary to obtain the 
commitment of non-white leaders to the rules of the consocia-
tional system, since consociationalism itself does not provide 
the institutiOnal mechanisms for rapid or radical reform. 
Consociational democracy assumes a fully representative political 
system, which in the South African context would require the ex-
tension of the franchise to presently disenfranchised groups. 
But beyond this, consociationalism places a heavy reliance on 
representative leadership ~lites because of the necessity for 
their deliberate joint co-operation to stabilise the political 
system. Consociationalism is therefore intimately dependent on 
the freedoms of political association and political expression. 2 
In South Afrita. there are a number of statutes which prevent or 
inhibit the emergence of legitimate leaders, ranging from those 
1. On the important role of elites see A. Lijphart 'Consociational Democ-
racy' (21) 1968 World Politics 207 at 216-222, and The Politics of Ac-
commodation (2 ed, 1975) 59-70 and 139-180, and in particular E. 
Nordlinger Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (1972) 46-87. 
2. See generally J. Dugard Human 'Rights and the South African Legal Order 
(1978) 146ff. 
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which impose group membership on individuals, to others which cur-
tail the freedoms of the person, assembly and speech. Further-
more government-created institutions have proved unattractive 
and discrediting to many black leaders resulting in an under-
development of black political leadership, and the proscription 
of various organisations has led to the formation of movements 
across the country's borders and has created a significant lead-
ership in exile. These factors are not favourable from the 
consociational perspective. 
1 
A system of free political association to allow the emergence of 
voluntarily defined political segments in South Africa would re-
quire amendments to those laws which prohibit inter-racial or 
ethnic political organisation 2 and empower the executive to pro-
scribe or otherwise affect parties or organisations.
3 
The free-
dom to form political groupings, however, also implies a range 
of other civil rights which are presently denied, limited or 
differentially allowed. These include the freedom of the per-
son,4 and freed~m of movement,5 the freedom to assemble and hold 
1. The tendency in South Africa has " been for constitutional consultations 
to be conducted between the government and other 'moderate' leaders; 
this can be of no more than intermediate term significance, as the 
Zimbabwe experience revealed. 
2. The Prohibition of Political Interference Act No 51 of 1968. 
3. The Internal Security Act No 44 of 1950, the Unlawful Organisations Act 
No 34 of 1960, the Affected Organisations Act No 31 of 1974, the Parlia-
mentary Internal Security Commission Act No 64 of 1976, and the Electoral 
Act No 45 of 1979. 
4. The main limitations on this freedom are contained in the pre-trial and 
preventive detention laws, the most important of which are the Internal 
Security Act No 44 of 1950 (ss 4,10(1)(a) bis and 12B), the Criminal 
Procedure Act No 51 of 1977 (s 185) and the Terrorism Act No 83 of 1967 
(s 6), and the banning and house arrest provisions of the Internal 
Security Act. See A.S. Mathews Law, Order and Liberty in South Africa 
(1971) 133-163; M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 152f. 
S. Restrictions here apply mainly to blacks by virtue of the 'influx con-
trol' provisions of the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act No 25 of 
1945 (ss 10,12,29 and 29 bis) and the 'pass laws' (Act No 25 of 1945, 
the Blacks (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act No 
67 of 1952, and the Blacks (Prohibition of Interdicts) Act No 64 of 
1956). See Dugard op cit 73-78; L.J. Boulle 'Citizens and Exiles' 
paper delivered in Platform 80 series, 27 August 1980, at University of 
Natal, Durban. The denationalisation of homeland blacks introduces new 
forms of movement and influx control. 
• 
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meetings, gatherings and processions,l and the freedom of poli-
tical expression and speech. 2 In many of these cases exceptions 
to these freedoms would be compatible with the Rule of Law and 
the liberal-democratic tradition, provided they were well defined, 
of a limited scope, and accompanied by judicial or extra-judicial 
safeguards. 3 Nevertheless a wide range of statutory provisions, 
which constitute an intrinsic part of the present political order, 
would require amendment or repeal so as to allow authentic group 
formation and the emergence of a legitimate leadership. In 
addition an administrative reassessment would be required of the 
position of banned, sentenced or exiled leaders or potential lead-
ers. These would clearly be far-reaching changes, particularly 
in view of the likelihood that during a period of government-
controlled constitutional change there will be an expansion and 
intensification of many of the security-related provisions in or-
der to retain political stability. This perspective highlights 
the discrepancy between present constitutional and political rea-
lities and the basic essentials of the normative consociational 
model. / 
1. The most important restrictions are imposed by the Riotous Assemblies 
Act No 17 of 1956 as amended by Act No 30 of 1974, the Gatherings 
and Demonstrations Act No 52 of 1973, and Procl R268 of 1968 which 
applies only to black areas. Since 1976 there has been a· countrywide 
ban on all outdoor political gatherings attended by twelve or more 
persons (unless authorised by the minister or a magistrate). See also 
s 9(7)(f) of the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act No 25 of 1945 
and s 5(1)(b) of the Black Administration Act No 38 of 1927. 
2. Insofar as curtailments in additibn to those implied by the previous 
restrictions are concerned, the following statutes are relevant: 
the Internal Security Act No 44 of 1950, the Publications Control Act 
No 42 of 1974, the Riotous Assemblies Act No 17 of 1956 and the Official 
Secrets Act No 16 of 1956. Other provisions prevent the dissemination 
of information on defence matters, prison conditions, the police and 
railway police forces, and strategic supplies. The freedom of express-
ion is indirectly restricted in South Africa by the limitations on 
access to official information; this is dealt with in comparative con-
text by A.S. Mathews in The Darker Reaches of Government (1978). On 
secrecy and consociationalism see below, 477-488. 
3. Even the courts' common law review powers are severely curtailed by 
many of the statutes referred to above. See SA Defence and Aid Fund 
v Minister of Justice 1967 (1) SA 263 (AD), Winter v Administrator in 
Executive-Committee 1973 (1) SA 873 (AD). 
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Besides contributing materially to a resolution of the legiti-
macy crisis, a system of free political association would solve 
one of the recurring problems experienced by contemporary South 
African commentators, namely which groups in society should be 
constitutionally accommodated. Both advocates of the govern-
ment's constitutional dispensation and more innovative constitu-
tional reformers argue that, in recognition of the dive!sity in 
South Africa's plural society, certain ethnic, linguistic or 
religious groups should be constitutionally recognised and that 
their 'group rights', appropriately defined, should be consti-
tutionally safeguarded. This argument can claim some support 
from the consociational notion of political participation through 
communal units, and the empirical consociations have often de-
fined and accommodated these units in specific terms. But the 
constitutional recognition of these units, or groups, is only 
possible where there are clearly discernible groups and the con-
stitutional definitions coincide with the groups' own self-
concept. In South Africa neither of these two requirements 
have been complied with, and this now necessitates a system of 
voluntary group affiliation2 to ensure the emergence of self-
defined groups with legitimate leaders. The principles of con-
sociationalism are intimately concerned with the questions of 
group autonomy and the protection of 'group rights', but these 
can be effected in neutral terms through such constitutional fea-
turesas the electoral system, the distribution of power, and 
the decision-making procedures, without any specific delineation 
of such groups. The absence of constitutional references to 
'race' and 'ethnicity' would also make a contribution to the 
resolution of the legitimacy crisis in South Africa. 
There is an apparent contradiction between the principle of free 
political association and the consociational maxim that 'good 
fences make good neighbours'. Underlying the maxim is the theory 
1. Cf A.S. Mathews 'Security Legislation and Peaceful Change in South Africa' in F. van Zyl Slabbert and J. Opland South Africa: Dilemmas of Evolutionary Change (1980) 181 at 186ff. 
2. On the importance of this aspect in Degenaar's pluralist model see above, 78. 
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that clear boundaries between the groups in a divided plural 
society have the advantage of limiting mutual contacts, and re-
stricting the chances of potential antagonisms erupting into 
actual hostility.l It must again be emphasised, however, that 
the main 'fences' in South Africa have been established through 
a system of 'race' classification which has been unilaterally 
imposed by the white government. 2 The system is unscientific 
and arbitrary3 and has been manipulated for political and econ-
omic ends. The maxim does not therefore have the same signi-
ficance in the South African context as it has in the empirical 
consociations. Nor is it possible to justify the other laws 
which are dependent on the system of race classification and 
which provide for differential access to land, amenities and 
facilities,4 or whith differentiate equally among the races,5 by 
reference to this maxim. These enactments have come to form 
essential parts of the living constitution, but stand in the way 
of authentic democratic consociationalism. 6 Their retention in 
existing or di~guised form would also make any attempt at conso-
ciational engine~ring liable to be perceived as an extension of 
the separatist constitution-making of the past, as was in fact 
the case with the government's 1977 constitution. It is of 
course true that in the absence of these laws 'race' and 'eth-
nicity' may indefinitely remain important factors in the politi-
cal process, but they would then be voluntarily assumed identi-
ties which could exist alongside other types of group formation. 
1. A. Lijphart Democracy in Plural Societies (1977) 88. 
2. The system is regulated mainly by the Population Registration Act No 30 of 1950 and the Black States Citizenship Act No 26 of 1970, but many statutes incorporate their own classifications. 
3. As numerous commentators have pointed out 'coloured persons' are not positively defined, but comprise a residual group which is neither 'black' nor 'white'. See s 1 of Act No 30 of 1950. 
4. The most frequently cited discriminatory statutes are the Group Areas Act No 36 of 1966, the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act No 49 of 1953 and the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act No 25 of 1945. 'Job reservation' as enforced by a number of statutes had also a high salience, but has been largely dispensed with by recent amendments. 
5. Eg the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act No 55 of 1945 and the Immor-ality Act No 23 of 1957 (s 16). As has been pointed out these laws are in effect discriminatory. See J. Dugard and W.H.B. Dean 'The Just Legal Order' in S. van der Horst and J. Reid (eds) Race Discrimination in South Africa (1981) 22. See also the useful article by M. Savage 'What Does Removal of Race Discrimination Effectively Mean in the South African Context?' in Slabbert and Opland op cit 156-176. 
6. It is of course not being overlooked that these laws have contributed significantly to political instability in South Africa. 
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Besides the statutory changes mentioned above, there are various 
types of social and economic reform which would be required be-
fore a system of consociational democracy could be expected to 
operate successfully. The removal of discriminatory legisla-
tion would have some effect on existing patterns of socio-
economic inequality, but could not alone effect the type of 
socio-economic reform which numerous commentators have recommend-
ed should precede constitutional change; many of these recommend-
ed changes would constitute necessary conditions for a democratic 
consociational system. Amongst those usually cited 1 are: the 
correction of inequalities in access to resources such as land, 
amenities, health facilities, and social pensions and other wel-
fare benefits; equitable state expenditure on housing and edu-
cational facilities; the appointment of non-whites to all levels 
of the bureaucracy, and to administrative boards and tribunals, 
commissions of enquiry and other statutory bodies; the removal 
of the remaining limitations on occupational mobility of blacks 
and an increase in facilities for their vocational training; the 
encouragement o~ a range of institutional developments for deal-
ing jointly with conflict, particularly in the industrial field; 
the institution of representative government at the local level; 
the decentralisation of administrative authority; and the en-
couragement of political development in black areas. The govern-
ment has already made a formal commitment to reform in some of 
these areas, though the actual progress has been slow, sporadic 
and isolated; there has been a tendency to advance by way of 
1. See eg L. Schlemmer 'Social Implications of Constitutional Alternatives 
in South Africa l in J. Benyon (ed) Constitutional Change in South Africa 
(1978) 271-273, and 'Political Structures for Multi-Racial Societies: 
Basic Concepts and Structures' (SAIRR, 1980); A. du Toit 'Discussion' 
in Benyon op cit 286-289; the Sprocas Report No 10 South Africa's Poli-
tical Alternatives (1973) 221-242; H. Adam 'The Preconditions for Peace-
ful Change and Intergroup Accommodation in a Divided Society', paper 
del~vered at the International Futures Conference: The Road Ahead, 
GrahamstoWTI, July 1978; F. van Zyl Slabbert and D. Welsh South Africa's 
Options (1979) 120-132; G. Thula 'A Basis for Constitutional Transform-
ation of South Africa' in R. Rotberg and J. Barratt (eds) Conflict and 
Compromise in South Africa (1980) 161-172; the papers on economic and 
social change in Slabbert and Opland op cit; the articles on education, 
housing, health and social welfare in S. van der Rcrst and J. Reid (eds) 
Race Discrimination in South Africa - A Review (1981); and Ranf, 
Weiland and Vierdag op cit 382-397. 
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administrative exemption alone, without providing the institu-
tional support to sustain the particular reform.
1 
There has 
also been noticeable neglect of the redistributive aspects of 
the above reforms,2 and even in the field of industrial rela-
tions, where there has been extensive statutory and administra-
tive activity in the last few years, the reforms have been limited 
and constrained by other political and economic factors. 
A programme of planned social and economic change along the lines 
suggested above would be a necessary, though not a sufficient, 
condition for democratic consociationalism. In consociational 
terms it would serve to replace the present hegemony of a single 
segment with a 'multiple balance of power', by creating new cross-
cutting lines of social differentiation and new politically rele-
vant conflicts of interest. Some of these changes could succeed 
a consoc ia t ional accommodation, but it should be re-emphas ised 
that the cO'nsociational form of government is slow and cumbersome 
and not suited to radical reform. Therefore popular loyalties 
to the system as ' a whole, and in particular the commitment of 
black leaders to the rules of the consociational system, would 
probably depend on the extent to which progress had already been 
made towards social and economic reform. 3 In the South African 
context this could require an as yet unapparent political will-
ingness to restructure the society in a far-reaching manner. 
3. Basic Options 
Having outlined some of the extra-constitutional preconditions 
for a system of consociational democracy, it is necessary to deal 
briefly with the most important basic options facing the framers 
1. Eg the admission of blacks to white univers~t~es, their occupation of 
property in white group areas, and their use of entertainment facili-
ties, are 'exceptional' situations requiring an administrative permit. 
2. Even moderate internal black parties have called for the nationalisation 
of land and the mining sector as part of a redistributive strategy. 
See 'A Constitutional Alternative for South Africa (Inkatha), by G. 
Thula in Slabbert and Opland op cit 36-46. 
3. For critical black references to the limitations of constitutional change 
alone see D. Curry in Benyon op cit 90 and the Inkatha evidence to the 
Schlebusch commission included in W. Felgate 'Co-operation Between Natal 
and KwaZulu - an Inkatha View' in L.J. Boulle and L.G. Baxter Natal and 
KwaZulu : Constitutional and Political Options (1981) 154 at 158-162. 
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of a consociational constitutional system.
1 It has been empha-
sised in this work that consociationalism does not provide an 
analytical constitutional model, that it is understood primarily 
in behavioural-attitudinal terms, and that it can be applied in 
a variety of institutional frameworks. But before a selection 
could be made among the various institutional alternatives, 
there are four preliminary options which would have to be settled: 
Ca) The first option is whether the consociational rules should 
be embodied in formal documents, such as a constitution act 
and electoral act, or whether reliance should be had on in-
formal arrangements, such as conventions or inter-party 
pacts. Some features would of necessity require a statu-
tory basis, for example a proportional electoral system or 
a territorial-federal division of power, whereas others, 
such as the grand coalition and veto principles, could be 
based on conventions or formal agreements; a combination 
of the two alternatives is also possible, as evidenced by 
the empirical consociational democracies,although it is 
significant / that in many of these systems there has been 
a high degree of reliance on informal agreements. In the 
South African context, however, it would seem necessary to 
specify the consociational rules in the constitution2 
since they would involve radical changes from existing con-
stitutional structures and political practises. A legacy 
of South Africa's political history is an absence of mutual 
trust at the leadership level, and in the light of this 
reality it would be unrealistic to rely on informal agree-
ments or pacts. 3 It would therefore be judicious to have 
1. See on this section A. Lijphart 'Consociation: The Model and its 
Applications in Divided Societies', paper presented at the Study Con-
ference on Models of Political Co-operation held at Queen's University 
of Belfast, Northern Ireland, 25-28 March, 1981. 
2.. The term is used loosely here to include other basic laws besides the 
constitution act. 
3. As the consociational option assumes a change in leadership attitudes 
this point requires further elaboration. As Barry (B. Barry 'The Con-
sociational Model and its Dangers' 3 (1975) European Journal of Political 
Research 393 at 410) emphasises, prescriptive power-sharing will not be 
successful where the political will is absent - the failed consociations 
testify to this point. But the 'corollary' does not necessarily follow, 
namely that where there is a recognition on all sides that an accommoda-
tion is necessary, constitutional prescription is not preferable. 
Within limits constitutional provisions can restrain power, thereby com-
pelling compromise and affecting attitudes; in the absence of a tra-
dition of elite accommodation they could make a significant contribution 
to the maintenance of a consociational system. 
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the principles of consociationali~m constitutionally pre-
scribed and to make power-sharing an institutional nece-
. 1 
SSlty. 
Cb) The second option is whether the constitution should de-
fine and enumerate the segments in explicit terms, or 
merely accommodate them neutrally. The empirical evidence 
tends to support the former arrangement, with constitution-
al recognition being given to formally specified linguistic 
or religious groups. It is also possible, however, to 
avoid any constitutional identification or direct recog-
nition of the segments, and to define power-sharing neu-
trally in terms of political parties; this approach was 
consistently followed in the Progressive Federal Party's 
constitutional proposals. 2 The segmental autonomy prin-
ciple can also be applied, where circumstances permit,3 
in a territorial-federal arrangement, without direct ref-
erence to the segments. In view of the wide-spread oppo-
sition to any form of racial or ethnic classification in 
South Africs and the necessity for a system of free politi-
cal association, it would be preferable to adopt the neutral, 
rather than the explicit, constitutional formulation of 
power-sharing. In specific institutional terms this would 
entail the avoidance of such features as separate voters' 
rolls · or communal assemblies. On the other hand it might 
be necessary to make formal distinctions at the very top 
level of political leadership to ensure, for example, that 
despite a proportional electoral system no significant 
group is unrepresented in the coalition cabinet. In this 
situation there could be a constitutionally-provided 
'affirmative action' arrangement. 4 
Cc) The third option concerns the extent of the powers and 
rights of minorities, or conversely the extent to which 
1. ef R. Schrire 'The Just Political Order' in Van Der Horst and Reid op cit 1 at 14-15. 
2. See eg the composition of the Federal Assembly (§ 5.4.1) and the Federal Executive Council (§ 5.4) in the PFP Constitutional Report (1978); cf A. Lewis Politics in West Africa (1965) 83. 
3. That is the segments are largely geographically concentrated. 
4. See further, below. As Justice Blackmun stated in the celebrated Ameri-can 'affirmative action' case Regents of the University of California v 
Bakke 438 US 265 (1978), 'In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race' (at 497). 
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majority rule should apply, notwithstanding the anti-
majoritarian nature of the consociational system. This 
includes such questions as whether minorities should be 
proportionately represented or over-represented in the 
legislature and executive, the extent of the powers to 
be delegated to the different segments, the extent and 
effect of the veto power, and the content and juridical 
status of a bill of rights. 1 This category does not 
provide dichotomous alternatives, and on all the issues 
mentioned a balance would be required between the legiti-
mate demands of political minorities and the need for 
effective and efficient government. 
(d) The fourth option relates to the levels of government at 
which the principles of consociationalism would apply. 
Preferably this should be at all levels of government,2 
but it would be realistic to expect them to be applied 
initially at the highest levels only. Conversely, conso-
ciationalism could be applied at only the subnational level, 
provided the region enjoyed a relatively large measure of 
autonomy short of independence; some empirical support for 
this proposition is found in the case of the Netherlands 
Antilles and Surinam at various historical stages,3 and the 
notion has been implicit in some of the sub-national con-
stitutional alternatives recommended for South Africa. 4 
1. Some of these matters are investigated in the latter half of this 
chapter. 
2. Except where segmental autonomy is applied on a territorial basis in an 
asymmetrical federation; as the principles of consociationalism are 
designed to operate only inter-segmentally they need not be applied at 
the intra-state level. 
3. And, in the light of Aunger's recent study, in New Brunswick, Canada 
(although Canada itself is a semi-consociational system). See E.A. 
Aunger In Search of Political Stability: A Comparative Study of New 
Brunswick and Northern Ireland (1981). -
4. For example the 'condominium' suggestion made in the Ciskei (Quail) 
Report (above, 275) and the institutional recommendations of the 
Lombard Report (above, 280). Cf N. Olivier 'Implications of Consti-
tutional Development in KwaZuluJNatal for the Rest of South Africa' in 
Boulle and Baxter op cit 57-74. 
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4. The Optimal Constitutional Framework 
Although consociational democracy cannot be identified with any 
specific institutional arrangement, and its characteristics are 
often found extra-constitutionally, some constitutional frame-
works are more favourable for its successful operation than 
others. Thus while consociationalism is not incompatible with 
presidentialism, majority or plurality electoral systems, and 
unitary forms of government, a better institutional framework is 
provided by their 'opposites': parliamentary systems (or semi-
parliamentary systems with a plural executive), list systems of 
proportional representation and, in the case of societies with 
geographically concentrated segments, federal systems.
1 
The main advantage of the parliamentary system over presidential-
ism is that it facilitates the emergence of a coalition cabinet; 
it is easier for all or some of the parties represented in the 
legislature to be included (on a proportional basis) in a joint 
executive, becau?e of the close institutional relationship between 
the two; in fact, even traditional parliamentary systems have 
transformed their one-party majority cabinets into coalition cabi-
nets at times of instability or crisis, despite the distortions 
this involves for the conventions of cabinet government. Presi-
dentialism, on the other hand, entails the predominance of a 
single, usually popularly elected, leade~who is at arm's length 
from the legislature and has greater institutional freedom in 
appointing his cabinet. His method of election tends to make 
him representative of a particular segment, which, combined with 
his institutional predominance, provides a less favourable con-
stitutional setting for the emergence of a coalition cabinet,2 
despite the fact that there may have been a measure of coalition-
building to secure the president's election. On the other hand, 
1. A. Lijphart Democracy in Plural Societies (1977) 224. 
discussion in Slabbert & Welsh op cit 134-135. 
See also the 
2. Lijphart op cit 33 cites as an exception the Columbia arrangement where the presidency alternated between the two main parties; here presidential predominance was modified by proportionality in the temporal dimension. See also R.H. Dix 'Consociational Democracy - the Case of Columbia' 1980 Comparative Politics 303. Alternatively, there could be a power-sharing executive comprising the president and other top office-holders (deputy-president, prime minister, etc). 
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the more formal separation of powers normally associated with 
presidentialism has been cited as a factor which facilitates 
a coalescent style of government, since elites have more inde-
pendence from the legislature to co-operate with one another.
1 
In this sense the semi-parliamentary Swiss system provides a 
compromise between parliamentarianism and presidentialism and 
what is generally regarded as a highly favourable site for 
elite co-operation, the federal executive council. The members 
of the council are elected by the federal parliament for a fixed 
period, during which they vacate their seats in the legislature 
and do not remain dependent on its support for their continuance 
in office. The presidency rotates annually among members of 
the council, in order of seniority, but the president has no 
greater powers than the other members;2 it is thus a collegial 
executive in form and substance. 3 The advantages of this system 
are that the members of the cabinet can be drawn from the legis-
lature on a proportional basis, but that once appointed the 
cabinet has tenure and stability, without there being a loss of 
all constitutio~al controls over it. 4 
As far as the electoral system is concerned, 5, proportional repre-
sentation, in consociational theory, ensures that all segments 
are represented in common insti tutions to enable th-em to influence 
decisions .according to their proportional strength: the power 
of political majorities is thereby mitigated, and minorities are 
not permanently excluded from office and influence. Clearly a 
plurality system operating in single-member constituencies, with 
its well-known electoral distortions and discouragement of minor-
ity parties, is the most anti-consociational of all e l ectoral 
1. Cf R. Dahl Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (1965) 351; 
C. Palley Constitutional Law and Minorities (1978) 20. For a contrary 
view see C.J. Friedrich Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice (1968) 
29. The former approach tends to overlook the degree of control in fact 
exercised by the legislature over the executive in, say, the American 
system. 
2. His status is that of primus inter pares, as was the case with the prime 
minister in a Westminster system. 
3. See G.A. Codding The Federal Government of Switzerland (1965) 23. 
4. Such as 'interpellation'; see art 22 of the Swiss constitution and C. 
Hughes The Federal Constitution of Switzerland (1954) 150 and 160. 
5. On electoral systems see E. Lakeman How Democracies Vote - A Study of 
Majority and Proportional Electoral Systems (3 ed, 1970), W.J.M. MacKenzie 
Free Elections (1958). 
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systems. 1 Some refinement can be added through such devices 
as a second ballot or alternative vote, but because these still 
operate in single-member constituencies the system remains fun-
damentally majoritarian. 2 The many systems of proportional 
representation, on the other hand, are designed to allocate 
seats to all parties in proportion to their electoral strength. 
Of these the list system ensures the most faithfully institution-
al reflection of popular support and gives the greatest degree 
of control to party leaders; it is therefore the most optimal 
system from the consociational point of view, although most 
countries using list systems have modified them so as to give 
voters a choice between candidates in a more or less effective 
form. 3 The list systems can operate on a national basis or in 
several multi-member constituencies, with the former (the 'pure 
form') being the more proportional of the two. 4 Two broad 
variations are found within the list systems as far as the cal-
culation of the parties' seats is concerned: the d'Hondt or 
highest average method, and the greatest remainder method. 5 
~~ile the latter'method tends to favour small parties, and there-
/ 
fore seems preferable for consociational systems, the former is 
the more widely used, even in the empirical consociations. 6 The 
second main system of proportional representation is based on 
the single transferable vote operating in multi-member constituen-
cies. T~is system was devised before the list system, and it is 
more democratic than the latter from the voter's point of view 
1. On the other hand plurality elections are not necessarily undesirable at 
the segmental level, since it is primarily inter-segmental relationships 
which are regulated on a proportional basis. 
2. Lakeman ~p cit 80-89) describes various semi-proportional systems, but 
these are numerically insignificant. 
3. Lakeman op ci t 98-103 . 
4. This is used in Israel (see E. Likhovski Israel's Parliament - The Law of 
the Knesset (1971) 63ff); in the Netherlands the country is regarded as 
a single unit for the allocation of seats. The national list system 
was used in the internal Namibian elections in 1978, and effectively in 
the 1979 and 1980 pre-independence elections in Zimbabwe. It is inter-
esting to note that Lijphart (The Politics of Accommodation (2 ed, 1975) 
214) attributes the breakdown of the Dutch politics of accommodation par-
tially to its countrywide system of proportional representat~on. 
5. Mackenzie op cit 78-80. 
6. Such as Belgium and the Netherlands; other countries include the Federal 
Republic . of Germany, Italy and Luxembourg (with a small variation). See 
G. Hand, J. Georgel and C. Sasse (eds) European Electoral Systems Handbook 
(1979). In Switzerland the list system is used but the provision for 
panachage allows voters to choose candidates on opposing lists. 
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because it allows him a wider range of choice.
1 
The main varia-
tions within the system concern the number of seats in each con-
stituency, with the degree of proportionality bearing a direct 
relationship to this factor. 2 ~nile taking second place, in 
terms of consociational priorities, to the list system of pro-
portional representation, the single transferable vote is design-
ed to make every vote effective, and it is clearly more favourable 
than plurality elections. 
Finally, federalism is more favourable than a unitary system for 
the operation of consociationalism because its division of power 
is anti-majoritarian in itself, and because the increase in sites 
of political competition reduces the distinction between govern-
ment and opposition and the competitiveness of the contest between 
the two. 3 It is necessary, however, to add the qualification 
that the federal constitution should in fact give rise to a de-
centralised system of governmen0to comply with the requirements 
of consociationalism. Nwabueze, writing on the subject of con-
stitutional gov~rnment in Africa,5 suggests that the decentralisa-
tion of functions makes the question of central control less em-
1. The system was developed in England in the 1850's by Hare and was pro-
moted by J.S. Mill Representative Government (ed by H.B. Acton, 1972 
at 263ff) but rhetorically castigated by WaIter Bagehot The English Con-
stitution (The World's Classics edition, 1974) 132-140. It came to be 
used in English-speaking countries other than Britain (save for the 
University MP's until 1945) - Northern Ireland, Canada, Australia and 
most consistently in the Republic of Ireland (see Hand, Georgel and Sasse 
op cit 121-139). For a contemporary critique see G. Doron 'Is the Hare 
Voting Scheme Representative?' 41 (1979) The Journal of Politics 918. 
2. The system will be self-evidently more proportional the greater the num-
ber of seats per constituency. 
3. See Dahl op cit 351. There is also an affinity between the modern 
tendency to describe federalism in terms of the political process, and 
not its constitutional-juridical aspects, and the behavioural-attitudinal 
emphasis in consociationalism. 
4. Numerous commentators have observed that unitary, federal and confederal 
systems of government occupy different places on the same continuum; a 
high degree of decentralised government is compatible with a unitary con-
stitution, whereas a federal constitution could in practice give rise to 
a centralised form of government. 
5. B.O. Nwabueze Constitutionalism in the Emergent States (1973) 112. 
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bittering than it would be in a unitary system; with its limi-
ted powers the central government can less easily become 'an 
instrument of total domination'. Federalism has also been 
described as a consociational method, a limited and special 
type of consociational theory;' it facilitates the application 
of the segmental autonomy principle where there is a geograph-
ical concentration of segments. Where such concentration does 
not exist segmental autonomy must be applied on a non-territorial 
basis, and this has been referred to as 'corporate federalism,.2 
It should be noted, however, that while a federal constitution 
is well suited to consociationalism, it may be an obstacle to 
other objectives such as sociti-economic reform, national planning 
or a welfare state, because it is not conducive to uniform devel-
opment and progress. 3 
This optimal framework can be compared briefly with the South 
African constitution. Within the context of 'white politics' 
there has always existed a conventional parliamentary system in 
South Africa, an ' institutional tradition which would not require 
/ 
change for the creation of a grand coalition, provided the poli-
tical system were made more inclusive. 
ments of 1980 were somewhat ambivalent; 
The constitutional amend-
on the one hand they in-
creased the prime minister's power and patronage, thereby contri-
buting to~ards an unfavourable concentration of power in a single 
individual; on the other hand the new institutional relation-
ships between cabinet and parliament, while not yet involving a 
semi-separatitin of powers, would allow the executive (~n a future 
modified form) greater leeway to act as an accommodationist insti-
tution, without the normal responsibility and accountability to 
parliament. As far as the electoral system is con~erned, the 
South African practice has been at variance with the optimal 
arrangement, as the plurality system in ' single-member constituen-
cies has been used for most elective or partly elective institu-
1. A. Lijphart Democracy in Plural Societies (1977) 42-44. On the links 
between consociationalism and federalism see above, 108-114. 
2. See above, 111 . 
3. I. Duchacek Comparative Federalism - The Territorial Dimension of Politics 
(1970) 120. 
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tions; 1 the last vestiges of proportionality disappeared with 
the Senate. 2 Finally as far as the unitary/federal distinc-
tion is concerned, it is generally accepted that the South Afri-
can constitution is fundamentally unitary with some federal 
characteristics, but that the system of government is strongly 
uni tarian and hig"hly centralised. There are two apparent ex-
ceptions to this description, the decentralisation implicit in 
the provincial system, but this has not given rise to a signi-
ficantly decentralised system of government, and the departmental 
devolution of authority to coloured and Indian institutions and 
the homeland governments, but the former has been an erratic and 
limited process, while the latter has taken place under a system 
of tight central government control with the express objective 
of partition and constitutional independence. Many constitution 
commentators have suggested that this latter process might cul-
minate in the national states unifying with the republic in a 
federal arrangement, but this scenario has a low political prob-
ability. In general, then, there has been little affinity be- • 
tween South Africa's constitutional system and the optimal frame-
/ 
work for consociationalism. 
5. The Institutional Alternatives 
Against the background of the optimal constitutional framework 
for consociationalism it is proposed to describe some of the in-
stitutional alternatives for its application in South Africa. 
1. This includes the House of Assembly (s 40 of the Constitution Act No 32 
of 1961), the Coloured Persons Representative Council during its exis-
tence (ss 2, 8 and 9 of the CPRC Act No 49 of 1964) and the South Afri-
can Indian Council (s 1(a) of the SA Indian Council Act No 31 of 1968 
r.w. the Electoral Act for Indians No 122 of 1977). 
2. Save for the relic in s 40(1)(c) of the Constitution Act. Although use 
is made here of the single transferable vote these indirect elections 
are based on prior majoritarian elections and do not have a proportional 
outcome. Cf s 30(3) of the Constitution Act before its repeal by Act 
No 101 of 1980. Before 1962 provincial executive committees were elect-
ed on a proportional basis, but since then each provincial councillor has 
a single non-transferable vote for each member of the committee which , 
renders the election purely majoritarian (s 77 of the Constitution Act). 
But the single non-transferable vote system can have a proportional out-
come if used in multi-member constituencies and it has been used in Japan 
since 1900. 
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While manv of these alternatives would involve a radical break 
/ 
with the constitutional traditions of the past, they would have 
to be adapted in some combination if South Africa was to move 
beyond the present stage of sham consociationalism to genuine 
consociationalism. They are therefore described without par-
ticular reference to their likelihood of materialising in the 
light of the present constitution, the government's political 
policies, and the economic demands of the society, although these 
factors are alluded to at times. Furthermore they are all pre-
mised on the prior attainment of a universal franchise and a 
system of " voluntary political association, and at least some of 
the socio-economic reforms already referred to.
1 
What is re-
quired are constitutional structures which would serve to en-
force and sustain the two fundamental and complementary .princi-
pIes of consociationalism, power-sharing and segmental autonomy, 
should the political actors agree to this type of political 
arrangement. 
Ca) The grand c6alition principle 
The grand coalition principle involves the participation of all 
significant political elites in the main policy-making institu-
tions. It can either be institutionalised in the national exe-
cutive, whether of the parliamentary or presidential type, or it 
can be applied in other co-ordinating and advisory bodies. 
In a parliamentary system the principle could be applied in a 
coalition cabinet in which all parties represented in the legis-
lature would participate, in proportion to their respective 
strengths. To avoid the formation of one party majority cabi-
nets, or temporary miriimum-size coalitions, it would be prefer-
able for a permanent grand coalition to be an institutional nece-
ssity. This could be achieved by allowing members,of the legis-
lature to elect the cabinet on a proportional basis,2 or by em-
powering the head of state to appoint it proportionally, after 
1. See above, 395-396. 
2. As with the Swiss federal executive - see above, 99. 
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compulsory consultation with party leaders.' The 'collegiality' 
of the cabinet would be less easy to structure - it would re-
quire an egalitarian arrangement in which the head of the cabi-
net was no more than primus inter partes. Some institutional 
support for this arrangement could be provided by limiting the 
chairman's powers and patronage and his ability to dismiss minis-
ters; it ~ould in any case be inappropriate for collective min-
isterial responsibility to apply in the conventional sense and 
this would strengthen the posititin of individual ministers. 
Another factor which would affect the collegiality of the cabinet 
would be the distributitin of portfolios among its members; this 
is also an important aspect for minority leaders, for whom mere 
participation in the grand coalition would be insignificant, un-
less accompanied by powers of some substance to increase their 
bargaining power. This would r~quire a qualitative dimension, 
and some form of balance, iri the distribution of crucial port-
folios such as finance, defence, and justice. The coalition 
cabinet as a whole would have traditional executive functions, 
such as the irii;iation of legislation, the formulation of policy, 
fiscal and economit control, and the conducting of foreign 
affairs. On all these matters the consociational norm would 
require compromise and consensus, and this would be institution-
ally enforced through a veto arrangement. Individual ministers 
could be ~xpected to co-ordinate and supervise their respective 
government departments and be answerable to parliament for de-
partmental affairs, but they would not be subject to removal by 
that body in terms of traditional notions of individual minis-
terial responsibility. This greater political freedom from the 
cabinet could be institutionalised in a semi-separation of powers 
arrangement, following the model of the Swiss federal executive. 
In a presidentiil system it would be less easy to constitution-
ally enforce the grand coalition principle, and there would have 
to be limits and controls on presidential power for presidential-
ism to be reconciled with consociationalism. The competitive 
and majoritarian nature of the presidential electoral contest 
could be only minimally mitigated through the use of a second 
ballot or alternative vote electoral system; but the intensity 
of the competition could be partially mitigated through the use 
of indirect elections to avoid extensive popular involvement in 
,. As provided in the PFP constitutional proposals and the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia 
constitution - seE? .qhnvp _ ,nQf ~1"'Irl ?.6.n.f "'O,",'nO"'~;'n~'''' 
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the campaign. One way of applying the coalition principle would 
be through the allocation of other high offices, such as the deputy-
presidency, prime-ministership, or office of speaker, to groups not 
'represented' in the presidency; this could be more easily effected 
in a semi-presidential system, such as that of the French Fifth Republic.' 
Alternatively, the constitution could require the President to 
make allowances for the representation of different political 
parties or reg~ons in his cabinet, a convention which already 
exists in many presidenti~l systems. 2 Finally the presidential 
period of office could be made reiatively short, to allow for a 
frequent al terna tion in office. · While all these factors would 
involve vari~tions on the established concepts of presidential 
government, they would . enhance the prospects of applying the 
grand coalition principle in a generally unfavourable institu-
tional setting. 
The grand coalition principle need not, however, be restricted to 
the national executive, and it could be applied, particularly 
(though not exclusi~ely) in a presidential system, through various 
/ 
advisory and co-ordinating councils. These could be permanent 
or ad hoc bodies and, provided they were brciadly representative, 
the members could be elected or nomiriated. The councils could 
have certain areas of functional specialisatio~ such as the nat-
ional budget or ecortomit affair~ and. although not having formal 
legislative or executi~e powers could serve in an advisory capa-
city to the central legislature and executive. They could also 
function as deadlock-breaking mechanisms for various legislative 
or executive bodies, where the consociationalprinciple of elite 
bargaining behind closed doors could be applied. A prototypal 
model for the non-executive 'grand coalition' is the Dutch Social 
and Economic C6unci1 3 which has been described as a 'permanent 
confederal organ in which th~ l~aders of all organizationally 
separate interest groups that are important in the economic realm, 
1. See J. Blondel The Government of France (2 ed, 1974) 129-148. 
2. K.C. Wheare Modern Constitutions (1966) 131-132. 
3. See A. Lijphart The Politics of Accommodation (2 ed, 1975) 113ff. 
409. 
meet and compromise'. 1 Although it has limited formal powers 
its status and prestige give the council considerable political 
significance. A similar institution of comparative interest 
is the Economic and Social Council under the Fifth French Repub-
lic which can be consulted on all social or economic questions 
and can itself make recommendations to the government, although 
it cannot initiate legislation. 
Besides the expertise which these institutions would be able to 
provide, they could also have a depoliticising function in rela-
tion to controversial political issues, an important element of 
consociationalism. 2 They also draw attention to an additional 
possibility for consociational engineering, namely the institu-
tion of an economic or vocational or functional second or third 
chamber in the legislature. 3 Such a chamber would be designed 
to reflect non-territorial interests and would be expected to 
provide a different perspective to the lower chamber, or chambers, 
on matters under the legislature's consideration. While this 
concept has been-promoted by various constitutional writers their 
/ 
suggestions have had little practical impact. 4 
An additional dimension can be added to this analysis by refer-
ence to the Norwegian system of extra-parliamentary corporate 
pluralism. 5 Here corporate negotiation and bargaining takes 
place in a highly formalised manner, but outside the immediate 
sphere of the government, parliament and political parties. 
Annual rounds of negotiation are held among government represen-
tatives, trade union leaders, representatives of small businesses, 
and delegates of the employers' association. In this process, 
1 . Ibid. 
2. Cf E. Nordlinger Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (1972) 26. 
3. Cf K.C. Wheare Legislatures (1968) 213. 
4. Ibid. The Republic of Ireland has a functional second chamber (the 
Senate) but it has proved to be predominantly a party assembly in prac-
tice; this is not an uncommon fate for subordinate chambers. 
5. See S. Rokkan 'Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism' 
in R. Dahl (ed) Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (1965) 
107ff; also the Sprocas Report South Africa's Political Alternatives 
(1973) 166-169. 
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'The parliamentary notions of one · member, one vote and 
majority rule make little sense. Decisions are made 
through complex considerations of short-term or long-
term advantages in alternative lines of compromise. ,1 
While these negotiations are limited to matters of economic poli-
cy and could not be a substitute for representative politics, 
they have an important supplementary role in the system of gov-
2 ernment. As the Sprocas report observes, 
'The main advantage of such a complex of extra-parlia-
mentary organised national bargaining is that it ex-
tends the opportunities for the effectiveness of par-
ticipation in authoritative decision-making ... 
Opportunities for bargaining with the executive and 
the bureaucracy, and a significant place for collective 
negotiations and associations and corporations, provide 
ways of supplementing ... the limited political parti-
cipation po~sible at the ballot box.' 
Although important and effective decisions are taken in this pro-
cess it is as y~t without institutional support. 3 
These alternatives for applying the consociational grand coali-
tion principle must be seen together with the constitutional 
alternatives for the principles of proportionality and the mutual 
veto~ as the three principles are complementary features of the 
consociational concept of power-sharing. However, they would 
all involve substantial deviations from South Africa's present 
constitutional politics, in which the president's council is the 
only concession to the grand coalition principle. 
1. Rokkan ibid. The concept leads back to the American notion of poli-
tical pluralism and shares its shortcomings and weaknesses. See 
above, 64-68. 
2. Op cit 167; see also A. Lijphart Democracy in Plural Societies (1977) 
107. 
3. The creation of formal institutions of consultation between the govern-
ment and corporate groups is, of course, a general phenomenon of modern 
government as pressure groups have shifted their attention from the 
legislature to the executive and bureaucracy. ef Harrison's concept 
of 'concertration' in R.J. Harrison Pluralism and Corporatism - The 
Political Evolution of Modern Democracies (1980) 64-97. On corporatism 
and consociationalism see above, 114-115. 
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Cb) The proportionality principle 
It has been sho~~ that the principle of proportionality operates 
at various levels in the consociational model - in the electoral 
system, in the composition of all public authorities, and in the 
allocation of the 'spoils' of government. Thus the grand coal-
ition should consist of segmental representatives in proportion 
to each segment's numerical or electoral stiength to ensure the 
equitable participation of all groups, including minorities. 1 But 
the most important area of application for the proportionality 
principle is in the electoral system; this serves not only as a 
basis for the composition of the legislature,but also , a basis 
for the application of proportionality in other areas in the con-
stitutional system. The electoral system could make provision 
for each communal group to elect its proportional number of repre-
sentatives on the basis of separate electoral rolls, but communal 
representation along these lines2 is effectively precluded for 
South Africa because of the necessity for a system of voluntary 
3 political association; there are however, other ways in which 
proportionality can be applied at the electoral level. 4 
1. The Belgian Constitution (art 86(b)) provides that the cabinet must 
comprise equal numbers of French- and Dutch-speaking ministers, the 
prime minister excepted. 
2. Communal representation has been used at various historical stages in 
the constitutions of India, Indonesia, New Zealand, Pakistan (to en-
sure the parliamentary representation of women), Cyprus, Lebanon, 
Rhodesia and Zimbabwe, and South Africa. This can, however, be 
arranged in a flexible manner. Thus the New Zealand Electoral Act No 
107 of 1956 makes provision (ss 11(b) and 23) for four Maori represen-
tatives to be elected to the New Zealand parliament, but Maoris can 
register as voters for either these constituencies or for the general 
constituencies (s 41). Likewise the Bangladesh Constitution of 1972 
(s 65(3)) reserved 15 seats in the national parliament exclusively for 
women for a minimum period of ten years, but did not exclude them from 
contesting other seats. See also I. Duchacek Comparative Federalism 
(1970) 101-108; S.A. de Smith The New Commonwealth and its Constitu-
tions (1964) 117-121. 
3. See above, 390-394. 
4. For a discussion of possible 'transitional electoral regimes' see W.D. 
Burnham 'Milestones on the Road to Democracy: Electoral Regimes and 
Their Relevance to South Africa' in R. Rotberg and J. Barrett Conflict 
and Compromise in South Africa (1980) 77-105. 
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It has been shown that of the many alternatives to plurality 
elections in single-member constituencies: the list system of 
proportional representation is most in line with consociational 
theory. When the list system is used on a country-wide basis 2 
there is no need for the delimitation of constituencies and this 
has the effect of depoliticising a controversial feature of most 
electoral systems; delimitation tends also not to be a critical 
feature where the list system is used on a regional basis because 
of the relatively small number and large electoral sizes of the 
constituencies 3 - nor do regional lists detract materially from 
the overall proportionality of the system. Apart from the dif-
ferent methods of calculating parties' seats under the list sys-
tem~ there are other variations whith affect the degree of party 
control over the elections, and the voters' ability to choose not 
only between parties but also among candidates. 5 The Belgian 
system offers one such variation - preferential voting within 
one list. 6 The voter can vote not only for one of the party 
lists of candidates, but can also indicate one preference of can-
didates from within that list; these preferential votes are 
/ 
taken into account in deciding which" individuals .on a party's 
list of candidates sh~uld be allocated its proportional component 
of seats. But since preferential voting is not compulsory, the 
original list order of party candidates remains of importance in 
the allocation of seats, and other refinements have been intro-
duced to increase the voters' influence. 7 The variation can be 
taken further, as in the Swiss system,8 by extending the voter's 
1. Reference has been made to the second ballot and alternative vote; 
semi-proportional systems include the limited vote, the single non-
transferable vote and the cumulative vote. See E. Lakeman How 
Democracies Vote (3 ed, 1970) 80-89. 
2. As in Israel and the Netherlands. 
3. In Luxembourg there are four constituencies, in Belgium thirty, and in 
Italy thirty-two. 
4. That is the d'Hondt and greatest remainder methods. See above, 402. 
5. See W.J.M. Mackenzie Free Elections (1958) 81f; Lakeman op cit 98-103. 
6. See G. Hand, J. Georgel and C. Sasse European Electoral Systems Handbook 
( 1979) 1-28. 
7. For example provision for mUltiple preferences within a party list (as 
in the Swedish or Finnish systems); or by making preferential voting 
compulsory (Sweden). 
8. C. Hughes The Federal Constitution of Switzerland (1954) 83-84. 
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choice beyond a single party list. Each voter has as many 
votes as there are vacancies, and he can distribute them among 
the candidates in any manner; this allows the voter to divide 
his vote between parties and to influence more directly the 
allocation of seats to individual candidates on the party lists. 
This increased flexibility shows some approximation to the 
single transferable vote system. A "further variation within 
the list systems is the existence of a threshold which has to be 
crossed by a political party before representation is possible, 
the minimum size of this threshold varying from case to case. 
In some systems there is a formally prescribed percentage of 
votes which has to be acquired before a party can compete in the 
national distribution of seats,1 but there are other informal 
thresholds inherent in the different list systems. 
The single transferable vote system has fewer empirical prece-
dents and fewer variations than the list system. The main varia-
tion concerns the number of seats in each of the multi-members 
constituencies; /" the greater the number of seats the more propor-
tional the system will be, since proportionality operates only 
at the constituency level. The constituencies need not be of 
equal siie and in practice tend to range between three and seven 
seats; this flexibility in the sizes of constituencies emphasises 
the need for an independent and impartial delimitation authority.3 
The second main variation concerns the quota of votes required by 
a candidate to secure election. Each voter has only a single 
vote whith can be cast for the candidate of his preference, but 
additional preferences among the remaining candidates can be in-
dicated on the ballot paper. In allocating the seats all first 
preferences are counted, the number of votes required by a candi-
date depending on whether the Hare quota 4 or Droop quota 5 is used. 
1.. For example in Denmark two percent, and the Federal Republic of Germany 
five percent, of the total votes cast. 
2. The main practical application of this system has been in Ireland where 





ef ss 42-44 
The formula 
The formula 
of the RSA Constitution Act No 32 of 1961 . 
for the Hare quota is total valid votes . 
total seats 
for the Droop quota is total valid votes 
total seats +1 +1 . 
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The former is larger than the latter, · and has the advantage of 
making use of every vote cast, but it also has the disadvantage 
that votes are withdra\\rrl from active participation in the elec-
tion at an earlier stage; 1 the Droop quota tends to be the more 
proportional of the two, and is the one used in practice.
2 
In 
both systems a candidate receiving . the quota on first preferen-
ces is elected, and his surplus votes above the quota are dis-
tributed according to second preferences. 3 Where there are no 
such surplus votes the candidate who at this stage is at the 
bottom of the list is eliminated, and his votes are distributed 
in accordance with their next preferences. This process con-
tinues until all the seats have been allocated, or there are 
only two candidates left for one seat and neither has the quota: 
in this case the one with more votes is declared elected. While 
political parties are not indispensible to the workings of this 
system, as with the list system, it is clear that party prefer-
ences will be strongly reflected in electoral outcomes. 
This brief descJiption shows that the principle of proportion-
ality can be applied in a number of ways at the electoral level, 
although no reference has been made to many other important fea-
tures of the various systems, such as the legal status of politi-
cal parties, party financing, the position of independent candi-
dates, an~ the filling of casual vacancies arising between gene-
ral elections,4 all of which would be important in assessing 
their suitability for South Africa. They would require evalua-
tion both in terms of the various purposes which elections are 
designed to serve, and the different ideologies upon which elec-
5 toral systems are based. Other more technical aspects would 
also require consideration: the potential difficulty of the dif-
ferent systems for the average voter, the procedure for illiter-
ate voters, the length of time taken for elections and counting 
of votes, and the costs of elections for parties, candidates and 
1. See Lakeman op cit 137-139. 
2. For example in Ireland. 
3. Or more accuratelY,a number of votes equivalent to his surplus is dis-
tributed in proportion to the next preferences on all his first pref-
erence votes. See Hand, Georgel and Sasse op cit 131 and Lakeman 
op cit 113. 
4. See generally Hand, Georgel and Sasse passim. 
5. See M. Wiechers 'The Franchise and Alternative Electoral Systems' in 
L.J. Boulle andL.G. Baxter Natal and KwaZulu - Constitutional and 
Political Options (1981) 185. 
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the government.' It should also be remembered that the two 
main systems of proportional representation could be combined 
with each other, or could even be juxtaposed with the plurality 
system. The best example of the latter combination is found 
in the Federal Republic of Germany:2 half the members of the 
Bundestag are elected in single-member constituencies on a 
plurality basis, but each voter also has a second vote which can 
be cast for a party list. The two systems are combined by sub-
tracting the constituency seats won by a party from the seats 
owing to that party according to its proportion of second votes;3 
the remaining seats are filled by candidates on the lists who 
were not directly elected in constituencies. 4 The aim of this 
electoral arrangement is to correct any misrepresentation of 
parties arising from the constituency elections, while retaining 
a substantial personal element in the representative system. 
The hybrid system of 'personalised proportional representation' 
has been generally accepted as being politically effective5 and 
is compatible with the principles of consociationalism. 
/ 
Reference has already been made to the two variations of the 
principle of proportionality, namely the deliberate over-represen-
tation of minorities, and parity of representation for all groups. 
These devices are particularly useful when there is a large major-
ity segment and several minority segments, and no 'multiple balance 
of power' . While in theory these variations could be incorpor-
ated into the electoral system,6 it would be difficult to achieve 
them in practice because even systems of proportional representa-
tion tend to favour larger parties at the expense of small ones, 
1. See Lakeman op cit 141-159. 
2. See Hand, Georgel and Sasse op cit 58-86. 
3. The allocation of seats is calculated according to the d'Hondt largest 
average method. 
4. To share in the distribution of seats a party must cross one of the two 
thresholds: five percent of the second votes, or three constituency 
seats by first votes. 
5. But cf D. Rae The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (1971) (111-
113) 
6. Clearly both variations are more easily attainable when the segments 
are explicitly defined by the constitution. 
4 1 6 • 
although they are designed to mitigate the biases of majority 
and plurality elections. 1 On the other hand parity of repre-
sentation for federal states is a common feature of federal 
upper chambers and could be structured into the consociational 
arrangement under discussion. 2 Over-representation of minority 
parties could also be an institutional requirement for a coali-
tion cabinet, with the principle being incorporated into the 
nomination or election procedure for ministers. 
The other major area in whith the principle of proportionality 
should be applied is in the distribution of the 'spoils of gov-
ernment' . Under this general category attention will be given 
to two specific matters - the allocation of the financial re-
sources at the government's disposal, and the appointment of mem-
bers in the public service and other government and quasi-govern-
ment bodies. In respect of both matters a complicating dimen-
sion in the South African context is the need for redistributive 
measures to overcome existing inequalities. 
/ 
The proportional allocation of public funds is a matter closely 
rela ted to the is·sue of segmental auton olmy, and is deal t wi th 
further under that heading. 3 It is easier to achieve in a 
territorial-federal arrangement where a degree of fiscal autonomy 
can be created for state governments by guaranteeing them a pro-
portionate share of public funds - and various formulae can be 
designed to determine these amounts. bn the other hand feder-
alism is notoriously inept at removing gross economic disparities 
among its constituent units, even where equalising institutions 
and mechanisms have been established by he federal government. 
The debate on consociationalism in South Africa tends not to 
address itself to the problem of redistr ~butive mechanisms, and 
the effect of the 1977 constitutional pr posals would have been 
to freeze constitutiOnally the 'unequal istribution of commonly 
produced wealth' and the existing class elationships.4 Without 
1. Rae op cit 69-86. 
2. Cf § 5.4.2 of the Progressive Federal Party' constitutional proposals; 
a state's Senate representatives could be el~cted directly by the state 
electorate, or indirectly by the state legis ature. 
3. See below, 425-433. 
4. H. Ad am and H. Giliomee The Rise and Crisis 4, f Afrikaner Power (1979) 
295-297. 
I 
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a territorial-federal arrangement (and in the absence of a 
system of statutory raceJethnic classification) the proportion-
al allocation of public funds would require at least the pro-
vision of public goods to everyone on an equal basis - education-
al, health, social and other welfare services; in some coun-
tries the 'welfare state' has been perceived as the main means 
of accelerating egalitarian trends agair.st an historic back-
ground of ethnic, racial and class inequalities. 1 
As far as proportionality in the public sector is concerned it 
is unusual to find its stipulation in formal rules, and it is in 
any case difficult to achieve without some constitutional recog-
nition being given to specific groups. Nevertheless proportion-
ality in the national and local civil service was a key feature 
of the politics of accommodation in the ~etherlands,2 and the 
principle "has been institutionalised in other countries in rela-
tion to linguistic or religious segments. 3 In the South African 
context a quota system for recruitment to the public service, 
and for promotiphs within the public service, poses a number of 
problems,4 and even the full equalisation of opportunities, in 
terms of education and training, could obviate the need for such 
1. J. Grove 'A Test of the Ethnic Equalisation Hypothesis' 1 (1978) Ethnic 
and Racial Studies 175,quoted in M. Savage 'What does Removal of Race 
Discrimination Effectively Mean in the South African Context?' in F. van 
Zyl Slabbert and J. Opland South Africa: Dilemmas of Evolutionary Change 
(1980) 156 at 158. 
2. A. Lijphart The Politics of Accommodation (2 ed, 1975) 128; see also 
E. Nordlinger Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (1972) 22-24, D. 
Smock and A. Smock The Politics of Pluralism (1975) 272ff. 
3. The Official Languages Act of Canada, 1968-6'9, c54 provides (s 39(4) 
that there must be equitable appointment to the public service for both 
language groups, subject to 'the maintenance of merit selection'. See 
also the Canadian Supreme Court Act, 1949 (in relation to the composition 
of the judiciary). The Lebanese constitution applied the proportionality 
principle extensively to the civil service. " S 75 of the Zimbabwe Con-
stitution also attempts to reconcile the claims of proportionality and 
merit as far as appointments to the public service are concerned. 
4. For example expertise and efficiency could bE~ jeopardised if 'proportion-
ality' replaced merit as a basis of appointment and promotion. Cf W. 
Gutteridge 'The Pub lie Services in a Plural ~;ociety 1 in N. Rhoodie (ed) 
Intergroup Accommodation in Plural Societies (1978) 174-178. 
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a system only in part. Sugge s t ions the.t a quota system be en-
forced, 
'carefully and discreetly by bodi€'s of unimplacable 
integrity, insulated from manipulation by politicians 
seeking to distribute patronage') 
are imbued with the spirit of c6nsociationalism and are made with 
the specific object of avoiding the necessity for any type of 
group classification, but would be difficult to institutionalise 
and remain somewhat idealistic. Nevertheless the organisation, 
composition and control of the whole public service, and in par-
ticular the key positions, are no less important than the more 
prominent constitutional arrangements relating to the electoral 
system, representative institutions, and the judiciary. In par-
ticular the powers and composition of the armed forces and the 
police force would pose complex problems during a period of con-
sociational transition~ and may be the one area in a consocia-
tional system where ethnic or racial quotas would be indispensi-
ble. 
/ 
An issue raised by the discussion of proportionality and quota 
systems is that of 'affirmative action', which has received little 
serious consideration in South Africa. 3 The concept is closely 
associated with recent American constitutional experience,4 where 
it has been felt that the contemporary equal treatment of blacks 
and other minority groups through the enforcement of non-discri-
mination provisions has done little to mitigate the effects of 
past discrimination. The American experience of moving beyond 
formal equality of opportunity has revea:.ed additional features 
of inequality which had not been previously considered, and which 
1. F. van Zyl Slabbert and D. Welsh South Africcl's Options (1979) 160. 
2. See Gutteridge op cit 176-178. 
3. But see the thoughtful contribution by M. Savage op cit 176. 
4. See L. Tribe American Constitutional Law (1978) 1043-1052 (in relation to race) and 1066-1070 (in relation to gender). Two of the more recent American decisions 0 f note are Regents of the University of California v Bakke 438 US 265 (1978) in which the Supreme Court ruled that racial quotas were justified to cure past acts of discrimination, but that racial specifity should be minimised as far as possible, and Weber v Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp 563 F 2d 216 (1979) in which a com-pany was permitted to run a training-programme which aimed to put blacks on an equal competitive footing with whites for jobs. For a series of articles on this topic, including the unresolved constitutional problems of reverse discrimination, see 67 (1979) California Law Review 3-190. See also N. Glazer 'Individual Rights AgalnEt Group Rights' in E. Kamenka and A. Tay Human Rights (1978) 87-103. 
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require in turn additional forms of 'reverse discrimination'. 
But the process has encountered a number of legal difficulties' 
2 and is surrounded by controversy. Nevertheless affirmative 
action programmes have a close affinity with the consociational 
principle of proportionality~ and the various examples could 
provide models for a consociational system; in South Africa 
they would be worth consideration with Cl view to addressing the 
effects of past discrimination and assessing the need for a form 
of historical compensation. 4 
In view of the many difficulties surrounding the institutionali-
sation of proportionality in the South African contex~ substitute 
arrangements might be necessary to achieve a similar object. 
This would involve going beyond traditional notions of constitu-
tional and administrative law and adjusting to the realities of 
the modern bureaucratic state. DeanS has made an important 
theoretical contribution along these lines. He points to the 
limitations of the franchise in securing effective popular parti-
cipation in gov~tnment - even a sophisticated proportional elec-
toral system leaves the voter little say in the formulation of 
state policy.6 Moreover the traditional popular controls over 
government are remote, indirect and often quite ineffective. As 
an al ternative, Dean adv'ocates the opening of the administration 
to greater public participation and consultat~on; while recog-
nising the important and necessary policy functions of the admin-
istration, new and more effective forms of control could be 
achieved through the direct participation of the electorate in 
its activities. Such participation would lend itself to a 
greater variety of forms than representation through the franchise. 







One of the difficult questions which the Amel~ican courts have had to answer in assessing the propriety of affirmative discrimination is whether the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution entails a right to colour-blind government (cf Justice Harlan in Plessy v Ferguson 163 US 537 (1896)) or a right to government which does not discriminate against racial minorities. See Tribe op cit 271. 
See for example the arguments against affirmative action programmes in Nathan Glazer Affirmative Discrimination (1975). 
And in particular the varients of proportiona.lity, namely over-represen-tation of minorities and pari ty of representa.tion. 
M. Savage op cit 160. 
'The Administration: Control and Participation - Some Preliminary Thoughtst in Boulle and Baxter op cit 109-127. 
These remarks apply a fortiori in the normative consociational model with its heavy reliance on leadership elites and a qui.escent elel"tr'll-:lt"Q ' 
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include the direct and indirect representation of interested 
parties on the decision-making body, formal or informal consul-
tation with interested parties, public hearings, and referenda 
and public opinion polls.1 ~~ere this type of arrangement has 
been provided by statute, for example in relation to urban and 
town planning, the courts have insisted on strict compliance 
with the provisions,2 but these instances are limited and there 
is scope for the principle to be expanded into many other areas.3 
In the United States statutory requirements for citizen partici-
pation in administrative policy-making have increased at all 
levels of government since the enactment of the Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1964. 4 While citizen involvement cannot be a 
substitute for the representative political process, it can be a 
complementary means of improving that process. In the context 
of this discussi6n it may be seen as a compensatory process for 
groups who would inevitably be excluded from the public service 
itself during a period of constitutional transition, and as a 
method "of obviating the difficulties of applying the proportion-
ality pririciple / in this branch of government. -
1. Dean op cit 118. 
2. Eg in McCarthy v Mustheights (Pty) Ltd and others 1974 (4) SA 328 (C) (at 347) in relation to the Townships Ordinance No 33 of 1934 (C): 'It must be remembered that the Ordinance recognises the public interest in the planning of urban and village development. The public is en-titled to notice of such proposed development and must be given the opportunity ... to object and any objection ',[llust be considered ... the public cannot be robbed of this right ... '; and on the return day (McCarthy v Mustheights (Pty) Ltd and others 1974 (4) SA 627 (C) at 630: 'The democratic process through which public involvement in various as-pects of goverr~ent is secured often requires compliance with what may seem to be elaborate procedures and may result in irksome delays ... the function of the Court (is) to be anxiously on its guard that it protects the public against any erosion of i '~s rights to notification and protest.' See Dean op cit 123. 
3. The principle has some application in relation to professional councils and industrial relations - see eg the provis i ons of the Industrial Con-ciliation Act No 28 of 1956 on industrial councils (ss 18 and 19) and conciliation boards (ss 35, 36 and 37). 
4. See the essays in S. Langton (ed) Citizen Participation in America (1978). Citizen participation in the United States has been associated with three distinct developments - the civil rights movE~ment, the public-interest movement, and the demands for more open government. See also C.B. Macpherson The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (1977) 93ff. 
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(e) The mutual veto principle 
The principle of a veto power is not unfamiliar in modern con-
stitutionalism and is usually encountered in some form in the 
legislative process, whether it be a suspensive veto for the 
upper chamber' or a nominally absolute veto for the head of 
state. 2 In this context the veto is usually perceived as one 
of the institutional checks and balances, a safeguard against 
precipitate action by the lower chamber acting alone. In the 
consociational model the veto principle is also designed to em-
power minorities to discourage prejudicial action by the 
majority, but it is also intended to have another, more positive, 
function, namely to iriduce a system of power-sharing. Thus, it 
is argued, the iristitutional requirement of unanimity or near-
unanimity in the legislative and executive process will necessi-
tate compromises from the majority to ensure the necessary support 
of minorities for a specific proposal - hence the notion of the 
concurrent majority.3 It is seen as essential for minorities 
not only to par;itipate in various representative institutions, 
but to be able to influence decision-making as well; in the ad-
versarial model, by contrast, it is traditionally accepted that 
once the opposition has had its say the government is entitled to 
have its way.4 The mutual veto is therefore one of the most im-
portant features of the consociational system, an essential com-
plement to the other anti-majoritarian pTinciples of porportion-
ality and the grand coalition. The extent to which the principle 
can contribute to compromise and induce power-sharing is of course 
limited,S and some of its other shortcomings and dangers have al-
ready been referred to,6 but its absence from the government's 
1. Eg The House of Lords' powers as provided in the Parliament Act of 1949; 
cf s 63 of the RSA Constitution Act No 32 of 1961 before its repeal in 
1980. 
2". Eg the American president t s suspensive veto (U. S. Constitution art 1 
s 7.2) which at the end of a congressional session can become absolute -
the well-known 'pocket veto'; cf s 64 of the RSA Constitution Act No 32 
of 1961. 
3. J. Calhoun A Disquisition on Government (ed by C. Gordon Post, 1953) 20-
31. Calhoun's concurrent majority applied only to the legislature but 
it could apply in other areas as well. 
4. K.C. Wheare Legislatures (1968) 159. 
5. In particular Calhoun's eulogy is naive and nlisplaced; and see D. Rae 
'The Limits of Consensual Decision-Making' 69 (1975) American Political 
Science Review 1270-1294. 
6. See above, 102-103. 
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1977 constitutional proposals can be described as their most im-
portant institutional weakness from a consociational point of 
view. It will be discussed here in relation to the main deci-
sion-making processes, the relationship between an upper and 
lower house, and constitutional amendments. 
In the first place the minority veto should be available in both 
the national legislature and executive to prevent minorities from 
being outvoted or overruled. In its practical application there 
are, besides the basic options already referred to,1 three dif-
ferent, but closely-related, issues which would have to be settled. 
The first is the size of the minority entitled to exercise the 
veto - most commentators suggest a minimal size of between five 
and fifteen percent. 2 The second concerns the matters in res-
pect of which the veto is available - here distinctions could be 
drawn between less important or non-controversial decisions, and 
those with greater significance because of their high political 
salience or because they needed to be taken urgently for the 
smooth running 9£ government. 3 The third is the effect of the 
veto - whether it would be absolute or suspensive, and if the 
latter, for what period it would operate; this aspect also raises 
the question of veto-breaking mechanisms, such as neutral consul-
tative committees or overrule through referendum. 4. As each of 
these factors interrelates closely with the others they could be 
arranged on a highly flexible basis, so that, for example, on spec-
ified crucial issues the veto would be absolute and could be in-
voked by any minority group of five percent, whereas on less im-
portant everyday matters it could only b,e used by a fifteen per-
1. See above, 396-399. 
2. See Slabbert and Welsh op cit 153-154. 
3. Most constitutions distinguish so-called monl:y-bills because of this 
factor. 
4. The referendum has come to be closely associated with the Swiss political 
system, where its direct popular majoritarianism stands in contrast to 
the otherwise coalescent style of Swiss poli·~ics. A referendum can be 
popularly initiated in respect of both federal laws and constitutional 
amendments, but in the latter case both cantonal and popular majorities 
are required for its success. See C. Hughes The Federal Constitution 
of Switzerland (1954) 100-103, 132-138, and M. Mowlam 'Popular Access 
to the Decision-making Process in Switzerland' 14 (1979) Government and 
Opposition 180-197. 
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cent minority and would have a suspensive effect for a ninety 
day period, after which the matter could be reconsidered and 
passed with only majority support. 1 In resolving these 
issues a delicate balance would have to be struck between two 
conflicting interests - the consociational requirement of ef-
fective minority participation in government, and the demand in 
the modern administrative state for efficient and effective gov-
ernment. In the South African context the latter considera-
tions cannot be underestimated, since future governments will 
require extensive powers to redress socio-economic imbalances 
and promote other reforms. Persistent deadlock and immobilism, 
brought about through the over-use of the veto power to block 
progressive legislation,would inevitably favour the status quo, 
and prove politically destabilising. It is an ironic reality 
that the case for a constitutionally entrenched veto power in a 
transformed political system is likely to be strongly made by 
the whites, despite the absence of this institution in the con-
stitutional history of South Africa. In comparison to the grand 
coalition and proportionality principles, therefore, the greatest 
circumspection would be required in the institutionalisation of 
the veto principle. 
1. The revised Belgium constitution of 1971 gives a suspensive veto over 
legislation to each of the French and Dutch language-groups. Art 32(b) 
provides that the elected members of each house shall be divided into 
their respective language-groups; while normal decisions require an 
absolute majority in both houses (art 38), three-quarters of the members 
of one group may declare that the provisions of a draft bill have 
serious consequences for their community in which case the bill is re-
ferred back to the cabinet for reconsideration (art 38(b)). The veto 
is operative for thirty days, and can only be used once in respect of 
the same bill. 
2. The breakdown of the consociational system in Cyprus is generally attri-
buted to the misuse and overuse of the veto power, which lead to dead-
lock and immobilism. 
3. A veto right was only introduced in Zimbabwe once the transition to 
majority rule had properly commenced; see above, 240f. The Turnhalle 
constitution for Namibia also made a veto power freely available; see 
L.J. Boulle 'The Turnhalle Testimony' 1978 ~ALJ 49-62. 
4. Vide the circumvention of the entrenched clauses during the constitution-
al crisis. Since the abolition of the Senate the only formal veto is 
in relation to the official languages and avails one third or more of the 
numbers of the House of Assembly - s 118 of the RSA Constitution Act No 
32 of 1961. As in other Westminster systems the cabinet operates on a 
'consensual' basis, but this does not imply an informal veto. For a 
former prime minister's account of cabinet procedure see House of Assembly 
Debates vol 10 cols 4552-3 (12 April 1978). 
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The veto principle is also relevant as far as the relationship 
between the two chambers in a bicameral system is concerned. 
In parliamentary systems it is customary for the upper house 
to have a suspensive veto of specified duration in respect of 
non-financial bills, whereas in presidential systems the upper 
1 
house's veto power tends to be more extensive, if not absolute. 
In a consociational system a veto for the upper house would also 
seem desirable, particularly if it were representative of par-
ticular segmental, functional or regional interests. On the 
other hand, the problems of deadlock and immobilisrn would be com-
pounded if the veto could operate cumulatively in two sites, and 
the factors referred to in the previous paragraph would apply a 
fortiori in deciding on the scope and effect of an upper chamber's 
veto power over legislation. 
Finally, a special type of veto arrangement could be anticipated 
in relation to constitutional amendments since these are general-
ly regarded as belonging to a special category of legislative 
activity, excep~ ' in those jurisdictions 'where the doctrine of 
legislative supremacy is still prevalent. 2 Consociational theory 
would seem to indicate the need for a highly rigid and supreme 
constitution since the main rules of the consociational system 
would be institutionalised in its provisions - the veto power, by 
necessary .implication, should avail relatively small minorities 
in respect of all constitutional amendments, and should be abso-
lute in its effect. The same argument could be applied to other 
basic statutes, suth as the electoral law and a bill of rights. 
But the issue cannot be seen simply in terms of the traditional 
debate bet~een the merits and demerits of rigid and flexible con-
stitutions. Constitutional rigidity is never a politically 
neutral factor, let alone in a consociational system with its em-
phasis on the sharing, diffusing, dividing and limiting of auth-
ority. Whatever the normative attractions of these features, they 
1. In the semi-presidential French system the constitution (art 45) re-
quires approval of a bill by both houses; if the houses disagree on two 
occasions a joint committee is established to draft a compromise text. 
If there is also disagreement on the compromj.se the bill is quashed, 
unless the government intervenes and directs the lower house to rule 
definitively. Cf s 26(1)(a)(v), (b) and (c) of the 1979 RSA Draft Con-
stitution Bill. 
2. Notably Britain, Israel, New Zealand and South Africa. 
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must be balanced against the requirement at times for decisive, 
quick and efficient government, and formal changes to the con-
sociational rules might be necessary to accommodate these re-
quirements. In order to prevent the fulfilment of Salmond's 
well-kno"~ prophecy,1 the potentially destabilising effects of 
over-rigidity would have to be forestalled by introducing an 
additional variable into the amending procedure - namely that 
the constitution should only be rigid for a specified period of 
time. This was done in both the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia 2 and Zim-
babwe 3 constitutions and was not uncommon in African constitu-
tions in the decolonisation period. 4 A temporally qualified 
constitutional rigidity could be of both functional and symbolic 
importance in the short term, even if it allowed an easier for-
mal transition to a majoritarian-based constitution. 
(d) Segmental autonomy 
Segmental autonomy would seem to be the most difficult of all the 
/ 
consociational principles to apply in the South African context. 
Its theoretical function is to complement the power-sharing fea-
tures of the joint national institutions, by allowing each (min-
ority) segment to control and regulate matters of exclusive con-
cern to it; whereas the power-sharing requires elite summit dip-
lomacy and a depoliticised public, segmental autonomy requires 
more conventional features of representative government. It re-
quires a devolved political structure, which could have a commun-
al or territorial basis. 5 
1. a constitution which will not bend will sooner or later break'. 
J. Salmond Jurisprudence (11 ed, 1957) 523. The over-entrenchment of 
inter-segmental ratios in both Cyprus and Lebanon contributed to the 
destabilisation of these systems; this dang(~r is more remote where the 
segments are not constitutionally defined. 
2. Ss 155-159. 
3. S 52. As has been shown whites only acceptl:d the principle of consti-
tutional rigidity once the transition to majority rule had begun. Cf 
ch 3 s 3(g)(i) of the Turnhalle constitution and s 8(1)(d) of the RSA 
Draft Constitution Bill of 1979. 
4. See R. Luyt 'African Constitutionalism: Constitutions in the context 
of decolonisation' in J. Benyon (ed) Constitutional Change in South 
Africa (1978) 15-24. 
5. No attention is paid here to local government: systems, though clearly 
these could play an important role in establishing a devolved political 
structure. 
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In the past the government has sought . to devolve power on a 
communal basis through a system of non-territorial communal 
assemblies,but apart from its political inadequacies the system 
has had manifest constitutional shortcomings: the absence of 
complementary national authorities, the difficulties inherent 
in personality-based jurisdiction, and the relatively few 
matters which could be of exclusive concern to communities lack-
ing a clear territorial base. Apart from these difficulties 
the creation of community assemblies wotld be problematic where 
a system of voluntary political association was introduced for 
the first time, and in the South Africa!. context it would tend 
to be perceived as an extension or modification of separate de-
velopment policy and practice. It is therefore logical to ex-
amine first the possibilities of applying segmental autonomy in 
a federal arrangement. At the same time, and without identify-
ing the groups specifically, constitutional allowance could be 
made for religious, linguistic or cultural group~ to establish 
their own representative councils where they felt the need there-
for,1 and for these councils to have structured access to nation-
/ 
al and sub-national authorities in respect of decisions which 
might vitally affect their specific religious, linguistic or cul-
2 tural groups. 
The close empirical and conceptual links between consociationalism 
and federalism have been described,3 and it has been shown that 
federalism is a special form of consociationalism in which segment-
al autonomy operates on a territorial basis, provided there is a 
geographical concentration of the segments. Besides the tradi-
tional constitutional characteristics,4 a federal system requires 
three additional features before it can become fully consociation-
al. 5 First, the autonomy given to the federal units must be a 
1. The revised Belgium constitution of 1971 recognises the existence of 
three cultural communities in the country, the French, Dutch and German 
(art 3(c». It further provides for the existence of two separate 
cultural councils to comprise the French- and Dutch-speaking members 
respectively of both legislative houses. T'1ese councils can issue 
decrees on cultural and educational matters which have the force of law 
Ln respect of the relevant language group (art 59(b». 
2. Cf s 5.4.2 of the PFP constitutional proposals. 
3. See above, 108-114. 
4. See G. Sawer Modern Federalism (1976) 1-3. 
5. See A. Lijphart 'Consociation: The Model and its Applications ID Divided 
Societies', paper presented at the Study Conference on Models of Politi-
cal Co-operation held at Queen's University, Belfast, 25-28 March 1981. 
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method for allowing the segments to run their o~~ affairs - con-
versely the state boundaries should be drawn so as to coincide 
as nearly as possible with segmental divisions. Second, the 
federation should be decentralised so that the constituent 
states tan have a ' sLrong measure of self-government and politi-
cal autonomy~1 Third, the segmental autonomy must be supplement-
ed by the other main principle of consociationalism, power-
sharing, operating through the central authorities of the federal 
system. A federal model incorporating these additional features 
would provide an optimal constitutional framework for a consocia-
tional system of government in an appropriate situation. Un-
fortunately the South African situation does not appear highly 
appropriate. 
There is a wealth of literature on federalism in the South Afri-
can context,2 and the subject has been 2pproached from a number of 
perspectives. In some cases the federG.l model is appl ied pres-
criptively,with due emphasis to those features which are perceived 
as a guarantee p'f constitutional government - the separation of 
powers, the checks and balances, ' and the availability of judicial 
review. In others federalism is seen as a logical evolutionary 
development in view of the existing 'federal' features of the con-
stitutional system: the decentralised provincial system and the 
stages of . self-government through whith the homelands proceed. 
1. Contemporary trends are towards organic and co-operative forms of feder-
alism in which the centre gives a strong lea.d to the units ,even on matters 
within their sphere of competence (eg the United States, India, Austalia) 
but there are other federations where regional autonomy remains strong 
(Canada, Switzerland). On the stages of federalism see Sawer op cit 
98-108. 
2. Some of the more worthwhile contributions can be found in D.V. Cowan 
Constitution making for a Democracy (1960), the Mo1teno Report for the 
Progressive Party (1960), L. Marquard A Federation of South Africa (1971), 
the Sprocas report South Africa's Political Alternatives (1973), A. du 
Toit Federalism and Political Change in South Africa (1974), M. Wiechers 
'Grondslae vir Politieke Ontwikkeling in Suid Afrika' in J. Coetzee (ed) 
Gedenkbunde1 H.L. Swanepoe1 (1976) 102ff, W. Thomas Plural Democracy 
(1977), the Slabbert Constitutional Report for the Progressive Federal 
Party (1978), F. van Zy1 Slabbert and D. Welsh South Africa's Options 
(1979) 134-151, several of the contributions in J. Benyon (ed) Constitu-
tional Change in South Africa (1978), W. Thomas 'South Africa Between 
Partition and Integration l 1979 Aussenpolitik 326. Some contributors 
base their discussion specifically on a more generous consolidation of 
the homelands: R. Botha Suid-Afrika - Toekolnsblik (1979), G. Maasdorp 
'Forms of Partition' in R. Rotberg and J. Bar ratt 'Conflict and Compromise 
in South Africa (1980) 107 at 135ff. See a l so the Royal Institute for 
International Affairs A Survey of Proposals f or the Constitutional Develop-
ment of South Africa (London, 1980). 
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In yet others it is seen as a temporary compromise arrangement 
which could subsequently develop into a majoritarian, unitary 
system. Despite these different approaches, a recurring theme 
in the literature is the difficulty of drawing state boundaries;' 
quite apart from factors of motive and legitimacy which compli-
cate this aspect,2 it is generally seen as impossible to create 
federal units which are more 'homogeneous' than the country as 
a whole,without extensive 'gerrymandering' of state boundaries 3 
or large-scale resettlement programmes. In terms of present 
statutory concepts of race and ethnicity, therefore, a federal 
arrangement could only be partially asymmetrical and would not 
provide an escape from 'majority domination', or in consociation-
al terms could not serve as a method of applying the segmental 
autonomy principle. 4 In each of the federal units there would 
be a high degree of heterogeneity ' and diversity, and it would be 
necessary to achieve a coalescent style of politics at these 
levels as well. S Even within a system of voluntary group form-
ation and free political association this position would pertain, 
as the existing / imposed group affiliations would tend to be poli-
tically relevant for some time to come and new types of group 
formation, for example along class lines, would be unlikely to 
follow regional boundaries. 
Therefore .even if the preconditions for consociationalism were 
all satisfied, it is unlikely that the consociational character-
istic of segmental autonomy could be directly applied through a 
federal division of power in South Africa. But the fact that 
federalism cannot, in the South African context, be seen as offer-
ing a ready vehicle for achieving segmental autonomy, does not 
render it irrelevant as far as a consociational system is concern-
ed; after all both systems involve a re~ection of majority rule 
1.. Marquard op cit 71f; Du Toit op cit 17f. 
2. There is also a tendency to see federal government primarily in legalis-tic terms. 
3. For example with the Group Areas Act No 36 of 1966 as a basis. 
4. In only one of these contributions (the PFP constitutional proposals) is an attempt made to incorporate the principles of consociationalism consistently and comprehensively into a federal constitution. 
5. Slabbert and Welsh op cit '40. 
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in all matters' and federalism has been frequently advocated as 
the optimal constitutional arrangement for heterogeneous socie-
ties,2 despite its poor record in many cases. And despite the 
existence in South Africa of a number of unfavourable factors 
as far as federal government is concerned,3 there does exist an 
institutional infrastructure which, in modified form and without 
any ethnic or racial basis, could be used as part of the federal 
constitutional framework. Other institutional requirements 
would include a division of authority between the central and 
regional institutions, a system of public finance to ensure a 
measure of regional autonomy, and the ir.terpretation and enforce~ 
ment of the constitution by a federal judiciary. If the power-
sharing aspects of consociationalism were introduced at both 
central and regional levels of government a federal arrangement 
would in fact enhance the prospects of a consociational political 
system and reduce the necessity for segmental autonomy in the 
accepted consociational sense. 
A variation on ~he federal theme which has been recommended by 
some commentators is the territorial devolution of authority to 
one or more specific regions within the country.4 The justifica-
tion for this differential status if usually found in the parti-
cular economic, geographic, demographic ~r political characteris-
tics of the relevant region. The conce?t of a special status 
for some regions in an otherwise unitary system is not without 
constitutional precedent, although the main empirical example is 
not encouraging. S It finds support in South Africa in the al-
ready existing forms of devolved government, in particular the 
self-governing states which at the second stage of self-government 
have a special constitutional status via··a-vis other regions, in-
,. M.J.C. Vile 'Federal Theory and the "New Fede.ralismft ' in D. Jaensch (ed) ' The Politics of "New Federalism" (1977) 4ff. 
2. Cf E. McWhinney Federal Constitution-making for a Multinational World (1966); I. Duchacek Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics (1970); K. Heard Political Systems in Multi-Racial Societies (1961). 
3. Chief among these are the gross socio-economic imbalances among existing regions of the country. 
4. Cf Duchacek's (op ci~ 277ff) notion of 'asymmetric federalism'. 
5. Northern Ireland had a special status within the United Kingdom from 1921 to 1972 during which it had virtual autonomy on local affairs. This should be distinguished from the position of 'associated' states, such a~ Puerto Rico (which is associated with the U.S.A.). See Duchacek op c~t 184-187: M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 47. 
430. 
cluding the provinces. 1 The recommendations call for a greater 
devolution of power to existing institu·~ ions, an extension of 
their territorial jurisdiction, and a lessening of the central 
government's institutional and fiscal controls; but such an 
arrangement would also require constitu~ional changes in the nat~ 
ional institutions to ensure the direct participation there of 
the special status regions, and thereby indirectly to safeguard 
their regional autonomy. While this idea itself is not new,2 
it has been given considerable impetus r ecently by both the 
Quai1 3 and Lombard4 reports, and implicit in both is the notion 
of segmental autonomy along regional-ethnic lines for specific 
geo-political units. While it is beyond the scope of this work 
to evaluate these recommendations~ they do highlight another in-
stitutional possibility whereby the consociational principle of 
segmental autonomy might be applied on a quasi-federal basis. 
The preceding analysis has shown that a federal arrangement 
would, in terms of traditional notions of constitutionalism, en-
hance the prospects of a consociational system, but would not pro-
vide a suitable way of applying the segmental autonomy principle 
as it is understood in consociational theory. On the other hand 
the alternative of devolving authority to constitutionally created 
communal assemblies with personal jurisdiction has been effective-
ly excluded by the earlier-stated pre-conditions for consociation-
alism in South Africa. 6 A third alternative would be to make 
constitutional provision in neutral terms for the flexible dele-
gation and re-delegation of certain matt.ers between various gov-
ernment authorities and voluntarily constituted community councils. 
The potential number of such matters is relatively few, but the 
1. The powers conferred by the National States Constitution Act No 21 of 
1971 are nominally more extensive than those of the provincial councils 
(cf s 84 of the Constitution Act No 32 of 1961). 
2. See the suggestions of P. Malherbe in Multistan: A Way out of the South 
African Dilemma (1974). 
3. Report of the Ciskei Commission (1980). See above, 274-277. 
4. Alternatives to the Consolidation of KwaZulu: Progress Report, Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis, University of Pretoria (1980). See above, 277-281. 
5. See Natal and KwaZulu: Constitutional and Political Options by L.3. 
Boulle and L.G. Baxter (eds), and the Supplement (1981) by the same 
authors which contains an edited version of the discussions at the Work-
shop on Constitutional Issues in KwaZulu and Natal held at the University 
of Natal in October, 1980. 
6. See above, 390-394. 
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arrangement can be illustrated with reference to education.
1 
The basic principle is that alongside a system of state schools 
there would be provision for a private school system which could 
be made use of on a flexible voluntary basis. Any group of 
a certain minimum size would be empowered to establish a private 
school to cater for its linguistic, religious or even specialist 
educational requirements; educational responsibility would then 
be transferred by the state to the school authorities, or to an 
umbrella organisation which wished to co-ordinate a number of 
similar schools. The schools could have a relatively large 
measure of educational autonomy within a framework of loose 
state supervision;2 they would also be supported by public funds 
to ensure financial viability and autonomy. The funding would 
take place in accordance with the two basic principles of equal-
ity of expenditure on education and equal access to educational 
opportunity.3 The system could also be extended to all types of 
tertiary education, though inevitably with less flexibility and 
greater state control; thus on the question of establishing a 
university in a / particular locality, for example, the autonomy 
principle might have to give way to local or regional feelings as 
expressed in a referendum, because of the scale of the undertaking 
and its implications for public funds. 
At differ~nt times the above arrangements have been used in vary-
ing combinations to provide segmental autonomy over educational 
matters in Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Lebanon. 
They would also have certain attractions in the South African con-
text. They are based on a system of iniividual choice and volun-
tary associa tion wi fhou t any need for th ,~ consti tutional recog-
nition of segments, nor is a significant geographic concentration 
1. See T. Ranf 'Education and Consociational Co:~flict Regulations in Plural 
Societies' in Slabbert and Opland op cit 224·-237 (and references cited 
there), and the succeeding discussion (238-2,~8); A. Lijphart The Poli-
tics of Accomm.:>dation (2 ed, 1975) 110-112. 
2. For example in relation to the minimum period of obligatory schooling, 
or inter-school recognition of attainments. 
3. In practice this could be achieved in various ways - by providing schools 
with a per capita subsidy in proportion to expenditure on state schools, 
or through the individualisation of expenditure in a voucher system: 
here each child of school-going age would receive a voucher representing 
a certain claim on public funds which could be made by the school attended 
by the child, the voucher could either cover all claims on state funds 
by the school, or additional funds could be allowed for capital expendi-
ture and special projects. ef also Ivan Illich (Deschooling Society 
.( 19 71) 87. 
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of segments necessary. They are based on the egalitarian prin-
ciples of equal educational opportunity and expenditure through-
out society, but not at the cost of having central government 
control over all crucial aspects of an educational programme -
medium of instruction, curricula, methods of examination and 
broad educational philosophy.' They serve to depoliticise a 
potentially divisive issue 2 by removing it from the overt poli-
tical agenda, and even preventing such abuses as government at-
tempts at political socialisation through the educational process. 
They also provide the greatest degree of segmental autonomy pos-
sible, short of a system of communal authorities. But past poli-
cies of differentiation in education would make the goal of 
equality of opportunity somewhat elusive, in spite of equalised 
formal access to,and expenditure on,education. In particular 
whites would have an immense advantage in terms of existing 
schools, facilities and teachers, and even a per capita subsidy 
system would not necessarily result in an equalisation of these 
features since wealthy parents or communities would be able to 
subvent their i~stitutions from private resources. A loaded 
subsidy, or affirmative-action type formula, for funding the in-
stitutions of relatively deprived communities would provide some 
amelioration, although it would be politically contentious. In 
short, this type of segmental autonomy would tend to encourage 
at least $ome perpetuation of .privilege, segregation or other 
exclusivity in the educational system. 3 
A final alternative would require the adaptation of constitution-
al structures to the realities of the administrative state. Here 
Dean has suggested the establishment of a system of 'issue poli-
tics' through a process of functional decentralisation 4 - this is 
closely related to the question of greater public participation 
in the administrative process. 5 The essence of 'issue politics' 
1. Cf Nordlinger's emphasis on purposive depoliticisation ~n Conflict ~n 
Divided Societies (1972) 26. 
2. Cf the De Lange education report (above, 283) at 210f. 
3. In the American South the voucher system was used to avoid the integration 
of schools. 
4. See W.H.B. Dean 'The Administration: Control and Participation' in Boulle 
and Baxter op cit 109 at 119ff; see also D. Cohen 'The Public-Interest 
Movement and Citizen Participation' in S. Langton (ed) Citizen Participa-
tion in America (1978) 55-64. 
5. ·See above, 419-420. 
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is the practice of organising politically around particular 
issues; 1 it can exist separately from political party organi-
sation, or ethnic or racial sectional group politics, but is 
clearly easier to sustain where sectional interests are not 
overtly dominant, as in consumer or environmental issues. 
Institutional support could be provided by establishing para-
statal bodies with greater autonomy than government departments, 
but still subject to some state control. The authority to 
determine state policy in particular areas could be allocated to 
these bodies instead of to the central government, and provision 
could be made for active public participation in their activi-
2 ties. According to Dean, 
'Such "issue fragmentation" has a number of advantages 
in the South African context. It could provide for 
inter-group co-operation on an "issue" rather than 
group basis. In other words the control of activities 
in which people have a common interest can be determined 
by that interest rather than simply by group identity. 
The prop9sal could also provide a mechanism for insula-
tion from party political influence ... (through) direct 
active public participation ... The proposal lends it-
self to such participation because it reduces the size 
of the policy making units and the range of issues which 
they will have to consider.' 
Issue decentralisation, therefore, would both provide an alterna-
tive to (or even variation of) the segmental autonomy principle, 
and give effect to Nordlinger's concept of purposive depolitici-
sation.,3 In the South African context it would require a new 
approach to the functi6ns of the bureaucracy and a reassessment 
of certain admiriistrative law principles such as locus standi. 
1. Cohen op cit 56. 
2 • Op c i t 11 9 . 
3. E. Nordlinger op cit 26. On the 'citizens' initiatives' which have 
arisen in the Federal Republic of Germany without constitutional sup-
port see B. van Niekerk 'The German Burgerinitiativen - a New Form of 
Plebiscitary Control of Government' 1979 SALJ 424-432; but see the 
cautionary warning of Baxter in Boulle and Baxter opcit 95. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this chapter attention has been given to the range of insti-
tutional alternatives which would be supportive of a consocia-
tional system of government, should the necessary political 
will be present. In many cases these alternatives highlight 
well-known structures and mechanisms of constitutional law, or 
close variations thereof. In fact, although consociationalism 
does not provide an analytical constitutional model, its four 
main principles have well known constitutional equivalents,1 and 
are encountered in both semi-consociational and non~consociation­
al constitutional systems. The main conclusion of this chapter, 
however, is that in the process of consociational engineering it 
is possible to range far beyond a single constitutional model in 
order to find institutions which might be suitable for the social, 
political and economic realities of South Africa. 
In this reduction of consociationalism to constitutional terms a 
number of instiyutional details have been overlooked altogether. 
These include the size of the legislature and executive, the 
qualifications and tenure of office-holders, legislative proce-
dures, details of the party and electoral systems, forms of exe-
cutive and administrative responsibility, and the composition 
and functioning of the bureaucracy. Another institution which 
has been omitted is the judiciary, its structure, composition and 
powers, and in particular its constitutional function in relation 
to a possible bill of rights. Other aspects of lesser importance 
in modern constitutionalism include the nature and use of national 
symbols. Many of these aspects are relevant to the principles 
of constitutionalism generally, but not to consociationalism it-
self; where they have implications for both constitutional theory 
and consociationalism they are dealt with in the following chapter. 
1. Cf De Smith's 'nine types of safeguards against the abuse of majority 




CONSOCIATIONALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
1. Introduction 
In recent times an increasing number of constitutional princi-
ples and doctrines have been challenged by contemporary social, 
economic and political realities, leading to an ever-widening 
chasm between constitutional theory and the modern practice of 
government. 1 By and large modern constitutionalism was con-
ceived for a relatively simple form of the plural society and, 
whatever its resemblance to reality in that setting, it has 
clearly not been updated to take account of the most important 
developments in modern systems of government - in particular 
the continued growth of the administrative state, the contem-
porary importapte of the bureaucracy and corporate power, the 
economic forces operating on the constitution, the technologi-
cal dimensions and complexity of modern decision-making, and 
the influence of international politics and economics on nat-
ional systems. Amongst the constitutional doctrines which 
have bee~ affected by these developments are the separation of 
powers, the rule of law, the authority of parliament, notions 
of ministerial responsibility, theories of representation, and 
the judicial function and judicial independence - in other 
words the most important areas of constitutionalism. 2 
South Africa has not been unaffected by the developments men-
tioned above and suffers from the same dilatoriness in updating 
constitutional theory. In this chapter attention will be given 
.to some of those areas which are of particular concern to the 
subject-matter of this work, namely consociationalism. The 
first topic, the legislative supremacy of parliament, is likely 
to be of relevance mainly during the period of government-con-
trolled constitutional development along quasi-consociational 
lines; the other three topics, the role of the judiciary, the 
1. See L.G. Baxter 'Constitutionalism, Bureaucracy and Corporatism' in L.J. 
Boulle and L.G. Baxter Natal and KwaZulu: Constitutional and Political 
Options (1981) 75-108. 
2. See R.W.M. Dias 'Gotterdammerung : gods of the law in decline' 1981 (1) 
Legal Studies 3-23. 
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notion of responsible government, and the question of citizen-
ship, are also relevant to this period, but require further 
reassessment in the light of the principles of consociational 
democracy. 
2. The Legislative Supremacy of Parliament 
In its modern sense parliamentary supremacy denotes that there 
are no constitutional limitations on the legislative competence 
of parliament; parliament cannot be limited in the substance 
of its authority by earlier parliaments, it has no legislative 
rivals, and the judiciary cannot invalidate acts which it has 
duly passed. The doctrine has been consistently applied in 
South Africa since the removal of the external limitations on 
parliament's competence in the 1930's,1 and commentators ascribe 
to it a central importance in relation to constitutional and 
political developments since that time. 2 During the constitu-
tional crisis of the 1950's there was a strong vindication of 
the concept by/ the government,3 and on other occasions of con-
stitutional significance subsequent prime ministers have empha-
sised the importance of parliamentary supremacy to the political 
system. 4 From the political point of view the principle can be 
said to have both substantive and symbolic importance, and it is 
therefor~ not likely to be readily discarded during a period of 
government-controlled constitutional change. 
From a juridical point of view the principle of parl i amentary 
supremacy raises the following issues relating to constitutional 
development in South Africa: can procedural or substantive re-
straints be imposed on the existing parliament without terminat-
ing its existence, can the scope of the judiciary's review 
·1. By the Statute of Westminster of 1931 (22 Geo.5,c.4) and the Status of 
the Union Act No 69 of 1934. See s 59(1) of the RSA Constitution Act 
No 32 nf 1961. 
2. See J. Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978) 14-
36; F. van Zyl Slabbert and D. Welsh South Africa's Options (1979) 77-89. 
3. See the then prime minister in House of Assembly Debates vol 78 col 3124 
(25 March 1952). 
4. In relation to the republic constitution see Dr. Verwoerd House of Assem-
bly Debates vol 1 col 101 (20 January 1960) and in relation to the 1977 
constitution Mr. Vorster House of Assembly Debates vol 10 col 4547 (12 
April 1978). Dugard Cop cit 28) observes that in the 1940 ' s government 
enthusiasm for parliamentary supremacy waned but was restored after the 
. constitutional crisis. 
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powers over legislation be extended,and can parliament termi-
nate its supremacy completely? The answers to these questions 
will determine the extent to which the following constitution~l 
features are feasible in terms of present legal realities: a 
justiciable bill of rights, constitutional entrenchments, a 
rigid amending procedure, a secured 'federal' or 'corporate' 
division of power policed by the courts, and the creation of a 
wholly new constitutional order. These innovations would be 
relevant not only to a consociational system,but to any form of 
fundamental constitutional change, but they will be examined with 
particular reference to the government's form of quasi-consocia-
tionalism. In order to resolve some of these issues it is nece-
ssary to turn to English constitutional law whence our concept 
of parliamentary supremacy derives. 
In English law the nature and significance of parliamentary sup-
remacy has been subjected to increased analysis in recent times, 
most particularly in relation to the possible introduction of a 
bill of rights;~ although there is no unanimity on the legal 
/ 
status of such rights, there is a significant body of opinion in 
favour of their constitutional entrenchment and judicial enforce-
ability.2 There are also other areas of constitutional topical-
ity whith have revived the debate on parliamentary supremacy, 
1. Among the many WTltlngs on this topic are Lord Scarman English Law - The 
New Dimension (1974), J. Fawcett 'A Bill of Rights for the United King-
dom· 1976 Human Righ~Review 57-64, Lord Lloyd 'Do We Need a Bill of 
Rights?' 1976 Modern LR 121-129, Lord Hailsham The Dilemma of Democracy 
(1978), N. Anderson Liberty, Law and Justice (1978), M. Zander A Bill of 
Rights? (2 ed, 1979), J. Jaconelli Enacting a Bill of Rights: The Legal 
Problems (1980), R.W.R. Wade Constitutional Fundamentals (1980). As 
commentators point out the debate has been prompted in part by the fact 
that Britain is a party to the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Human Rights, yet it seems to fall short of many of 
the Convention's provisions. There is also a perceived need to prevent 
a minority government from making fundamental constitutional changes for 
which it has no mandate. P. O'Higgins Cases and Materials on Civil Liber-
ties (1980) 49; Lord Hailsham op cit 21-22. 
2. Other possibilities are that it form an ordinary statute which repeals 
earlier inconsistent statutes but could itself be repealed by subsequent 
inconsistent legislation; or that it could have the status of presump-
tions of statutory interpretation. The Canadian bill of rights, as 
interpreted in the celebrated R v Drybones (1970) 9 DLR (3d) 473, pro-
vides that an inconsistent statute is rendered inoperative but not in-
valid, that is it remains in force but cannot affect the outcome of the 
case in issue. See Jaconelli op cit 159-161. 
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such as the possibility of introducing a 'federal' division of 
authority within the United Kingdom, and the probability of 
the future strengthening of institutional links with the Euro-
pean Economic Community. Unfortunately, even the English law 
commentators are not agreed on the nature and significance of 
parliamentary supremacy, although the notion that no parliament 
can bind its successors has long been recognised as the 'ulti-
mate rule of recognition,1 or 'grundnurm,2 of the English con-
stitution. There is, first of all, a division of opinion as 
to whether or not the sovereign parliament's competence includes 
the power of self-limitation - that is whether parliament at a 
particular moment in its history can terminate its sovereignty 
in such a way as to bind all its successors. Corresponding to 
the responses to this question are the two views of 'continuing' 
and 'self-embracing' supremacy, respectively.3 But while the 
adherents of the continuing view of supremacy are agreed that 
the sovereign parliament cannot impose any substantive limita-
tions on its legislative powers, there is further disagreement 
as to whether 9t not it can impose procedural limitations; 
those favouring this possibility have formulated the so-called 
'new view' of sovereignty. 
The notion of continuing legislative supremacy is advocated by 
Hart 4 and Wade,S who build iri turn on Dicey6 and Salmond. 7 
According to this view legislative supremacy is the one rule of 
English constitutional law which parliament cannot alter by stat-
ute. This view can be justified in terms of logic, namely that 
a fundamental rule cannot contain the conditions relating to its 
own amendment (the problem of self-reference B), and the constitu-
1. H.L. Hart The Concept of Law (1961) 145. 
2. H. Kelsen General Theory of Law and State (Transl by A. Wedburg, 1946) 115. 
3. See Hart op cit 146. 
4. Ibid. 
5. H. W. R. Wade 'The Basis of Legal Sovereignty' 1955 Cambridge l.a.;r Jornal 172; see also O. Hood Philips Constitutional and Administrative Law (6 ed, 197B) 80-91. 
6. A.V. Dicey An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10 ed with intro by E.C.S. Wade (1959) 68-9). 
7. J. Salmond Jurisprudence (12 ed, 1966 ed by Fitzgerald) 111. 
B. G. Marshall Constitutional Theory (1971) 46; P. Mirfield 'Can the House of Lords Lawfully be Abolished?' 1979 Law Quarterly Review 36 at 41. 
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tional reality that judicial loyalty "to the fundamental rule 
is not a function of parliament's bidding, but a simple poli-
tical fact. 1 Thus a subsequent expression of parliament's 
will must always prevail over an earlier enactment,2 including 
one which purports to impose a limitation of substance or pro-
cedure on parliament, or to entrench itself. 3 The courts' 
only function is to apply the law,after having ascertained its 
authenticity from the parliamentary roll. 4 The implication of 
this view is that, as long as parliamentary supremacy endures, 
there can be no limitation of parliament's competence by way of 
an enforceable bill of rights, constitutional rigidity, changes 
in parliamentary procedure, or a judicial testing-right; a 
further implication is that parliament is not only unable to 
abolish the House of Lords legally, but can also not make funda-
mental reforms to it.5 It is thus argued that the Parliament 
Acts of 1911 and 1949 6 did not involve a redefinition of parlia-
ment for certain purposes, but made provision for the exercise 
of delegated legislative power by the Queen and Commons. 7 
/ 
As far as the partial abdication of its legislative authority is 
concerned, the traditional notion of sovereignty is committed to 
saying that any such attempt leaves parliament unfettered in its 
competence;8 it could thus theoretically repeal both the Statute 
of Westminster 9 and the independence legislation relating to the 
Commonwealth countries. 10 But refuge is usually sought in Lord 
Sankey's well-known observation that 'that is theory and has no 
1. Wade op cit 29. 
2. Lex posterior derogat priori. 
3. Here the case law provide~ sUEPort, most importantly Vauxhall Estates Ltd 
v Liverpool Corporation )1932/ 1 KB 733; Ellen Street Estates Ltd v 
Minister of Health /19347 KB-590. But see the criticism of these cases 
"in Jaconelli op cit-163=165. 
4. Edinburgh and Dalkeith Rly v Wauchope (1842) 8 Cl & F 710(HL); but "see 
S.A. de Smith Constitutional and Administrative Law (2 ed, 1973) 86-88, 
R.F. Heuston Essays in Constitutional Law (2 ed, 1964) 17. 
5. G. Winterton 'Is the House of Lords Immortal?' 1979 Law Quarterly Review 
386-387; see also P. Mirfield op cit 36. 
6. Parlia~ent Act (1 & 2 Geo 5, c.13) and Parliament Act (12, 13 & 14 Geo 
6, c.103) respectively. 
7. See Wade op cit 193~ " Ho0d Phillips op cit 89. 
8. Marshall op cit 62-3; Hood Phillips op cit 70-74. 
9. 22 & 23 Geo 5, c.4. 
10. Eg the Indian Independence Act of 1949 (10 & 11 Geo 6, c.30), the Ghana 
. Independence Act of 1957 (5 & 6 Eliz 2, c.6), and the Nigerian Indepen-
dence Act of 1960 (8 & 9 Eliz 2, c.5S). 
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relation to realities', 1 and the political reality is that the 
domestic courts would neither recognise nor enforce a subse-
quent English statute. 2 More problematic is the European Com-
munities Act of 1972,which transfers legislative authority over 
certain matters to the European parliament and purports to give 
EEC regulations overriding preference over inconsistent British 
statutes,3 without otherwise affecting parliament's status or 
authority. Those favouring the continuing view of supremacy 
would argue that subsequent legislation could impliedly repeal 
the earlier transfer of authority and that the Communities Act 
could be repealed in toto. 4 But the position is by no means 
clear and will have to await judicial determination. 
While the proponents of the notion of continuing sovereignty rely 
heavily on Dicey, even he readily conceded that parliamentary 
supremacy could be terminated, by parliament legally dissolving 
itself and either leaving no means whereby a subsequent parlia-
ment could be summoned, or by transferring supremacy to another 
body.5 But i~ ' terms of the continuing view this would require 
a technical revolution, a breach of legal continuity between the 
old constitutional order and the new, because a new grundnurm, 
or ultimate legal reality, cannot derive its authority from the 
old. As Hood Phillips explains,6 
'the only way by which the legislature of this country 
could become legally limited would be for the United 
1. British Coal Corporation v R L19327 AC 500, in relation to the possible 
repeal or disregard of s 4 of the Statute of Westminster which purported 
to prevent parliament from legislating for a dominion unless the act em-
bodied the dominion's request and consent. 
2. In the unlikely event of the English courts being called on to do so, they 
might well invoke the maxim 'freedom once conferred cannot be revoked'. 
Ndlwana v Hofmeyr 1937 AD 229 at 237; and see Denning M.R. in Black-
burn v Attorney-General (1971) 2 AER 1380 . 
.3. Ss 2 (1) and (4). 
4. PEovi£ed the intention to override was clear: Macarthys Ltd v Smith 
L1972/ICR 174; G. Winterton 'The British Grundnurm: Parliamentary 
Supremacy Re-examined' 1976 Law Quarterly Review 591 at 603-4; E. Ellis 
'Supremacy of Parliament and European Law" 1980 Law Quarterly Review 511-
514, Hood Phillips op cit 75-80. It is doubtful, however, that the doc-
trine of implied repeal would apply: Ellis ibid; E.C.S. Wade and G. 
Phillips Constitutional and Administrative Law (9 ed, 1977) 76 suggest 
that the Communities Act alters the former doctrine of the implied repeal 
of statutes. 
5. Op cit 68-69. 
6. Op ci t 91. 
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Kingdom Parliament to extinguish itself, after surrend-
ering its powers to a new written constitution with en-
trenched provisions ... and judicial review.' 
Additional moral sanction could be given to the new constitution 
by invoking a constituent authority to draft it, and by submit-
ting it to the electorate in an inaugural referendum. 
1 
In this 
way a bill of rights could be introduced, constitutional pro-
visions could be entrenched, a federal division of power among 
the constituent parts of the United Kingdom could be effected, 
or a closer organic bond with the European Economic Community 
could be institutionalised. Wade, somewhat paradoxically, sug-
gests an even simpler solution for the entrenchment of any sort 
of fundamental law: 2 mindful of the fact that judicial loyalty 
to the laws of parliament is ultimately only a political fact, 
he points out that loyalty to a new fundamental law could be 
secured through a new judicial oath of office. The fundamental 
question, namely what will the judges recognise as an act of par-
liament, can now be answered by reference to the new judicial 
oath: they wi~l recognise only those acts which do not (for ex-
ample) conflict with the bill of rights or entrenched clauses. 
This again amounts to a de facto change in the ultimate consti-
tutional rule of recognition. 
The 'new .view' of parliamentary supremacy allows for a more 
flexible interpretation of the rule,and this avoids many of the 
constitutional problems associated with continuing supremacy. 
The 'new view' is favoured by the majority of constitutional 
lawyers 3 and also has judicial support. 4 It involves drawing a 
distinction between the content and scope of parliament's legis-
lative competence, and the 'manner and form' in which it legis-
1. Ibid; N. Johnson In Search of the Constitution (1977) 200. 
2. H.W.R. Wade Constitutional Fundamentals (1980) 24-39. 
3. Eg I. Jennings The Law and the Constitution (5 ed, 1959) 137-170; R.F. 
Heusten op cit 6ff; S.A. de Smith op cit 88-92; G. Winterton 'The 
British Grundnurm' op cit 591. 
4. Att-Gen (NSW) v Trethowan (1931) 44 CLR 394; Harris v Minister of In-
terior 1952 (2) SA 428 (AD); The Bribery Commissioner v Ranasinghe 
L1962/ AC 172; Akar v Att-Gen of Sierra Leone L197QI AC 853. Wade, draw-
ing support from Dicey, distinguishes Trethowan's case on the basis that 
it involved a subordinate and not a sovereign legiSlature, but other 
writers dismiss the importance of this distinction. See Wade 'The Legal 
Basis of Sovereignty' op cit 182. 
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lates; 1 in relation to the former there can be no limitation 
on parliament, but in relation to the latter there can be a 
redefinition of the legislative procedure which will be bind-
ing on subsequent parliaments. According to this view supre-
macy is 'substantively continuing' and 'procedurally self-
embracing,.2 The implication of this view is that a bill of 
rights and other constitutional provisions could be introduced 
and legally entrenched without any constitutional break with 
the past, and, provided the entrenching provision was itself en-
trenched,3 could be neither expressly nor impliedly repealed by 
subsequent legislation, unless parliament followed the pre-
scribed procedure. Theoretically the new procedure could in-
volve special majorities in one or both houses, the assistance 
of extra-parliamentary bodies, or even the approval of the elec-
torate in a referendum. And the ability of parliament to change 
its manner and form of legislating includes the ability to re-
define itself,4 as it did, according to this view, in the Parlia-
ment Acts, the Statute of Westminster,S and even, it has been 
suggested,6 in/ the European Communities Act which created a new 
composite legislature; the redefinition could also extend to 
the abolition or fundamental reform of the House of Lords: with-
out in any way affecting parliament's substantive supremacy. 
In all such cases subsequent parliaments would be bound by the 
procedures then in force and, although there is as yet no recog-
nition in English law of the possibility of judicial review of 
1. The term 'manner and form' derives from s 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity 
Act (28 & 29 Victo c 63) which was the subject of interpretation ~n 
Trethowan's case. 
2. Winterton 'The British Grundnurm' op cit 604; J.D. Mitchell Constitu-
tional Law (2 ed, 1968) 81) describes it as a distinction between parlia-
ment 'incapacitating itself' and 'imposing limitations which do not in-
capacitate' . 
3. As in Trethowan's case. In 1956 the New Zealand legislature provided 
that certain institutional provisions should not be amended without a 
seventy-five percent majority in parliament, but the 'entrenching' pro-
vision was not similarly safeguarded. There is a similarity here with 
s 114 of Act No 32 of 1961. 
4. Notionally there is a difference between changing the 'manner and form' 
of legislating and redefining parligment, but it is of no practical sig-
nificance. 
5. See I. Jennings op cit 163-165. 
6. See Winterton 'The British Grundnurm' op cit 614. 
7. G. Winter ton 'Is the House of Lords Immortal?' 1979 Law Quarterly Review 
386 at 389. In Diceyan terms the abolition of the Lords would involve 
a transfer of sovereign authority from Queen, Lords and Commons to Queen 
and Commons. P. Mirfield, 'Can the House of Lords Lawfully be Abolished?' 
1979 Law Quarterly Review 36 at 39. 
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legislation, the courts would be able to ensure compliance with 
the required procedures. 1 And in the process of enforcing 
these procedures the courts would likely go beyond the formality 
of the 'parliament roll' rule,to ensure that what purported to 
be a duly enacted statute was in fact so, or in the language of 
this approach, that parliament had indeed spoken; this investi-
gation could not, however, affect the privilege of each House 
. d. 2 to regulate Its o~~ procee Ings. 
But the new view of parliamentary supremacy is not altogether 
without theoretical and practical difficulties. As many commen-
tators have pointed out,3 the line between what relates to the 
'manner and form' of legislating and to the substantive authority 
of parliament is one of degree only: a requirement of a sixty 
percent affirmative vote in the legislature for the enactment of 
certain laws is clearly a matter of 'manner and form', but the 
requirement of ninety percent approval for a matter in a refer-
endum among the electorate, while ostensibly a procedural limi-
tation, could 0e so difficult to achieve in practice as to amount 
to a curtailment of parliament's substantive authority.4 As 
yet this problem has not arisen in English constitutional law, 
and no theoretical solution can be offered in advance. A re-
lated problem is whether the concept 'manner and form' should be 
widely understood,so as to include any redefinition of parlia-
ment's legislative procedure, or more narrowly, so as to include 
only redefinitions relating to the internal workings of parlia-
ment (eg special majorities), and not those which involve exter-
nal parties, suth as subordinate institutions or the electorate 
in a referendum. 5 As with the first problem this could only be 
1. See on this matter Mitchell op cit 82-91. A judicial testing-right 
could of course be expressly introduced by parliament. 
2. See Wade and Phillips op cit 71. 
3. Winterton 'The British Grundnurm' op cit 605; J. Jaconelli Enacting a 
Bill of Rights (1980) 159; De Smith op cit 91; H.L. Hart The Concept 
of Law (1961) 147. 
4. But see the argument of H.R. Gray 'The Sovereignty of Parliament Today' 
10 (1953) University of Toronto Law Journal 54 at 71-2 . 
5. This point is clearly made by G. Marshall Constitutional Theory (1971) 
50-51; it has particular relevance to the 'section 114' controversy 
in South Africa and is dealt with below (448£). See also Jennings op 
cit 6. 
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solved by judicial resolution: where the circumstances of a 
case required it the court would have to decide whether speci-
fic rules were of such fundamental importance as to constitute 
absolute preconditions for the validity of legislation.
1 
And 
finally it is by no means clear that the new view of supremacy 
provides a satisfactory basis for determining the future con-
stitutional effect of the European Communities Act, since it is 
at least arguable that it is an attempt at substantive limita-
tion. 2 Nevertheless this remains the preferred view of parlia-
mentary supremacy in British constitutional law. 
According to the third view of supremacy3 parliament is legally 
capable of irrevocably limiting the competence of future parlia-
mentsj supremacy is thus 'self-embracing' in that it includes 
the wider self-limiting power not associated with continuing 
supremacy. Therefore parliament could introduce substantive 
limitations, such as a justiciable bill of rights and constitu-
tional entrenchments, or it could create a wholly new constitu-
tional order, syth as a federal system within the United Kingdom 
or a close confederal relationship within the European Community. 
A new grundnurm would emerge, but there would be no break in 
legal continuity with the past - the new order would derive its 
authority from the old. This view, however, has little academic 
support ~nd has received no judicial recognition. 4 The real ob-
jection in principle to this view seems to be that it could lead 
to a legislative vacuum if there were a total renunciation of 
legislatiVe competence in any field,S but this does not seem to 
be a problem with much practical significance. Legal theorists 
also reject this view on the grounds that a constitutional norm 
1. See De Smith op cit 86; in this grey area Wade's criticism of the un-
certainties of the 'manner and form' approach are trenchant: Constitu-
tional Fundamentals 29. 
2. Jaconelli op cit 168-173. 
3. Hart op cit 146; Winterton 'The British Grundnurm' op cit 612; Marshall 
op cit 45-48. See also Jennings op cit 152-153; Mirfield op cit 40. 
4. Winterton 'The British Grundnurm' op cit 613 suggests that the only cir-
cumstance in which the courts might accept this view is one in which the 
traditional political setting is radically altered, enabling the courts 
to say that a new grundnurm has emerged. But judicial acceptance of a 
new grundnurm is equally consistent with the continuing view: Wade 'The 
Basis of Legal Sovereignty' op cit 196. 
5. Mitchell op cit 77. 
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cannot contain the conditions relating to its ow~ amendment 
~ .. 1 the problem of the self-referring or re~lexive proposltlon. 
Although the English principle of legislative supremacy was re-
ceived into ' South African constitutional law2 it was never to 
cause the same theoretical problems as in the English constitu-
tion. 3 The South Africa Act 4 vested in the Union parliament 
'full power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of 
the Union', but until 1931 there were limitations on its legis-
lative competence by reason of the Union's subordinacy to Bri-
tain. As with similar subordinate legislatures the rules gov-
erning the Union parliament were provided by the imperial en-
actment which brought it into existence, and since its inception 
these proceduial measures,S n;t all of which related to · the 
Union's subordinate status, were .regarded as binding by both 
the courts 6 and parliament: 7 The constitutional crisis resolved 
the issue of the status of the remaining entrenchments after the 
Statute of Westminster: in the result both the efficacy of the 
entrenching pr9cedure and the principle of legislative supremacy 
were confirmed. In the process the 'new view' of supremacy be-
1. See Marshall op cit 48; Hood Phillips op cit 61; and cf J.C. Hicks 
~The Liar Paradox in,Legal Reasoning' 1971 Cambridge Law Journal 275. 
2. The reasons for the historical reception of the doctrine in South Africa, 
and not for example in the United States, are explained by John Dugard 
Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978) 14-16. There was 
only a brief pre-Union rejection of this notion by Kotze C.J. in the 
celebrated Brown v Lloyds NO (1897) 4 Off Rep 1~ in which he held that 
sovereignty vested in the constitution and not the Volksraad. 
3. M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 33; H.R. Hahlo and E. Kahn The Union 
of South Africa: The Development of its Laws and Constitution (1960) 146. 
4. 9 Edward VIr c 9, s 59; cf s 59(1) of Act NQ 32 of 1961. 
5. Ss 35(1) and 152 of the South Africa Act. There were also substantive 
limitations (ss 20 and 24) but these were qualified temporarily. S 5 
of the Colonial Laws Validity Act also required adherence to the 'manner 
and form' of legislating at any time in force. 
6. R v Ndobe 1930 AD 484; but the existence of the Colonial Laws Validity 
Act (ss 2 and 3) clearly affected this decision. 
7. Eg in passing the Official Languages of the Union Act No 8 of 1925; 
the Native Administration Act No 38 of 1927, which was challenged in 
R v Ndobe, above, did not deal directly with electoral qualifications. 
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came firmly established in South Africa; it
1 
influenced the 
first Harris decision,2 which in turn became a leading judicial 
authority for this view. Since then the 'new view' of suprem-
acy has been upheld by the majority of constitutional commen-
tators,3 and has also found additional judicial support,4 and 
since the constitutional crisis parliament has, with one notable 
but inconsequential exception,S held itself bound by the 'manner 
and form' laid down in the entrenching provision
6 
of the Consti-
tution. 7 Conversely, there are no substantive limitations on 
parliament's competence,and the ordinary legislative procedure 
has been used for such far-reaching constitutional purposes as 
establishing the republican Constitution8 and abolishing a com-
ponent part of parliament. 9 
It has been shown that a corollary of parliamentary supremacy is 
the absence of any judicial testing-right over the scope or con-
tent of legislation. This position is confirmed in South Africa 
by s 59(2) of the Constitution, which limits the courts' review 
powers to enactrnents affecting the entrenched provisions. This 
/ 
statutory formulation was first introduced in the wake of the 
1. As expounded mainly by D.V. Cowen Parliamentary Sovereignty and the En-
trenched Sections of the South Africa Act (1951). 
2. Harris v Minister of the Interior 1952 (2) SA 428 (AD). 
3. B. Beinart 'Sovereignty and the Law' 1952 THR-HR 101; Rahlo and Kahn 
op cit 151-163; H.J. May The South African Constitution (3 ed, 1955) 25, 
J.van der Vyver 'The Section 114 Controversy - and Governmental Anarchy' 
97 (1980) SALJ 363-374; Wiechers op cit 33-37 and 333-340; G.N. Barrie 
'Die gebondenheid van die parlement aan die reg rakende sy struktuur en 
funksionering' 1981 TSAR 46-56; P.J. Laubscher 'The Foundation of 
Sovereignty - Parliament as a Law-Making Body' 98 (1981)SALJ 529-541. For 
other authorities, and contrary views, see Rahlo and Kahn op cit 154. 
4. S v Hotel & Liquor Traders' Association 1978 (1) SA 1006 (W); 
v Nasopie (Edms) Bpk en andere 1980 (2) SA 547 (NC). 
Cowburn 
5. When Act No 32 of 1961 repealed the South Africa Act, including ss 137 
and 152, the entrenched procedure was not followed, but either this re-
peal was ineffectual and the sections are still in force, or else the 
corresponding sections of the republican constitution (ss 108 and 118) 
can be regarded as a valid re-enactment of them. 
6. Now s118 of the RSA Constitution Act No 32 of 1961. 
7. For example in amending s 108 (Act No 1 of 1971) and s 118 (Act No 74 of 
1980). R. Goldblatt in W.A. Joubert (ed) vol 5 The Law of South Africa 7. 
8. Act No 32 of 1961. 
9. The Senate was abolished by Act No 101 of 1980. 
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constitutional crisis. 1 Before this innovation no express 
testing riaht had been conferred on the courts but Wiechers o 3 argues persuasively,2 and it is submitted correctly, that the 
courts did have such a right at common law. This right was 
clearly terminated so far as parliament's substantive compe-
tence is concerned~ but it does not seem to have affected the 
courts' common law right to determine whether a statutory mea-
sure has been properly passed. 5 The courts in South Africa 
are thus able to enforce the 'manner and form' of legislation 
from time to time in force. 6 
But as in English constitutional law so in South Africa, the 'new 
view' of supremacy does not clearly indicate which aspects of 
parliamentary proceedings can be regarded as 'manner and form' 
and are therefore subject to judicial enforcement. 7 The Consti-
tution provides 8 that copies of acts in the office of the regis-
trar of the appellate division will be conclusive evidence of 
the provisions of every law, but this does not prevent the court 
from going beh~nd the enrolled copy to ascertain' the validi ty of 
an act. 9 On the other hand the privilege of regulating its own 
1. The South Africa Act Amendment No 9 of 1956 (s 2). On the possible in-validity of this section see E. Kahn 1961 Annual Survey of South African Law 12; but the issue is now academic since s 59(2) of the republic Constitution was undoubtedly validly passed. 
2. Wiechers op cit 334-339; see also Rahlo and Kahn op cit 152-153. 
3. On the authority of R v McChlery 1912 AD 199; R v Ndobe 1930 AD 484; Minister of the Interior v Harris 1952 (4) SA 769 (AD) - in this case, heard after the Statute of Westminster, legislation was invalidated for exceeding parliament's competence, and not for non-compliance with pro-cedural requirements. In Ndlwana v Hofmeyr 1937 AD 229, which was over-ruled in the first Harris decision, the court disclaimed any such power. 
4. S v Tuhadeleni 1969 (1) SA 153 (AD). 
5. This can be deduced from the wording of the sectio~which precludes the courts from invalidating 'any Act passed by Parliament' but not from de-claring an 'Act' not duly passed; the only problem with this interpre-tation is that it renders the proviso in respect of the entrenched clauses superfluous. But see B. Beinart 'The South African Appeal Court and Judicial Review' 1958 Modern Law Review 605. 
6. See Bhendeli v Attorney-General Transvaal 1961 (3) SA 232 (T). 
7. Wiechers op cit 320-321. 
8. S 64. 
9. G.N. Barrie 'Die bevoegdhede van Die Howe om Wette van die Parlement te Toets' 1969 THR-HR 209. But see Nasopie (Edms) Bpk en andere v Minister van Justisie en andere 1979 (3) SA 1228 (Ne) at 1243. 
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procedure and domestic rules of conduct has always been enjoyed 
by the House of Assembly and falls beyond the courts' jurisdic-
tion,1 although the exact scope of this privilege is not clear.
2 
1 Another area of uncertainty concerns the rules 'defining' par-
liament and the extent to which these are binding - this has 
given rise to a division of opinion on the significance of s 114 
of the Constitution,which stipulates that prior petitions from 
the relevant provincial councils are required before provincial 
boundaries can be altered or the powers of provincial authori-
ties can be abridged. 3 This procedure was not followed when the 
various Status Acts 4 were enacted, but their validity is supported 
by the views of Schmidt 5 and Wiechers 6 who argue that s 114 does 
not involve an essential redefinition of parliament, but at the 
most extends the power of legislative initiative to the provinces; 
should parliament therefore disregard this procedure the provi-
sion will be repealed by implication, on the strength of the lex 
7 --posterior derogat priori maxim. Van der Vyver, on the other 
hand, argues that s 114 does embody a procedural prerequisite 
which must be ~omplied with by parliament, and that the above 
maxim will only be relevant if parliament has enacted a valid act. 
On this argument the Status Acts would be legislative nullities, 
since parliament 'had not spoken'. But this approach overlooks 
the fact that there is no single, correct,and legally verifiable 
interpretation of 'manner and form', but only different interpre-
tations which prevail from time to time. 8 It is possible to 
1. See Masai v Jansen 1936 CPD 361, R v Ndobe 1930 AD 484. The Australian court has used the term 'the intra-mural deliberations' of parliament -Cormack v Cope (1974) 3 ALR 419. 
2. See B. Beinart 'Parliament and the Courts' 1954 Butterworths SA Law Review 134. 
3. For a description of the history of s 114 and the one occasion when it was adhered to see L.J. Boulle 'The resurrection of s 114 of the consti-tution' 95 (1978) SALJ 594. 
~. Acts Nos 100 of 1976, 89 of 1977, 107 of 1979 and 110 of 1981. 
5. C.W.R. Schmidt 'Section 114 of the Constitution and the Sovereignty of Parliament' 79 (1962) SALJ 315. 
6. Wiechers op cit 34-35; see also Rahlo and Kahn op cit 162. 
7. Op cit. In this article he elaborates on 'Rigidity and flexibility ~n con-stitutions: The judiciary, the rule of law and constitutional amendment' in J. Benyon (ed) Constitutional Change in South Africa (1978) 52-84. Support for these views was found in the celebrated obiter in Cowburn v Nasopie (Edms) Bpk 1980 (2) SA 547 (NC) at 554. See also Barrie 'Die g-ebondenheid van die parlement aan die reg rakende sy struktuur en funk-sionering' op cit 46. 
8. Marshall op cit 52-53. 
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discover the prevailing interpretation through empirical inves-
tigation 1 but not through academic theorising, and the former
2 
shows that the court does not regard s 114 as involving a re-
definition of parliament for certain purposes, but as consti-
tuting a moral declaration of policy. It is well to bear in 
mind that the changing content of parliamentary supremacy has 
a close affinity to political realities and that there was never 
any substantial chance of the judiciary invalidating the whole 
homelands' programme by resorting to notions of 'manner and 
form'. And even if the courts did interpret s 114 as part of 
the essential 'manner and form' of parliament's functioning, it 
would mean no more than that the provision was impervious to 
implied repeal, such as through a Status Act. A constitutional 
crisis could be averted by the government resorting to the ex-
press repeal of that section,which, it was generally agreed 3 
(and the court has accepted to be the case); could be done 
through the normal legislative procedure. Fortified by judicial 
support, the government resorted to this expedient to prevent any 
future challenges to the homelands programme, and, ex abundanti 
cautela, made the amendment retrospective to 1961. 5 
As far as the termination of parliamentary supremacy in South 
Africa is concerned, this is analogous to the English law position, 
1. See Hart op cit 46. 
2. Nasopie en andere v Minister van Justisie en andere (2) 1979 (4) SA 438 (NC) 
at 447F: although Mpangele and anor v Botha and others Case No M 1189/81 
(17 July 1981) CPD was concerned with the express repeal of s 114 the 
same inference may be drawn from it, especially as the judgment was de-
livered by Van den Heever J. who provided the celebrated obiter in Cowburn 
v Nasopie, above. On the other hand it might be argued that this gen-
erally unsatisfactory judgment leaves the question of implied repeal 
open. 
3. In terms of ss 118 and 59(2) of the Constitution. In the face of these 
two sections it is difficult to argue on the basis of the second Harris 
decision that to curtail or limit the safeguards afforded by s 114 the 
safeguarding procedure should itself be followed - that is acquire peti-
tions from all four provincial councils. 
4. Mpangele v Botha, above. The judgment, however, made no reference to 
the constitutional crisis and made only a cursory reference to the avail-
able literature, and none to the history of s 114. It also adopted the 
unusual (South African) practice of referring to parliamentary debates 
to assist in the interpretative process. 
5. The Second Constitution Amendment Act No 101 of 1981 (s 7) narrowed the 
scope of s 114(a) to provincial boundary alte~ations involving transfers 
of land from one province to another, thus precluding any further chall-
enges to the Status Acts; however this action strengthens the view that 
the s 114 procedure is binding on future parliaments in this restricted 
,form. 
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as described by those upholding the 'substantively continuing' 
view of supremacy.' Thus in constitutional theory there can 
be no complete transfer of supremacy without a legal revolution, 
although the revolution can be obscured by legal camouflage.
2 
The legal authority of the new constitutional order cannot be 
derived from the old, for otherwise the old grundnurm would re-
main in existence; instead it arises from the political fact 
of judicial recognition. Thus supremacy could be terminated 
through the establishment of a new constitutional order incon-
sistent with the continuance of the doctrine, provided the judi-
ciary came to accept and thereby validate the new arrangement -
a supreme constitution, or a division of sovereignty between 
federal and state legislatures, or a 'supra-national' arrange-
ment in terms of which parliamentary enactments would be subor-
dinate to those of a higher authority. The question of the par-
tial abdication of sovereignty has arisen in relation to the 
Status Acts, and is dealt with below. 3 
In the light of · this theoretical and historical background it is 
/ 
possible to analyse the implications of parliamentary supremacy 
fOT constitutional change in South Africa. The most immediate 
implication of the doctrine is that in the short term the govern-
ment, acting through its parliamentary majority, will be the 
only for~al initiator of constitutional c~ange, and there will 
be no constitutional-juridical limitations on the nature of that 
change. While legal authority can be derived from a constituent 
assembly,the government's process of quasi-consociational en-
gineering involves only piecemeal constitutional adjustments, 
whith in terms of present legal realities can only be made by 
the supreme white parliament. This has clear implications for 
the legitimacy of any constitutional innovations, whether or not 
they are presented as recommendations of the president's council. 
In fact the constitution has become a highly flexible and vola-
tile institution, as evidenced,inter alia, by the many formal 
1. That is adherents of the first two views described above. 
2. H.W.R. Wade 'The Basis of Legal Sovereignty' 1955 Cambridge Law Journal 
172 at '96. 
3. At 451-452. 
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amendments to the Constitution Act,' - and by virtue of its 
supremacy parliament has amended constitutional pro~isions by 
implication,2 made retrospective amendments,3 and empowered 
the State President both to amend the constitution,4 and de-
crease the territorial jurisdiction of parliament. 5 
It is also probable that the existing parliament's legislative 
supremacy will endure during a period of government-controlled 
constitutional change. This would be consistent with recent 
constitutional developments,none of which has involved any 
derogation from parliament's legal competence, including the 
establishment of the national states' authorities for self-
government,6 the Coloured Persons Representative Council, the 
South African Indian Council, the president's council, and,the 
community councils. The Status Acts were drafted on the pre-
mise that parliament can limit its sovereignty,7 but this limi-
tation was only conceded in return for a comprehensive denation~ 
alisation arrangement which left those affected with only con-
tingent rights/ and tenure in South Africa, and further weakened 
their claim to effective political participation. Likewise 
the government's ' -977 constitution (as embodied in the 1979 
draft bil1 8) continued to vest ultimate legal authority in the 
white House of Assembly, although this was inconsistent with the 
1. Since 1961 forty-two subsequent enactments have amended or repealed 
provisions of Act No 32 of 1961. 
2. As with the Status Acts, above. 
1926 TPD 638 at 650. 







Act No 101 of 1981. 
Proclamation No R249 of 1977 amended ss 28 and 33 of the constitution 
before their eventual repeal in 1980. 
See the Borders of Particular States Extension Act No 2 of 1980 which 
allows the State President to proclaim scheduled land to be part of an 
independent national state, upon which the republic ceases to have any 
authority over it. 
Homeland legislatures are even empowered to repeal or amend acts of 
~arliament (s ~0(1~)(b) of Act No 21 of 1971) but this clearly does not 
~nvolve an abd~cat~on of sovereignty. 
See W.B. Harvey and W.B.B. Dean 'The Independence of Transkei - A Largely 
Constitutional Inquiry' 16 (1978) Journal of Modern African Studies 189 
at 196. 
S 111 read with ss 26 and 55. S 8(1)(d) purported to prevent alter-
a~ions in the co~position of the electoral college without the approval 
or all three leg~slatures but in the light of the above three sections 
and the fact that it was,not itself entrenched, it would clearly have' 
had no greater legal eff~cacy than the existing s 114 of the constitu-
tion. 
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scheme's internal logic which implied a division of sovereignty 
among the three legislative bodies. 1 
Nevertheless, even during a period of government-controlled con-
stitutional change there is likely to be a movement towards en-
trenchment and constitutional rigidity as the political system 
becomes more inclusive. 2 In terms of the 'new view' of suprem-
acy this could be effected by extending the scope of s 108 of 
the Constitution, thereby requiring the two-thirds procedure for 
subsequent legislation on such matters. 3 Alternatively new 
types of entrenchment could be introduced, their efficacy depend-
ing in all cases on the entrenchment of the entrenching provision 
itself. Because these new arrangements would involve a redefi-
nition of parliament for specific purposes, it would not strictly 
be necessary to amend s 59(2) to ensure their judicial enforce-
ment,4 although consistency would indicate the need to extend 
the proviso therein to include the new entrenchments. As has 
been indicated, however, the permissible extent of this redefin-
ing process is not clear. The requirement of electoral approval 
/ 
in a referendum to validate certain enactments, for example, 
could be regarded as redefining the legislature in terms of a 
third element and therefore as being binding on future parlia-
1. Some commentators, such as Worrall and Devenish, have tried to explain 
the proposals in this way but there is clearly no substance to the 
notion of a new grundnurm. See G. Devenish 'The Doctrine of Parliamen-
tary Sovereignty and the Proposed New Constitution' 1979 THR-HR 85-91; 
C. Murray 'The New Constitution: Can Parliament Bind Itself?' 1978 
Responsa Meridiana 305 at 310 (on Worrall). Cf S.C. Jacobs 'n Juridiese 
analise van die konstitusionele voorstelle vir n nuwe grondwetlike bedel-
ing in Suid-Afrika' 1979 THR-HR 252 at 262. 
2. As has been shown (above, 240D this was also the constitutional trend ~n 
the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. See also s 8(1)(d) of the 
1979 Draft Constitution Bill. 
"3. S 118. Little attention is given in the literature to the question of 
how new procedural requirements should be enacted. A strict 'new view' 
approach would suggest according to the prevailing procedure, regardless 
of the nature of the new entrenchment, but logic suggests that in estab-
lising a new procedure, (eg, a 2J3 legislative majority on certain 
matters) that procedure should be used. Wiechers (Staatsreg (3 ed) 320) 
seems to prefer the latter view but it would be impractical in relation 
to some matters, such as a referendum requirement. 
4. See above, 447. 
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ments; 1 on the other hand as it purports to include extra-
parliamentary bodies in the legislative process it could be 
regarded as directory only, in which case it would be subject 
to implied repeal: as was the case with s 114 of the constitu-
tion. At present it is only possible to indicate the range of 
possible judicial attitudes, as the courts' decisions on such 
an issue would be as 'political' as they were in the Harris 
decisions. 3 On the other hand it would clearly not be possible 
to go beyond procedural limitations while parliament's substan-
tive supremacy endured. 
A more remote possibility is that the government could impose 
substantive limitations on parliament's competence at some stage 
during the implementation of its constitutional dispensation. 
Thus, to give greater credibility to the 1977 constitution it 
might deem it necessary to divide sovereignty between the three 
legis'lative bodies, or to introduce a justiciable bill of rights. 
In either case it would be necessary to limit the scope of s 59 
(2) of the Con?titution,to allow the judiciary to invalidate 
legislative activity for excess of jurisdiction. The main juri-
dical problem in these circumstances would be to determine 
whether the constitutional changes were so far-reaching as to 
prevent the existing parliament, or its successors, from re-
asserting ultimate legal authority over the system - in the last 
resort it would be for the judiciary to decide whether or not a 
new grundn rm had been established. The same problem would 
1. See S.A. de Smith Constitutional and Administrative Law (2 ed, 1973) 91; 
I. Jennings The Law and the Constitution (5 ed, 1959) 16. G. Barrie 
('Die gebondenheid van die parlement aan die reg raakende sy struktuur 
en funksionering' 1981 TSAR 46 at 54) assumes that because a referendum 
requirement is a procedural and not a substantive limitation it will be 
binding; but this is again to beg the question which remains, which 
procedures will the courts regard as involving an essential redefinition 
of parliament and therefore as peremptory, and which as merely directory 
because they do not affect the essential nature of parliament. See C. 
Schmidt 'Section 114 of the Constitution and the Sovereignty of Parlia-
ment' 79 (1962) SALJ 315. 
2. Very much would depend on the way the statutory provisions were worded. 
The possibility of future 'referenda' was first mooted in 1980 as a 
method of g ging the white electorate's attitude to constitutional 
changes, and ~f introduced would probably be plebiscitory in nature; 
while they may have been conceived as a device to outflank the National 
Party caucus and congresses, referenda could come to be used as a 
legitimising process for constitutional change affecting non-blacks and 
therefore pose a challenge to parliamentary supremacy. 
3. See R.W.R. Wade 'The Basis of Legal Sovereignty' 1955 Cambridge Law Journal 
172 at 192. 
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arise in a movement towards a closerconfederal institutional 
arrangement between the republic and the national states, al-
though here it is even less probable that there would be a trans-
fer of supremacy to a 'supra-national' institution. The 'con-
stellation' proposals raise the issue of the South African par-
liament's competence to repeal the Status Acts; which provided
2 
that the 'Republic of South Africa' would cease to exercise any 
authority over the respective territories as from the operative 
dates of the enactments, thereby purporting to restrict parlia-
ment's territorial jurisdiction. This is clearly at variance 
with the 'new view' notion of 'substantively continuing' suprem-
acy,and from a theoretical legal perspective it could be argued , 
that the unilateral revocation of these acts would involve an 
'extra-territorial' exercise of competence3 which, in the light 
of s 59(2) of the Constitution, would be judicially enforceable. 
But in terms of the same theory the judiciary of the relevant 
national state would not recognise the validity of such 'exter-
nal' activity, and in justification could cite the maxim first 
invoked in a South African case when the roles were reversed -
/ 
'freedom once conferred cannot be revoked,.4 But such judicial 
niceties would be of little value if South Africa were determined 
to reassert its authority over the national states and, remote 
as this contingency might seem, it is perhaps not so far from 
reality ~s was the possible repeal of the Statute of Westminster 
and the statutes conferring independence on the commonwealth 
states; it would also not be irregular in international law and 
politics because of the non-recognition of the independence of 
the national states. Nevertheless if the South African parlia-
ment were to repeal the Status Acts in the furtherance of its 
Cconfederal) constitutional plans, it would most likely be com-
plemented by legislation of the relevant national state, thus 
precluding any dispute involving parliamentary supremacy. 
Finally, it is necessary to describe the implications of a fully 
consociational system for the principle of parliamentary suprem-
acy. It is clear that the optimal constitutional framework for 
1. Acts Nos 100 of 1976, 89 of 1977, 107 of 1979 and 110 of 1981 
2. S 1 (2) of each Act. 
3. See r. Rautenbach 'The Constitution of Transkei' 1977 TSAR 199 at 200; 
Wiechers op cit 505. 
4. Ndlwana v Hofmeyr 1937 AD 229 at 237. 
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consociational dernocracy1 is incompatible with the continuance 
of the supremacy of the white parliament, or of any legislative 
successor. The consociational division of competence, whether 
it be on a territorial or non-territorial basis, would require 
a corresponding division of sovereignty between the respective 
legislative bodies, which implies a substantive limitation on 
the competence of each. An additional substantive limitation, 
in the form of a justici~ble bill of rights, is also a possibili-
ty, and is discussed further below. 2 Further procedural limi-
tations are implicit in the principles of proportionality and 
the mutual veto, and in the inevitable requirement of a measure 
of constitutional rigidity, and a traditional form of judicial 
control would be required to enforce both substantive and pro-
cedural restraints. It is clear that in terms of the prevail-
ing 'new vi~w' of supremacy there is no juridical obstacle to 
the termination of the existing parliament's supremacy, but the 
'hand-over' to a new constitutional order incorporating the 
above features would involve a technical break in constitutional 
continuitY,requlrlng clear evidence of judicial allegiance to 
/ 
the new order. It i~ unlikely that this would not be forth-
coming, but it could be enhanced by giving additional moral 
sanction to the new order by having it approved by a constituent 
assembly or the electorate in a referendum. 3 
As a constitutional doctrine, then, parliamentary supremacy does 
not, in English or South African law, "impose any constraints on 
future constitutional changes. But its symbolic political sig-
nificance might inv-olve considerable resistance to its termina-
tion in both systems: opposition to British participation in the 
EEC has been articulated, inter alia, in terms of the threat to 
the sovereign authority of British parliamentary institutions; 
and in South Africa the doctrine is not only of symbolic politi-
cal importance,but has historically been the one constitutional 
factor which has most enabled the government to institutionalise 
its political and economic policies. Within its framework of 
quasi-consociationalism the government is only likely to abandon 
this institution in return for a rigid constitution, a bill of 
1. See above, 400-405. 
2. At 464-469. 
3. Cf K.C. Wheare Modern Constitutions (2 ed, 1966) 52-66. 
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rights and judicial review: this would be to follow the Zim-
babwean example of accepting limitations on the powers of gov-
ernment once the transition to a more inclusive political sys-
tem has begun, although such a development is likely to be per-
ceived by black leaders as a means of retaining the existing 
d . 1 Th distribution of political an economIC power. e more remote 
eventuality of democratic consociationalism, on the other hand, 
would presume an acceptance by the government of more funda-
mental change, including the termination of the existing par-
liament's supremacy. 
3. The Judicial Role 
Implicit in the previous section is the suggestion that judicial 
review will not be an uncontroversial factor in future constitu-
tional developments, and this necessitates an assessment of some 
aspects of the ~udicial function in the South African context. 
Needless to saj the question of the judicial function is a very 
extensive one which cannot be adequately dealt with here, but 
the aspects referred to will be important in any attempt at de-
veloping a theory of the juditial role in relation to consocia-
tionalism. 
By .judicial review is understood the ability of the courts to 
annul or override enactments of the legi~lature on the grounds 
that they are unconstitutional. 2 As a method for imposing legal 
limitations on power it is an important feature of modern con-
stitutionalism,3 and South African constitutionalists writing in 
the liberal-constittitional tradition have, expressly or impliedly, 
advocated its adoption in South Africa. 4 Although insufficient 
' 1 . Cf J .A. G. Griffith ' The Political Constitutio'n' 1979 Modern Law Review 
1 at 17. 
2. This is to follow E. McWhinney's definition of 'direct judicial review' 
(Judicial Review (4 ed, 1969) 13). In South African public law the con-
cept has a more restricted 'administrative law' meaning. See below,467. 
3. Cf C.J. Friedrich Constitutional Government and Democracy (4 ed, 1968) 
114 at 165. 
4. Eg D. Cowen (The Foundations of Freedom(1961), K. Heard (Political Sys-
tems in Multi-Racial Societies 1961), W.ff.B. Dean CWhither the Constitu-
tion?' 1976 THR-HR 266), A.S. Mathews (Law, Order and Liberty 1971), J. 
van der Vyver (Die Beskerming van Menseregte in Suid-Afrika 1975), J. 
Dugard (Human Ri hts and the South African Le al Order 1978) F. van Zyl 
Slabbe!t and D. Welsh (South Africa's Options 1979 , M. Wiechers (Staats-
reg 3 ed _ 1981)_ 
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attention has been given at times to such aspects as the suit-
ability of our courts and judges to perform this function, 
1 
or the exact contents of the proposed justiciable bill of 
rights, these writers have generally approached the subject 
in a comprehensive and critical manner. And despite differ-
ences in approach they are all agreed on the desirability of 
judicial review and an enforceable bill of rights. 
The arguments in favour of judicial review are well-known and 
well documented - suffice it to refer to two aspects here. 
Firstly, judicial review is seen as indispensible for keeping 
public bodies within the limits of their constitutional author-
ity - this derives from the principle of constitutionalism, or 
limited government, according to which governmental action must 
be justified in terms of an express or implied conferment of 
authority, and it is also supportable in terms of the rule of 
law doctrine. In terms of this reasoning the courts should 
declare acts of government unconstitutional if they were not 
carried out in/ the prescribed manner, if they usurped the func-
tions of another organ or level of government, or if they in-
volved an unauthorised delegation of authority.2 Secondly, it 
is argued that there are certain fundamental rights and liber-
ties which are morally inalienable and should therefore not be 
subject ~o political bargaining in the 'political' organs of 
government, but should be stringently enforced by the judiciary,3 
a view which derives from a philosophy of natural rights. 4 
In terms of this reasoning courts should invalidate acts of gov-
ernment if they violate constitutionally guaranteed rights. 
The arguments against judicial review are also many and varied, 
but the most important for present purposes can be summarised as 
follows: judicial review is fundamentally undemocratic because 
it removes certain matters from the competence of representative 
institutions, and, conversely, it allows decisions on social and 
1. But see J. Dugard 'Judicial Po~er and a Constitutional Court' in L.J. 
Boulle and L.G. Baxter Natal and KwaZulu - Constitutional and Politi-
calOptions (1981) 189-211; W.B.B. Dean 'Discussion' in J. Benyon (ed) 
Constitutional Change in South Africa (1978) 88. 
2. See B.O. Nwabuese Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa (1977) 229. 
3. See J. Rawls A Theory of Justice (1972) 4. 
4. J. Jaconelli Enacting a Bill of Rights (1980) 206; cf R. Dworkin 
Taking Rights Seriously (1977) 142ff. But a doctrine of natural 
rights is not necessarily a deduction from the theory of natural law -
K. Minogue 'Natural rights, ideology and the game of life' in E. Kamenka 
and A. Tay (eds) Human Rights (1978) 15-35. 
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economic policy to be taken in an unrepresentative and account-
ably remote institution with the possibility of defeating, or 
at least obstructing, the popular will. 
In analysing this issue it will be helpful to turn to the Ameri-
can constitutional experience where judicial review holds a more 
pre-eminent position than in any other system, although it is 
by no means an exclusively American institution. The .American 
Supreme Court first assumed a legislative testing power in the 
celebrated case of Marbury v Madison 1 and, although there is a 
lively academic debate concerning the source of this power, it 
is now an established feature of American constitutionalism and 
allows the courts to invalidate legislative or executive acti-
vity for contravention of the constitution or the bill of rights. 
There has thus been a long tradition in the United States of 
presenting social and political problems as questions of law to 
2 be resolved by the courts. Commentators have always been cri-
tical of this state of affairs,3 but it is only in the last few 
decades that they have more insistently argued that the Supreme 
/ 
Court has intervened in matters in respect of which it had no 
jurisdiction, and which should have been decided by the legisla-
tive and executive organs of government. 4 In particular the 
Warren Court has been accused of judicial 'usurpations,5 in its 
pursuit of a broadly-based egalitarianism,6 and of being res-
ponsible for a radical shift of focus from the supervision of 
1 . 1 Cranch 137 (1803). 
2. See L.J. Theberge (ed) The Judiciary in a Democratic Society (1979) Xl. 
3. For an early description of the 'anti-democratic' nature of this func-
tion see H.S. Commager 'Judicial Review and Democracy' 19 (1943) 
Virginia Quarterly Review 417. 
4. There is a wealth of literature covering all aspects of this issue but 
it is only possible to touch on a few factors here. For an extensive 
bibliography see G. Schubert Judicial Policy Making (rev. ed, 1974) 214-
231. See generally the essay of L.L. Fuller 'The FQrms and Limits of 
Adjudication' in 92 (1978) Harvard Law Review 353-409, in which he looks 
at the question of what kinds of socIal tasks can be assigned to courts. 
5. The term given by Hamilton (The Federalist, No 81) to encroachments on 
legislative authority. 
6. A. Bickel The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress (1978) 3. Bickel 
returned to this theme in much of his ~~iting; he sought reform through 
the gradual workings of the political system rather than judicial inter-
vention in areas of social policy, and in his final work (The Morality 
of Consent (1975) 3-25) acknowledged the influence of Edmund Burke. 
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legislative procedure to the control . of legislative policy-
making. 1 ,2 Thus the CDurt has been referred to as a 'third, 
unelected chamber' of the legislative branch,3 and a 'super-
legislator' ,4 and Kurland has suggested5 that the 'imperial 
judiciary' of recent times is constitutionally analogous to the 
'imperial presidency' of the Watergate era. 6 And from early 
charges that the Supreme Court was 'counter-majoritarian' ,7 and 
therefore capable of frustrating the ~ishes of popular majori-
ties,8 has come the accusation that recent judicial behaviour 
has involved the subjection of the majority to the 'tyranny of 
the minority,.9 An important element of these criticisms of 
1. R. Berger Government by Judiciary (1977) 249. Berger's thesis is that 
the fourteenth amendment does not authorise the extensive judicial be-
haviour justified in its name on matters such as desegregation (Brown 
v Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954)) and reapportionment (Baker v 
Carr 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Reynolds v Sims 377 V.S. 533 (1964)2, which 
were intended to be left to the state governments. On reapportionment 
see also M. Uhlmann's incisive essay 'The Supreme Court and Political 
Representation' in Theberge op cit 91-109. 
2. R. Winter in his analysis of this development posits two corresponding 
models of jud}cial review, the 'interpretive model' and the 'judicie'-
power model': 'The Growth of Judicial Power' in Theberge op cit 29-66; 
see also T.C. Grey 'Do we have an Unwritten Constitution?' 27 (1974) 
Stanford Law Review 703. 
3. Bickel op cit 27. 
4. Berger op cit; Berger (2-3, 408) is one of many who reject the notion 
that the court should function as a 'continuing constitutional conven-
tion' and constantly be in the process of revising the constitution. 
5. P. Kurland in Theberge op cit 21-22; see N. Glazer 'Towards an Imperial 
judiciary' 41 (1975) The Public Interest 104-123. 
6. See P. Kurland Watergate and the Constitution; (1978); A. Schlesinger The 
Imperial Presidency (1974). 
7. A. Bickel The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of 
Politics (1963) 16-17. The title derives from Hamilton (The Federal-
ist, No 78) who, with support from Montesquieu, held that the judiciary 
would be less dangerous than the legislature or executive because it 
would have 'neither force nor will but merely judgment'. 
8. But cf E.V. Rostow's classic defence of judicial review 'The Democratic 
Character of Judicial Review' 66 (1953) Harvard Law Review 193 in which 
he responds to points made by Commager op cit. 
9. See P. Kurland in Theberge op cit 23. 
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perceived judicial usurpation is the fact that justices of the 
Supreme Court are not elected, enjoy tenure for life,1 and con-
stitute a relatively isolated, intellectual ~lite. The fact 
that the ultimate power of constitutional amendment rests with 
the political organs 2 is not seen as being of great significance, 
since this process is not easy to invoke. 
Needless to say there have been numerous rejoinders to these 
attacks and it has been suggested that the notion of 'govern-
f h 3 I . ment by judiciaryt is a gross overstatement 0 t e case. t 1S 
pointed 4 out that the court and other institutions of the con-
stitutional system are a product of the long-standing dualism 
in American political thought: a desire for limited government 
on the one hand, and for democratically responsible government 
on the other. S Judicial review is inextricably linked with the 
former, and serves to contain the other branches of government 
within the limits of their constitutional authority; it also 
has a clear rationale in relation to the federal division of 
competence, al>hough there has, for a variety of legitimate rea-
sons, been a considerable expansion of judicial responsibility 
beyond these two areas in the last two decades. 6 The Supreme 
Court has always had a 'political' role, although it has in fact 
imposed upon itself a comprehensive body of rules aimed at en-
couraging self-restraint and avoiding controversial issues. 7 
In respect of the unrepresentative nature of the judiciary, it 
is pointed out that similar accusations have been made against 
other important institutions, such as the bureaucracy and the 
presidency,8 and to the charge that the judicial review is 
'coun ter-majoritarian' it . isretorted that the judicial majority 
1. Although the impeachment procedure (Art II s 4 of the D.S. Constitu-
tion) has been instituted against Supreme Court justices in the past, 
it has yet to result in a conviction. 
2. Art V of the D.S. Constitution. 
3. R. Funston Constitutional Counter-Revolution? The Warren Court and the 
Burger Court: Judicial Policy Making in Modern America (1977) 12. 
4 • Ib id 11-1 2 . 
5. Cf Bracton's notions of gubernaculum and jurisdictio as outlined by C. 
McIllwainCcnstitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (rev. ed, 1947) 77ff. 
6. See D. Horowitz The Courts and Social Policy (1977) 4-9, where he re-
fers to the new areas of adjudication which have opened up and observes 
that litigation has become more explicitly problem-solving than grievance-
answering. 
7. Funston op cit 23. 
8 . . Horowitz op cit 18. 
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usually reflects the dominant majority in the larger politi-
1 cal system. Thus attempts have been made to construct a 
constitutional theory in which the principles of judicial re-
view and democratic theory can be reconciled: Ely proffers a 
'representation-reinforcing' theory of judicial review; in 
terms of which the courts would be actively concerned with en-
suring representative and effective participation in the poli-
tical process, without at the same time deciding on the sub-
stantive merits of political choices. By concentrating on 
procedural matters, and ensuring that the political process was 
democratic and open, judicial review could perform the import-
ant constitutional function of reinforcing the representative 
political institutions. Other writers have referred to speci-
fic ways of improving the resources and processes of the courts 
in relation to their review function.
3 
It is not only in the United States that the tension between 
judicial review and the principle of popular control of govern-
ment has been experienced. In Israel the ~uman rights legis-/ 
lation,which purports to restrain the Westminster-mo~elled 
supremacy of the Israeli parliament,has been described as having 
a 'schizophrenic quality; it
4
app ears to give with the right 
hand and take with the left'. In France the matter is seen 
as a separation of powers issue, and the judicial review of the 
constitutionality of legislation has long been regarded as an 
infringement of that doctrine.
S 
In the Federal Republic of 
Germany the Federal Constitutional Court has a very extensive 
1. Schubert op cit 20. But this is to meet the argument head on; other commentators (eg C. Black The People and the Court (1960) B.O. Nwabuese Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa (1977) argue that to ~peak of a :counter-majoritarian' effect is to misconstrue the true basis of major-lty rule. 
2. J.B. Ely Democracy and Distrust - A Theory of Judicial Review (1980) 181. 
3. Eg Borowitz op cit 255-298. 
4. L. Ratner 'Constitutions, MBjoritarianism and Judicial Review: The Function of a Bill of Rights in Israel and the United States' 1978 American Journal of Comparative Law 373. 
5. G .. Marshall Constitutional Theory (1971) 99; M.C.J. Vile Constitution-allsrn and the Separation of Powers (1967) 237-262; J. Blondel The Gover~ment of Franc~ (2 ed~ ~974) 196-197. It is interesting ~note that 7n recent Engllsh declslons the separation of powers doctrine has b~en lnvo~ed to prevent the_judiciary from intruding in the legislature's fleld: Blnd v The Queen 11972) AC 195, Duport Steels Ltd v Sirs /19807 1 W.~.R. 142; and see C. Munro 'The Separation of Powers: Not Su~h a-Myth 1981 Public Law 19-24. 
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review jurisdiction but has been criticised recently for its 
lack of self-restraint, and has been accused of becoming a 
'super-Iegislator t and exercising ultimate political control.
1 
And amidst the demands in Britain for a justiciable bill of 
rights and other legal restraints on the powers of government, 
has come the warning from Griffith 2 against substituting law 
for politics - to require a court to make certain kinds of poli-
tical decisions does not make those decisions any less political. 
In a socio-political sense, argues Griffith, there are no over-
riding human rights, but only political claims which can be 
made by individuals and groups. The decisions on these claims 
should be made by politicians who are accountable and removable, 
and their responsibility to the electorate should be facilitated 
by forcing government 'out of secrecy and into the open t • 3 
This would require, inter alia, greater opportunities for dis-
cussion, more open government, less restriction on debate, more 
access to information, and changes in the law of contempt. 
While Griffith presents the case against judicial review and a 
bill of rights in the British constitutional system the most 
forcibly, his is not the only such voice. 4 Among the many ob-
jections raised to a system of judicial review,~t is most fre-
quently argued that it would require a revolution in constitution-
al thinking, i~ would demand of the judiciary a role which they 
are not qualified to play, it would be fundamentally undemocratic 
1. See G. Brinkman 'The West German Federal Constitutional Court: Politi-cal Control through Judges' 1981 Public Law 83-104. 
2. J.A.G. Griffith 'The Political Constitution' 1979 Modern Law Review 1; for responses to these views see H.W.R. Wade Constitutional Fundamentals (1980) 75-79; M. Zander A Bill of Rights? (2 ed, 1979) 48-50. 
3. Griffith op cit 16. 
4. See eg B. Sedgemore The Secret Constitution (1980) for an endorsement of Griffith's views; Lord Boston 'Arguments Against a Bill of Rights' in C. Campbell Do We Need a Bill of Rights? (1980) 12-37; J. Jaconelli Enacting a Bill of Rights (1980) 200-211. While Zander (A Bill of Rights?(2 ed, 1979» joins issue with Griffith, he concedes the need to leave the final authority in human rights issues with parliament. ef N. Johnson In Search of the Constitution (1977) 139-142, and Nwabueze's chapter on 'Judicial Review and Democratic Government' in Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa (ch 10). 
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and would increase the influence of unrepresentative indivi-
duals,1 it would lead to political appointments to the bench 
and the politicisation of the judiciary, it would stifle popu-
lar and legislative initiatives in the protection of fundamen-
tal rights, and it would tend to preserve the social and 
economic status quo. 
This last point 1S of particular relevance in relation to the 
possible introduction of judicial review in South African con-
stitutional law, and it is an aspect which has tended to be 
overlooked by liberal-constitutionalists advocating this inno-
vation. 2 It is worth reiterating, therefore, that to give the 
courts a constitutional function is ipso facto to give them a 
'political' rol~ because constitutional law is by its nature 
'political'. A bill of rights, moreover, is inevitably a 
statement of political values~ and in a socio-political sense 
can never be functionally neutral, although some rights, such 
4 as civil rights, are less 'political' than others. From the 
perspective of/ reforming inequalities in South African society, 
legal limitations on authority might appear as reactionary ob-
structions in the way of social reforms and be responsible for 
a future government having 'unconstitutional thoughts _,.5 Thus 
any theory of judicial review must take into account the complex 
inter-relationship between the judiciary and the other organs of 
government and must be evaluate~ in part,by the extent to which 
it allows for a necessary programme of social reform by legisla-
tive means. It should also be open to the possibility of pro-
1. That is elderly, upper middle class, conservative men. (See Bayefsky's review of A Bill of Rights] 1980 Public Law 505-507). But cf Dworkin's views (op cit 126, 240-258) on the correct judicial course when an appro-priate rule does not exist: the judge must apply a principle not be-cause it advances an economic or social situation, but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness. As these principles are discoverable there is no need for a judge to 'legislate'. In the suggestion that community values must be refined by the judge in a way that removes pre-judice, emotional reaction and rationalisation, the influence of con-sensus theory is clear. 
2. See the critique of liberal-constitutionalism in the Sprocas Report South Africa's Political Alternatives (1973) 127-142. 
3. See Johnson op cit 139. 
4. Zander (op cit 50) distinguishes between civil and political rights on the one hand and economic, social and cultural rights on the other, and would withhold the latter from judicial influence. 
5. Sprocas Report op cit 140-141. 
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tecting civil rights through the constitution, while at the 
same time leaving the electorate and 'political' institutions 
free to decide on socio-economic issues. 
Against this theoretical background it is possible to examine 
the question of judicial review in South Africa. Clearly the 
prominence of the principle of parliamentary supremacy in South 
Africa's constitutional history implies the absence of any tra-
dition of judicial review. Even the government's 1977 consti-
tution, which implied a system of review, would have involved 
no change to this aspect of the constitutional system. From a 
political point of view it is highly improbable that the govern-
ment would graft a bill of rights and a system of judicial review 
onto the present constitutional order; this would in any case 
involve an inversion of priorities, since it would occur before 
the resolution of such basic constitutional issues as the fran-
chise. But if the political system becomes more inclusive 
through the consociational incorporation of coloureds and In-
dians, such constitutional features as judicial review, constitu-/ 
tional rigidity,and a justiciable bill of rights, are likely to 
appear more attractive to the government as devices to check the 
power of the 'majority'.' There is also likely to be a tenden-
cy to secure the liberal rights such as freedom of property and 
contract, and a corresponding neglect of economic rights,2 which 
would serve as a means of retaining the existing distribution of 
economic power. The relevance of the American experience is 
that the objections to basic issues of social and economic poli-
cy being decided by an unrepresentative institution, would apply 
a fortiori during a period of constitutional and political change 
in South Africa, during which even the basic rules of the system 
would be in issue. To allow the judiciary, as presently com-
posed and constituted, to invalidate the decisions of a represen-
tative legislature on grounds of substantive unconstitionality 
is not likely to enhance the stability of the political system. 
At the most the judiciary should police a constitutional divi-
1. Cf s 8(1)(d) of the 1979 Draft Constitution Bill. 
2. This trend is clearly evident in the Lombard Report (Alternatives to the Consolidation of Natal and KwaZulu: Progress Report, 1980) '9 which draws on F.A. Hayek The Constitution of Liberty (1960). Cf Dugard's comments in Boulle and Baxter op cit 191 . . 
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sion of powers and safeguard basic civil rights. Thus al-
thouah the aovernment is at present uncommitted to a system of o 0 
judicial review, its position may change at a later stage in 
the process of consociational engineering; but in any future 
system of authoritarian consociationalism judicial review 
would have to be evaluated in terms of its potential effects 
on the political system. 
As far as consociational democracy is concerned, one encounters 
a dearth of references in the literature to the role of the 
judiciary; this is partially attributable to the fact that the 
field has been dominated by political scientists and sociolo-
gists with little contribution from constitutional lawyers, and 
it results in a noticeable deficiency in consociational theory. 
The furthest that the constitutions of the empirical consocia-
tions have gone, is in providing that the judiciary should be 
appointed on a segmental, and at times proportional, basis; 1 
but there is no mention of any specifically consociational 
function or procedural method for the judiciary. On the face / 
of it there would seem little need to justify the inclusion in 
a consociational system of a device which checks the power of 
the majority; indeed a system of judicial revi~w, particularly 
in its 'counter-majoritarian' aspects, would seem to supplement 
the other features of consociationalism. And in line with con-
sociational theory commentators have suggested that a 'univer-
sally respected judicial system can be a valuable agent of de-
politicisation,2 and 'a mechanism of further diffusion of poli-
tical power .... a means of defusing conflict and competition 
between groups,.3 'But this would be to assume that general 
1. The 1960 Cyprus constitution established a Supreme Constitutional Court comprising a Greek judge, a Turkish judge and a neutral President, with a similar- arrangement for the Righ Court; it was also provided that Greek and Turkish coroners should conduct inquests for Greeks and Turks respectively. S.A. de Smith The New Commonwealth and its Consti-tions (1964) 202 and 282-295. Art 107 of the Swiss constitution pro-vides that the Federal Court shall include members of the three official language groups. On the regional and linguistic composition of the Canadian Supreme Court see P. Hogg Constitutional Law in Canada (1977) 122; since 1949 the chief justiceship has alternated between English and French-speaking incumbents. 
2. F. van Zyl Slabbert and D. Welsh South Africa's Options (1979) 156; cf E.Nordlinger's concept of 'purposive depoliticisation~Conflict Regula-tion in Divided Societies (1972) 26. 
3. W.R.B. Dean 'Discussion' in J. Benyon (ed) Constitutional Change in South Africa (1978) 87. 
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agreement had been reached on a range of issues affecting the 
judiciary and its functions: the method of appointment of 
judges, the structure and procedures of the courts, the system 
of constitutional remedies, and the scope and nature of judi-
cial power.' And notwithstanding such agreement, the reserva-
tions about an activist judiciary in the American system would 
also apply to a fully consociational system,with its heavy em-
phasis on bargaining amongst genuinely representative leader-
ship ~lites on all crucial issues. Judicial review of the 
constitutionality of legislation, moreover, would add an addi-
tional factor of delay to an already cumbersome and slow deci-
sion-making process, rendering it prone to immobilisation. On 
the other hand there would seem no objection to the courts per-
forming a traditional federal function of policing the consti-
tutionally defiried division of power among the various s~gments, 
and of ensuring compliance with procedural requirements by the 
various organs of government, and safeguarding the constitution-
ally entrenched features of a consociational system such as 
the 'grand coalition' principle and the mutual veto. 
/ 
But to exclude or limit the courts' power of direct review of 
legislation does not exhaust its possible functions in a con-
sociational system, including the government's form of authori-
tarian consociationalism. Besides direct review there is also 
the possibility of a system of indirect judicial review, or, as 
it has been called 'judicial braking,.2 There are three main 
-variants of indirect review: 3 using a bill of rights as an in-
terpretative aid for the judiciary4 - while this would be of 
limited efficacy it could 'weight the scales of statutory pre-
sumption in favour of the indiv idual and against the State,;5 
requiring special majorities for the enactment of legislation in 
contravention of the bill of rights - this is a familiar consti-
',. Cf J. Dugard 'Judicial Power and a Constitutional Court' in Boulle & Baxter op cit '89-200. 
2. E. Mc~~inney Judicial Review (4 ed, 1969) 13. 
3. J. Jaconelli Enacting a Bill of Rights (1980) 42-49; 62-91. 
4. As with both the New Zealand and the Canadian Bills of Rights; see also ~ 20 of the Israeli Basic Law: Rights of the Individual and the Citizen, ln the Appendix to L. Ratner 'Constitutions, Majoritarianism, and Judi-cial Review' 1978 American Journal of Comparative Law 373 at 394-396. 
5. Jaconelli op cit 44. 
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tutional principle in relation to rigid amending procedures 
and can be associated ~ith the consociational principle of the 
mutual veto; requiring a statute which infringes the bill of 
rights to contain an 'express derogation' clause declaring it 
to be operative notwithstanding such infringement - here the 
government could render its legislation immune from all judi-
cial review, but in doing so would have to draw attention to 
this fact at the risk of political embarrassment. 1 In all 
three cases the judiciary acquires only limited control over 
the legislature; it can ensure compliance with the required 
procedures, but cannot invalidate legislation on the grounds ·of 
substantive unconstitutionality. Likewise,where the judiciary 
is limited to providing an anticipatory advisory opinion on the 
compatibility of draft legislation with a bill of rights, the en-
forcement of such rights 2 is seen as a political issue y,Tith 
final authority vesting in the legislature. 3 There is thus a 
range of possibilities to be taken into account in constructing 
a suitable theory of judicial review for a consociational system. 
Finally,the ty~e of judicial review more familiar in South Afri-
ca 4 is quite compatible with a consociational system and is 
1. This system is used in Canada and is favoured by both Jaconelli (op cit 282-286) and Zander (A Bill of Rights? (2 ed, 1979)) for Britain. 
2. As, eg, in France and the Irish Republic. This arrangement should be distinguished from a system of 'political review' where the constitution sets out general principles for the guidance of the legislature but pro-vides no legal sanction for their non-observance. Examples are found in the Irish constitution (art 45), the Indian constitution (part IV) and the Turnhalle constitution (see L.J. Bou1le 'The Turnhal1e Testimony' 95 (1978) SALJ 49-62). The proposed draft constitution for Switzerland has, besides certain enforceable rights, several 'principles of govern-ment action' (ch 2 arts 4-7). 
3. In a formal sense even direct judicial review leaves ultimate authority with the legislature through its power of constitutional amendment, but this reserve power might be difficult to exercise and therefore operate as only a remote constraint. The constitutional crisis in South Africa saw the reversal of judicial decisions through constitutional amendment (eg the S.A. Act Amendment Act No 9 of 1956) and there have been subse-quent examples of this phenomenon (cf the legislative and executive res-ponse to Theron v Hy1ton-Smith 1978 (2) SA 294 (N) on s 55(d) of the Constitution: Act No 54 of 1978, Gov Notice 1350j1979 in Government Gazette No 6509 of 22 June 1979, and Act No 99 of 1979). In the United States the amendment procedure has been used on four occasions to over-ride Supreme Court decisions - the eleventh, fourteenth, sixteenth and twenty-sixth amendments - see L. Tribe American Constitutional Law (1978) 50-51 . 
4. The term is used loosely here to include the second and third types of review referred to in Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co v Johannes burg Town Council 1903 TS 111, although there is much inconsistency in the use of the term: Tickley and others v Johannes N.O. & others 1963 (2) SA 588 (T); Rosenburg v South African Pharmacy Board 1981 (1) SA 22 (AD). 
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likely to be of particular importance as a protection against 
the abuse of executive power during the government-controlled 
phase of quasi-consociational authoritarianism. 
1 
Here the 
courts can ensure compliance by officials and tribunals with 
the statutory and common law rules regulating the scope of their 
authority and its method of exercise, without encroaching on the 
right of the administrative agency to determine the merits of 
the decision. Unfortunately South African administrative law 
remains relatively undeveloped and unsystematic~ and lacks a 
sound theory of judicial review; it is further enervated by a 
rigid system of classification3 and a tendency by the legislature 
to curtail or oust completely the courts' common law review jur-
isdiction. 4 Nevertheless there are well-recognised grounds on 
which administrative decisions can be set aside as ultra vires 
and, particularly from the academic point of view, there have 
been attempts to build up systematic principles of administrative 
law. 5 This type of judicial review has an invaluable constitu-
tional function,without involving the same problems as a system 
) 
1. Cf B.O. Nwabueze Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa (1977) 236-241, 
where he slightly overstates the case that judicial review cannot be 
counter-majoritarian where the government is a minority one. 
2. A function of the Diceyean legacy and the relatively late emergence of 
the administrative state in South Africa. 
3. Between so-called 'quasi-judicial' and 'purely administrative' func-
tions," the rules of natural justice applying only in respect of the 
former. Despite academic criticism of this classification, and judi-
cial cognisance of its dangers (Pretoria North Town Council v A.I. Ice 
Cream Factory 1953 (3) SA 1 (p~)), it has persisted. 
4. There are innumerable examples of 'ouster clauses': eg s 6(5) of Act 
No 83 of 1967 and s 10 sex of Act No 44 of 1950, although the courts 
have interpreted them restrictively - Union Government v Fakir 1923 AD 
466; Winter v Administrator-in-Executive-Committee 1973 (1) SA 873 
(AD): Honey and anor v Minister of Police 1980 (3) SA 800 (TSC). 
5. M. Wiechers (Administratiefreg (1973) made the first serious attempt 
to systematise administrative law and supply a supporting theory, though 
at times it became abstracted from the case law; his 'legaliteitsbegin-
sel' remains a valuable contribution. Baxter has begun constructing 
a theory of 'fairness' to replace the concept of natural justice (see 
'Fairness and Natural Justice in English and South African Law' 96 
(1979) SALJ 607-639) and draws on English and Canadian developments in 
support;--5ome judicial recognition for this notion was forthcoming in 
Roberts v Chairman, Local Road Transportation Board and others (2) 1980 
SA 480 CC) at 496 (C) (on which see Baxter's case note 98 (1981) SALJ 
308-320); and see also the earlier decision Motaung v Mothiba NO----
1975 (1) SA 618 (0) at 629 A-B. 
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of direct review of legislation, because it emphasises the need 
for administrative bodies to act within the bounds of their 
authority , to comply with prescribed formalities, to apply 
their minds to relevant considerations and ignore those that 
are irrelevant, to act in good faith and without ulterior pur-
pose, to give reasons for their decisions, and above all to ad-
here to the obligation to act fairly. All these factors com-
bine not to restrict the exercise of discretionary power, but, 
negatively, to prevent its abuse and, positively, to ensure that 
it is exercised correctly. Judicial review at this level 
would also buttre~s any moves towards making administrative 
bodies more representative, responsible and open.' 
Thus the 'consociational option' in South Africa requires an ex-
tensive reassessment of the judicial role. Insofar as conso-
ciationalism implies a deep sense of constitutionalism, it sug-
gests the need for a more prominent constitutional role for the 
judiciary. The consociational division of competence between 
different inst~tutions, the jurisdictional problems which it in-
volves, and the constitutional rigidity which it implies - all 
suggest the need for the judiciary to keep the various institu-
tions within the limits of their constitutional authority. But 
as the analysis has shown the court's 'counter-majoritarian' 
role in other areas must be evaluated in the light of the other 
anti-majoritarian features of consociationalism, and their poten-
tial for obstructing democratic government. In the government's 
form of authoritarian consociationalism, moreover, judicial re-
view could only have a limited positive effect if grafted onto 
the existing constitutional order, without the prior resolution 
of basic political issues. Nevertheless in two areas there is 
clear scope for judicial review, and in both cases it is recon-
cilable with the consociational option - the safeguarding of 
basic civil liberties, and the control of the administrative 
branch of government. 
1. See above, 419-420. 
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3. Responsible Government 
To the extent that the preceding section has indicated a need 
to limit the judicial control of government, so it would seem 
to imply a heavy reliance on the other element of traditional 
constitutionalism, namely the political responsibility of the 
government to the governed. 1 If political decisions are to be 
taken by politicians, then their responsibility and accounta-
bility to the people, whether direct or mediated, should be 
real and not fictitious. 2 A variety of constitutional mecha-
nisms are designed to ensure this responsibility in the liberal 
democracies, but the contemporary political reality is that 
these are generally ineffective. 3 The gap between constitu-
tional theory and political reality indicates an urgent need 
to revise the former, and it will be shown that the principles 
of consociationalism pose additional problems for this process. 
Theories of constitutional responsibility in South Africa are 
derived largely · from English constitutional law. Despite the 
y 
growing realisation of their inadequacies, there has been an 
e~during acceptance of the theoret~cal fou~dations of the.west-~ 
mlnster system: thus there are stlll vestlges of the notlo~ 
that sov~reignty vests in the people,who delegate it to their 
politica~ representatives to hold in trust for them. 4 Accord-
ingly members of the legislature are seen to be responsible to 
the electorate, who can remove them from office in periodic 
elections if they do not carry out their mandate. The legis-
lature in turn is the mediating institution through which the 
executive is made accountable to the electorate - it enforces 
the individual responsibility of ministers through the mechan-
isms of parliamentary questions, departmental budget votes, 
legislative debates and the select committee procedure. The 
1. C. McIllwain Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (rev. ed, 1947) 146; 
C.J. Friedrich Constitutional Government and Democracy (4 ed, 1968) 31. 
2. See J.A.G. Griffith 'The Political Constitution' 1979 Modern Law Re-
view 16. 
3. See C.B. MacphersonThe Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (1977) 64-69. 
4. This may be attributed in part to the cumulative influences of John 
Locke (Two Treatises of Government (Everyman's Library edition, 1977) 
192-198), Walter Bagehot The English Constitution (The World's Classics 
edition, 1974) 25), and A.V. Dicey (An Introduction to the Study of the 
Law of the Constitution (10 ed by E.C.S. Wade, 1959) 432). 
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cabinet is also collectively responsible to parliament for its 
policy decisions, and must resign jointly if subjected to a 
motion of censure, or if defeated at the third reading of an 
important bill. The bureaucracy, according to this theory, 
can be called to account vicariously through its administrative 
and political head, the relevant minister, and through other 
devices such as the compulsory tabling of subordinate legisla-
tion. What is significant about these traditional forms of 
responsibility is that, by and large, their status is no great-
er than that of the notoriously elusive constitutional conven-
tions, and this distinguishes them from the well-kno~~ checks 
and balances of the American constitutional system,which pro-
vide an elaborate institutional basis for the responsibility of 
government. South Africa, however, accepted most of the Eng-
lish conventions into its constitutional law,1 including those 
upon which constitutional responsibility is founded, despite 
the differences in political culture between the two countries. 
There is now general agreement that the forms of responsibility 
./ 
associated with the Westminster system are not functionally ef-
fective, despite the nostalgic attraction which they hold for 
some contemporary constitutionalists. Their break-do~~ in 
practice can be attributed to a number of factors. The party 
system has made parliamentary representatives responsible to 
the cabinet and prime minister,and not to their respective con-
stituencies 2 - this in turn has allowed the cabinet to dominate 
parliament in complete contradiction of constitutional theory; 
the doctrine of individual ministerial responsibility has been 
circumvented whenever the cabinet has elected to extend the 
shield of collective responsibility over a recalcitrant minis-
ter;3 the extent and complexity of bureaucratic activity has 
precluded any possibility of effective ministerial control over 
"1. M. ",Tiechers Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 172-186. 
2. C.B. Macpherson The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (1977) 67-68. 
This loyalty is ensured through a combination of patronage, the threat 
of expUlsion from the party, and the threat of a premature dissolution 
of parliament. But Macpherson goes on to argue that strict respons-
ibility is irreconcilable with the manoeuvre and compromise which a one-
party government requires to mediate between opposed class interests in 
British society. 
3. S.E. Finer Five Constitutions (1979) 86-87. 
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the bureaucracy, or its effective monitoring by parliament; 
the notion that the bureaucracy is politically neutral and 
should therefore enjoy anonymity and protection from political 
accountability has become an anachronism in the administrative 
state;1 and finally the modern phenomenon of corporatism tends 
to bypass ministers, parliament and the public, thereby dis-
torting all traditional notions of responsibility.2 These 
factors have also contributed to the weakening of responsibili-
ty in the South African constitutional context,and the position 
has been aggravated by local political and constitutional pecul-
iarities: the idiosyncracies of the socio-political tradition, 
the unrepresentative nature of the mediating institution be-
tween cabinet and people (the white parliament), the ability of 
administrative organs to exercise extensive discretionary powers, 
and the absence of institutions such as the British Joint Com-
mittee on Statutory Instruments. 3 However, attention will be 
given to only one additional factor which is common to the 
British and South African political systems and which affects 
all forms of responsibilitj: the absence of a meaningful degree 
/ 
of open government. After demonstrating the extent of closed 
government, and its contribution to the widening gap between con-
stitutional theory and political reality, it will be related to 
the principles of consociationalism,with specific reference to ~e 
need for responsible government. 
Openness in government can be justified on a number of grounds, 
both philosophical and practical: 4 it can be argued that the 
availability of information is an integral feature of any theory 
of representative government, or that an open administration is 
a necessary condition for the prevention of official corruption. 
But in this context openness in government is justified on the 
1. This point is made in different ways from a number of perspectives -
class theory (R. Milliband The State in Capitalist Society (1969) 107), 
group theory CJ. Richardson and A. Jordan Governing under Pressure (1979) 
25-31), and the corporatist perspective (R. Harrison Pluralism and Cor-
poratism (1980) 115-131). 
2. B. Sedgemore The Secret Constitution (1980) 36; Harrison op cit 189; 
J. Richardson and A. Jordan op cit 41ff. 
3. See H.W.R. Wade Administrative Law (4 ed, 1977) 733-736. In South 
Africa delegated legislation has to be tabled in parliament in terms of 
s 17 of the Interpretation Act No 33 of 1957 but this monitoring is quite 
inadequate, and does not preclude the judiciary from invalidating legis-
lation subsequently: Bestuursraad van Sebokeng v Tlelima 1968 (1) SA 
680 (AD). 
4. See P. Bathorv and W. McWilliams 'Political Theory and the People's 
~~~~~, t~ ~~ow~ in r. Galnoor (ed) Government Secrecy in Democracies 
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purely functional basis that ~ithout . it all forms of responsi-
bility, in a representative system, cannot operate adequately; 
in the most simple terms, government cannot be called to account 
unless the governed are informed as to its activities and their 
consequences. A political system will not be open to the ex-
tent that, inter alia, it excludes the public from official 
meetings, it confers on the public no right of access to adminis-
trative records, it has a stringent form of censorship and anti-
disclosure laws, it enforces a wide definition of contempt of 
court and commission, it has no administrative law means of eli-
citing information from the bureaucracy, and it allows the ready 
use of state privilege in judicial proceedings. Clearly the 
'right to know' is intimately related to a range of other rights 
and liberties, in particular that of freedom of speech. 1 
Secrecy is most problematic in respect of the executive and 
bureaucratic organs of government, the main repositories of in-
formation, and only marginally so in respect of the legisl~ture 
and judiciary,2 which are usually themselves constitutionally 
empowered to force the public disclosure of information. 
/ 
As with its constitutional theory, so in respect of openness in 
government, South Africa has followed the British rather than 
the American example. 3 In Britain4 there is no constitutional 
1. In the: United States the right to gather information has been held to 
derive from the First Amendment right to free speech. See F. La~~ence 
'The First Amendment Right to Gather State-Held Information' 89 (1980) 
Yale LJ 923. On freedom of speech in South Africa see J. Dugard Human 
Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978) 146-202, B. van Niekerk 
JThe Uncloistering of the Virtue. Freedom of Speech and the Administra-
tion of Justice' 95 (1978) SALJ 362-393, 534-573. 
2. The sessions and records of parliament are open to the public, subject 
to the provisions of the Powers and Privileges of Parliament Act No 91 
of 1963 and the House of Assembly Standing Orders. Judicial proceed-
ings are held in open court save for certain criminal trials (s 153 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act No 51 of 1977); court records are public 
documents and can be publicised, subject to certain exceptions (eg s 154 
of Act No 51 of 1977, s 12(1) of the Divorce Act No 70 of 1979). 
3. See A.S. Mathews The Darker Reaches of Government (1978), in which he 
analyses comparatively the law and practice of secrecy in government in 
South Africa, the United States and the United Kingdom. 
4. There are ~ome specialist studies on openness in government in Britain, 
and a significant number on the United States. A useful comparative, 
though undetailed, source book is Administrative Secrecy in Developed 
Countries (1979) by D. Rowat (ed) which ~urveys twelve countries in 
Scandinavia, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and North America; see also 
I. Galnoor (ed) Government Secrecy in Democracies (1977). 
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right of access to information' and the prevailing principle is 
one of discretionary secrecy. On the other hand there is a 
range of direct and indirect prohibitions on access to and dis-
semination of information, of which the most important are the 
Official Secrets Acts: 2 apart from prescribing activities such 
as espionage, these acts also criminalise the communication 
~ithout authority of almost any official information. 3 There 
are also other acts which allow the bureaucracy to function 
covertly, secrecy is implicit in such constitutional princi-
ples as collective cabinet responsibility, and even the courts 
have tended to reinforce the system of secrecy in government.
4 
These factors all encourage closed government, and in exercising 
the principle of discretionary secrecy the government uses a 
system of administrative classificationS which allows it to 
select, and even distort, the information which is made availa-
ble. The extent of secrecy · in government can be illustrated by 
two examples: while the principle of collective responsibility 
depends on a high degree of openness within the cabinet,minis-
ters are frequently kept in the dark on major issues and have 
/ 
difficulty penetrating the secrecy enveloping decisions taken by 
the 'establishment,;6 and it has been shown that individual mem-
bers of parliament are so lacking in information as to be unable 
to fulfill their roles adequately.7 The implications of these 
1. Save for a limited right in respect of local government created by the 
Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act of 1960 (8 & 9 Eliz. 11 c 67) 
and other less important statutes. See R.E. Wraith in Rowat op cit 195-
198. 
2. The Official Secrets Act of '911 (1 & 2 Geo v c 28), 1920 (10 & 11 Geo 
v c 75) and 1931 (2 & 3 Geo vi c 121) which have not been consolidated. 
3. Mathews op cit 103-116; Wraith op cit 184-5. Civil servants are 
obliged to sign secrecy declarations in terms of these acts. 
4. Eg in their development of a breach of confidence action in public law 
(Attorney-General v Jonathan Cope Ltd L1972) 3 AER 484 in respect of the 
Richard Crossman diaries) and their attitude to contempt of court (eg 
Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd }19737 3 AER 54 (HL), The Dis-
tillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd v Times Ne~spapers Ltd L19727 1 AER 41 
(QB). For the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights on the 
latter cases see 1979 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 
400-408. 
5. This functions quite separately from the Official Secrets Acts. 
6. That is, according to B. Sedgemore (The Secret Constitution (1980» a 
handful of politicians, civil servants, industrialists, trade unionists 
and scientists. 
7. J.A.G. Griffith Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government Bills (1974) 234. 
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de¥elopments for the responsibility of the government are clear. 
Nevert~eless, there have been some signs 1 of a recent liberal-
isation in British secrecv practices in relation to administra-
tive planning, Crown priV~lege,2 maladministration,3 and the 
investigatory functions of parliamentary committees,4 although 
these developments fall well short of any constitutional right 
to information, nor have the ~nti-disclosure laws been affected 
as such. 5 In the United States, by way of comparison, there is 
a sounder tradition of open governrnent:
6 
not only are the anti-
disclosure laws less stringent, but in recent times there have 
been an increasing number of enactments bestowing a positive 
right to information and access to meetings. 7 The most promi-
nent of these laws is the Freedom of Information Act of 1967~ 
which provides that anyone may request certain types of informa-
tion from designated government agencies; there is no right of 
disclosure in respect of certain statutory exemptions, but in 
these areas it is still possible for the administration to dis-
close information voluntarily, and there is a general right of 
appeal against refusals to disclose. Also operating at the 
federal level ~f government is the Sunshine Act of 1976 9 which 
1. See Wraith op cit 185-186. 
2. As a result of the well-known decision in Conway V Rimmer [196§7 1 AER 
874. 
3. Through the ombudsman-type Parliamentary Commissioner for Administra-
tion. As H.W.R. ~ade (Constitutional Fundamentals (1980) 55) observes, 
this institution provides for the first time the constitutional means 
of going behind the responsible minister's parliamentary responses to 
investigate departmental activities. 
4. See S.A. Walkland 'Committees in the British House of Commons' in J.D. 
Lees and M. Shaw Committees in Legislatures (1979) 242-287. 
5. The Departmental Committee on 5 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911 
(Franks Committee, Cmnd 5104}1972) reported that the present law was 
unsatisfactory and should be changed so as to specify what matters 
should be kept secret; it made no recommendation on a right to informa-
tion. 
'6. This has been partly a function of the American political culture, but 
also of constitutional features such as the First Amendment right of 
free speech (see above, 473) and the checks and balances flowing from 
the separation of powers system (thus the congressional committees 
monitoring the executive have investigatory powers far surpassing those 
of their British counterparts). 
7. See Mathews op cit 39-100; M.J. Singer on the United States in Rowat 
op cit 309-356. 
8. 5 USC 552. The act was extensively amended in 1974. 
9. 5 USCA par 552(b). 
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allows public access to meetings of various federal agencies 
and departments. And at the state level there have been 
numerous laws pertaining to openness in government, so that 
in both law and practice it is relatively difficult for the 
various administrations in the United States to clothe their 
. ... 1 actIvItIes In secrecy. 
In following the British example South Africa has both refrain-
ed from granting any positive rights to information, and enacted 
stringent secrecy laws which have facilitated an appreciably 
closed system of government. 2 The South African Official 
Secrets Act 3 is a close replica of the British statutes and 
penalises a vast range of activities relating to the communica-
tion of 'official' information. There are in addition several 
far-reaching censorship laws~ and numerous other acts providing 
for an absolute or qualified restriction on the publication of 
information. 5 In his survey of secrecy practices in South 
Africa Mathews concludes that 'the situation in practice more 
than matches the expectations which the laws arouse'! and the 
/ 
problem is compounded by the restrictions on open government 
implicit in the many statutory limitations on other freedoms. 7 
The 'information scandal' of the late 1970's gave some indica-
1. American commentators are less sanguine; see F. Rourke on the United 
States in I. Galnoor Government Secrecy in Democracies (1977) 113-128; 
and for an account of the presidential abuse of the executive privilege 
to withhold information (the American counterpart of British crown 
privilege) see in the same work B. Schwartz 129-142. 
2. See Mathews op cit 138-173. 
3. Act No 16 of 1956. 
4. The main acts are the Publications Act No 42 of 1974 and the Internal 
Security Act No 44 of 1950. On censorship see Dugard op cit 191-201; 
J. van der Vyver in W. Joubert (ed) vol 2 The Law of South Africa 93-
185. 
5. For example the Defence Act No 44 of 1957, the Police Act No 7 of 1958, 
the Prisons Act No 8 of 1959, the Nuclear Installations Act No 43 of 
1963, the Terrorism Act No 83 of 1967, the Atomic Energy Act No 90 of 
1967, the Armaments Development and Production Act No 57 of 1968, the 
National Supplies Procurement Act No 89 of 1970, the National Key Points 
Act No 102 of 1980, the South African Transport Services Act No 65 of 
1981. In many cases the restrictive provisions of these acts were 
introduced in the wake of the 'information scandal'. For other stat-
utory prohibitions on the publication of information see K. Stuart The 
Newspaperman's Guide to the Law (2 ed, 1977) 186-204. 
6. Op ci t 168. 
7. See above, 390-394. 
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tion of the extent of secrecy in the . administration 1 but the 
government's legislative response to this episode involved a 
tightening of secrecy in certain areas;2 even the Advocate-
General Act,3 which makes provision for an ombudsman-type in-
vestigation into the improper use of state monies, contains 
new anti-disclosure provisions. 4 Apart from these institution-
al factors, the political culture of South Africa is not con-
ducive to openness in the administration. The secrecy implicit 
in the convention of collective responsibility has allowed the 
responsible ministers of maladministered departments to be pro-
tected by the cabinet as a whole;5 a survey of parliamentary 
questions over the last few years shows that government back-
benchers seldom elicit information through this public rnethod;6 
and the government has at times refused to respond to the oppo-
sition's questions, on the grounds that the publication of the 
required information would not be in the public or national in-
terest. 7 The government engages in the common practice of 
press briefings, with its well-known opportunities for presenting 
one-sided or distorted information, and it has also abused B the 
/ 
1. See generally the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Alleged 
Irregularities in the Former Department of Information RP113J197B (the 
Erasmus report). The report found that one of the main causes of ad-
ministrative malpractices and irregularities was secrecy. (§ 13.2) 
2. Eg the · Secret Services Act No 56 of 1978 makes provision for money to be 
appropriated to a Secret Services account from where it can be flexibly 
transferred to other accounts for use by government departments in ser-
vices of a secret nature (s 2(3»; the Minister of Finance can determine 
the extent to which such monies should be audited by the Auditor-General 
(s 3(2». See also the Information Services of South Africa Special 
Account Act No 10B of 1979. 
3. Act No 118 of 1979; the Advocate-General's reports must be tabled in 
parliament, unless he directs otherwise. 
4. Ss 6(3) and 8(1). 
5. This was sho~~, inter alia, in the government's responses to the Erasmus 
report (op cit) and the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Riots at Soweto and other places in the Republic RP 55)1980 (the Cillie 
Report). 
6. The number of such questions in the years 1976-1981 was 7,3,3,1,17 and 
27 respectively. 
7. This phenomenon is not unique to South Africa (cf T.C. Har~ley and J.A. 
Griffith Government and Law (2 ed, 1981) 208, B. Sedgemore op cit 183-
191), but here there is no method of going behind the minister's res-
ponses. 
8. For references to one of the few empirical surveys on the partiality 
of the SABC, the largest disseminator of information in South Africa, 
see House of Assembly Debates vol i cols 4183-7, 4193-4 (18 September 
1981): ~rop~ganda is the reverse of the secrecy coin, and has the 
same lmpllcatlons for open and responsible government. 
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control which it has over the electronic media in South Africa.
1 
Thus at both the constitutional and socio-political levels 
there are numerous ways of controlling information in South 
Africa, and the principle of discretionary secrecy has not lead 
to a system of open government in practice. Nor has the judi-
ciary been able to further the cause of open government signi-
ficantly,by reason of the constitutional context in which it 
operates, the nature of many of the laws it has to implement, 
and its own caution in some matters, such as in requiring admin-
istrative bodies to furnish reasons for their decisions. 2 It 
is against this background that the implications of consocia-
tionalism for openness in government, and therefore theories of 
responsible government, must be assessed. 
From its very nature it appears that consociationalism would in-
evitably compound the problem of administrative secrecy. In 
the focal institution of the consociational model, the grand 
coalition, there would seem to be a greater need for secrecy 
than exists even in single-party or coalition cabinets, so that 
/ 
elite bargaining can be successfully pursued. This aspect of 
consociationalism is essentially conspiratorial and it puts a 
premium on the non-circulation of leaders and a deferential 
citizenry,3 both of which would tend to aggravate the problem 
of closed government. Lijphart in fact cites secrecy as one 
of the s~ven rules of accommodationist politics~4 There is a 
close affinity between the rule of secrecy and the third rule 
of consociationalism, namely summit diplomacy or government by 
elite: and Lijphart justifies it on the basis that, 
'the leaders have to be able to make concessions and to 
arrive at pragmatic compromises even when religious or 
1. The South African Broadcasting Corporation was created by statute 
(Act No 22 of 1936) and all the members of its board are appointed 
by the State President (s 14). 
2. See on this and related matters, below, 485-487. 
3. E. Nordlinger Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (1972) 79-80. 
4. A. Lijphart The Politics of Accommodation (2 ed, 1975) 131-134. 
5. Op cit 126; cf J. Richardson and A. Jordan Governing under Pressure 
(1979) 103-105. 
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ideoloaical values are at stake. The process of 
b 
accorrnnodation . must, therefore, be shielded from pub-
licity. The leaders' moves in negotiations among 
the blocs must be carefully insulated from the know-
ledge of rank and file. Because an "information 
gap" is desirable, secrecy is a most important rule. 
In this respect, the poli tics of accorrnnodation again 
resembles international politics.,1 
Lijphart goes on to point out that at the height of Dutch accom-
modationist politics both academics and the press were partners 
in the conspiracy of silence_ In this way leaders were able 
to take their followers with them on compromise decisions with-
out constant public scrutiny and the possibility of mass resent-
ment. In terms of this approach consociationalism would seem 
to be heavily dependent on popular nescience and to provide 
little scope for traditional forms of government accountability. 
On the other hand in two respects the normative consociational 
model would seem to indicate the need for, or at least the possi-
bility of, gre~ter openness in government than in the tradition-
al liberal democracies. Firstly , the notion of power-sharing 
implies at least a measure of information-sharing. 2 · Thus at 
the top leadership level, such as in the grand coalition, it 
would be necessary for participants from all sectors to have 
reasonable access to information; in the adversaria1 system, 
by contrast, there is no such justification for information-
sharing, but rather a strong inducement for the government to 
withhold information from the opposition. But this internal 
circulation of information is clearly not inconsistent with 
greater secrecy as far as those external to the grand coalition 
are concerned; the tendency, therefore, would be to withhold 
such information from the legislature, party caucuses and the 
public, with the result that this apparent exception to the rule 
of closed government might not in fact contribute to the pros-
pects of responsible government. The second exception appears 
less illusory. The consociationa1 model's emphasis on the divi-
sion and diffusion of power to regional and functional authori-
ties indicates a need to disseminate appropriate information to 
1 • op c i t 1 3 2 • 
2. See A.S. Mathews The Darker Reaches of Government (1978) 6-9. 
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these authorities, thereby precluding the possibility of a 
central monopoly over the control of information. And in 
respect of administrative records at their disposal, or meet-
ings and hearings held by these authorities, there would not 
be the same justification for secrecy as pertains to the inter-
segmental authorities. Thus although the decisive factor 
would be the extent and nature of the authority and information 
conceded by the central government, there could be a largely 
open administration at these levels, and therefore a greater 
measure of responsible government. 1 Further attention will 
be given to these possibilities after investigating the impli-
cations of South Africa's form of consociationalism for open 
government. 
While South Africa's constitutional development has introduced 
only a form of sham consociationalism, it has to a large extent 
incorporated restraints on open government implicit in the con-
sociational model, and this has had a significant effect on the 
existing secrecy practices. This can be shown in relation to 
/ 
both the separate development and parallel development aspects 
of the government's policy, the institutionalisation of which 
has not contributed to a system of open government. Thus deci-
sions relating to the constitutional development of the national 
states are taken along quasi-consociational lines, with the 
negotiations preceding each stage of development being conducted 
by representatives of the government and homelands on a secre-
tive and confidential basis; in other words the very process 
of constitution-making is shielded from both the homeland and 
general South African citizenries, including such salient factors 
as a homeland's institutional, financial and citizenship 
. 2 
arrangements. Even at the early stages of this process the 
'summit diplomacy' dimensions are strongly apparent, with only 
the final product of the negotiations being publicised, either 
by government announcement or promulgation in the gazette, al-
though in some cases the formal legitimising procedure of a par-
1. Ynis exception might also involve a contradiction in that it requires 
an ambivalent attitude to information on behalf of the public - a 
lack of inquisitiveness on national issues, and a healthy probing on 
local or communal issues. But against the background of a general 
apathy towards open government it can be expected that any demand for 
information would be in respect of matters most immediately affecting 
the public. 
2. See N. Stultz Transkei's Half Loaf (1980) 44-75. 
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liamentary debate and legislative enactment is required.' 
But even the latter procedure is not always accompanied by 
full and adequate disclosure, as evidenced, for example, by 
the confusion over the so-called 'Ciskeian package-deal' in 
the debates 2 on the Status of Ciskei Act. 3 And while the 
diffusion of authority to the national states might create 
additional potential sites for open government there has been 
no evidence of a lessening of secrecy during the pre-indepen-
dence stages,4 and there has in fact been a trend for the 
homelands accepting independence to enact their own secrecy 
laws along the same lines as those of the republic. 5 Thus, 
for example, an individual Transkeian resident in South Africa 
is faced with a double veil of secrecy, and is further hampered 
by the fact that he is an alien in the country of his residence 
and permanently absent from the country of which he is a nation-
a1 6 - the implications of this situation for the principle of 
responsible government are significant. FurthermoreJthe post-
independence relations between a national state and South Africa 
will assume an ·'international' consociational form~ whether con-/ 
ducted on an ad hoc basis or through the proposed constellation 
arrange~ent; 'foreign affairs' are by convention conducted in 
secrecy, with lessened formal accountability to parliament and 
little judicial intervention. 8 Although such negotiations could 
1. Most obviously the Status Acts. 
2. House of Assembly Debates vol 9 col 4933-5158 (29 September 1981). Furthermore the South African-Ciskeian 'convention' was only made avail-able to MP's at the beginning of the second reading, and the exact bor-ders of the Ciskei were still not kno~~ during the third reading - House of Assembly Debates vol 10 col 6304 (9 October 1981). Needless to say the 'package deal' had not been finalised when Ciskei held a referendum on independence in 1980. 
3. Act No 110 of 1981. 
4. The Inkatha movement has emphasised the need for the 'elimination of secrecy in public administration' (see the Inkatha evidence to the Schlebusch commission in W.S. Felgate's paper 'Co-operation Between Natal and KwaZulu - an Inkatha View' in Boulle and Baxter op cit 154 at 158-162), but there is no evidence of any such trend in KwaZulu. 
5. See B. Streek and R. Wicksteed Render unto Kaiser: A Transkei Dossier (1981) 286-302 for an account of information control in post-1976 Trans-kei. 
6. This matter is dealt with further, below, 490-508. 
7. See N. Stultz op cit 150. 
8. M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 342-343. 
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have important consequences for homeland nationals, they would 
be surrounded by an additional layer of secrecy as far as the 
persons affected thereby would be concerned. 
As far as the government's 'internal' constitutional proposals 
are concerned they tend to involve a similar form of dual 
secrecy - that is the process of constitutional change takes 
place with limited public awareness) and the quasi-consociation-
al constitution itself implies the same degree of closed govern-
ment and lack of responsibility as consociationalism. One of 
the remarkable aspects of the government's 1977 constitution was 
that it was 'approved' by the white electorate in the general 
election of that year,~ithout ever having been published in 
draft form, elucidated in a white paper, or given any greater 
substantiation than a general exposition from political plat-
forms and in published propaganda; it appeared subsequently 
that even the closed National party congresses which enthusiasti-
cally endorsed the scheme received only scanty information as to 
its content. The piecemeal implementation of the scheme had / 
already begun before the Draft Constitution Bill of 1979 was pub-
lished,1 and even the bill was subject to differing interpreta-
tions because of its incompleteness and vagueness. The Schle-
busch commission held public hearings and issued a public pro-
visional report, although it is evident from the report that a 
measure of confidential party caucussing preceded its drafting. 
But subsequent implementations of the government's constitution 
also followed the consociational pattern,in that decisions were 
taken during secret consultations before being publicly legiti-
mised in parliament. 2 
The implications of the 1977 constitution itself for open govern-
ment can be assessed by reference to the focal joint institutions, 
the president's council and the council of cabinets. The presi-
dent's council, which is to have a central role in the process 
1. This can be dated to Act No 122 of 1977, the Electoral Act for Indians. 
2. See, eg the references of the Minister of Internal Affairs to discussions held with Indian leaders in relation to the holding of elections for the S.A. Indian Council: House of Assembly Debates vol 2 cols 731-2 (5 February 1981), vol 4 cols 2050-1 (26 August 1981). The Indian elec-torate also had no definitive version of the government's constitutional plans before these elections on 4 November 1981. 
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of constitutional change, has some of the characteristics of 
a consociational grand coalition, and is generally not likely 
to be conducive to a system of open government - its members 
are not elected and therefore have no constituency to whom 
they are accountable, the council operates mainly through a 
system of closed committees, 1 its chairman is protected from 
public criticism,2 and its agenda is more secretive than that 
of parliament. Because of the constitutional status of the 
council its members are also in a client position as far as the 
receipt of information from the government is concerned. 
During the first year of its existence the Powers and Privileges 
of the President's Council Act 3 was passed, extending to the 
council many of the privileges of parliament 4 and introducing 
specific secrecy provisions. Now it is possible for sessions 
of the whole council, or individual committees, to be held in 
camera on the direction of the respective chairman, if he is of 
the opinion that the public's presence would be undesirable;5 
and councillors and the council's officials are expressly dis-
barred from disclosing any information entrusted to them in con-
fidence. 6 Th~ 'secret summit diplomacy' dimension of consocia-
tionalism is strongly prevalent in this body. Much the same 
can be said of the council of cabinets as envisaged in the 1979 
draft bill. The members of this body would also have no im-
mediate constituency and its chairman would be protected from 
public c;iticism. 7 As with most cabinets, the proceedings of 
the council would not be public and, despite its heterogeneity, 
members would take an oath agiinst divulging directly or in-
directly any information entrusted to them under secrecy.8 In 
any event no mechanism was provided for members of one of the 
three parJiaments to elicit information from a member of the 
1. These proceedings are not reported, unlike the plenary sessions of the council. 
2. S 13 of Act No 32 of 1961. 3. Act No 103 of 1981. 
4. Such as the freedom of speech and the right to SUnuIlons witnesses before it. s. S 7. 
6. S 10. S 22 provides that the act does not affect the provisions of the Official Secrets Act No 16 of 1956. 
7. S 13 of the draft bill. 
8. S 16(3) read with s 19(5) of the draft bill; cr s 19(5) of Act No 32 of 1961. 
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council of cabinets belonging to another parliament. 1 At 
the most the government's constitution would involve a sharing 
of information between the government and new leadership elites -
in fact the extent to which such sharing did take place might 
be taken as one yardstick of the government's commitment to con-
sociational politics. 2 But for non-elites it would seem to in-
volve a discernible closing of the deliberative processes of 
government, and no reason to anticipate easier access to admin-
istrative records. It complements the other factors mentioned 
in this work which have contributed to the movement away from 
representative and responsible governmen~ towards a managerial 
system. In short the trends in South Africa's constitutional 
politics are antipathetic to both openness in government and 
traditional notions of responsibility. 





negative implications for open government, it is 
ascertain more closely what degree of openness it 
although in conformity with this work's approach no / 
be made to be prescriptive. The control and mani-
pulation of information is a crucial component of power, and it 
is clear that the government will not readily surrender these 
advantages while it remains in control of constitutional develop-
ment; d~ring this period the principle of discretionary secrecy 
is likely to endure, and to be exercised even more stringently 
as the system becomes increasingly authoritarian. However, to 
complement the earlier description of the optimal constitutional 
framework~ it is proposed to describe areas of government in 
which openness is compatible with the essential features of con-
sociationalism, and by implication South Africa's quasi-consocia-
tional system, and based on these suggestions new theories of 
responsibility may in time be constructed. 4 
1. This assumes that the council of cabinets would have executive functions but the problem would be compounded if, as appeared from the draft bill, executive powers vested in the cabinets of the three parliaments, and predominantly in the white cabinet. 
2. See A.S. Mathews The Darker Reaches of Government (1978) 8. 
3. See above, 400-405. 
4. ef A.S. Mathews 'Monitoring the Administration: New Perspectives' in Boulle and Baxter op cit 128-142. 
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Reference has been made to the potential for breaking do~~ 
secrecy in the consociational emphasis on the division and 
diffusion of authority. The consociational system requires 
that only crucial decisions be taken through 'secret summit 
diplomacy' in the grand coalition and poses no such requirements 
for the less sensitive decisions taken by devolved authorities. 
Thus open meetings legislation, along the lines of the American 
federal or state models, could be made applicable to segmental 
authorities, local authorities, quasi-public boards and public 
corporations. In terms of this legislation all such agencies 
could be compelled, subject to defined exceptions, to open their 
meetings to the general public; this would also be a necessary 
condition of the system of 'issue fragmentation' referred to 
earlier. 1 Also compatible with consociationalism would be open 
records legislation at these levels of governments, and such 
legislation could in fact apply throughout the system, short of 
encroaching on the grand coalition's legitimate preserve. This 
legislation could confer on the public generally a positive right 
of access to administrative records, subject to defined exemp-
/ 
t ions ""hich would accommodate the need for secrecy on certain 
matters and the protection of personal privacy. The important 
feature of right-to-know laws is that they would terminate the 
existing principle of discretionary secrecy,which can be used to 
withhold information for illegitimate or spurious reasons, ln 
favour of a clear delineation of those areas where secrecy might 
be preserved, with disclosure being available as of right in all 
other areas. Additional safeguards could be afforded by a 
speedy and inexpensive system of reviewing administrative deci-
sions against disclosure. Depending on the degree to which the 
separation of powers doctrine was applied in the consociational 
system, other forms of internal (that is non-public) monitoring 
of the administration could be instituted, such as investigatory 
,functions for legislative committees,to ensure that proper effect 
is being given to legislation and that its objects are not being 
frustrated by bureaucratic obstructionism,2 and to supervise 
more closely delegated legislation. 
1. See above, 433. 
2. Mathews 'Monitoring the Administration' op cit 140-142. 
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An open administration in these areas would be of general bene-
fit to the public, but a more immediate need for openness occurs 
once an individual is involved in a specific dispute ~ith the 
administration. In this administrative law area there is at 
present a great deal of needless secrecy in South Africa. Thus 
while the disclosure of documents is of importance at an early 
stage of administrative proceedings, there is no general right 
of discovery in South Africa;1 and although the courts are aware 
of the need for disclosure 2 they are at times reluctant to order 
it. 3 The furnishing by an administrative body of reasons for 
its decisions is also an important source of information in re-
lation to possible appeal or review proceedings. At common law 
it is not necessary for an administrative body to give reasons 
and there is an unfortunate tendency not to do so unless com-
4 pelled by statute, and even then, at times, to furnish inade-
quate reasons. 5 The courts have refrained from discouraging 
this practice of non-disclosure by drawing an adverse inference 
from the ~bsence of reasons; they have gone no further than re-
garding it as a · factor to be taken into account where there is / 
an allegation of improper purpose, bad faith or bias, and there 
is evidence aliunde to support such allegation. 6 The courts 
could also play a constructive role in opening the administra-
tion by virtue of their common law power to overrule the state's 
objection to the disclosure of evidence on the grounds of state 
privileg~,7 except where privilege is claimed on the basis that 
1 . Huyser v LoU\v 1955 (2) SA 321 (T). 
2. Loxton v Kenhardt Liquor Licensing Board 1942 AD 275. 
3. Minister van Justisie v Alexander 1975 (4) SA 530 (AD). See H. Corder 'The content of the audi alteram partem rule in South African adminis-trative law' 1980 THR-HR 156 at 164-7. 
4. See M. Wiechers Administratiefreg (1973) 222; L. Rose-Innes Judicial Review of Administrative Tribunals in South Africa (1973) 189-200. 
5. Steyn v Estate Agents Board 1980 (2) SA 334 (T). On the distinction between 'reasons' and 'information', and its significance - see L. Rose-Innes op cit 191-193. 
6. Pretoria North To~~ Council v A.I. Ice Cream Factory Ltd 1953 (3) SA 1 (AD); Winter v Administrator-in-Executive Committee 1973 (1) SA 873 (AD). 
7. Van der Linde v Calitz 1967 (2) SA 239 (AD); Geldenhuys v Pretorius 1 9 7 1 ( 2 ) SA 227 ( 0) . 
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disclosure would affect the 'securitv 
( 
of the state' in 'which 
the have such residual 1 In all these case courts no power. 
areas of administrative proceedings there would be no irrecon-
cilability between greater open government and the principles 
of consociationalism. The same can be said of other secrecy-
inducing factors encountered in the judicial process - the wide 
test used for contempt of court,2 and judicial acceptance of 
the principle that a minister defamed by criticism levelled at 
the cabinet can institute a personal action,3 despite the fact 
that the gov~rnment itself cannot be defamed. 4 And the judicial 
process can be manipulated in other ways to encourage secrecy in 
government: the use of commissions of enquiry to put political 
issues 'on ice' and prevent their public discussion can be judi-
cially buttressed through enforcement of the contempt of com-
mission rule,S and investigative journalism can be inhibited 
through the use of the courts to force revelation of reporters' 
sources. 6 None of these practices can be justified solely by 
reference to the principles of consociationalism and could 
therefore all be modified in a consociational system to create 
a more open adfuinistration. 
It can be asserted, in conclusion, that the secrecy inherent In 
the normative consociational model has negative implications for 
the popular control of the central executive authority, but not 
necessarily for other branches or levels of government. The 
analysis has shown that many of the negative restrictions on 
1. S 29 of the General Laws Amendment Act No 101 of 1969, as amended by s 2S of the General Laws Amendment Act No 102 of 1972. 
2. That is, conduct with a tendency to influence the courts (S v Van Niekerk 1972 (3) SA 711 (AD» rather than a narrower test of whether it constitu-ted a real risk of prejudice. See J. Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978) 298-299. 
3. South African Associated Newspapers Ltd v Estate Pelser 1975 (4) SA 797 (AD); see C. Forsyth 'Recent Judicial Attitudes to Free Speech' 94 (1977) SALJ 19. 
4. Die Spoorbond and anor v South African Railways & Harbours 1946 AD 999. 
5. In terms of the Commissions Act No 8 of 1947 and the regulations framed in terms thereof. For a description of the usual regulations and their significance for secrecy see K. Stuart The Newspaperman's Guide to the Law (2 ed, 1977) 101-102. Because a commission appointed by the State President is not a quasi-jUdicial body the public has no right of access to its record. Bell v Van Rensburg NO 1971 (3) SA 693 (C). 
6. In terms of s 205 read with s 189 of the Criminal Procedure Act No 51 of 1977. In many jurisdictions (Sweden, United States) reporters are pro-tected from revealing their sources. D. Rowat (ed) Administrative Secrecy in Developed Countries (1979) 9. 
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open government in South Africa ~ould find no inherent justifi-
cation in the principles of consociationalism, nor are those 
principles incompatible with laws conferring a positive right 
to information. Indeed the consociational model points to new 
forms of responsible government to replace those which have be-
come ineffective in modern political systems' - the devolution 
of policy formulation to administrative agencies and para-
statals, greater popular consultation and participation in these 
agencies, breaking down the anonymity of the bureaucracy, and 
making the exercise of discretionary power rational, public and 
open to criticism. These features have some affinity with the 
concept of participatory democracy,2 with its emphasis on direct 
citizen participation in administrative decision-making, local 
authorities, neighbourhood movements and the industrial work 
place. Developments in these directions might even tend to 
weaken traditional lines of responsibility, but could introduce 
more suitable replacements. 
/ 
5. Citizenship 
In the previous section reference was made to the recent phenome-
non in South Africa of 'internationalising' political relation-
ships along consociational lines, and to the consequences of this 
trend for the popular control of government. The government has 
made use of the symbols and terminology of international law in 
an attempt to remove matters of potential conflict from the arena 
of domestic politics to the field of 'international relations'. 
Another important aspect in this process is the use and manipula-
tion of concepts of nationality and citizenship, which has an im-
portant role in South Africa's version of consociationalism. Bv 
~ 
reference to these concepts it is possible to add a useful addi-
'tional perspective to South Africa's constitutional politics -
they provide a key to an understanding 'of both the constitutional 
developments of the past, and the likely developments of the 
future. This is also an important area as far as the govern-
ment's attempted legitimisation of its policies is concerned. 
1. Cf W.B.B. Dean's challenging paper 'The Administration: Control and Participation - Some Preliminary Thoughts' in Boulle and Baxter op cit 109-127. 
2. Cf C.B. MacPherson The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (1977) 93-~15. Thes: institutional changes clearly a~sume significant changes ~n the publlc consciousness. 
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At the outset it is important to provide some terminological 
clarity to this topic because constitutionalists, politicians 
and statutory draftsmen have in the past tended to blur the 
distinction between 'nationality' and 'citizenship'. 'Nation-
ality' denotes essentially a continuing legal relationship be-
tween an individual and the particular state of which he is a 
national;' although matters of nationality are regulated main-
ly by municipal law, it has predominantly an international law 
significance, in that it entitles the individual to travel faci-
lities, diplomatic protection abroad, and the right of re-entry 
into the state of which he is a national. 'Citizenship', on 
the other hand, denotes the status of an individual within a 
particular political community; it has exclusively a municipal 
law significance in that it determines the extent of an indivi-
dual's political, civil and socio-economic rights within the state 
of which he is a citizen, and these rights are subject to fluc-
tuation over time. Weis observes that conceptually and lin-
guistically the terms emphasise different aspects of the same 
notion: state membership.2 'Nationality' stresses the inter-
/ 3 
national, 'citizenship' the national, municipal aspect. While 
the two terms overlap, 'nationality' is clearly a wider concept 
than 'citizenship': all citizens of a state will ipso facto be 
nationals, but not all nationals need be citizens 4 (although in 
most jurisdictions this will be the case). Thus those nationals 
enjoying full political, civil and socio-economic rights accord-
ing to the municipal laws of a state can be described as 'citi-
zen-nationals' . While international law has various rules and 
conventions pertaining to nationality and citizenship, it recog-
nises the fundamental right of sovereign states to regulate 
1. D.P. O'eonnell vol 2 International Law (2 ed, 1970) 670ff; M. 
Akehurst A Modern Introduction to International Law (3 ed, '977) 83; 
L. Oppenheim vol 1 International Law (7 ed, 1948) 585ff. 
·2. P. Weis Nationality am Statelessness in International Law (2 ed, 1979) 
4-5. 
3. South African writers tend now to use the terms in these senses. See 
W. Olivier's chapter 'Burgerskap' in M. Wiechers Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 
344ff; C. Schmidt 'Citizenship and Nationality' in W.A. Joubert (ed) 
vol 2 The Lay,1 of South Africa 260; H. Booysens Volkereg - 'n Inleiding 
(1980) 108. 
4. The corollary is that loss of nationality always involves loss of 
citizenship, while the converse is not necessarily the case. 
490. 
these matters in terms of their own municipal la~,1 although 
there is a modern tendency for international law to restrict 
the discretion of states in matters of nationality.2 
South African constitutionalists have avoided developing a 
theory of citizenship, and have tended to analyse it as a juri-
dical concept without regard to the various elements of citi-
zenship. There are basically three such elements, the civil, 
the political and the social, and the citizenship complex deve-
loped chronologically through these three phases. 3 In the 
first phase the emphasis was on the civil rights of the citizen, 
the protection of which became an obligation of government: 
religious rights, freedom of the individual, and freedom of 
speech and thought. The second phase in the development of 
citizenship concerned participation in public affairs and in-
volved the political rights: extension of the franchise, free-
dom of assembly, and the right to participate in political in-
stitutions. The third phase is concerned with the social ele-
ment of citizenship, the welfare of citizens; here the emphasis 
/ is on the right to economic welfare, education and health ser-
vices and to 'share ... in the social heritage and the life of 
a civilised being,.4 The public institutions associated with 
these three phases are the courts, the legislature and other 
political institutions, and the educational and social welfare 
systems, "respectively. As Wiechers observes,S 
'The reason why citizenship is considered a crucial 
factor in the equal distribution of power is that 
citizenship, as a juridical concept, contains within 
1. Weis op cit 65ff; O'Connell op cit 678-9; D.W. Greig International Law (2 ed, 1976) 370. 
2. I. Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (2 ed, 1973) 367ff; Akehurst op cit 98-99. 
3. See T. Parsons The System of Modern Societies (1971) 20ff; R. Dahrendorf Society and Democracy in Germany (1967) 70ff. 
4. Dahrendorf ibid. 
5. M. Wiechers 'Citizenship and IntergrouD Accommodation in Plural Socie-ties' in N. Rhoodie (ed) Intergroup Accommodation in Plural Societies (1978) 430. 
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itself the three components which are supposed to 
comprise the total of a subject's public law compe-
tences, that is political, civil and social rights.' 
According to the pluralist model citizenship implies impartial 
treatment by the law, in politics, and in the social context, for 
all citizens of a particular country.1 
Consociationalism also has no developed theory of citizenship, 
a state of affairs partially attributable to the fact that it 
has been approached from a behavioural-attitudinal and not a 
constitutional-juridical perspective. In its democratic 
variant it presupposes a single nationality as well as an equal 
citizenship status for all members of a nation state. However, 
implicit in the segmental autonomy principle is the notion of 
'separate but equal' political and social rights, particularly 
as far as segmental matters are concerned. The equalisation of 
such rights, in the normative consociational model, is assured 
through such devices as the proportional allocation of public 
funds. Thus although the segmental autonomy principle might 
/ 
result in the political rights of citizenship being exercised 
primarily through different subordinate political institutions, 
this should not imply a differential political status for dif-
ferent groups of citizens; by and large these conditions have -
been satisfied in the empirical consociations. Likewise equal 
citizen participation in national affairs is ensured by the 
principles of the grand coalition, proportionality and the mutual 
veto. 
The best developed system of citizenship in a consociational sys-
tem is found in Switzerland, and brief reference will be made to 
its main features; the relevance of this comparative exercise 
is heightened by the fact that the Swiss 'canton system' has 
received approving reference from government spokesmen in the 
- 2 
past. A Swiss national is entitled to three types of citizen-
ship.3 The first of these is communal citizenship which follows 
1. J. Degenaar 'Pluralism and the Plural Society' in A. de Crespigny and 
R. Schrire The Government and Politics of South Africa (1978) 223 at 
236; and see chapter 2, above. 
2. Eg Dr. P. Koornhof. See the references in Royal Institute of Internation-
al Affairs A Survey of Proposals for the Constitutional Develooment ~n 
South Africa (1980) 9. . 
3. See C. Hughes The Federal Constitution of Switzerland (1954) 52-53; G.A. 
Codding The Federal Government of Switzerland (1965) 47-48; H. Huber 
How Switzerland is Governed (1968) 16-20. 
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the ius sanguinis rule 1 and is inalienable during an indivi-
'= 
dual's lifetime. Apart from its symbolic and emotional sig-
nificance, communal citizenship entitles an individual to the 
support of his commune of origin if indigent, but this historic 
right is of diminished contemporary importance with many Swiss 
living outside their citizen communes and an increasing number 
of arrangements for the reciprocal sharing of welfare costs. 
But citizenship of a commune is a necessary precondition for 
cantonal citizenship, the second type of Swiss citizenship, 
which also follows the ius sanguinis rule. Cantonal citizen-
ship, however, is of even less practical significance than 
communal citizenship, because the constitution provides that 
Swiss citizens may settle in any part of the country2 where, 
within three months of settling, they ~ill acquire the right to 
vote in cantonal and communal affairs. 3 Finally every citizen 
of a canton is also a Swiss citizen,4 and the constitution 
guarantees to all Swiss citizens equality before the lawS and 
equal treatment in the legislative and judicial proceedings of 
all cantons. 6 · The interdependence of these three forms of 
/ 
citizenship can be illustrated by the fact that an alien can 
only acquire Swiss citizenship (or nationality) by naturalisa-
tion if he has first acquired communal and cantonal citizenship. 
But although for historic reasons Swiss citizens may be distin-
guished according to their internal communal and cantonal citi-
zenship, these distinctions do not have much practical signifi-
cance because the right of political participation at all levels 
of government is determined by an individual's place of domicile, 
and the non-political rights attaching to communal and cantonal 
citizenship are not of great importance. Within each level of 
government there is no hierarchical ordering of citizenships and 
all Swiss nationals may be classified as full-citizen nationals. 
The same position prevails in most other composite states, al-
.though nationality is usually a matter within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the central governmen~ and state nationality 
usually carries unit citizenship, subject to additional condi-
1. That is by descent, in this case through the father. The ius soli 
(place of birth) principle does not generally operate in Switzerland. 
2. Art 45. 
3. Art 43.2; political rights may not be exercised ~n more than one canton. 
4. Art 43. 1 • 5. Art 4. 
6. Art 60. 
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. d 1 tions such as reSl ence. In the United States the constitu-
tion did not originally make clear whether national citizenship 
was · anterior to state citizenship, or vice versa, and in the 
celebrated Dred Scott case 2 the Supreme Court accepted the 
priority of state citizenship. The Fourteenth Amendment,3 how-
eve r, rev e r sed t his de c is ion, and pro vi de d for the fir s t t i m e a 
definition of citizenship which made national citizenship an-
terior to that of the states, so that the citizenship of blacks 
had, perforce, to be recognised;4 state citizenship has little 
contemporary significance other than in relation to residence 
within a state, and does not denote a differential political 
status. In other federal systems, such as Australia and Canada, 
nationality is also regulated by the federal government and in-
dividual state citizenship is of comparatively little importance. S 
Within most jurisdictions, then, all nationals are also full-
citizens, and the terms nationality and citizenship can be used 
interchangeably. 
In South Africa . the distinction between nationality and citizen-
/ 
ship has always been of greater significance because of the dif-
ferential access to political, economic and social rights pro-
vided for by South African municipal law. 6 As a general rule 
nationality can be acquired without regard to colour or ethnicity 
according to the ius soli and ius sanguinis principles;7 however, 
the acquisition of South African nationality through naturalisa-
tion, whether on voluntary application or involuntary operation 
1. Weis op cit 13-15. 
2. Dred Scott v Sandford 19 How. 393 (1857). 
3. The Fourteenth Amendment, section 1, of the D.S. Constitution, adopted 
in 1868. 
4. See C.R. Pritchett The American Constitution (2 ed, 1968) 759-761. 
5. ef also par 11 arts 4 & 5 of the Belgium constitution and arts 4-6 of 
the Netherlands constitution. 
6. On South African nationality and citizenship generally see Schmidt op cit 
260-277; Wiechers op cit 344-396; W.R. Olivier 'n Juridiese evaluasie 
van burgerskap' 1979 TSAR 212-225, 1980 TSAR 22-31, 127-151. 
7. Nationality is regulated by the South African Citizenship Act No 44 of 
1949, one of the ma~y statutes contributing to the conceptual confusion 
between nationality and citizenship. 
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1 h h· 2 of law, is effectively precluded for those w 0 are not W lte. 
Likewise the loss of Sou~h African nationality, whether through 
renunciation, operation of law or administrative deprivation, 
operates on a non-discriminatory basis, save for the compulsory 
denationalisation of blacks only, which is a crucial component 
of the homelands' independence process. 3 But as far as the 
public law rights of citizenship are concerned South Africa has 
always differentiated among its nationals, and this has given 
rise to different types of citizenship.4 Thus as far as poli-
tical rights are concerned only whites have continuously en-
joyed electoral rights and ~he right to hold office in the main 
political institutions; they can thus be designated full-
citizen nationals. Coloureds in the Cape enjoyed electoral 
rights until the constitutional crisis, but since then have had 
no direct representation in the central organs of government 
and have never had access to public office, while neither In-
dians nor blacks had ever had effective political rights in the 
central government. On the basis of their political status 
the three non-white groups can thus be designated part - or non-
citizen nation~ls. Likewise the non-political rights of citi-
zenship avail the groups on a differential basis, ~n particular 
rights of movement, settlement, educational and social-welfare 
benefits, and employment and trading rights, and to a lesser 
extent civil rights. In terms of the constitutional system as 
a whole, coloured, Indian and black 'citizenship' has had a nega-
tive or exclusionary significance, and the government has 
attempted to give it a more positive orientation in the recent 
institutionalisation of its policies. 
1. Since 1978 certain white aliens become nationals after two years resi-
dence to make them eligible for military service - s 11A of Act No 44 
of 1949; (see House of Assembly Debates vol 5 col 2150 (1 March 1980); 
the provisions of this section were tempered somewhat by Act No 95 of 
1981. See also D.H. van Wyk 'The Ebb and Flow of South African 
Citizenship Law' 1978 SAYIL 148-152. On international law aspects 
of the involuntary nationalisation of aliens see Bro~~lie op cit 376-9. 
2. Ss 10 and 11A of Act No 44 of 1949 read with s 4(3)(b) of the Aliens 
Act No 1 of 1937. 
3. This matter is dealt with below. 
4. Wiechers op cit 386ff. 
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The first attempt to systematise a form of black citizenship 
can be dated to the passing of the Transkei Constitution Act 1 
and the Kational States Citizenship Act. 2 These statutes 
provided that all South African blacks would be citizens of 
one or other national state on the basis of birth, descent, 
place of domicile, and linguistic or cultural association. 3 
Homeland citizenship did not attribute to non-blacks, but it 
comprehensively affected all blacks, for whom there was no op-
tion save that of forfeiting citizenship of one homeland to ac-
quire that of another. 4 But the nationality of blacks at this 
stage was left unaffected, and it was expressly provided that 
homeland citizens would not be regarded as aliens in the repub-
lic,but would continue to enjoy the international law benefits 
of South African nationality.5 All South African blacks were 
now South African nationals but homeland citizens, and their 
political rights of citizenship would be exercised only through 
the homeland authorities. 6 Conversely~non-blacks could not ac-
quire the political rights of citizenship in a dependent home-
land through place of birth or domicile. As far as the non-
/ 
political rights of citizenship are concerned, the statutes 
purported to leave intact all 'existing rights, privileges or 
benefits,7 of homeland citizens, nor did they expressly affect 
the position of non-blacks resident in the national states. At 
this stage the main significance of homeland citizenship was 
that it further institutionalised the principle of political 
separation in South Africa: henceforth every black would be re-
quired to acquire an appropriate citizenship certificate 8 which 
would designate, inter alia, the regional/ethnic institution in 
which he could exercise political rights. 
1. Act No 48 of 1963. 
2. Act No 26 of 1970 which should be seen in conjunction with the National 
States Constitution Act No 21 of 1971. 
J. S 7(1) and (2) of Act No 48 of 1963 and s 3(1) and (2) of Act No 26 of 
1970. For some theoretical problems associated with these prov~s~ons 
see F. Venter 'Bantoeburgerskap en Tuis1andburgerskap' 1975 THR-HR 239- 253. 
4. S 4 of Act No 26 of 197D. 
5. S 7(3) of Act No 48 of 1973 and s 2(4) of Act No 26 of 1970. The term 
'alien' is defined in both the Aliens Act No 1 of 1937 (s 1) and Act No 
44 of 1949 (s 1) as a person who is not 'a South African citizen'; in 
the present context it clearly refers to a non-national. 
6. S 7(1) of Act No 48 of 1963 and s 2(3) of Act No 26 of 1970. See J.F.H. 
'A Transkeian Citizen of South African Nationality' 1963 THR-HR 44-49. 
7. S 7(4) of Act No 48 of 1963 and s 2(5) of Act No 26 of 1970. 
8 . . S 5 of Act No 26 of 1970. 
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The Status Acts 1 built on the existing citizenship legislation 
in that they denationalised all those "ho, according to its 
provisions, were citizens of the relevant national state immed-
iately before independence, as well as new categories of per-
sons, and conferred on them nationality of the independent 
state;2 the process has been described as the most comprehen-
sive transfer of nationality that legal draughtsmanship could 
achieve. 3 As far as South African municipal law was concerned 
these persons became aliens;4 furthermore the arrangement is 
of a self-perpetuating nature in that all future generations of 
blacks having the statutorily prescribed association with the 
independent national state will be regarded as aliens, irres-
pective of their place of birth or permanent residence. S As 
far as international law is concerned the position is slightly 
more complex: it is accepted that the power to denationalise, 
along with other matters of nationality, falls within the domes-
tic jurisdiction of an individual state,6 but this is subject 
to the existence of treaties for the elimination of stateless-
ness,7 the principles against arbitrary denationalisation on 
racial, ethnic~ religious or political grounds,8 and the fact 
that fqr it to be recognised by other states the denationalisa-
tion . should conform to the general principles of international 
1. Acts Nos 100 of 1976 (Transkei) , 89 of 1977 (Bophuthatswana), 100 of 
1979 (Venda) and 110 of 1981 (Ciskei). On the political manipulation 
preceding the Transkei Act see P. Laurence The Transkei - South Africa's 
Politics of Partition (1976) 109-118. 
2. S 6(1) read with Schedule B of each Act. In fact, however, a state de-
nationalising its nationals cannot ascribe to them nationality of another 
state, so that this second aspect is of no juridical significance. 
3. The Quail Report (1980) 43. 
4. For the sake of clarity they will be referred to as 'statutory aliens' 
to distinguish them from 'foreign aliens'. 
5. That is nationality would not attribute to those born in the republic 
after independence according to the ius soli principle in terms of s 3 
of Act No 44 of 1949; this assumes that the national state would confer 
nationality indefinitely according to the ius sanguinis principle, where-
as most countries, including South Africa (s 6 of Act No 44 of 1949), 
confer nationality by descent on only one generation. 
6. See D.P. O'Connell vol 2 International Law (2 ed, 1970) 678-9, 683; 
I. Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (2 ed, 1973) 376ff; 
M. Akehurst A Modern Introduction to International Law (3 ed, 1977) 87; 
G. Barrie Topical International Law (1979) 62; H. Booysen Volkereg - n 
Inleiding (1980) 108. 
7. See P. Weis Nationality and Statelessness in International Law (2 ed, 
1979) 126. 
8. See Art 9 of the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961; 
cf Art 1S of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. 
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1 law. Nominally the Status Acts do not denationalise on the 
grounds of colour or ethnicity but on the basis of language 
and culture, and they would seem to conform with the principles 
of international law. 2 But since the Status Acts are 'rooted 
in L~arlie!7 citizenship provisions which were founded on 
colour,3 and in practice apply to blacks only, it could be said 
that the y are discriminatory in effect and therefore in viola-
tion of international law principles. 4 However, the real ob-
jection to denationalisation is that it could result in state-
lessness~ and this requires separate consideration . 
. A..mong the many consequences of the homelands' nationali ty and 
citizenship arrangements statelessness is one of the more re-
mote problems for those concerned, and it can be dealt with 
fairly briefly. Statelessness will arise by operation of muni-
cipal law if an individual does not fulfill the nationality cri-
teria of any state, and in the present context would arise if 
an individual denationalised by a Status Act did not acquire 
nationality of the appropriate independent national state. An 
/ 
analysis of the two relevant sets of criteria shows that they 
complement each other to a large exten~ and they give rise to 
very few, if any, instances of statelessness. 6 This may be 
attributed to a compliant attitude thus far by the national 
states, as evidenced by their own criteria of nationality which 
1. Such as the doctrine of 'effective link' as laid down in the Nottebohm 
case 1955 ICJ Reports 4. See below, 498. 
2. See W.B. Olivier 'Statelessness and Transkeian Nationality' 1976 SAYIL 
143-154, and 'Bophuthatswana Nationality' 1977 SAYIL 108-118. 
3. W.H.B. Dean 'A Citizen of Transkei' 1978 CILSA 57 at 65. 
4. See J. Dugard 'South Africa's "Independent" Homelands: An Exercise in 
Denationalisation' 10 (1980) Denver Journal of International Law and 
Policy 11 at 26-27. The Status Act schedules do include non-blacks 
having linguistic or cultural associations with the relevant ethnic 
group, but the policy is clearly to denationalise only blacks and there 
is no instance of non-blacks being regarded as aliens because of this 
connection. 
5. See O'Connell op cit 684. 
6. See Dean op cit 62-63; Olivier 'Statelessness and Transkeian National-
ity' op cit 154; Dugard op cit 27. The possibilities of dual nation-
ality are less remote, but also less significant. 
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1 
have replaced those provided in the Status Acts; but should 
2 
these criteria be unilaterally narrowed in the future, those 
denationalised by the national state would not, in terms of 
South African law, revert to South African nationals, but would 
3 be rendered stateless. Statelessness in turn has implications 
for the right of admission to a national state, the freedom of 
movement between states, and state protection in the internation-
al sphere. However de facto statelessness could also arise in 
international law in the following circumstances: if South 
Africa's denationalisation process is not recognised as lawful, 
if blacks born and resident in the republic are not regarded as 
having the necessary 'genuine link' with a national state to 
qualify as its national,4 or if the independence of the national 
states fails for an indefinite period to secure recognition by 
the international community.S In all these cases South Africa 
would exercise no diplomatic protection over those affected and 
international law would not recognise the right of any other 
state to protect them, and they would be effectively stateless. 
/ 
The more immediate consequences of the nationality/citizen 
arrangements relate to the political, social and economic rights 
of blacks within the republic. The government's policy is that 
1. See ss 57-59 of the Transkeian Constitution Act of 1976 and the Citizen-
ship of Transkei Act No 26 of 1976; s 80 of the Bophuthatswana Consti-
tution Act of 1977 and the Bophuthatswana Constitution Act No 19 of 
1978; and s 60 of the Venda Constitution Act of 1979. 
2. Cf D.H. van Wyk 'A Note on Bophuthatswana Citizenship' 1978 SAYIL 163-9. 
3. In 1978 provision was made for those denationalised by the Status Acts 
to regain South African nationality subject to certain conditions, in-
cluding the acquisition of citizenship of one or other non-independent 
homeland; this right avails only former South African nationals and not 
future generations of statutory aliens, and would be effective only until 
the homeland in question acquired independence. S 3(3) of Act No 26 of 
1970 introduced by Act No 13 of 1978. 
4. This was the ruling in the Nottebohm case 1955 lCJ Reports 4, although 
the exact scope of the decision is not clear. See Akehurst op cit 99, 
Bro~~lie op cit 393-407. As the ius sanguinis rule is used cumulatively 
wit~ succeeding generations the link with the national state will become 
more and more remote. 
5. Dugard op cit 28. 
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the political rights of blacks will be exercised only In the 
national states and not in the political institutions of South 
Africa. In an important symbolic sense the denationalisation 
process legitimises the implementation of this policy, because 
it is easier to justify the exclusion of statutory aliens from 
political rights, than the exclusion of non-citizen nationals; 
moreover their participation in separate political authorities 
can be legi timised in the name of 'self-determination' .1 The 
South African government's strategy, as evidenced by recent con-
stitutional developments and ministerial pronouncements, is 
that when the process of 'internal decolonisation' has run its 
course there will be no black nationals of South Africa who 
could make a claim to the political rights of citizenship. It 
is generally recognised that the political status of aliens can 
be defined by municipal law, and it is a principle of interna-
tional law that sovereign states are not required to accord 
political rights to aliens within their jurisdiction; in the 
South African context this rule can be invoked in support of 
denying statutory aliens, on the basis of their 'nationality' 
and not their ~olour, the right to elect or be elected to the 
central political institutions. But the process has other con-
sequences extending beyond the symbolic: as a substitute for a 
c I a i m to f ut u rep 0 1 i tic a I rig h t sin the I c omm 0 n are a " i t pro -
vides for blacks inferior rights in a nominally sovereign, but 
financiaily dependent and jurisdictionally limited, legislature, 
which is remote from many electors; and the process divides the 
black constituency, pitting sections thereof against one another, 
and decreases the sense of urgency to resolve internal political 
problems. In the words of well-known commentators, 
1. The most well-known is that of Dr. C. Mulder (House of Assembly 
Debates vol 2 col 579 (7 Feb 1978); see also the preamble of the 
draft constitution of 1979 and the third and fourth points of the 
government's twelve point plan (above, 342). 
2. A.C. Evans 'The Political Status of Aliens in International Law, 
Municipal Law and European Community Law' 1981 International and Com-
parative Law Quarterly 20-41. 
3. Cf the provisions which exclude a:iens from the state presidency, 
cabinet, parliament and president's council (ss 8(4), 20(3), 46(c) 
and 103(c) of Act No 32 of 1961 respectively) and the franchise (s 3 
(1) of the Electoral Act No 45 of 1979), although in all cases there 
are additional qualifications besides nationality. 
4. Quail Report 39. 
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'the semantics of international law are being used 
to create fictions on levels of constitutional 
development so as to solve vexing political prob-
lems' .1 
The only exception to this arrangement consists in the limited 
local government rights afforded by the Community Councils Act
2 
to both black nationals and resident statutory aliens; but 
while this feature is at odds with the internal logic of the 
government's citizenship policy, it should be seen in the light 
of the very limited functions and powers of the community coun-
cils. 3 
As far as the non-political rights of citizenship are concerned 
the government has not been prepared to take the national/alien 
distinction to the same logical conclusion as with political 
rights, although the distinction has given it new forms of con-
trol and manipulation. 4 The Status Acts include a provision 
purporting to retain all 'existing rights, privileges or bene-
fits ... except · as regards citizenship'S for those denationalised 
/ 
thereby, provided they were resident in the republic at the com-
mencement of the respective acts. Apart from the fact that - t~is 
proviso affects only the present generation of republican resi-
dents and does not avail residents of the national states, its 
scope is . by no means clear. 6 In the light of the preceding 
1. M. Wiechers and D.H. van Wyk 'The Republic of Bophuthatswana Constitution' 
1977 SAYIL 8S at 86. Booysens (op cit 401-402) is the most extreme in 
arguing that relationships between South Africa and independent homelands 
should be seen purely in terms of international law concepts. Wiechers 
(Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981) 502) rightly rejects this approach. 
2. Act No 125 of 1977 (s 3(5)); on the face of it future generations of 
statutory aliens would not acquire these rights. There are precedents 
for allowing resident aliens to participate in local government elections, 
for example the Irish Republic and Switzerland (in some cantons). 
3. See above, 179-182. 
4. N. Stultz (Transkei's Half Loaf (1980) 110ff) emphasises that many of 
the consequences of homeland independence and denationalisation have 
been deferred to a future uncertain date. 
5. S 6(3) of the Transkei, Venda and Ciskei Acts and s 6(4) of the Bophu-
thatswana Act. 
6. See Wiechers op cit 390-393; Booysens op cit 409-410. 
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analysis It has no bearing on the political status of those 
to whom it applies, but it could hardly be said they do not 
become aliens because of this provision. 1 In the only case 
in which it has been judicially interpreted 2 it was held that 
this provision preserved an individual's right to permanent 
residence in the republic,3 notwithstanding the passing of the 
Status of Bophuthatswana Act. It also appears that the so-
4 
called 'section ten rights' of blacks to reside in urban areas 
were intended to be preserved, and in 1978 the legislature 
narrowed the definition of 'foreign blacks' (who do not quali-
fy for 'section ten rights') so as to exclude the present 
generation of statutory aliens;5 'section tenners' are in turn 
eligible for other rights, such as home ownership under the_ 
6 ninety-nine year leasehold scheme. However, all future gene-
rations of statutory aliens will be in the same position as 
foreign aliens, and in terms of the present legal order will 
require individual administrative approval or a general minis-
terial exemption 7 in order to reside permanently in urban areas. 
Some indication - of the government's intention can be gleaned 
/ 
from the treaties and conventions entered into between the re-
1. Cf W.B.B. Dean 'A Citizen of Transkei' 1978 CILSA 57 at 58. 
2. Ex parte Moseneke 1979 (4) SA 884 (T). It is not certain that this 
generous interpretation would extend to other issues such as deportation. 
3. That is for the purposes of the Attorneys Admission Act No 23 of 1934 
(since repealed), but this does not necessarily include 'permanent resi-
dence' for other matters such as naturalisation. 
4. S 10 of the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act No 25 of 1945. 
5. S 12 of Act No 25 of 1945 as amended by Act No 12 of 1978. 
6. S 6A of Act No 25 of 1945; in terms of s 1 of this Act the scheme avails 
only those with s 10(1)(a) or (b) 'rights'. In Rikhoto v East Rand Ad-
ministration Board and anor Case No 9290/81, 22 Sept 1981 (WLD) it was 
held for the first time that contract workers could acquire s 10(1)(b) 
'rights'. -In terms of s 6A(5) (c) leasehold rights can be let or be-
queathed only to 'qualified persons' and thus not even to a wife or 
child who qualifies in their own right for urban residence under s 10(1) 
(c). Cf Komani v Bantu Affairs Administration Board 1980 (4) SA 448 
(AD) which reversed the decision in Komani v Bantu Affairs Administration 
Board 1979 (1) SA 508 (C). See M.L. Dixon 'Black Residence Rights: The 
Appellate Division on Section 10(1)' 90 (1981) SALJ 42-55. 
7. In terms of ss 12 and 41A respectively of Act No 25 of 1945; there re-
mains an administrative discretion to reverse both types of concession. 
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public and the national states Khich regulate matters such as 
the sojourn of statutory aliens in South Africa, and the cross-
ing of inter-state boundaries,1 and the statutory provisions 
. b h' 2 B 4= th purportlng to uttress suc treatles. ut none o. ese 
rights or privileges are inviolable and they could be abolished at 
any time by the South African government on an ad hoc or sys-
tematic basis to give greater effect to the nationaljalien dis-
tinction. 3 
The extent of the ne~ forms of control afforded to the South 
African government can be shown in relation to the single issue 
of influx control. Historically the movement of blacks gene-
rally, and into urban areas in particular, has been statutorily 
regulated. The main contemporary source of influx control is 
the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act,4 section ten of which 
prevents blacks from settling in prescribed urban areas unless 
they qualify in terms of birth, long employment or dependence on 
someone qualified in their own right; this provision is comple-
mented by section 29 of the act, which allows for the removal of 
/ 
1. See Booysens op cit 412-417; the Quail Report 40; J. Dugard 'South 
Africa's "Independent" Homelands: An Exercise in Denationalisation' 10 
(1980) Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 11 at 31-2. 
Against the background of the Quail Report's unequivocal rejection of the 
citizenship aspects of the earlier Status Acts it was expected that the 
Ciskei · would demand a different arrangement, but it accepted the standard-
form Status Act which gave effect to none of the commission's recommenda-
tions. Instead a convention was entered into between the two govern-
ments retaining for Ciskeian nationals r'esidential rights, free movement 
across boundaries, preferential employment opportunities, use of com-
munity benefits, and social benefits. It was announced that other 
national states could acquire similar privileges and that the convention 
might be re-enacted in the constituent charter of the constellation of 
states. See House of Assembly Debates vol 9 col 4939-4943 (28 September 
1981). 
2. But individuals derive no rights from the treaties (Pan American World 
Airways Incorporated v SA Fire & Accident Insurance Co Ltd. 1965 (3) 
SA 150 (AD~; in Maluleke v Minister of Internal Affairs 1981 (1) SA 
707 CB.S.C.) the subordinacy of these treaties to national law was em-
phasised by the Bophuthatswana Court which upheld action taken under the 
Bophuthatswana Aliens Act against the applicant, a South African national. 
3. The Designated Neighbouring Countries Act No 41 of 1978 empowers the 
State President to proclaim the provisions of the Act applicable to any 
independent state, thereby causing laws relating to entry into, sojourn 
in and departure from the republic applicable in respect of such state's 
nationals only in so far as they are not inconsistent with treaty agree-
ments between the two countries. The act is a sequel to an agreement 
between the republic and Bophuthatswana, but does not provide immunity 
against unilateral rescission of these agreements. See D.H. van \~yk 
'The Ebb and Flow of South African Citizenship Law' 1978 SAYIL 148 at 
149-150. --
4. Act No 25 of 1945. 
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b 1 a c k s fro m u r ban are as, in c 1 u din g the s e \\' h 0 q u a 1 i f y un de r sec-
tion ten, if there is a finding at an administrative hearing 
that they are 'idle and undesirable'. The implications of the 
national/alien, distinction for this arrangement are that it 
provides more effective mechanisms of influx control and gives 
the system greater apparent legitimacy. Thus not only can the 
movement of statutory aliens be controlled at border posts with 
support from the international law principle that a state may 
prevent aliens from entering its territory,' but the policing 
of such movement is shared to some extent by homeland govern-
ments. 2 Moreover for the removal of statutory aliens from the 
'common area' the government can make use of the existing non-
o 3 h' h d ' discriminatory mechanisms for deportatIon, W lC 0 not requIre 
4 the prior hearing involved in section 29 proceedings, and are 
not subject to judicial review. 5 Again this can be legitimated 
1. D.P. O'Connell vol 2 International Law (2 ed, 1970) 706; I. Brownlie 
Principles of Public International Law (2 ed, 1973) 505; Booysens op 
cit 112-3; H. Akehurst A Hodern Introduction to International Law (3 ed, 
'977) 88. M~iuleke v Hinister of Internal Affairs 1981 (1) SA 707 
(B.S.C.) . 
2. In view of the financial indebtedness of the national states to South 
Africa they are likely to accept this function as if acting for the re-
public on an agency basis. 
3. Ss 42-45 of the Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulation Act No 
59 of 1972 (s 45 allows the minister to order the deportation of aliens 
'in the public interest') and s 14 of the Internal Security Act No 44 
of 1950. The former act was used for the deportation of squatters 
from Nyanga in 1981. 
4. The limitations of such an enquiry must be conceded: it is not a judi-
cial hearing, the rules of evidence do not apply, and there is a rever-
sal of the normal onus (s 29(6)(b». Nevertheless the heB:ring must be 
fair. Some guidelines were set out in Hoeca v Addisionele Kommissaris, 
Bloemfontein 1981 (2) SA 357 (0); see also S v l'iKabinde 1967 (2) SA 
157 (T», S v Mangena 1978 SA 585 (T). 
5. Orders under s 29 are reviewed by a Supreme Court judge who may set 
aside or vary them; in the course of such reviews the judiciary has 
commented on the harshness of the process and its consequences. See 
Hashe and Others v Cape Town Municipality and Others 1927 AD 380, S v 
Nkabinde 1967 (2) SA 157 (T) and In re Dube 1979 (3) SA 820 (N). On 
the other hand there exists an ouster clause in respect of decisions 
taken under s 45 of Act No 59 of 1972 and deportees are not entitled to 
the audi alteram partern rule or to reasons for the minister's decision. 
Deportation orders could only be challenged on the notoriously narrow 
grounds that they were taken in bad faith or that the functionary failed 
to apply his mind. Union Government v Fakir 1923 AD 466, Kairainsammy 
v Principal Immigration Officer 1923 AD 673, and see Steyn Uitleg van 
Wette (5 ed, 1981) 285-289; aliter the position when a permanent resi-
dence permit is cancelled (s 8(2) of Act No 1 of 1937): this is a quasi-
judicial discretion and the audi alterarn partern principle applies .. 
Everett v Minister of the Interior 1981 (2) SA 453 (C». There is an 
extreme Judlclal restra1nt 1n respect of ~eportation orders in the United 
, Kingdom. Schmidt v The Home Secretary 11969} 1 AIR 904. 
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in terms of basic principles of international law
1 
and these 
principles also require the national state concerned to readmit 
its o~~ nationals. 2 Thus the South African government is af-
forded greater manoeuvrability in controlling the movement of 
homeland blacks and of regulating the labour force, and can do 
so without overt reference to factors of colour or ethnicity; 
in particular: at times of political instability or economic 
recession statutory aliens can be returned to their national 
states, in apparent conformity with principles of international 
law. 3 These new arrangements conform to the Wiehahn-Riekert 
strategy of abolishing racial divisions in the . labour market, 
but intensifying the system of influx control. 4 . On the other 
hand the government has shown no commitment to treating statutory 
aliens according to the minimum standards required by interna-
tional law~ and the discriminatory legislation applying to black 
nationals continues to apply to them as well;6 although they 
enjoy some preferential treatment over black foreign aliens they 
are clearly in an inferior public law position to both citizen-
nationals and white aliens. 
/ 
1. See the references at 503, above. However the right to expel an 
alien is not as well established in international law as the right to 
exclude him, and even where the right to expel exists the manner of 
expulsion can give rise to a claim for compensation. 
2. Akehurst op cit 84-85; and see A.C. Evans 'The Political Status of 
Aliens ' in International Law, }1unicipal Law and European Community Law' 
1981 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 20 at 21. 
3. That the economic system will not allow this to occur on a mass scale 
is self-evident, but that it occurs on ad hoc and selective bases is 
sho~~ by the fate of the Johannesburg municipal strikers in 1980 and 
the Nyanga squatters in 1981. And see the Quail Report 46-48. 
4. On the Wiehahn and Riekert reports see above, 265 to 270. The 
latter report also envisaged individual employers playing a greater 
role ,in the enforcement of influx control. 
5. International law requires that states treat resident aliens according 
to the 'minimum international standard', or alternatively the 'national 
standard', which can be higher or lower than the former. Failing to 
comply with the applicable standard engages international responsibility. 
See Akehurst op cit 90-92; Brovmlie op cit 509-514; O'Connell op cit 
693ff; Booysens op cit 112-113. 
6. See the Quail Report 46; Dugard op cit 30-33. 
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Several aspects of the preceding arrangements show an apparent 
affinity with the principles of consociationalism. Firstly, 
as has already been shown, the 'internationalisation' of poli-
tical relationships through the homelands programme and its 
citizen features takes on the 'summit diplomacy' dimensions of 
the consociational model. Secondly, the compulsory conferment 
of citizenship and then nationality on the various black ethnic 
groups leads to the creation of statutorily-defined 'segments', 
for whom self-government and independence resemble forms of 
'segmental autonomy'; to further the comparison, members of the 
segments exercise political rights through the respective seg-
mental authorities, regardless of their place of work or resi-
dence, and these authorities have jurisdiction over members of 
the segment on the basis of the personality principle. And 
thirdly, the mooted prospect of a common 'constellation nation-
ality' for all inhabitants of the republic and national states, 
with the retention of separate citizenships of the constituent 
parts with concomitant political rights, bears some resemblance 
to a consociatjonal system operating in a nation state. But 
on closer analysis the comparisons prove to be largely illusion-
ary. The vast difference in quality between citizenship rights 
in the republic and the national states destroys the notion of 
'separate but equal' citizenships; neither the existing dis-
pensation, nor the proposed constellation arrangement, makes any 
provision for the representation of all citizens in joint poli-
tical institutions as would be required for a democratic form of 
consociationalism - in fact particularly at the pre-independence 
stage inter-segmental contact takes place severally, and not 
jointly, between representatives of South Africa,on one hand,and 
the national states, on the other; while there may be some demo-
graphic balance between the citizen-blocs, there can be no ques-
tion of equal bargaining status in view of the republic's com-
.plete economic domination of the region; the compulsory confer-
ment of citizenship and nationality is irreconcilable with the 
1. In 1979 the Niewoudt Commission was appointed to investigate nation-
ality and citizenship matters; it reported to the cabinet in 1980 
but its recommendations have not been released. It was speculated at 
the time that the co~~ission would recommend a common confederal nation-
ality but this possibility now seems more remote. In any event it 
negates the government's standpoint that the national states are fully 
independent in international law. See above) 283. 
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consociational principle of free political association and the 
pluralist model generally; 1 and finally the rigidity of the 
system is exposed by the SKiss consociational system which 
allows all citizens political, social and economic rights in 
their places of domicile, regardless of their communal or can-
tonal citizenship. And from a narrower institutional point of 
view the system has many inconsistencies - in fact the citizen} 
national distinction is consistently applied only is so far as 
it serves to deprive blacks of political rights in the central 
government, irrespective of their places of permanent residence 
or employment. But where the distinction would be dysfunctional 
to the economic system, or where a-political supra~national 
matters are concerned, the distinction is not rigidly maintained. 
As far as non-blacks are concerned it is clear that whites, 
co10ureds and Indians are all South African nationals, but that 
there is a difference in each group's citizenship status. In 
terms of their present political position it would be premature 
to speak of a coloured or Indian 'citizenship' but to the ex-
/ ' 
tent that there are, or have been, subordinate representative 
institutions for coloureds and Indians it is possible to speak 
of an inchoate 'citizenship'; and in so far as they have more 
substantial access to residential, housing, educational and wel-
fare facili ties than blacks, it would be possible to designate 
them part-citizen nationals. But their status is clearly in-
ferior to the full-citizen status of whites. Nevertheless it 
is clear that the government envisages an enhanced political and 
socio-economic status for coloureds and Indians in the South 
African 'common area', and the governmenT's 1977 constitution 
was based implicitly on the notion of 'separate but equal' poli-





See above, 78 . 
E? statutory aliens are allowed access to industrial areas, to residence 
r~ghts there, and they may join trade unions. This gives rise to a 
type of 'economic citizenship' for blacks in the common area. 
Eg stat~tory aliens can. acquire South African passports and diplomatic 
protect~on (see the Quall Report 40 and art 1 (a) and (b) of the South 
African/Ciskei convention - House of Assembly Debates vol 9 col 4940-1 
(~8 September 1981). This is an unorthodox arrangement, althouoh not 
wlthout precedent in international law. See QIConnell op cit 691. 
In 1972 M. Wiechers ('Kleurlingburgerskap in Suid-Afrika' 1972 THR-HR 
1-18) predicted in the light of contemporary developments the evolution 
of a 'coloured citizenship'. The abolition of the CPRC confounded 
this prediction, but a similar prognosis could be made for 'Indian 
citizenship' in the wake of the SAlC elections in November 1qR1 _ 
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though this principle was not borne out by the institutional 
arrangements. Again there is an apparent affinity with the 
consociational model: each group of citizens would be repre-
sented in exclusive 'segmental' authorities,which would have 
personal jurisdiction over group members regardless of their 
geographic location. But again the comparison is destroyed 
by the quality-differential inherent in the nature of the three 
'citizenships', the absence of joint institutions representative 
of all citizens, and the imposed definition of group membership . 
Yet as long as the national/alien distinction endures for blacks 
and they are excluded from political rights on the basis of 
their foreign nationality, it is not inconceivable that the gov-
ernment will give greater institutional effect to the notion of 
'separate but equal' citizenships for coloureds and Indians, as 
they are incorporated consociationally into the central political 
system.' This could even culminate in a single South African 
( 
citizenship if whites, coloureds and Indians were granted equal 
electoral rights and equal access to office in joint political 
institutions, and formal equality in relation to the non-politi-
cal rights of ~itizenship.2 At this stage the significance of 
the nationality/citizenship distinction would fall awa~ as all 
South African nationals would have the status of full citizens. 
The preceding analysis shows that matters of nationality and 
citizenship are fundamental to an understanding of South Africa's 
constitutional politics and that it is possible to develop a 
corresponding theory of citizenship. This theory has important 
implications for the traditional constitutional doctrines ana-
lysed in the preceding section (in particular the concept of res-
ponsible government), and others not dealt with in this chapter, 
such as theories of representation and human rights. The analy-
sis shows the significance of the denationalisation process to 
the government's constitutional strategy - it provides the insti-
tutional basis for denying resident blacks political rights in 
,. ef the institutional alternatives referred to in chapter 7, above~ 
2. It may not be entirely coincidental that the first attempts to construct 
a coloured and Indian 'citizenship' began soon after the" denationalisa-
tion of blacks had commenced. By 'depluralising' the polity in this 
way the government was given greater scope for making innovations in the 
'non-black' political system. 
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the 'common area', which in turn provides the political leeway 
to incorporate coloureds and Indians more closely into the 
political process. Furthermore it has both a legitimising 
and an economically functional role, and ~ill not be readily 
departed from by the government. And although it sho~s some 
affinitv to consociational theorv at both the intra-national , ' 
and supra-national levels of government, it is nevertheless 
antipathetic to the fundamental principles of consociational 
democracy. 
6. Conclusion 
The analysis in this chapter has shown that the trends in South 
Africa's constitutional development necessitate an updating of 
constitutional theory in several important areas. Although 
consociationalism is used at times as an explanatory and legi-
timising model for this development, it does not in itself make 
any contributi6n to constitutional theory. In fact the govern-
ment's embracement of various forms of consociational politics 
has contributed to the widening gap between constitutional 
theory and political reality. Any form of constitutional 
change in South Africa, including the piecemeal introduction of 
the gov€tnment's 1977 constitution, has implications for the 
traditional doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. The prevail-
ing trends in modern systems of government, including South 
Africa's, necessitate the developing of new notions of govern-
mental responsibility and the judicial role. And developed 
theories of citizenship, both normative and South African-
specific, are indispensible to an understanding of the govern-
ment's constitutional proposals and their shortcomings. On all 
these matters the emphasis has been mainly on highlighting as-
'pects requiring the attention of constitutionalists and public 
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CHAPTER 10 
SOUTH AFRICA AND CONSOCI ATIONALISM -
CO NCLUDI NG RE!'-1ARKS 
1. Introduction 
In the general introduction to this work reference was made 
to the l ~ itimation crisis facing the state system in South 
Africa. As part of its response to this crisis the govern-
ment has embarked on a wide-ranging process of constitutional 
--change, which has emphasised its own perception of the need 
for some type of rational-legal legitimacy. This process has 
not, however, followed the historical patterns of liberal-
democratic constitutional development, which have involved the 
gradual introduction of the democratic franchise into the 
liberal state. 1 Instead the government has articulated the 
need to move away from that tradition of liberal constitution-
alism which has been most evident in South Africa, namely 
Westminster parliamentarianism, to a more appropriate sui 
generis constitutional system. The government's present con-
ception of this system is a combination of partition and the 
triple-parliament plan, with eventual overarching co-ordination 
in a constellation arrangement. The institutional basis for 
this system has been developed over the last ' few years, although 
it in fact has its roots much further back in South Africa's 
constitutional history . But because these constitutional de-
veloprnents have continued to deny excluded groups access to the 
political system they have made no material contribution to the 
resolution of the legitimacy crisis, and have probably aggra-
vated it. 2 
In rejecting the traditional forms of parliamentarianism and 
presidentialism as normative models because of their association 
with a universal franchise and majoritarianism, the government 
has m a des 0 ID e use 0 f con s 0 cia t ion a lis m a san e '\.; leg Lt i m at i n g ----ideology . Ho'we ver, the analysis in this work has shown that 
1. See C.B. Macpherson The Real World of Democracy (1966) 1-11 . 
2. See S.M. Lipset Political Man (1959) 80: tpolitical systems which deny new strata access to power except by revolution also i~hibit the growth of . legitimacy by introducing millenial hopes into the political arena.' 
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although the terlilinology and some of . the trappings of conso-
ciationalism are becoming increasingly apparent, neither the 
process nor the substance of contemporary constitutional deve-
lopments measures up to the essential principles of consocia-
tional democracy. The prevailing trend is for the white gov-
ernment to consult formally or informally with nominated or 
elected 'representatives' of the other statutorily-defined 
groups and, where necessary, to institutionalise these arrange-
ments through the sovereign white parliament; while these pro-
cesses have some of the 'elite cartel' dimensions of consocia-
' tionalism, they do not have a representative basis, nor do they 
involve any significant increase in political participation for 
political outsiders. At the most these developments have given 
rise to a form of 'sham consociationalism', 1 but in view of 
their extensive divergences from the principles of consociation-
al democracy it might be questioned whether concepts of conso-
ciationalism should be used to describe them at all. In this 
chapter attention is given to the alternative theory of '~o~trol', 
and it will be shown that control has a useful analytical func-
/ 
tion In describing the present system in South Africa. 
As far as future constitutional developments are concerned it 
has been suggested in this work that the government will continue 
to indulge in forms of consociational engineering, as it adapts 
with a series of gradualist reforms to the range of pressures 
whith will be exerted on the state system. Writing in 1979 
Lawrence Schlemmer 2 predicted that . in the 1980's, 
'The government's constitutional proposals of the late 
seventies will have flowered into a complex consocia-
tional arrangement involving separate legislative 
chambers for whi tes, coloureds, Indians (or coloureds 
and Indians together), certain urban Africans, linked 
together by a painfully cumbersome joint cabinet 
with white cabinet ministers enjoying at least a parity 
of numbers, as well as a veto or blocking right. This 
1. T. Ranf, R. Weiland and G. Vierdag South Africa: The Prospects of 
Peaceful Change (1981) 410, and see above, 337. 
2. South African Society in the 1980's: An Exercise in Hazardous but Con-
cerned Speculation (CASS, University of Natal, 1979) 18. 
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executive ~ill in turn be linked via another federal 
structure to certain non-independent and enlarged 
homelands ... A "supreme council" or body of a simi-
lar description with a white executive president and 
one or two African executive vice presidents will be 
the highest tier of government, projecting great pres-
tige to the outside world but controlled pretty effect-
ivel y by the white power segment in the lower-level 
executive council.' 
Developments along these lines would involve a further continua-
tion of previous constitutional trends and none of the constitu-
tional changes of the early 1980's detract from the probable 
accuracy of Schlemmer's prediction. Other writers have also 
suggested that new forms of sham consociationalism will emerge 
in the future and that there is unlikely to be an evolutionary 
transition to genuine consociationalism. Nevertheless it is 
relevant to look briefly at consociationalism from a different 
perspective, namely as a 'political crisis' model.
2 
/ 
Finally in the light of this work's constitutional-juridical 
approach to the subject-matter, some concluding remarks are made 
in this chapter on constitutionalism and consociationalism. 3 
2. Consociationalism Versus Control 
The legitimacy crisis affecting the state system in South Africa 
has resulted in the use of a high degree of coercion by the gov-
ernment to maintain the stability of the system, but it is clear 
that the stability cannot be explained solely In terms of co-
ercion. The forms of sham consocLationalism which have been 
adopted have been used not ~nly to~eR.itimise t 
but also to stabil ise it through the co-optation various st-rata 
of elites. A sense of perspective can be given to this arrange-
ment by referring to Lustik's theory of 'control'~ which he pre-
sents as an alternative explanation for the persistence over time 
1. Ranf, Weiland and Vierdag op cit 419. 
2. Below, 520-524. 
3. Below, 524-527. 
4. I. Lustik 'Stabilitv in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism 
versus Control' 1979 World Politics 325-344. 
513. 
of deeply-segmented socio-political systems. Contrel incor-
porates elements of both consociationalism and coercion. It 
s h are s 'hi i t h con s 0 cia t ion a 1 ism the 1 u r a 1 i s t not ion 0 f de e_p and 
continuing divisions in a society and intense rivalry between 
/ the different segments for social, economic and political re-
sources. But whereas the consociational approach emphasises 
the factors of compromise and consensus among leadership elites, 
which lead to a coalescent political process, the control ap-
proach focuses on the superior power of one segment, which is 
used to constrain the political activities and opportunities of 
other rival segments; the dominant segment can enforce stabili-
ty by sustaining this manipulation over time. And the control 
approach emphasises the role of coercive techniques in maintain-
ing a stable pattern of intergroup relations, but also accommo-
dates non-coercive techniques. 
Lustik is not the first to use concepts of control or domination 
to explain why plural societies continue to function,' and the 
mechanisms of 5ontrol he refers to show some convergence with 
class theory. Lustik, however, attempts to make a contribution 
to a developed theory of control, and to compare and contrast 
this with consociational theory. This has a useful analytical 
purpose as far as South Africa is concerned, in tha tit high-
lights t~e combination of control and consociational techniques 
which are used by whites to retain their political domination 
over other groups. This can be illustrated by referring to the 
seven conceptual distinctions which Lustik draws between conso-
ciationalism and control. 2 The distinctions relate to the 
following matters: 
1. ef M.G. Smith's concept of 'differential incorporation' (at 71, above); A. Rabushka and K. Shepsle (Politics in Plural Societies (1972) 90) refer to the 'dominant majority configuration'; P. van den Berghe ('Pluralism and the Polity; A Theoretical Exploration' referred to at 72, above) emphasises the economic techniques of control. See also the central ~heme of H. Adam's work Modernizing Racial Domination (1971) 15-16. 
2. Lustik op cit 330-332. 
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Ci) The criterion that effectively governs the authoritative 
allocation of resources 
In the consociational system this is 'the common denominator of 
the interests of the segments as perceived and articulated by 
their respective eli tes', 'hrhile in the control system it is 'the 
interest of the dominant segment as perceived and articulated by 
its elite'. On this aspect South Africa unquestionably follows 
the control approach, as evidenced by the superior resources 
allocated to the dominant white group: residential, educational, 
health, recreational, welfare and trading facilities.' While 
there has been an official commitment to the equalisation of 
facilities in some areas, such as education, there has to date 
been no material progress in this direction. 
Cii) The linkages between the segments 
In the consociational system this takes the form of political or 
material exchanges, that is 'negotiations, bargains, trades and 
compromises', whereas in the control system the linkage is pene-
trative in cha~acter and the dominant group extracts the proper-
ty, political support and labour it requires from the other 
groups, and delivers what it sees fit. Again South Africa con-
forms more closely to the control system: this is particularly 
evident at the political level, where instead of genuine nego-
tiation there tends to be sporadic consultation with subordinate 
groups to give credibility to decisions taken in advance by the 
dominant group, but it is also evident in other areas - for 
example, the functional role of the homelands in relation to 
labour resources and the white-dominated economic system. How-
ever, there may be some tentative steps towards negotiational 
linkages in . institutions such as the president's council, and ln 
the industrial field. 
(iii) The significance of bargaining 
In the consociational system bargaining is 'a fact of political 
life' and a sign that the system is operating successfully, where-
as in the control system genuine bargaining would signal 'the 
breakdown of control as the means by which the political stabili-
ty of the system is being maintained' . The relevance of this 
1. SEe generally S. van der Horst and J. Reid (eds) Race Discrimination 
in South Africa - A Review (1981). 
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distinction In South Africa is highlighted by the follo~ing 
observation of de Kadt:' 
, ... the government is not prepared to allow OPPOSI-
tional groups - especially those concerned with 
attempts to articulate and mobilize black interests -
to grow. This means that whatever form of concess-
ionary politics they are likely to engage in will tend 
to be of a manipulative and co-optive sort rather than 
a kind that is premised on negotiation. The point 
about a ttpolitics of negotiation tt is that it requires 
the growth of organisations and movements whos~ in-
terests are iri conflict with those of the dominant 
group and with whith the dominant group can bargain 
over the contents of the latter's rights claims. In 
other words, the ttpolitics of negotiation tt implies a 
ttpolitics of autonomytt in terms of which interest and 
pressure groups can emerge free from government tute-
lage. There seems to be little evidence that the 
governme9t is making much provision for the emergence 
of such groups. If anything, it seems as though the 
strategy for which they are opting is one that involves 
a substantial amount of control over all political ac-
2 tivity - whether on the labour or on any other front. 
This process of granting concessions on its own terms 
rather than establishing the basis for negotiating 
change seems also to be inherent in the present consti-
tutional reconstruction.' 
In South Africa the emergence of open-ended bargaining would SIg-
nify the end of what has been referred to in this work as the 
period of 'government-controlled constitutional change', and in 
whatever form it might occur would have a similar significance 
to that of the Lancaster House conference in Zimbabwe's consti-
.tutional development. As has already been indicated such an 
eventuality appears far distant on South Africa's political hori-
zon. 
1. Raphael de Kadt Democracy and Development - The South African Challenge (unpublished paper, University of Natal, 1981) 6-7. 
2. De Kadt seems to understate the case here, in that many political organ-isations have actually been proscribed or subdued by the government. See above, 9'. 
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( iv ) The role of the official reglme (that is the public ser-
vice, courts, educational system, police, armed forces ) . 
In the consociational system it must 'translate the compromises 
reached between sub-unit elites ... into appropriate legislation 
and effective administrative procedure (sic) and enforce these 
rules Kithout discriminating', whereas in the control system the 
official regime is the 'legal and administrative instrument of 
the dominant group'. Here the convergence with class theory is 
apparent, as it is a fundamental principle of the marxist pers-
pective that the state apparatus is an instrument of the capital-
ist class in its domination of the economically subordinate 
classes.' But even within the pluralist perspective it has 
been suggested that the predominantly white bureaucracy in South 
Africa is an administrative instrument of the white Afrikaner 
group,2 and although constitutionalists have historically not 
questioned the independence and freedom from bias of the judi-
ciary,3 it is increasingly being accused of executive-mindedness. 4 
It is also noticeable that within the confines of white party 
politics there/ ~as a recent suggestion of partisanship by the 
defence force. S Thus although South African constitutional 
theory is based on the notion of an impartial bureaucracy and an 
independent and unbiased judiciary it can be said that, at least 
as far as their composition and orientation are concerned, they 
reflect the interests of the dominant white group. Therefore, 
as far as the official regime is concerned South Africa tends to 
follow the control rather than the consociational system. 
1. See eg R. Milliband The State in Capitalist Society (1969) 107-130; A. Szymanski The Capitalist State and the Politics of Class (1978) 20ff. 
2. See H. Adam and H. Giliomee The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner Power (1979) 61-82; see also S. Greenberg Race and State in Capitalist Development (1980) 401-403. 
3. See for example the traditional views in H.R. Hahlo and E. Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background (1973) 38-48. 
4. See J. Dugard's section on the judicial process in Human Rights and the South African Leg21 Order (1978) 279-390. However South African con-stitutionalists have yet to produce a critical study like that of J.A.G. Griffith - The Politics of the judiciary (1977). 
5. On 12 February 1980 the Defence Force issued a document entitled 'Psychological Action Plan: Reference Budget Debate' which was allegedly aimed at nullifying the parliamentary opposition's criticism of the defence vote. The chief of the Defence Force appointed a board of en-quiry under a former chief, H. Biermann, to investigate the matter, but the board's report was not made public. See House of Assembly Debates vol 8 col 3325 (24 March 1980). 
51 7 . 
Cv) The type of normative justification for the continuation 
of the political order espoused by the regime's officials. 
In the consociational society the system is likely to be legit~i­
sed in terms of the common welfare of all groups and '~arnings 
of the chaotic consequences ... of consociational breakdown', 
whereas the control system is likely to be justified in terms of 
the interests of the dominant group. This distinction, however, 
requires further refinement, in that the regime's officials in a 
control system may have a certain public justification for the 
continua;ion of the system, but have a different private or 
inarticulated justification. Historically the South African 
system was justified purely in terms of ~hite interests, whereas 
the subsequent justifications tended to be less white-group 
specific - for example 'western civilization' or 'Christian prin-
ciples' or 'national security,.1 The present system and poli-
cies, moreover, are sometimes justified along consociational 
lines, in terms of the common welfare of all groups, the need to 
protect group identities, and the adverse consequences for all 
of a breakdown / in the existing socio-economic arrangement. But 
here the public legitimisation runs far ahead of actual consti-
tutional and political changes, and it can be assumed that the 
regime's private justification for the system accords more close-
ly with the control model. 
(vi) The character of the central strategic problem that faces 
leadership elites. 
In the consociational system all e1ites must effect compromises 
~ithout jeopardising the integrity of the whole system,and they 
must maintain suffitient segmental cohesion and discipline to be 
able to enforce such decisions. But in the control system the 
different sets of elites have different strategic problems: 
elites of the dominant group must 'devise cost-effective tech-
niques for manipulating subordinate groups', while those of the 
subordinate groups must 'cope as satisfactorily as possible with 
the consequences of subordination' and 'evaluate opportunities 
for bargaining or resistance'. In South Africa the roles of the 
1. ef Adam's views on the 'ideology of survival' in H. Adam and H. Giliomee The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner Power (1979) 128ff. During 1980 and 1981 the 'total onslaught' rhetoric became increasingly prevalent. 
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respective ~lites have generally conformed to the asymmetrical 
pattern of the control system, and for those subordinate elites 
that do exist, one of the central strategic problems has been 
f £· . 1 Th whether or not to participate in 0 Llclal structures. e 
recent incorporation of subordinate ~lites into institutions 
such as the president's council and South African Indian Council 
has involved some movement towards the symmetrical problem pat-
tern of the consociational system. However, a major difference 
here is that many non-white elites are either nominated by the 
dominant group, or elected with very little popular support; 
furthermore there can be no real problem of 'internal group dis-
cipline' without a system of constituency politics. There is 
even evidence that the nominated white ~lites on the president's 
council were unable to gain acceptance among the white group for 
a compromise decision reached in that institution. 2 
(vii) Finally, the visual metaphor appropriate for consociation-
alism is 'a delicately but surely balanced scale', while that 
for a control system is 'a puppeteer manipulating his stringed 
puppet'. In terms of existing constitutional realities the con-
trol metaphor is clearly more appropriate for South Africa, and 
the prospect of even a mixed metaphor does not seem high during 
a period of government-controlled constitutional change. 
Lustik's -seven categories are not necessarily exhaustive of the 
conceptual differ~nces between consociational and control systems, 
but they highlight the fact that in South Africa there is an 
overwhelming preponderance of control over consociational fea-
tures, although consociationalism is used explicitly and impli-
citly to justify current constitutional developments. The con-
trol is exercised through a variety of social, economic and poli-
tical mechanisms, and in the preceding chapters some of the main 
constitutional factors facilitating control have been identified: 
the homelands structures and the nationality}citizenship arrange-
ments which divide the black constituency and 'depluralise' the 
1. See above, 339-340. 
2. In October 1981 the president's council recommended that the group areas of Pageview and District Six be returned to Indians and coloureds res-pectively; the government, apparently under pressure from conservative factions, accepted the recommendation in relation to only a small portion of District Six. See above, 345. 
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South African polity; the incipient constellation of states, 
which in its developed form will rationalise and extend white 
control over the economy of the sub-continent, and over other 
matters of 'joint interest' to the national states and the re-
public; the president's council, which enables the government 
to control constitutional developments and serves as a legiti-
mising agent for the government's socio-political and economic 
reforms; the government's proposed new constitution, which will 
consolidate the non-black constituency while retaining effective 
control for whites; and the community councils,which are in-
tended to stabilise the position of urban blacks. In addition, 
within the confines of white party politics various constitution-
al amendments have added to the government's resources for con-
trolling existing or potential opposition parties. These pat-
terns of control, with their negative implications for personal 
freedom and civil liberties, are likely to endure during a 
period of government-controlled constitutional change, or even 
be extended, as was the case in some respects with the 1979 
Draft Constitution Bill.' There may even be an attempt to use 
/ 
quasi-consociationalism to disguise the fact that non-white 
elites are being made to share control in order to stabilise and 
legitimise the system.
2 
This will tend to weaken the prospects 
of consociationalism over time,because the control system mili-
tates against the emergence of opposition parties and authentic 
leaders. 
However, as Lustik points out,3 
'One society can contain both kinds of relationships 
between different sets of groups. For example, two 
groups which relate to one another in the consociation-
al mode, might, in their joint relationship to a third 
group, adopt and enforce a relationship of the control 
type. ' 
Lustik cites Israel as an empirical example of such an arrange-
1. ef Kuper's much earlier views that the system of control is not self-
sustaining but relies increasingly on force and repression. L. Kuper 
'Political Change in "'Thite Settler Societies: The Possibility of Peace-
ful Democratization' in L. Kuper and M.G. Smith (eds) Pluralism in 
Africa (1971) 182. 
2. Cf Ranf, Weiland and Vierdag op cit 419. 
3. Op cit 335-336; and see A.J. Venter n Kritiese Ontledino van die 
Konsosiasiemodel van Arend Lijphart, unpublished M.A. th;sis, Unisa 
(1980) 168. 
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ment,1 but the same situation Kould prevail in South Africa 
if the relationships between whites, coloureds and Indians 
came to reflect the consociational pattern more faithfully, 
but the composite non-black group maintained a control rela-
tionship over blacks; and even the latter relationship could 
be further divided, so as to distinguish between the quasi-
consociational relationships which are tending to develop be-
tween the government and the self-governing and independent 
national states, and the more overtly control relationship 
it has with the citizens and nationals of those states resident 
within the republic. And in all these cases various degrees 
of coercion would be blended with consociationalism and control, 
to maintain overall political stability. 
Finally, in view of the limited relevance of consociationalism 
in the South African contex~ it is appropr~ate to note that 
Lustik suggests that control may even serve as a normative 
model: 2 
'In deeply- divided societies where consociational tech~ / 
niques have not been, or cannot be, successfully em-
ployed, control may represent a model for the organi-
zation of intergroup relations that is substantially 
preferable to other conceivable solutions: civil war, 
extermination, or deportation. 1 
However, no such prescription is made for South Africa, inter 
alia, because the present forms of control are largely responsible 
for the legitimation and other crises facing the state system. 
3. Consociationalism as a 'Political Crisis' Model 
Con~titutional outcomes are intimately related to the timing of 
-socio-political developments. At present the white government 
has a virtual monopoly of bargaining strength, and it has the 
political power and legal competence to introduce unilaterally 
a wide range of constitutional reforms, but the actual rate and 
1. Op cit 336. \fnile consociational techniques are used to stabilise intra-Jewish political relations, Jewish-Arab relations are conducted on a control basis. For references to Israel as a semi-consociational system see above, 116. 
2. Ibid. 
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scope of constitutional change ~ill be determined by the real 
and perceived internal and external pressures operating on the 
system. In the past blacks have had insufficient bargaining 
strength to induce ~hites to share political power and have 
exerted relatively little pressure on constitutional changes; 
their main strength has lain in their ability to confer legiti-
macy on, or deny it to, institutional innovations introduced 
by the government. This position will change over time, but 
it is nevertheless possible that in the short-term the govern-
ment will be more sensitive to internal pressures exerted by 
anti-reform groups, than to the combined internal and external 
pressures for reform: thus pressure from the reputedly strong 
anti-reform factions within the National party and Afrikanerdom, 
the predominantly conservative white electorate, the powerful 
and conservative bureaucracy, the influential militarist-minded 
members of government, and even the growing number of non-white 
~lites working within existing structures, might impose severe 
restraints on the government's reformist policies. This would 
force the government to rely increasingly on coercive and con-
/ 
trol measures, at the expense of consociational measures, to 
maintain the system. A no-change situation would lead in turn 
to an intensification of external diplomatic and economic pres-
sures on the system, and an increase in internal pressures 
caused by political instability, industrial action, and the 
security situation. But at that stage it would be more diffi-
cult than at present for the government to introduce a consocia-
tional-type arrangement,because this would be seen by subordinate 
groups as a reactionary rear-guard measure designed to maintain 
white political control. 1 The rejection of belated changes would 
require an intensification of control, and particularly coercive, 
measures to stabilise the political system; this could lead to 
an intractable Northern Ireland-type situation which could only 
.be terminated by abdication or violent revolution, in which case 
there would be little institutional continuity from the past and 
the new constitutional order would probably show little evidence 
of liberal-constitutionalism or consociationalism. In short the 
prospects of consociationalism are closely related to the timing 
of constitutional change. 
1 . ef Ranf, \.Jei land and Vierdag op ci t 419. 
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What requires consideration in the light of these factors is 
the relevance of consociationalism as a !political crisis 
model,.l This eventuality pre-supposes a massive destabilisa-
tion of the socio-political system through a combination of 
social and political disturbances, industrial unrest, sabotage 
and insurgency, to the point where the state is hardly able to 
keep the system functioning through coercive, control and quasi-
consociational measures. Where the government perceived the 
costs of continuing in this situation to be greater than the 
probable costs of open-ended negotiation with its adversaries 
to terminate it, the stage of the 'political crisis model' would 
be reached. This \-Jould be the notional !no-\\in' situation, in 
which the perceived bargaining strengths of the respective par-
ties would be equal, and the period of government-controlled 
change would come to an end. 
The Zimbabwean experience 2 suggests the possibility of two dis-
tinct phases in this process. At the first phase the govern-
ment might incorporate internal non-white leaders directly into 
the cabinet 3 t~ form a grand coalition with effective control 
over the political system; this would have strong consociation-
al features but would probably lack the accorrunodation of legiti-
macy needed to resolve the crisis situation. This could lead 
to a second, and more protracted phase, during which the authen-
tic leaders of the most significant internal and external groups 
would negotiate on a future constitutional dispensation. 
Whether this took place at a single 'national convention' or a 
series of connected conferences, it would involve a difficult and 
drawn-out bargaining process by leadership ~lites behind closed 
doors. Genuine negotiation would presuppose a coalescent style 
of decision-making involving a series of reciprocal concessions, 
compromises, package deals, and 'log-rolling!,4 facilitated by 
the perceived equality in bargaining strength of the participants. 
This would require the commitment of participating ~lites to 
1. Cf L. Schlemmer in L.J. Boulle and L.G. Baxter (eds) Supplement to 
Natal and K,vaZulu: Constitutional and Political Options (1981) 59. 
2. See above, 234-249. 
3. See above, 336. 
4. Cf A. Lijphart Democracy in Plural Societies (1977) 40-41; E. Nord-
linger Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (1972) 27-29. 
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reaching an acconnnodation ""hich would .be impossible at the mass 
level, and they would face the common strategic problem of ac-
quiring acceptance of these compromises from their respective 
followers after, and not before, they had been agreed on. In 
all important respects this process would show an affinity with 
consociationalism - an example of the 'self-denying hypothesis' 
resulting from the mutual perceptions of the costs of a con-
tinued siege-situation. 
The important feature of this process would be the 'joint coali-
tion' formed by leadership elites to break the crisis deadlock. 
This would be likely to endure for some time without extensive 
popular political participation or a developed political infra-
structure, and without any general acceptance of consociational-
ism as a normative model. But inevitably the coalition would 
be compelled to institute more permanent decision-making bodies, 
and these would again be likely to embody the constitutional 
structures and processes associated with consociationalism. 
This must be seen in the light of the fact that the main consti-
/ 
tutional issue is likely to be seen as the acconnnodation of both 
black and white non-negotiables: a significant share in the 
political process at all levels of government, and an alternative 
to a unitary system operating on a winner-takes-all basis, res-
pectively. The grand coalition, proportionality, mutual veto, 
and possibly segmental autonomy principles,are likely to be 
applied through corresponding constitutional features: joint 
executives, proportional electoral systems, constitutinal en-
trenchment, a devolution of authority, and a justiciable bill of 
rights. These features would probably be combined with some 
institutional features of the past, although one of the many im-
ponderable factors would be the future constitutional status of 
the national states. 
Thus consociationalism could have particular relevance as a 
'political crisis' model, both in respect of the initial initia-
tives to resolve the crisis, and the nature of the resultant 
1. This is to assume a measure of cohesiveness in both the black and 
white constituencies, \\'Thich probably v.1ill not exist. But in the 
light of past discriminatory practices, constitutional issues are 
1 ike ly to be seen in b lackJv.7hi te terms. In Zimbabwe \.;rhi tes were 
seen.as a cohesive group requiring protection through guaranteed 
. parllarnentary representation, etc. 
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constitutional system. It could be. more authentically imple-
mented at that stage than during the present phase of govern-
ment-controlled constitutional change with the government 
making concessionary constitutional changes on a piecemeal 
basis, although to endure it would require eventual acceptance 
as a normative model. While the prospects for consociational-
ism will deteriorate over time, a point of destabilisation could 
be reached where it provides the only option short of abdication 
or revolution. Nevertheless this remains a remote possibility 
in the light of the government's existing dominance over the 
political, economic and strategic resources of the country. 
4. Consociationalism and Constitutionalism 
The constitutional-juridical perspective from which the subject-
matter of this work has been approached necessarily provides 
only a limited view of a complex overall picture. The emphasis 
has tended to pe on legal and institutional matters and not on 
the dynamic economic and political forces behind constitution-
making. 1 Even consociationalism, which is a concept of politi-
cal sociology and not constitutional law and which does not pro-
vide an analytical constitutional model, has tended to be re-
duced to .constitutional terms to conform with this disciplinary 
approach. But, notwithstanding these limitations, this one-
dimensional approach may be justified on several grounds: the 
government has so defined the political agenda that the focal 
socio-political issue in South Africa has become the constitu-
tional accorrrrnodation 'of whites, coloureds, Indians and blacks; 2 
the legitimation crisis which the state system faces exists pre-
dominantly at the highly symbolic constitutional level; and if 
any form of democracy is to emerge in South Africa without ex-
.tensive violence it is likely to be a form of constitutional 
1. ef I. Duchacek Rights and Liberties in the World Today (1973) 8-9. 
2. ef E. Schattscheider's well kno~~ statement, !All forms of political or-ganisation have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others, because organisation is the mobilisation of bias. Some issues are organised into politics while others are organised out' (The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America (1960) 71). See S. Lukes POHer: A Radical Viev,1 (1974) 16ff. 
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democracy.' Thus the constitutional system, no matter hOK 
unrealistic In the sense of 'nondescriptive of who actually 
2 governs', has a definite contemporary value. 
While constitutions are both enabling and restraining, the real 
emphasis of constitutional democracy is on the restraint of 
power through its legal limitation, dispersal, devolution and 
diffusion, and on making the government responsible to the gov-
erned. Consociationalism, with its heavy emphasis on the re-
straint of power, is easily compatible with the broad principles 
of constitutionalism - indeed consociationalism 'presupposes a 
deep sense of constitutionalism,.3 But consociationalism is 
restricted in its concern to public power, and the rules of the 
political game; it is compatible with a range of social and 
economic systems,and if a favourable constitutional framework 
for constitutionalism were introduced in South Africa this would 
not necessarily involve any restructuring of the socio-economic 
system. 
/ 
UnfortunatelY,even with their limited scope many of the princi-
ples of constitutionalism have been undermined by the modern 
phenomena of the administrative and corporatist state. Our 
constitutional theory was conceived for a very simple form of 
the plur~l society4 which no longer exists today, and the prob-
lem is compounded in South Africa by the emergence of a manager-
ial style of government which bypasses many forms of responsi-
bility, and by the situational nature of many constitutional 
rules. 5 In some respects consociationalism also compounds the 
problem - it tends to blur lines of responsibility and account-
ability, and diminish the extent of popular participation in 
government. And in the South African context as long as the 
state uses consociationalism as a legitimating ideology while in 
,. R. de Kadt Democracy and Development - The South African Challenge (un-
published paper, University of Natal, 1981) 2-6; he also suggests that 
the present economic circumstances favour the establishmen~ of a con-
stitutional democracy, although there is clearly no sign of the political 
liberalisation necessary for its attainment. 
2. C.J. Friedrich Constitutional Government and Democracy (4 ed, 1968) 583. 
3. M. Wiechers 'Possible Structural Divisions of Power in South Africa' in 
J.A. Benyon (ed) Constitutional Change in South Africa (1978) 112. 
4. L.G. Baxter 'Constitutionalism, Bureaucracy and Corporatism' in Boulle 
and Baxter op cit 75 at 81f. 
5. See the author's review of Staatsreg (3 ed, 1981, by M. Wiechers) to be 
published in 1982 THR-HR. 
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reality maintaining the existing system through coercive and 
control measures, constitutional theory will be threatened by 
an ever-increasing irrelevance. This requires of public law-
yers a thorough reassessment of traditional notions of consti-
tutionalism, with the assistance, ~here necessary, of the func-
tional methods of the social sciences, and an energetic adap-
tation of constitutional theory. 
But the challenge extends beyond a mere updating of constitution-
al theory. South African constitutionalists ~ill have to begin 
anal ysing more closely the nature of the relationship between 
law and society, and whether law can be a vehicle of change or 
whether material changes must precede legislative changes.' 
This of course is to enter a much wider intellectual enquiry, but 
one which will have to be entered if constitutionalists ~ish to 
make a valuable contribution to the current constitutional de-
bate and to keep that debate In touch with South Africa's econo-
mic, political and social realities. Barrington Moore has said
2 
that historically democracy has developed as, 
/ 
'a long and certainly incomplete struggle to do three 
closely related things: (1) to check arbitrary rulers, 
(2) to replace arbitrary rulers with just and rational 
ones, and (3) to obtain a share for the underlying pop-
ulations in the making of rules. The beheading of 
kings has been the most dramatic and by no means the 
least important aspect of the first feature. Efforts 
to establish the rule of law, the power of the legisla-
ture, and later to use the state as an engine for social 
welfare are familiar and famous aspects of the other two.' 
While constitutions are considered 'too serious a business to be 
left to constitutional lawyers alone'~ the developments described 
by Barrington Moore require purposive constitution making in 
,. Vrnile constitutionalists in this country have not ignored these matters altogether (eg W.H.B. Dean 'Discussion' in Benyon op cit 86f) they have not given it sufficient attention; if anything they tend to show un-conscious deference to :r,n<v.rumah' s well-knO\\'Tl adage, 'seek ye first the political ki~gdom, and all things else shall be added unto you t (see B.O. Nwabueze Constitutionalism in the Emergent States (1973) 161), al-though not without some justification in the light of South Africa's political history. Of the many recent books 0; this matter see T. Mathieson Law, Society and Political Action (1980). 
2. Barrington Moore Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966) 414. 
3. Duchacek op cit 9. 
\I; h i ch ani m po r tan t r 0 1 emu s t be pIa ye cl by con s tit uti 0 n all a v.~y er s . 
This role must be seen against the need for any movement towards 
democracy in South Africa to involve changes in behaviour, att~-
tudes and structures. 1 As Du Toit has pointed out,2 it is 
easier to change values and attitudes than structures, but struc-
tures can in turn embody values and constitute the means in terms 
of ~hich values can be mobilised. 
Constitutionalists have in the past tended to be over sanguine 
about the role of constitutional rules and conventions, and their 
relevance for society. The high-point in constitutional opti-
mism can be found in a provision of the Mexican constitution 
which reads,3 
'This constitution shall not lose its force and effect, 
even if the observance is interrupted by rebellion. 
In the event that a government whose principles are 
contrary to those that are sanctioned herein should 
become established through any public disturbance, as 
soon as the people recover their liberty its observance / 
shall be re-established ... ' 
A very different view was expressed by WaIter Bagehot in typic-
ally extravagant style, namely 'the men of Massachusetts could 
Kork any constitution,.4 Yet in its epigrammatic way this 
statement is much closer to reality than the Mexican provision, 
and gives a useful perspective to the relevance of constitution-
alism, although it is in need of updating to avoid the chauvin-
istic exclusiveness of the day. The point -is that if the present 
conflicting forces in South African society, whether operating on 
the self-denying hypothesis or not, sought accommodation at the 
constitutional level, it would be possible to provide an appro-
priate constitutional framework to embody and give effect to 
their agreement, and within certain limitations to entrench the 
new 'social contract'. And the principles of constitutionalism 






De Kadt op cit 16. 
A du Toit 'Discussion' ~n Benyon op cit 286-289. 
Art 136 of the Constitution of Mexico, 1917, as amended. 
i~. Bagehot The English Constitution (World's Classics ed,1974) 202. 
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5. Conclusion 
This work has examined aspects of the constitutional politics 
of South Africa from a consociational perspective. In common 
with other recent \~orks on this topic no attempt has been made 
to formulate a constitutional blueprint for the country, nor 
has specific attention been given to the problems of 'constitu-
tional transition'. For the reasons already advanced in the 
text, consociationalism has not been applied prescriptively and 
any speculations on the constitutional future have been of a 
modest nature. Instead it has been sought to provide an analy-
sis of past and contemporary constitutional developments, to 
identify the main themes in these developments, and to project 
these themes into the short term future. It has been possible 
to show that while consociationalism is used as a legitimising 
ideology for some constitutional changes, both the process and 
the substance of these changes fall well short of the essential 
principles of consociationalism. These principles do have some 
relevance in t~e South African context, but whether they will 
come to be embodied in future constitutional arrangements de-
pends on a variety of unpredictable extra-constitutional factors. 
And whether consociationalism would contribute to the resolution 
of the acute socio-economic and political problems facing South 
Africa r~quires more extensive and intensive investigation. 
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1 • 
The South African State system has been faced with an acute 
legitimation crisis during recent years, and as part of its 
response to this crisis the government has embarked on an 
extensive programme of constitutional adaptation; in this 
process some use is made of consociationalism as a legitimising 
ideology, although past and present constitutional developments 
involve only a very limited use of consociational institutions 
and practices. 
2. 
The two main traditions of liberal-constitutionalism, Westminister 
parliamentarianism and American presidentialism, are both based 
on the fundamental principle of majority rule, although majori-
tarianism is mitigated in practice by a range of political and 
constitutional factors. The liberal tradition in South Africa 
has generally adopted these two systems as normative models. 
3 . 
According to traditional notions of pluralism a system of 
majority rule is unsuited for divided plural societies,as it 
will result in the creation of permanent majorities and minorities, 
with disadvantageous consequences for the latter and the de-
stabilisation of the polity. According to this view the liberal-
constitutional models are not suitable for South Africa ' s version 
of the plural society. 
4 . 
Consociationalism challenges the notions that democracy must 
be equated with majority rule, and that democratic stability 
is impossible in divided plural societies; it replaces the 
majoritarian and adversarial aspects of liberal-constitutionalism 
with a system power-sharing on matters of common interest, and 
autonomy on matters of exclusive interest to each of the politically -
organised segments in society. The consociational model clearly 
has relevance for South Africa, but it is not applied prescriptively 
because many of the crucial conditions for its success are not 
found here; it is used instead as a basis of analysis for South 
Africa's political constitution. 
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5 . 
South Africa has never embraced either of the two traditional forms 
of liberal-constitutionalism but its constitutional history shows 
the strong influence of the l\estminister model, although parti-
cularly in recent years there has been an apparent movement away 
from that model; however, neither the Westminister nor the non-
Kestminister features of the constitution show much affinity with 
the principles of consociationalisID, and 'majoritarianism' has a 
strong normative influence in the constitutional system. 
6 . 
In the wider southern African context several alternatives to 
majoritarianism and liberal-constitutionalism can be identified 
in the various empirical constitutional experiences, party 
political policies, and commission reports, and in some instances 
there is a close affinity with the principles of consociational 
democracy. 
7 . 
The government's/1977 constitution for whites, coloureds and 
Indians involves a basic continuation and rationalisation of 
previous constitutional developments, but it incorporates some 
of the structures of consociationalism and would give rise to a 
system of sham consociationalism; South Africa's relationships with 
the national states also display some consociational features, and 
the overall system can be described as a form of quasi-consociational 
authoritarianism. 
8 . 
The indications are that the government will pursue further 
strategies of quasi-consociational engineering in the future, 
including the implementation of its 1977 constitutional proposals, 
in an attempt to resolve the contemporary legitimation crisis; 
h6wever, this is again likely to involve the continuation of 
. previous constitutional developments and to occur under the overall 
control of the existing government. A transition to genuine 
consociationalism is unlikely to occur in this way. 
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9 . 
Although consociationalism can be applied in a ~ide variety of 
constitutional frameworks its application in South Africa would 
require a radical change in the present directions of constitu-
tional development; it would alsQ require a wide range of 
political, social and economic reforms before it would have a 
chance of being accepted in South Africa, as well as some 
fundamental attitudinal changes from leadership elites. 
1 0 • 
Apart from the challenges to constitutional theory posed by 
contemporary socio-econ~ic and political realities, both 
consociationalism, and South Africa's attenuated version 
thereof, have implications for traditional constitutional 
law concepts, including the legislative supremacy of parliament, 
the roll of the judiciary, theories of governmental responsibility 
and the question of citizenship; in all these areas there is a 
need to re-examine and update conventional notions of constitu-
tionalism. 
/ 
1 1 . 
It is possible to describe South Africa's contemporary consti-
tutional politics in terms of two theoretical systems, consocia-
tionalism and control; at present there is an overwhelming 
preponderarice of control features and this has adverse consequences 
for the future emergence of a fully consociational system, but 
consociationalism could take on a new relevance as a political 
crisis model. 
1 2 • 
The suitability of consociationalism for the resolution of the 
serious socio-economic and political problems in South Africa 
requires more extensive and intensive investigation. 
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